Combat Participation

[William F. Owen]

OK, I know this is a touchy subject, but Ken White's post here, does merit further examination in my opinion.

There have been numerous, quite well researched opinions, data and papers, that not everyone fights, when required to do so.

What we seem to know is

• Most men will fight, given good leadership, thus good leaders and NCOs make a huge difference.
• In the absence of such leadership, they will simply revert to doing the minimum required by appearances.
• 3-5% will run or simply play no useful part.

I do not want anyone to start airing dirty laundry, but I think this issue might be usefully discussed.

[Fuchs]

The general morale alters these figures - an especially poor morale could boost the last figure, for example.

The stress level and expectations should also be able to change the structure much.

Finally, it's been written in some sources that the 'cowards' or 'fragile' soldier are usually known in advance. A good roganization should therefore be able to almost eliminate the last fraction median problematic fights.


I recall much German writing on the subject, and it doesn't focus on percentages or such but on what the leaders should do.
The forming of small teams ("Kampfgemeinschaften" - combat collectives) as small as fire team or squad with very strong cohesion is one of the advised courses of action. This goes so far that WIA infantry in WW2 preferred to cure in their company instead of in a hospital, knowing that they would be cared for betterby their comrades.
This is strongly related to "Kameradschaftlichkeit" (conmradeship?).

The other advise is about the vertical relations; leader-troops.
The leaders should immerse into this Kameradschaftlichkeit to be accepted and respected (eating same food, no luxury, lead by example...) while still retaining the ability to be tough (~ sacrific men).

As I said; there's much about how to address the problem in German literature, but very little statistics (if any) about it itself.

[John]

A couple of good books, within the past few years or so, on this subject are "On Killing" and "On Combat" by Dave Grossman. Grossman founded Killology to research these very issues.

[William F. Owen]

A couple of good books, within the past few years or so, on this subject are "On Killing" and "On Combat" by Dave Grossman. Grossman founded Killology to research these very issues.

I know Grossman's work. Personally I think it's just plain wrong.
He has confused two entirely separate issues, that being a desire to kill with an ability to fight, just as SLA Marshall made the same mistake. Fear of harm is not fear of killing. Most of his evidence fails to make that distinction.

Once you subject a lot of his assertions to rigour they just fall apart. His assertion about man shaped targets and computer games is ridiculous.

[Chris jM]

Maj Gen Kippenberger was one of the more accomplished and famed commanders within the NZ Div in WW2, as well as being one of the more intellectually orientated. After Marshall released his 'Men Against Fire' Kippenberger undertook an unofficial review of combat experiences amongst the NZ infantryman. His findings do not sit well with Marshall's assertions with regards to non-participation in combat.

(apologies for the poor formatting, the doc has not copied well from word)

It may be accepted that a man will fight hardest when he has full confidence in himself and in his ability to use effectively the weapon with which he is armed. It is therefore necessary to treat men as individuals when making postings to sections and to allocate them to duties in the battalion which are in character. Thus a man who is a strong individualist may be a better soldier if employed as a sniper than he would be in, say, the anti*tank platoon. On the other hand, an indifferent performer in a rifle section may do well in a less exacting role with a mortar, perhaps because he needs the reassurance of other men working with him in the team, perhaps because he has more confidence in his ability with that weapon.

‘It could be seen from his reactions that he was absolutely terrified of front line action in a rifle section. He was placed in charge of a bren gun and as such took part in the Battle of Takrouna. With his machine-gun trained on to one of the approaches to the pinnacle itself, he stuck to his job during one of the enemy counter-attacks and simply mowed them down until the path was almost blocked with enemy dead. This man was one of the unsung heroes of Takrouna’

21. In general the most determined fighters should be found in the rifle sections, they are the essence of the fighting qualities of the unit and must be drawn from the finest material available.

SECTION 2 – USING THE MAXIMUM WEIGHT OF FIRE
40. The necessity for maximum effective fire against enemy positions in the assault is generally accepted.

‘In the attack on Takrouna, my men knew they were in for a tough job. I consider that though much of their fire found no targets, the volume of thefire carried my men along.’

41. Well trained and well led infantrymen will engage the enemy at every opportunity, especially when the situation is most critical.

‘When we moved over the area (at Bel Hamed) in which the 20th Battalion
was over*run, we remarked that invariably in each hastily dug slit trench
there was a small pile of expended small arms cartridge cases, and this applied also to mortar pits and gun sites.’

42. Nevertheless, there will always be a small proportion of men who will be reluctant to use their weapons, either through fright, or the feeling of drawing enemy attention to themselves, or through mistaken feelings of humanity.

‘On the Senio, a forward platoon phoned battalion headquarters to say that a
German was lying out in front of their position, and they wanted a mortar concentration on the poor unfortunate. No one seemed anxious to fire a Bren, rifle, or SMG. An order from the commanding officer put this right * and the 'German' was found to be nothing more than a steel helmet!’

43. This hesitation will be greatest among unseasoned troops, and especially among those who have not been fully trained to place confidence in their own weapons.

‘During the 1941 Libyan campaign, I witnessed the phenomenon of a few men
carrying out the attack drill faithfully and yet not even bothering to look up at the enemy whenever they took to ground. They seemed to be just lying
there waiting for the next order to charge. I remember ordering these men
to use their rifles. Now and again they did, but I feel certain to no good effect. At the next stop the same thing would happen again.’

‘In the battle of Tanaheran I attacked with two platoons in jungle warfare.
The men were heavily armed * about four grenades each, 100 rounds per rifle
and a full complement of ammunition for Bren and SMG. At the conclusion of
the battle, the platoon that had borne the brunt of the fight were, to a man,
nearly out of ammunition. These men had been painstakingly trained, time and ammunition being no object.’

44. It is important that the proportion of passengers be kept as low as possible, in order that the great fire potential of the infantry battalion may take its full effect on the enemy.

45. This great volume of fire will normally be supplemented by the heaviest fire support that the formation commander can provide from other sources. It is the primary task of artillery and other arms to provide the maximum available fire support in order to help the infantry forward to their objectives, all other tasks are of secondary importance. At the same time, the battalion commander must appreciate the tremendous firepower that is available under his hand in the unit. If heavier support is not available, for any reason, his own resources are normally sufficient to enable him to get forward against anything but strongly fortified opposition.

‘I am convinced that my own unit was tremendously improved by the period
on the Senio when we had no artillery support. Men developed a new confidence and delight in the Bren, sniping became almost common, and most valuable of all, we suddenly found that we could use the PIAT for a great variety of useful purposes. The PIAT was a great infantry weapon, which we only really used to the full effect in the very last campaign.’

46. A commander may anticipate that about one*quarter of his (infantry) weapons will be effective at any one time in the attack, but this will be reduced in conditions of poor visibility. Infantry moving forward close behind an artillery barrage (leaning on the barrage) may have little necessity to fire, other than to demoralise the enemy further. It is unnecessary to emphasise that every worthwhile target should be engaged, even when opposition is light.

[Kiwigrunt]

Maj Gen Kippenberger was one of the more accomplished and famed commanders within the NZ Div in WW2, as well as being one of the more intellectually orientated. After Marshall released his 'Men Against Fire' Kippenberger undertook an unofficial review of combat experiences amongst the NZ infantryman. His findings do not sit well with Marshall's assertions with regards to non-participation in combat.

(apologies for the poor formatting, the doc has not copied well from word)

Hi Chris, if this doc is available on line, could you give us a link? I'd love to read it.
Some of the remarks you quoted are relevant to a number of other threads here as well.

[William F. Owen]

Hi Chris, if this doc is available on line, could you give us a link? I'd love to read it.
Some of the remarks you quoted are relevant to a number of other threads here as well.

Concur. This document seems of great value and has managed to stay under my radar!

[Chris jM]

Grossman founded Killology to research these very issues.

Grossman was taught in one of my university papers as gospel, and at the time I thought very highly of him. After hearing about 'killology' and looking at his website I became a little more suspicious of his scholarship, and on rereading 'On Killing' (this time aware that his 'referencing' of Marshall with all the caveats SLAM invokes) I was more disappointed than anything.

'On Combat' seemed bizarrely orientated towards martial arts and law enforcement than I expected from a book about combat.

Another book that fits into the criteria is Bourke's 'An Intimate History of Killing.' As with Grossman, Bourke's book has many, many issues before one could apply her messages to military training however I would still recommend it as being of interest and educational value. 'An Intimate History' focuses more on the effects of media in the perception of combat than in defining any psych/ science behind killing.

However, without any hesitation I would recommend J Glenn Gray's 'The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle'. The author enlisted in the US Army in 1941 on the same day he was informed that he had achieved a doctorate in philosophy. You won't get any universal lessons or paradox-changing theories from Gray, but it is a well written view of a soldier viewing his experiences and impulses with a logical and philosophical perspective.

[Rifleman]

I think Grossman is valuable in one regard: he documents what happens to many people physiologically when in combat. So experiencing things like tunnel vision, auditory exclusion, and loss of fine motor skills should not come as a surprise.

I think that's about the extent of Grossman's contribution though.

Getting back to Wilf's original post. I suspect that most men really don't want to be there but they don't want to be seen as shirkers either. They see military service as a reluctant duty so they want to be able to say, "I did my part." But most men do not see military service as a calling or even an interest.

That's the biggest reason I don't like the idea of conscription.

[Tukhachevskii]

They see military service as a reluctant duty so they want to be able to say, "I did my part." But most men do not see military service as a calling or even an interest.

That's the biggest reason I don't like the idea of conscription.

Yet,surely, there is also a societal factor to be considered here too. Some states are permissive towards a "militaristic" civil-culture (by which I mean pro-military not pro-war) in which participation is seen to be an important part of what, ahem, turns a subject into a citizen. In Israel the IDF performs numerous ancilliary services; as a homogenising school to meld together recruits from differing backgrounds (spatially speaking, like Ethiopian, Yemeni, Indian jews, etc.) as well as inculcating the central tenents of Zionism and ensuring people learn basic civic responsibility and identification with the State. IMO this was dented after "Grapes of Wrath" (maybe even prior to that). Other countries like Russia where conscription often looked like a forced sojourn in borstal made service in the armed forces something one grittied one's teeth to get through. The strategic culture of states is IMO as important in inculcating a "warrior" mentality upon which to base, expand and deepen professionalism but there will, of course, always be those for whom the military is a plague on their house (like the ultra-orthodox in Israel for instance, though not because they are "scared"). Here (UK) there have been many calls for a return to national service (usually from people who, at the time, said they hated it!). It would be interesting to see if any studies were conducted by the German government in the interwar and war time (WWII) period as well as other countries. I'm sure there's a societal variable we're missing here. Anyway, thats my 2 pence of worth(less) observations from civvie street (and from someone who never got the opportunity to see if I was born to fight or flee).

[Bullmoose Bailey]

OK, I know this is a touchy subject, but Ken White's post here, does merit further examination in my opinion.

There have been numerous, quite well researched opinions, data and papers, that not everyone fights, when required to do so.

What we seem to know is

• Most men will fight, given good leadership, thus good leaders and NCOs make a huge difference.
• In the absence of such leadership, they will simply revert to doing the minimum required by appearances.
• 3-5% will run or simply play no useful part.

I do not want anyone to start airing dirty laundry, but I think this issue might be usefully discussed.

William,

In my experiences in first person interaction with American men of the last three Generations (roughly: WWII, Viet-Nam, GWOT, for sake of example), I find that their personal Christian, or other, faith has in the aggregate fallen off since the normalization of Atheism as establised by statute in the US, circa: Sputnik through the removal of prayer from Public School, via Darwinism & Socialism.

Together with these symptoms of lost faith comes a self centeredness that leads to disregard for all cultural sacrifice and leads eventually to sociopathy. Essentially I fear that not only will modern Western men increasingly not die for anything, they will not live for anything.

Predictions; cowardice, self-preservation to the detriment of Nation-State, malinvestment, creditory depletion, corporate greed, poor stewardship, poor planning, wasteage, faithlessness, non-church attendance, marital infidelity & suicide
will continue to increase.

Does that make sense to anyone in regards to combat participation, or the lack thereof?

[Red Leg]

In addition to the other variables that play into aggressiveness and/or duty performance while under fire, e.g. fire and maneuver on the enemy to destroy him in close combat, one needs to examine the conditions upon which soldiers enter and leave the combat theater.

Regardless of the overall national strategic goals, most soldiers will tell you that they want to, in order, 1. survive their time in combat and go home; 2. perform well in front of those they respect, mostly peers, but also superiors and, in the case of leaders, subordinates; and 3. win.

As you compare the conditions upon which a soldier can go home, disregarding medical or disciplinary reasons, look at WWII vs Vietnam vs GWOT. In WWII soldiers went home when the war was won, thus they had a personal stake in victory. In Vietnam, under an individual year long rotation system, and GWOT, under a unit based yearlong (in most cases) rotation system, the personal stake of the individual soldier is survival for a year. Leaders recognize this and, as anyone who has been deployed recently, try to combat both complacency and the reluctance to engage the enemy when terms of victory are ill-defined at best.

[Seabee]

William,

In my experiences in first person interaction with American men of the last three Generations (roughly: WWII, Viet-Nam, GWOT, for sake of example), I find that their personal Christian, or other, faith has in the aggregate fallen off since the normalization of Atheism as establised by statute in the US, circa: Sputnik through the removal of prayer from Public School, via Darwinism & Socialism.

Together with these symptoms of lost faith comes a self centeredness that leads to disregard for all cultural sacrifice and leads eventually to sociopathy. Essentially I fear that not only will modern Western men increasingly not die for anything, they will not live for anything.

Predictions; cowardice, self-preservation to the detriment of Nation-State, malinvestment, creditory depletion, corporate greed, poor stewardship, poor planning, wasteage, faithlessness, non-church attendance, marital infidelity & suicide
will continue to increase.

Does that make sense to anyone in regards to combat participation, or the lack thereof?

Huh!?!

Having served in a unit where the only religion I ever noticed was a mandatory X-Mas service, and I think I saw a Chaplin visit us twice in 5 years to say hello... I think that is soooooo way of the map I would not know how to answer it...

How would you measure the willingness to fight of the non judeo-Christian japanese or VC troops?

The Waffen SS was also not famous for church going....

I am really, really missing something here....