And Robb drank too much...
Kool Aid
And Robb drank too much...
Clearly, he still hasn't drunk enough...Originally Posted by John T. Fishel
John Wolfsberger, Jr.
An unruffled person with some useful skills.
I'm by no means convinced by Robb's theories, and he loses me with some of the programmer talk occasionally, but I think they're very interesting. It seems people here are quick to dismiss him because he's former Air Force, and because he believes small wars have fundamentally changed and the old solutions no longer apply.
He believes small group of terrorists, "global guerrillas," have the ability to cause state failure by attacking critical nodes in infrastructure (power, water, etc.) and denying the state the ability to provide for the basic needs of the populace. Reversion to primary loyalties (ethnicity, religion, tribe, etc.) will be the result in places where the state is already weak (much of the Middle East and Africa). Along the same lines, he emphasizes the power of black globalization, i.e. drug traffickers, oil smugglers, and the economic interests at play in state failure. Far from being an Air Force guy trying to put firepower on targets, he's arguing that open source insurgencies, where there is no central direction, just a unifying theme, are extremely tough to combat.
GS - yes, that's a good description of the book. I didn't want to seem overly anti-USAF...sometimes it's hard to overcome.
Using John Mackinlays model for insurgents:
In some places it has become war as an extension of economics, where lumpen insurgents just want to continue looting the remains of the state and flogging their goods on the black market, most notably in West Africa. For clan insurgents like in Somalia and Afghanistan, govt collapse is great because it lets the clans get along with making money on the blackmarket selling drugs or whatever because the return of the rule on law means they go out of business. Most of the above don't care about taking on the West and just want a continuation of the status quo.
While global insurgents could, (and have done with Al-Qaeda) jump from one collapsed state / warzone to another its very hard for anyone to unify such disparate types of insurgents, and the best you can hope for is mobilising individuals with a grand narrative through the internet and media.
In Afghanistan you've got people who don't want the government to succeed because that would mean no more poppy money, and they don't want the Taliban back - which is one reason why the Taliban have moved on into Pakistan tribal areas, and people have stayed under their warlords. One of the biggest mistakes was taking the War on Drugs to the middle of a counter insurgency war.
The one thing I did like was 'open source warfare' while it does point out the obvious 'whatever works will be copied' it is important to remember because it does come up and surprise you, now and then, such as when the Somalians copied the Sudanese tactics of using RPGs as anti aircraft (who copied it off the Afghans.)
History footnote here: RPGs were first used against helicopters in Vietnam. It's an old tactic...which makes me wonder why it surprised us so much in Somalia.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
RPG's and perceptions
Steve, we were 'surprised' by the RPG attacks against helos in Somalia the same way we were 'surprised' by RPG attacks against M1A1/2 tanks in Iraq. We had been told/taught/exposed to the perception that Vietnamese Regulars and VC troops were 'bad*sses' while African and Arab troops and insurgents were rabble, unprofessional, and down right silly. I believe we have learned much since then, respect your enemy.
Need Clarification
I hope Robb is wrong. His statement "Further, the relative modernity of Iraq features vectors of cross-connection that undermine any and all attempts at clearing/holding territory (the core of the Petraeus plan)." doesn't make a lot of sense to me. How does that physically prevent clearing territory? Perhaps someone else can translate what he is saying for me.
As a veteran who was both in Tal Afar and Ramadi - if that's Robb's position, he doesn't know what the hell he's talking about.
Heh. Hear that...
Things just look different a few hundred feet above the fray.
Always been fascinated by the techno approach to 'organizing' ground combat and have noted that the bulk of proponents of such have little or no experience (or,really, concept...) of actually getting from point X to point Y or clearing point Z when someone who hasn't read the right books doesn't want you to do those things on 'his' turf.
I second that remark as one in the same demographic.
Example is better than precept.
Ball Bearings and such
What makes the forum here unique is not that we often disagree, its how disagree. The best of what comes out of the SWC is the various perspectives so that we work through problem sets.
ZenPundit has a good point - don't discard the message jsut because the messenger sounds like he has a mouth full of marbles. Robb has made some good points, its his search for an application of them that often bothers me. He does often frame his questions in the context of the aviator (and its often worth hearing from our purple - winged brethen), but that does not mean we can't evaluate some of the stuff he says and place in better context from our perspective.
I have my share of problems with both EBO and Net Centric Warfare - but I also have my own biasSometimes you need a guy like Robb to force you to question your assumptions.
Now, I have to disagree with the over-arching statement. I think the approach that is ongoing in theater (the Petreaus/Kilcullen one in question) is evolving to meet the needs of the environment. I'll write more as to why I think it is later, but it has to to with the tactical price of operational success and translating that to meet strategic objectives that fulfill policy - (or in this case establishing the conditions where those political solutions can grow).
Good to be back - spent the last 3 days on a great staff ride considering Grant's Overland (AKA Wilderness) Campaign
Best regards, Rob
I'm not much swayed, but I think this does offer a good question. Much of the COIN theory we're taking as practice these days is intensely rooted in historical experiences. Which is all well and good - NOT using historical experience has gotten us fouled up in the first place - but one of Hammes' biggest points in "The Sling and the Stone" is that war, and insurgencies in particular, are constantly evolving. While I'm not gonna say Petraeus and Kilcullen are wrong, it is important to keep in mind that Iraq presents a wholly different COIN challenge than Algeria, Vietnam, or any of the other historical cases that seem to guide our thinking and practice. It is fair to ask whether the current strategy is too rooted in historical COIN examples rather than completely and effectively adapted to the unique Iraq situation.
Not that I'm the one to answer that, of course.
Robb's critique seems off-base to me, but continually questioning everything about COIN, even the dearly held principles we appear to take as gospel truth, is the only way to continue to evolve. And as many have said, adapt or die.
Ever find that open flank on Lee's line? I think they've been looking for 143 years now. . .
Matt
"Give a good leader very little and he will succeed. Give a mediocrity a great deal and he will fail." - General George C. Marshall
I don't think he's saying you can't clear territory: just that clearing territory doesn't work like it used to. Here's an example off the top of my head. Kicking Philippine rebels off an island and holding the village might work because the villagers lose all communication with their leaders. (Holding territory destroys command and control.)
That's not true anymore. Occupying Sadr City won't do any good because Sadr can pick up a cell phone and order attacks whenever he wants attacks. Killing Sadr doesn't do any good, because people can post his old anti US speeches on the Internet. Holding territory no longer denies command and control to the insurgents.
To use an Iraq example. Holding territory in Ramadi didn't work. Cutting a deal with local sheiks did. Occupying Afghanistan just forced Al Qaeda to the net and terrorist attacks have increased.
Last edited by Rank amateur; 08-16-2007 at 09:44 PM.
This is becoming a conversation I have with my tactics students regularly.
Out of FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics (All definitions are US Army definitions, as opposed to NATO or DoD):
Holding and Clearing are two different tactical tasks and missions. By themselves (by doctrine) you're not going to accomplish what you mentioned above in tasking units with clearing and holding. However...Clear - A tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned area.
Hold - To maintain or retain possession by force, as a position or an area.
Suffice it to say, with technology are you ever going to truely isolate an insurgent in a free society? Probably not without infringing pretty heavily on the rights of the populace. What else is there?Isolate – A tactical mission task that requires a unit to seal off—both physically and psychologically—an enemy from his sources of support, deny an enemy freedom of movement, and prevent an enemy unit from having contact with other enemy forces.
So here's the question. Out of the above options, which is the most feasible and which is least? Why? Additionally, what is the purpose of the task? Even better (looking for the prospective planners out there) put it into task, purpose, method, effect format. You might win a chance to serve on a Corps staff if your answer is good enough.Control - A tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy.
Contain – To stop, hold, or surround the forces of the enemy or to cause the
enemy to center activity on a given front and to prevent the withdrawal of any part of the enemy’s force for use elsewhere.
Occupy – A tactical mission task that involves a force moving into an area so that it can control the entire area. Both the force’s movement to and occupation of the area occur without enemy opposition.
Seize – A tactical mission task that involves taking possession of a designated area using overwhelming force.
Secure - A tactical mission task that involves preventing a unit, facility, or geographical location from being damaged or destroyed as a result of enemy action.
Example is better than precept.
tactics: the branch of military science dealing with detailed maneuvers to achieve objectives set by strategy
What's the objective? Seriously. It's not obvious to me.
In short, it's to win.
As per National Strategy for Victory in Iraq published November 2005. This has not changed.
Victory in Iraq is Defined in Stages
• Short term, Iraq is making steady progress in fighting terrorists, meeting political milestones, building democratic institutions, and standing up security forces.
• Medium term, Iraq is in the lead defeating terrorists and providing its own security, with a fully constitutional government in place, and on its way to achieving its economic potential.
• Longer term, Iraq is peaceful, united, stable, and secure, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism.
Additionally, people usually introduce themselves to add to their credibility, show us what experiences they bring to the table, and fill out their profile before starting the dull roar. Take this guy for example and the thread that ended his career here.
Last edited by RTK; 08-17-2007 at 02:06 AM.
Example is better than precept.
Hey RTK,You might win a chance to serve on a Corps staff if your answer is good enough.
I thought we were trying to encourage folks to post.....
Typical AF approach, I'm sorry to say. They don't understand that not every problem can be solved with a suitably large bombload or with some stealth system or another.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
John Robb wrote,OFF TOPIC:Since the American military's objective is to gain a monopoly on violence in Iraq, these developments indicate that it has sustained the commercial equivalent of a rapid loss in market share
The interchangeability of commercial thought and military thought scares me. You can't even read an article on the conflict without the terminology pervading it. War is not business.
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