Light Infantry and Afghanistan

[Ken White]

Are tough. Speaking from other wars, one without FOBs (but sometimes with, sometimes without, a MLR) and one with FOBs plus a couple of other excursions with a mixed case, the problem you're really having is the FOB concept. Same problem in Viet Nam, that's what led to the LRP development and employment and even to the development of freeze dried rations to provide lightweight sustenance for a week or two. Doubt we'll do that today for several reasons; fear of lack of control being paramount...

Ideally, you'd kick out for a couple of weeks at a time and thus, while still falling under observation, would have a better chance of a stealthy ambush placement. Can't do that because our equipment today wasn't designed for it and we haven't trained to do it -- given the risk aversion endemic in the USA today, we're not likely to do that for the GPF. The FOBs aren't going away for pretty much the same reason.

So the fact that ambushes are always tough is exacerbated by the condition of the US Armed Forces and of Afghanistan. Keep trying -- and keep your head down...

[Sylvan]

Are tough. Speaking from other wars, one without FOBs (but sometimes with, sometimes without, a MLR) and one with FOBs plus a couple of other excursions with a mixed case, the problem you're really having is the FOB concept. Same problem in Viet Nam, that's what led to the LRP development and employment and even to the development of freeze dried rations to provide lightweight sustenance for a week or two. Doubt we'll do that today for several reasons; fear of lack of control being paramount...

Ideally, you'd kick out for a couple of weeks at a time and thus, while still falling under observation, would have a better chance of a stealthy ambush placement. Can't do that because our equipment today wasn't designed for it and we haven't trained to do it -- given the risk aversion endemic in the USA today, we're not likely to do that for the GPF. The FOBs aren't going away for pretty much the same reason.

So the fact that ambushes are always tough is exacerbated by the condition of the US Armed Forces and of Afghanistan. Keep trying -- and keep your head down...

Modern communications and the wide open terrain of Afghanistan really ramp up the degree of difficulty. Vietnam at least you could manuever out of sight and every rice farmer didn't have instant world wide communication abilities.

[Ken White]

Vietnam at least you could manuever out of sight and every rice farmer didn't have instant world wide communication abilities.

Some places in VN, yes, however most, probably about 2/3 to 3/4 at that time, not so on the out of sight. Not all triple canopy and mangrove swamps. Great deal of primary rain forest and even more ag and scrub land...

Also true on the Farmers. However, in Veet Nam as is true in those parts of the 'Stan without global comm, Farmers most always have kids who are used to doing what they're told...

Every war brings its own unique problems -- and solutions.

[Infanteer]

From my viewpoint, insurgent tactics in alot of areas in southern Afghanistan along with the nature of the terrain don't lend themselves to ambushes. Due to roaming death in the skies, insurgents walking around with weapons are likely to die from a Hellfire long before they stumble into a well-sited killzone. For this reason, they don't really walk around openly with weapons much which makes it hard to ambush insurgents. Others may have noticed different, but these were my observations. I understand that the terrain in RC(E) lends itself to open insurgent movement and small-unit ambushes have been much more successful.

As for light infantry in Afghanistan, the largest constraint is water. You simply aren't light if you have to sustain yourself in 40-50 degree celcius heat. As much as possible, the chain of command must plan on how to safely use local sources (which, in the dense green spaces of Afghanistan are often rife with Hep and other fun things). If you don't find a work around this, you are tied to a vehicle laager or a piece of tactical infrastucture.

[JMA]

As for light infantry in Afghanistan, the largest constraint is water. You simply aren't light if you have to sustain yourself in 40-50 degree celcius heat. As much as possible, the chain of command must plan on how to safely use local sources (which, in the dense green spaces of Afghanistan are often rife with Hep and other fun things). If you don't find a work around this, you are tied to a vehicle laager or a piece of tactical infrastucture.

Water? Why are the Light Infantry going to be required to walk around for days on end? Light Infantry by simple definition means they do not have the integral heavy support weapons and they have a light vehicle footprint. This of course does not mean that their mobility cannot be provided by choppers and their supporting weapons by air delivery. Find a target deal with it then move on.

[William F. Owen]

Modern communications and the wide open terrain of Afghanistan really ramp up the degree of difficulty. Vietnam at least you could manuever out of sight and every rice farmer didn't have instant world wide communication abilities.

True, but today the average platoon has a far greater technological edge over the enemy than in 1969. TI, IINV and UAVs all mean working at night is an good option, and one the Taliban don't like.

[JMA]

True, but today the average platoon has a far greater technological edge over the enemy than in 1969. TI, IINV and UAVs all mean working at night is an good option, and one the Taliban don't like.

How many units will be capable of fighting at night in groups down to section level? Exactly how effective are the current night optics? 60% 75% 90% of daylight?

[William F. Owen]

How many units will be capable of fighting at night in groups down to section level? Exactly how effective are the current night optics? 60% 75% 90% of daylight?

Every infantry Battalion in the British Army in my day and I guess nothing has changed.
Every major attack in the Falklands, bar one, took place at night.
I think almost every man in the rifle platoon now has some kind of night vision device.

[JMA]

Every infantry Battalion in the British Army in my day and I guess nothing has changed.
Every major attack in the Falklands, bar one, took place at night.
I think almost every man in the rifle platoon now has some kind of night vision device.

There must be some reason for the reported lack of night action?

[Ken White]

because most reporters don't want to go out at night and few that do have night vision devices, night actions do not make good stories and they can't get good pictures or video clips