Fuchs. I am not apologizing, only offering condolences.
To blame the military is to absolve the civilians ... And those who believe that democracy was possible.
Worse, using it as justification to attack the military is simply unforgivable.
Fuchs. I am not apologizing, only offering condolences.
To blame the military is to absolve the civilians ... And those who believe that democracy was possible.
Worse, using it as justification to attack the military is simply unforgivable.
Last edited by TheCurmudgeon; 04-26-2014 at 02:59 AM.
"I can change almost anything ... but I can't change human nature."
Jon Osterman/Dr. Manhattan
---
Hardly. The military is held in much higher regard in the United States than usual in most developed countries. A dent in its image is hardly unforgivable.
In fact, criticism and questioning the performance, capabilities and ways is very useful. Even criticism that misses a point can be useful in fostering an environment in which actual deficiencies are quickly exposed and remedied.
An army is an armed bureaucracy, and bureaucracies need constant oversight and pressure, or else they go astray on their autopilot which maximises their budget, personnel, and their leadership's comfort.
It's also very typical of bureaucracies to expect and demand respect for their work, and to react appalled to external criticism.
An army is supposed to serve its country (or its dictator).
The U.S.Army has evidently not served the interests of its country in the Iraq occupation, though it fooled itself into believing so and superficially it "served" (just to what end?).
It didn't serve by achieving an outcome better than no war nor did it accomplish its mission nor did it protect the country from the wastefulness of warfare by forcefully insisting on the impossibility of the mission.
It was in no way useful.
A trillion to three trillion dollars, thousands of KIA, ten thousands of cripples and nothing to show for it.
It would be an interesting sociology/psychology research project to identify what it takes to believe that the army did not fail its country grossly in that whole affair.
If what you are seeing is institutional bias then you are missing the point of the argument. No one could have accomplished that mission. Period. With that said, why are you now attacking the military for failing to do the impossible (OK, improbable)?
I could understand an argument to re-look the civil-military relationship. Perhaps give the military the power to say "No", or give them the ability to go directly to the public with the failings of the administration. But I don't really like either of those, In the end we are a tool of the administrations policy.
Last edited by TheCurmudgeon; 04-26-2014 at 02:19 PM.
"I can change almost anything ... but I can't change human nature."
Jon Osterman/Dr. Manhattan
---
Humans are still hardcoded for social interaction in clans.
If someone attacks your clan - that's an attack on you.
Someone criticizes your institution - that's (perceived as) a critique of yourself.
The typical reaction is that the clan members rally and fight back.
Critique can be useful even if it's inaccurate, though. It is necessary to tolerate and embrace critique in order to overcome the partisanship and to improve (the own clan).
Here's what you did:
(1) Someone criticised your clan with the allegation of failure.
(2) You respond that your clan is free of guilt because some other clan failed allegedly.
Here's what would be useful:
(1) Someone criticised your clan with the allegation of failure.
(2) You respond by exploiting this reminder about clan imperfection to push for clan improvements, to foster beginner's interest in clan improvement and to create/maintain an environment in which both is standard.
I have nothing to do with the any of the clans in question, and in my view the failure was primarily at the policy level, in selecting utterly unrealistic objectives and pursuing them with tools poorly suited for the purpose.
I do suspect that the military, at the senior leadership, could and should have explained these things to the policymakers much more aggressively. Since I'm not privy to the discussions at that level, I don't really know what was said and what the reaction was. At the operational level, of course, the officers and men involved would have had little input or choice.
Part of this whole discussion, of course, is the nature of "mission creep"... at the early stages of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq the military leadership may not have recognized the extent to which the military would have the nation building task dumped on the military. Again, though, an honest analysis would require detailed knowledge of the discussions that took place at that time.
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”
H.L. Mencken
Bookmarks