Chaplains as Liaisons with Religious Leaders: Lessons From Iraq and Afghanistan

[wm]

Expectation Management 101

I see nothing more than common sense "stakeholder management" in this article's 18 pages. Its focus on including religious leaders in discussions before conducting operations in and around their "neighborhood" ought to be intuitively obvious. I suspect that you could replace the word "mosque" and "religious leaders" with "village" and "tribal leaders" and have an equally true claim.

Here is a much less dramatic case in point by way of example: I am preparing to cut down a tree that is close to one of my neighbors houses/property line in order to put up a fence. Would it not be prudent, and just generally "the right thing to do," to advise my neighbors of what I plan to do? Or would I rather have to deal with angry neighbors who call city inspectors, environmental regulators, etc, ad nauseum because I did not bother to let the neighbors know I had considered them in my planning and its possible impacts on them? To parapharase MSG Proctor's emphasized passage from the article, "At the same time, neigbors who are left out of the decisionmaking process are likely to hamper efforts to conduct successful operations . . . ."

http://www.twq.com/06spring/docs/06spring_hassner.pdf

Fighting Insurgency on Sacred Ground
Ron E. Hassner

"The religious implications of military operations at mosques are notoriously
complex, often vague or contradictory, always perplexing, and yet also
significant. The most obvious means of navigating this religious-legal minefield
is by eliciting the assistance of qualified guides. Religious leaders at all levels
from the imam of the mosque in question or a neighboring mosque to a leading
religious actor at the state level to a religious expert in another Muslim
country or even in the United States can provide key facts about the targeted
site, its meaning to worshippers, existing restrictions on access and behavior,
and crucial information about sensitive times and dates.

Although religious leaders should not be expected to cooperate enthusiastically
with military commanders who are plotting assaults on their mosques, the leaders
should be willing to provide information that can help minimize damage to
its most important elements, keep believers out of harm’s way, and reduce
the risk of sacrilege and desecration.

If Iraqi religious leaders are willing, their cooperation with U.S. counterinsurgency
efforts can provide far more than factual information. Religious leaders’ power lies
in their ability to span both religious knowledge and religious action. Because of
their expertise, they are capable of applying and interpreting formal religious rules
to changing circumstances. Cooperative religious leaders are therefore even
potentially capable of redefining the rules that govern behavior and access to sacred
places in a manner conducive to counterinsurgency efforts. Although there are limits
on religious leaders’ abilities to stretch the boundaries of the sacred, the reach and
ingenuity of these limits can be surprising. At the same time,
religious leaders who are left out of the decisionmaking process are likely to hamper
efforts to conduct successful operations (emphasis mine) in or near
sacred sites. Influential imams can enhance the value of a sacred site that is under
attack, expand its boundaries, or increase the insurgents’ freedom of operation within
its confines."

[marct]

Hi Skiguy,

MSG Proctor, I'm agreeing with just about everything (that I understand anyway) you're saying. If religion has such a big role in Islamic culture, and no doubt it does, then we need to have religion play a larger role as well in our interactions with them. JMO. Surprised no one's really brought up faith-based NGO's and their place in COIN operations. Can they or do they work with the military Chaplains currently in Iraq or Afghanistan?

Just a quick comment to add on to what John said. There have been a number of incidences where faith based NGOs have been used as a front for conversion (I'm thinking right now of the Southern Sudan, but there are lots of other instances). Even the rumour of such will be used as an IO platform, so if you are going to allow them in field, there has to be a fair amount of discrimination and, for want of a better term, "moderation". This would, in turn, be a hard sell politically back in the US where many of these groups are based.

[selil]

I'm still not convinced that a sectarian United States Military should be employing internal support mechanisms in chaplains as external dependencies in a relatively hostile religious tainted war. It would seem that the stain of radical right wing christianity would instantly permeate the process whether it was obvious or not. When considering the stabilization process, the fact that internal mechanisms of support for soldiers are strained, and that the political ramifications are horrendous. I can't see a substantive benefit in "advisor chaplains". I can see chaplains training and assisting forward facing trigger pullers, but to put another non-combatant into the field seems unwise. Unless the chaplains are trigger pullers? Then that adds another entire dynamic to the idea.

[MSG Proctor]

Expectation Management 101

I see nothing more than common sense "stakeholder management" in this article's 18 pages. Its focus on including religious leaders in discussions before conducting operations in and around their "neighborhood" ought to be intuitively obvious. I suspect that you could replace the word "mosque" and "religious leaders" with "village" and "tribal leaders" and have an equally true claim.

I respectfully submit that wm may have inadvertantly made a subtle yet essential point. He conflates religious leaders with tribal leaders and in his allegory, compares the actions affecting Islam with a tree felled in his yard that may affect his neighbor.

Nothing wrong with those comparisons in and of themselves; however, it demonstrates our proclivity as secularized westerners to enumerate religion as one of many competing factors and not what it is to a Muslim: the hub from which all life's spokes radiate.

This is why religious analysis is so critically needed. We cannot really sustain the cleric buy-in in OIF with casual attitudes toward religion. Suppose wm had said in his illustration that he was going to build a mini-mall across the street from his next door neighbor's house of worship. And that the mini mall would have a porno theatre and a 'men's entertainment' strip club. This is closer to the alarm we often cause among the Islamic clerics in our COIN operations in the ME.

Its not common sense as defined by western secular paradigms; its more like an old episode of the the original series of Star Trek where the crew lands on a strange planet and must quickly acquire knowledge about who their hosts are and what they want.

The article is focused narrowly on military action involving mosques in Iraq; however, I beg our readers to widen the lense to a more comprehensive appraisal of our actions in respect to Islamic perceptions on the whole.

[MSG Proctor]

I'm still not convinced that a sectarian United States Military should be employing internal support mechanisms in chaplains as external dependencies in a relatively hostile religious tainted war. It would seem that the stain of radical right wing christianity would instantly permeate the process whether it was obvious or not. When considering the stabilization process, the fact that internal mechanisms of support for soldiers are strained, and that the political ramifications are horrendous. I can't see a substantive benefit in "advisor chaplains". I can see chaplains training and assisting forward facing trigger pullers, but to put another non-combatant into the field seems unwise. Unless the chaplains are trigger pullers? Then that adds another entire dynamic to the idea.

Again, more objections based on theoreticals and not actual experience. I respectfully ask Mr. Selil to review post #51. This tack has been utilized with tremendous success in OIF. It has not provoked the kind of damage his post suggests; and the argument that it takes away from troop care is an easily disprovable straw man. I acknowledge that conclusion is a common-sense type caution, but upon the scrutiny of everyday business in the ITO it does not hold up.

[Steve Blair]

This is why religious analysis is so critically needed. We cannot really sustain the cleric buy-in in OIF with casual attitudes toward religion. Suppose wm had said in his illustration that he was going to build a mini-mall across the street from his next door neighbor's house of worship. And that the mini mall would have a porno theatre and a 'men's entertainment' strip club. This is closer to the alarm we often cause among the Islamic clerics in our COIN operations in the ME.

And I suspect that they would be equally alarmed if Western clergy began showing up in greater numbers in an advisory capacity. Crusading armies always have their priests close at hand. That's certainly an IO disaster in the making.

[MSG Proctor]

And I suspect that they would be equally alarmed if Western clergy began showing up in greater numbers in an advisory capacity. Crusading armies always have their priests close at hand. That's certainly an IO disaster in the making.

Again, your post posits theoreticals not grounded in current operational realities. Christians are a known (and mostly welcomed) commodity in Iraq; secularists are regarded with the utmost resistance. If you knew how AQI defined our efforts in religious and theological terms, you would see that the threat of secularism is far more ominous than having a Christian clergyman in the combat formation.

[Steve Blair]

Perhaps it's being spun that way now, but I do suspect that if you increased the visibility of Christian leaders (or people who could be portrayed as leaders) you'd see a shift in the propaganda. Please don't assume that I don't know the current spin...you'd be mistaken. But it's also very possible for that spin to change...reverting to the crusader stuff that came out in the early stages of the conflict.

[MSG Proctor]

Mr. Blair:
I won't speculate about what you know, but what you post here. I invite you and our readers to see that many influential Islamic clerics are very open to mediation from Christian chaplains and other Christian leaders here.

Part of our western, secular baggage includes a general dismissal of clerics as key influencers and a particularly pernicious stereotyping of Islamic clerics. Our default position should afford them the opportunity to define themselves. I have had many interactions with Shiite, Sunni and Christian Arabs in Iraq and found most of them to be very sincere, sensitive, well-educated and not at all lacking in any intellectual sophistication. Like American clergy, they are a mixed bag (surprise!) but low-balling them with coarse, unrefined stereotyping is usually not helpful.

[Steve Blair]

MSG Proctor,

I don't think you'll find me dismissing the ability of religious leaders to influence situations (although I am a very secular person). My comments center more on the potential for an increased public presence of Western clerical leaders to be used by those who wish us (and the people of Iraq) ill. Those individuals are not necessarily within Iraq, and there is a coarse segment of the ME population who would listen to their message (not unlike similar segments in any population who listen to messages that reinforce what they already believe or are open to believing). I also share some of Ken's concerns regarding the use of US military religious personnel in roles they may not feel comfortable taking on.

Being secular does not mean automatically dismissing the influence of religion on peoples' lives and social interactions. That level of coarse stereotyping seems to be common, and does no one any favors. I recognize the potential of increasing the contact between our religious leaders and those of the local Iraqi communities, but I also recognize the potential for that contact to be misread or misused by those outside the immediate framework who have agendas we do not share.

[wm]

I respectfully submit that wm may have inadvertantly made a subtle yet essential point. He conflates religious leaders with tribal leaders and in his allegory, compares the actions affecting Islam with a tree felled in his yard that may affect his neighbor.

Thanks for the left handed compliment. My point was made quite explicitly, not inadvertently. I did not, however, conflate religious leaders with tribal leaders. I was trying to point out that religious leaders are not the only stakeholders that ops planners (or anyone else thinking about acting in some way) need to consider when doing their jobs in Iraq, or any place else in the world.

Nothing wrong with those comparisons in and of themselves; however, it demonstrates our proclivity as secularized westerners to enumerate religion as one of many competing factors and not what it is to a Muslim: the hub from which all life's spokes radiate.

This may be true for some Moslems, but I doubt it is true for all Moslems, based on my experiences with Moslems (mostly Turks and Egyptians). I submit that your description is as much a caricature/strawman as those you have suggested are making the same mistake.

This is why religious analysis is so critically needed. We cannot really sustain the cleric buy-in in OIF with casual attitudes toward religion. Suppose wm had said in his illustration that he was going to build a mini-mall across the street from his next door neighbor's house of worship. And that the mini mall would have a porno theatre and a 'men's entertainment' strip club. This is closer to the alarm we often cause among the Islamic clerics in our COIN operations in the ME.

The value of the article is that it points out, as MSG Proctor's more grandiose example shows a little more poignanatly, folks' proclivity to adopt a NIMBY (not in my backyard) attitude toward things that upset their traditional way of behaving. As I previously indicated, this is something that folks with a clue, regardless of their ethnicity, nationality, etc, have known for a long time:
"Before you rock the boat, let the passengers know a big wave is coming. They can get ready for the attendant seasickness, and you may not have to spend so much time swabbing up the spewed chunks."

Its not common sense as defined by western secular paradigms; its more like an old episode of the the original series of Star Trek where the crew lands on a strange planet and must quickly acquire knowledge about who their hosts are and what they want.

The article is focused narrowly on military action involving mosques in Iraq; however, I beg our readers to widen the lense to a more comprehensive appraisal of our actions in respect to Islamic perceptions on the whole.

What makes it appear not to be common sense is the mapping of it on to a frame (operations around a mosque) that is outside the common expereince of most Americans. I find this to be very poor method of informing/teaching/training/pedagogy (pick your favorite). Starting with a known and moving to an unfamilair, showing how they are similar, rather than using an unfamiliar example from the "git-go," tends to be a more efficacious explanatory method from my experience as an educator, trainer, and parent.

[Ron Humphrey]

One of the reasons I discontinued my feedback to this particular discussion, other than not being a SME, was that it became apparent to me that for all intensive purposes there may be little point nor long term accomplishment through addressing it to any other than those it directly refers.

For most anyone outside of the religious field there will almost always be not only a lack of comfort with this type of interaction in relation to operational environments but as Ken and others have stated there is a high probability of over regulation. This of course would result in not only the predictable issues associated with those who don't know telling those who do how, but also the IO and external public relations issues.

That said I really do think it is important that it be understood that what MSG Proctor and others seek more than anything else is for their leadership not to stand in the way of productive and effective actions by educated and well thought out approaches to operational requirements. It seems to be a common sense statement to say; don't make people do what their not comfortable with; however isn't it just as important to make sure long standing cultures of communities don't stand in the way of effective work in the areas we are discussing. I would find it difficult to believe that anyone here could say that such restrictions have not taken place, or even more importantly that lives may have been lost which might not have had some things been addressed differently.

I highly appreciate everything that the MSG has done over the last years in efforts to deal with this and I truly hope at some point we will be able to move past our overt avoidance of whats uncomfortable and instead work towards whats doable within the exceptable limits.

This is simply how I feel.
The opinions stated are soley mine and do not reflect the opinions of SWJ, The US Govt, or anyone else who might be offended by them

[selil]

Again, more objections based on theoreticals and not actual experience. I respectfully ask Mr. Selil to review post #51. This tack has been utilized with tremendous success in OIF. It has not provoked the kind of damage his post suggests; and the argument that it takes away from troop care is an easily disprovable straw man. I acknowledge that conclusion is a common-sense type caution, but upon the scrutiny of everyday business in the ITO it does not hold up.

I don't see anywhere in post #51 where anything I said was disputed. The fact is the first half dozen or so points support that a chaplain is an adviser to a combat commander. Further it suggest further down in that post (#51) that it is an advisory capacity that is untested. Except in singular exceptional instances (specificity fails to illuminate generalities) I fail to see where turning a secular conflict into a religious war of ideologies is a good idea. Most of the same tools a chaplain brings to the table are going to be fully within the capability of sociologists and anthropologists without the political baggage.

Also it appears that there is an inherent failure to understand that involving a chaplaincy on the front lines may be wholly accepted by the insurgency only to see a substantial public relations debacle on the home front when one gets popped on the front lines. Further there is an inherent and substantial bias that assumes the chaplaincy is going to be providing Christian faith chaplains. What about Hindu's, Buddhism, or even Jewish faiths? If the chaplains aren't "plug and play" then there is an inherent issue and I'm having a difficult time perceiving that being the case.

Turning a secular conflict into a religious war is the tipping point for Middle Eastern populations, and as a rarity should we impose any form of forced religious interaction. There is a little benefit I can perceive in creating a high value target in a chaplain, exposing political sensitivities, and further eroding the political capital we've built up.

I can see where the United States political machinery founded in the religious right would be slathering to expand a religious war against Islam. A chaplain being assassinated might give them that political capital for further expansion. Though I usual categorize such abject suppositions as offal and ignore as appropriate.

[MSG Proctor]

All due respect Mr. Liles, but smarter people than us have already decided on this issue.


Here is a CALL handbook that provides detailed policy and doctrinal parameters for RST utilization in the GWOT (requires AKO log in credentials).

[/URL].

[wm]

All due respect Mr. Liles, but smarter people than us have already decided on this issue.


Here is a CALL handbook that provides detailed policy and doctrinal parameters for RST utilization in the GWOT (requires AKO log in credentials).

[/URL].

The guardians of the secret, sacred gnosis (AKA wisdom for those not members of mystery religions/cults) are hard at work. Seeking to follow your link yields the following:

Only Active Duty Military/Uniformed Services Members, Reservists, National Guard, USMA and ROTC (contracted) cadets, and Direct Hire Appropriated Fund DA Civilian Employees may gain access to CALL's DoD restricted website.

[Ken White]

All due respect Mr. Liles, but smarter people than us have already decided on this issue.

I doubt that the 'deciders' are all that much smarter than any of us -- and I'd submit it hasn't been decided or this thread wouldn't exist. It's still alive because it has not been decided.

NOTE: Edited to delete inappropriate reference. Some context is lost but the items listed below constitute concerns about the issue:

(1) The latitude given the Chaplain in meeting religious leaders -- I submit that a representative of the chain of command must be involved as the Chaplain is not in that chain.

(2) The degree to which the Chaplain's perception of his moral and religious scruples can affect his negotiations. I submit that is very much individual specific and the Commander has an obligation to consider that in determining how and when to use a particular Chaplain.

(3) Placing the Chaplain in an at least quasi warfighting role unless great care is exercised.

(4) Potential fear of proselyting or an overtly 'Christian' approach to a problem by leaders from other religions, a problem in any case but one which requires careful thought in intercourse with Muslims. That is not to say there should be no interface, just that it has to be done quite cautiously.

(5) The Chaplain's personal moral dilemma of how much is he aiding a war effort.

Two additional thoughts:

- What works in one theater in one type of war and in specific circumstances may not adapt well to other situations; while most people and many units are quit flexible, that is not true of the Army as a whole. One should be cautious in what one wishes to embed in the bureaucracy.

- You state:

and the argument that it takes away from troop care is an easily disprovable straw man.

I believe it can be disproven in rhetoric, anything can. I am not at all convinced that is untrue in practice and I believe that statement is very much questionable on the probability of considerable variance from unit to unit.

As an aside and appropos of little or nothing, I believe the CAC commander's wife is a Methodist Minister so one would expect some support for the RST handbook. That is NOT by the way, an accusation of any wrongdoing no matter how slight, I have no questions on integrity, merely noting that we are all colored by our experiences; you by yours, me by mine and so forth...

[MSG Proctor]

The guardians of the secret, sacred gnosis (AKA wisdom for those not members of mystery religions/cults) are hard at work. Seeking to follow your link yields the following:

Sorry wm, but the mods nailed me for posting FOUO quotes - and they are right - I shouldn't leak even 'harmless' text.

Suffice to say that while discussion on this important topic invites many theoreticals, what ifs and conjecture, there are concrete actions taking place that involve members of the Chaplain Corps in innovative ways.

I want to say that many of our military Chaplains are incredibly brave, selfless and deeply spiritual leaders and that their example in battle has inspired many Soldiers, Airmen and Marines. Their willingness to assume the same risks as their troops frequently results in access to our Soldiers on a profoundly personal level. Our motto is "bringing God to Soldiers and Soldiers to God". Chaplains (and their enlisted assistants) deserve recognition for their intrepididity, sacrifice and exemplary care for Soldiers.

In counterinsurgency operations where religion is a primary operational consideration, the unique capabilities of uniformed clergy teams have provided an effective option for some commanders that mitigates anti-CF hostility, promotes understanding, and fosters conditions that lead to peace. All activities by chaplain teams are inherently humanitarian. Involvement in civil-military activities such as religious leader engagements is closely monitored for any appearance of combatant activity. Chaplains are noncombatants and the overwhelming majority of commanders circumspectly safeguard their chaplains from embroilment in combatant-type activities.

For a scholarly treatment of this subject on open source, this War College monograph provides much more lucid thinking than anything I could offer.

[Gian P Gentile]

In counterinsurgency operations where religion is a primary operational consideration, the unique capabilities of uniformed clergy teams have provided an effective option for some commanders that mitigates anti-CF hostility, promotes understanding, and fosters conditions that lead to peace. All activities by chaplain teams are inherently humanitarian. Involvement in civil-military activities such as religious leader engagements is closely monitored for any appearance of combatant activity. Chaplains are noncombatants and the overwhelming majority of commanders circumspectly safeguard their chaplains from embroilment in combatant-type activities.

I am sorry my friend but I disagree with this type of use of chaplains on moral and ethical grounds. In so leading to peace as you say by making chaplains operators they indirectly even if in the most subtle ways can very likely be involved in killing, which is why I oppose this on moral and ethical grounds. I paste below here a scenario that I posed from a previous posting on this thread. I ask you not dismiss it as a simple what "if" but an actual scenario that will play out by making chaplains operators:

Lets say in a hypothetical scenario an infantry battalion chaplain is used by his commander to engage (talk to, establish relationship) with an imam of a mosque that the commander has yet to meet. The chaplain spends time at the mosque getting to know the imam through bonding due to shared eperiences as a man of the cloth. Through this bonding the chaplain develops a relationship with the imam and so does the battalion commander. One day the imam calls the commander and says hey, I know where three alqueda militants are hiding right now. Since the commander is still getting to know the imam and is not too sure of his credibility the commander then goes to his chaplain and asks, can I trust the imam? The chaplain says yes, the commander puts together an op to get the militants, and in the course of the operations the three alqueda militants are killed. In this scenario are there not clear violations of a chaplain having crossed the moral and ethical line by becoming an operator for the commander and assisting him in his operational and environmental understanding of his area that at certain points contributes to his ability to kill the enemy?

[wm]

Sorry wm, but the mods nailed me for posting FOUO quotes - and they are right - I shouldn't leak even 'harmless' text.

I wasn't blaming you, just letting others know that many would not be able to access the data at the link.

In counterinsurgency operations where religion is a primary operational consideration, the unique capabilities of uniformed clergy teams have provided an effective option for some commanders that mitigates anti-CF hostility, promotes understanding, and fosters conditions that lead to peace. All activities by chaplain teams are inherently humanitarian. Involvement in civil-military activities such as religious leader engagements is closely monitored for any appearance of combatant activity. Chaplains are noncombatants and the overwhelming majority of commanders circumspectly safeguard their chaplains from embroilment in combatant-type activities.

What concerns me about this is the "closely monitored" point. I suspect that we are dealing with an endeavor that is much more perilous than many other advisory roles that folks undertake. And without speaking for him, I suspect that this is a real concern of Ken White's as well. As we used to say, one "aw sh1t" wipes out a hundred "attaboys."

I accept your contention about the extreme mismatch between what one normally considers as religious connectedness for the majority of Westerners with that which applies to our fellow beings in SWA and the Middle East. And, because of this mismatch, were I to do a risk matrix on the use of military chaplains in a role as an emissary to the religious leaders in the AOR, I would estimate both likelihood of occurence and seriousness of impact as high as one can go.

Recall that in an earlier post I called on us to use the pros from Dover--I sincerely meant that--the role you are advocating is not for just any old religioso. Even though he is an MD, you wouldn't go to a dermatologist for triple bypass surgery, would you? We've already seen what a misguided overzealousness produced at Abu Ghraib.

I do not think that "l'audace, toujours de l'audace! " applies here. (BTW, this is actually a 1792 quotation from Georges Danton of France, misattributed to Frederick the Great by many as a result of George C. Scott's portrayal in "Patton.")

[MSG Proctor]

I am sorry my friend but I disagree with this type of use of chaplains on moral and ethical grounds. In so leading to peace as you say by making chaplains operators they indirectly even if in the most subtle ways can very likely be involved in killing, which is why I oppose this on moral and ethical grounds. I paste below here a scenario that I posed from a previous posting on this thread. I ask you not dismiss it as a simple what "if" but an actual scenario that will play out by making chaplains operators:

Sir, before I do that, have you seen my reply to your previous question in post #70?

Respectfully,
MSG P