The Army Capstone Concept: the Army wants your comments

[marct]

Hi Wilf,

Yet read the military discussions of late 19th Century and you see how military men have got their heads around steam power, new weapons, railways, telegraph and most of everything else. They are applying what they know for certain and not attempting to hypothesise or guess at what they do not. What wrong foots everyone in 1914 is not the technology, but the vast scale of the endeavour both in numbers and duration - none of which could have been reasonably predicted.

Bein' in a somewhat picky mood since the seminar I came up to the university for got cancelled with no notice, I do want to make a couple of observations.... Sorry, Wilf, it's just me taking out frustrations

Steam power - 1687 in England with the Newcomen Engine, 177r with the Watts;
"new" weapons - breechloaders, simple design first produced in 1774 (I think or thereabouts) and mass deployed by the Prussians in the 1860's.

Railways - 1827 in the UK

Telegraph - 1847 (I think; this is off the top of my head) with the first oceanic cable in 1857

If they bloody well didn't have it down by the end of the 19th century, they should have all been taken out and shot as hopeless incompetents!

Point being, what is it that we do no get or have evidence for? Why extrapolate beyond what we are certain of? "Just stop it!"

We have to extrapolate beyond "certainty" because the only thing certain is that we don't have it perfect - isn't that an old military saying ?

I choose airpower as the analog, but I could have also pointed to the armour debates on the 1920's as well, or the debates over crossbows and longbows back in the 14th century. The point I was trying to make with that analog was that it is at the start of the familiarity curve.

I would urge no deferring on any ones part. All the evidence is there, if you look for it. One of the key lessons of the Lebanon War - and one ALWAYS ignored - is how was it possible for the IDF to have such an extensive knowledge of Hezbollah - which they did - and not be able to employ that knowledge in a way that allowed effective preparation (lack of money/Leadership?) or for consistently successful operations once the fighting started. (EBO/SOD?)

So, knowledge without understanding? I think there is a really good warning lesson there .

[PhilR]

In looking at this as a document which is supposed to help the Army frame/prioritize what stuff to buy and how to educate and train soldiers, I found it less than useful. Knowing how the Pentagon works, there is a line in here for everyone. That, unfortunately, is how it will be used: as a source for quotes to support this or that program or initiative.

The only way to prevent that is for this document to become inculcated in the senior leadership. They must read, understand and support. The first paragraph of Gen Dempsey’s introduction states that “ideas matter”—yes they do, but not because they are written, but because they are believed and because they lead to action. Action in these terms is a prioritization of effort and resources. For me, the document didn’t give a clear sense of priority—while stating all the many things that the Army would be capable of, I didn’t get a sense of what was being left out, or left behind.

While I think that I understand the intent and emerging environment, etc., it really bothered me that a guiding document for the future of the US Army would place defeating enemies at the end of every list of key actions and capabilities. If that order is a defacto prioritization, I’m not sure if we are moving in the correct direction.

While I laud the focus on uncertainty and complexity, I was somewhat troubled by the phrasing, once again in Gen Dempsey’s cover, that spoke of “imposing order on chaos.” I’d recommend focusing that we take actions to achieve the mission or to impose our will on the enemy. However, chaos and uncertainly are just a natural part of the environment. Rather than focus on how we can’t change this, we must emphasize how we are going to use it to our advantage—leveraging chaos.

Within Chapter three—the meat of how the Army will design itself, I was confused about the differences between “supporting ideas” and “core operational actions.” Are they differentiated in some way by type, by priority? When it comes to racking and stacking, will a supporting idea get funded while a core action may not be? There needs to be more clarity on how these concepts relate to one another.

Following the same vein of my criticism, the Appendix of required capabilities seems pretty extensive. What I do not get a sense of is how much? This goes to the global operating environment. I can imagine building an Army that can do all of the things listed, but there are only four brigades when the cost is added up. The “how much” factor directly affects the what and capability factor.

All in all, I’d recommend a shorter and simpler document. If the fear is that by not mentioning something in this document, it will not be funded or pursued, then you will always end up with a document of lists. As its is, I still don’t have a clear picture of what the Army contained in this document will look like, or what real choices are being made.

Phil Ridderhof USMC

[William F. Owen]

If they bloody well didn't have it down by the end of the 19th century, they should have all been taken out and shot as hopeless incompetents!

So given let us say 10-15 years from 1865 (US Civil War) to 1870 (Franco Prussian War) what is it we are still confused about RE: Cyber or the Internet, or Media - all of which we have some 20 years experience of? - and given quite a lot more conflict!

I submit that Steam and Telegraph has at least as substantial social and cultural effect, as the Internet, Computers and so-called modern media.

We have to extrapolate beyond "certainty" because the only thing certain is that we don't have it perfect - isn't that an old military saying ?

Yet no threat we see today was unknown or unknowable in 1991 - 18 years ago? More over, should a Capstone Concept aim at telling the future in the way this one tries? Why seek to predict things more than 5 years away?
Would a Capstone Concept of May 2001, been relevant in October 2001?

I don't think I am knit picking. The scope and aim of the document may be part of the problem.

So, knowledge without understanding? I think there is a really good warning lesson there .

Precisely. The threat was clearly known and understood, but people failed to use that to their advantage!

[marct]

Hi Wilf,

So given let us say 10-15 years from 1865 (US Civil War) to 1870 (Franco Prussian War) what is it we are still confused about RE: Cyber or the Internet, or Media - all of which we have some 20 years experience of?

I would say the the current version of the ACC is confused about the basic analog to use for cyberspace and, from that, all other problems flow.

I submit that Steam and Telegraph has at least as substantial social and cultural effect, as the Internet, Computers and so-called modern media - and given quite a lot more conflict!

Don't disagree with you on this at all ! Actually, what I use when I'm analyzing resonance functions is how we, as a species, "adapt" to new technologies, especially communicative ones. Steam power, both in its transport and productive modes, had an insanely huge effect on both society and culture, especially after the deployment of the Watt Engine. Projecting the analog forward, steam would be the rough analog of the transistor chip; it's that fundamental.

At the same time, it's actually harder for people to see the changes being wrought. It's pretty simple to see shifts with the introduction of a steam engine in, say, a cotton factory in Manchester. It's harder to see the changes, and get a gut feel for the interconnections, when we look at chips being embedded in appliances.

Oh well, I guess I'll just have to finish that damn essay off......

Yet no threat we see today was unknown or unknowable in 1991 - 18 years ago? More over, should a Capstone Concept aim at telling the future in the way this one tries? Why seek to predict things more than 5 years away?

Hmmm, you're quite right that it was "knowable". as for predicting 5+ years into the future, that's also a valid thing to do IFF the freakin' model contains QC feedback loops (which, BTW, this one doesn't appear to). But what is actually being predicted isn't the "unknowable" in the future, it is the growth vector of what we can currently perceive. The QC loops should be in place to cover the possibility (probability) of completely new things happening.

Cheers,

Marc