What If We Fail in Afghanistan?

[davidbfpo]

As always Steve Coll is worth reading and in this article lays out four situations:

What would be the consequences of a second Islamic Emirate? My scenarios here are intended analytically, as a first-draft straw-man forecast: The Nineties Afghan Civil War on Steroids; Momentum for a Taliban Revolution in Pakistan; Increased Islamist Violence Against India, Increasing the Likelihood of Indo-Pakistani War and Increased Al Qaeda Ambitions Against Britain and the United States.

From:http://www.newyorker.com/online/blog...tml#entry-more

I have scanned previous threads, but cannot readily find one that has looked at futurology.

[omarali50]

I wrote this rambling post in reply to something else, but it seems more relevant here..

We can take the very reasonable view that some responses to terrorism (Afghan war, Iraq war? not sure if that even counts as a "response to terrorism", but whatever) have actually led to even more terrorism and that these are not the best responses. Maybe we should be removing "root causes" (Israel? Oil?). Maybe we should be arresting people and bringing them to court and dealing with nations that harbor such criminals by imposing X or Y UN backed sanctions. Still, its hard to see how you can get out of Afghanistan, after having gone in, without that being a major defeat with serious consequences (not to have gone in at all may have been a good idea, but that toothpaste has long since been pushed out of the tube).

Afghanistan is a god-forsaken cross roads with little appeal, but there IS a strategic reason for making Afghanistan work and that reason is Pakistan. Pakistan is the center of the loosely networked Islamist fanatics that have launched major terrorist operations in many different parts of the world. The most spectacular being the 9-11 attack. Pakistan is practically the only way a worldwide jihadist effort can ever be something bigger than a particularly bothersome irritant. IF defeat in Afghanistan leads to jihadi-sponsoring Pakistan, then its a serious matter.

One reason for confusion on this issue that I have noticed is that some people are saying "pakistan is an ally now, so that job is done, why bother about afghanistan". Well, if this were totally true, then definitely, leave afghanistan to the afghans. The country is just Somalia X 3 with better organized contestants (northern alliance and taliban being the main ones) and if the world can live with Somalia (not sure about that, but lets assume we can) then the world can live with the taliban and northern alliance fighting on in afghanistan. In any case, its a headache for regional powers, not for the US and Europe. But is that statement about Pakistan really true and is it permanently true?

I think it is not. I think the Pakistani army still has a lot of people who think they can use the taliban to project power westwards and the jihadis as proxies against India and if they gain the upper hand, then Pakistan will be jihad central, not just locally, but with distant consequences. IF the US and NATO leave without securing Afghanistan (and I have said before that securing is a very loose term with very flexible meaning, but NOT infinitely flexible) then the Pakistani army is likely to revert to its Jihadist position. Not overnight, not even as part of some clever plan, but just as the path of least resistance.

I also think there is a real salafist terrorist movement in the world that will be emboldened by an American defeat in Afghanistan. But I personally dont think THAT justifies hundreds of billions in money and thousands of casualties. Because I dont think they are that big a threat IF the Pakistani and Saudi states were both determined to stay away from these people. They would then be little more than Baader-Meinhof and company. OK, substantially more than Baader Meinhoff, mainly because so many of them have already been trained and organized into cells and because salafi Islam is a bigger movement than radical Marxism ever was, but I still think that in the bigger scheme of things these kind of movements have no future. NO country is as penetrated by Salafi ideology as Saudi Arabia, yet when push comes to shove, the Saudi state can and does act against them. Not just recently, but as long ago as 1930 (battle of Sibillia).

Pakistan is not as well organized a state as modern Saudi Arabia, but even in Pakistan these people will eventually lose IF the state is determined to act against them. IF the Pakistani army sees that going back to the good old days of using taliban and jihadi proxies are not really an option anymore, then there will be an almightly mess in Pakistan for a few years, but I have no doubt about who would win. The state would win. The real reason there is any doubt is because the jihadist factions of the army can still convince their fellow officers to keep some "good taliban" and "good jihadis" in reserve for the day when America leaves (and Obama's prolonged decision dance has not helped in this matter).

I am not saying the US HAS to stay. Its possible that there is some strategy that allows leaving Afghanistan while making sure Pakistan does not backtrack. But that will have to be specifically planned and cannot be taken as a given just because "now they are our allies". IF that can be done...IF things are so arranged that leaving afghanistan does not lead to triumphant victory celebrations in Pakistan, then by all means, leave. Can that be done?

Btw, I dont think offering the Pak army "help with resolving issues with India" is as brilliant an idea as its sometimes projeted. India can help or hinder this process to some extent, but it is not the crucial link. If the nexus with the salafists is broken (as it can be, if America is smart about it) then Pakistan and India can manage affairs without war and terrorism and that will be enough. No more is needed in the medium term. Trade and other links will change the equation over time. No grand deal has to be made in the interim and putting one on the table just gives the jihadi element in the Pak army another chance to push their agenda and delay things.

sorry for repetitions and disorganized thoughts. this was written in between real work. Got to run..

[William F. Owen]

Sorry, but the Strategic dissonance here - subject in general - is overflowing the bucket of sh*t.

a.) How does any Western Nation actually benefit from being in A'Stan? Let's say to prevent safe havens for AQ.

b.) What about Somalia. Great safe haven for AQ, as is the tribal area of Pakistan. If we want to stop Poppy Production, why has it increased?

c.) There is NOTHING we need in A'Stan. If A'Stan is actually important then the US should be deploying 50,000 more troops and the UK another 11,000. Basically all NATO nations should be prepared to commit 20-30% of their available ground forces and the US should fund and support that effort.

I see no shame in the US and NATO saying "We'll give up, because without an effective Afghan Government, we are simply not prepared to pay the cost."

This leaves the exam question of why the US and NATO could not defeat a 2nd/3rd rate Irregular force, with no ATGMs or MANPADS.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by omarali50

I also think there is a real Salafist terrorist movement in the world that will be emboldened by an American defeat in Afghanistan.

I think this is undeniable, but perhaps only in the short run. Over time the extremists will probably prove incapable of governing, and then their victory will turn into a political defeat that can be exploited.

WILF questions:

a.) How does any Western Nation actually benefit from being in A'Stan? Let's say to prevent safe havens for AQ.

Many Western countries clearly agree there are reasons to send their forces to Afghanistanfor security interests (local, regionally and globally) for certain and possibly economic interests (Pakistan stability) that again effect the West's security.

b.) What about Somalia. Great safe haven for AQ, as is the tribal area of Pakistan. If we want to stop poppy production, why has it increased?

These are two separate questions, and yes eventually Somalia's role as a safe haven will need to be addressed, but it will be easier to do so if we're successful in Afghanistan in first. We don't need to do both simultaneously.

The poppy production isn't the reason we went into A-stan, and while it is not irrelevant, it doesn't define victory against the Taliban and AQ.

c.) There is NOTHING we need in A'Stan. If A'Stan is actually important then the US should be deploying 50,000 more troops and the UK another 11,000. Basically all NATO nations should be prepared to commit 20-30% of their available ground forces and the US should fund and support that effort.

We may not need anything in A-stan, but the enemy does, and that means it is important to us. It is in our interests to deny him that.

I see no shame in the US and NATO saying "We'll give up, because without an effective Afghan Government, we are simply not prepared to pay the cost."

There would be no shame at all if we had not already stated we wouldn't leave until we stabilized the region. Leaving = a credibility gap.

This leaves the exam question of why the US and NATO could not defeat a 2nd/3rd rate Irregular force, with no ATGMs or MANPADS.

Because we didn't employ the full might of our military, we tried a several different approaches that were all under-resourced.

[omarali50]

The issue is not Afghanistan. By itself, its just a bigger and more dangerous Somalia, not a threat to world peace. The issues are:

1. what happens to the salafist insurgency if NATO suffers a defeat. Does it get bigger, etc.

2. What happens to Pakistan (which is clearly a different matter, unlike Somalia and Afghanistan, its a country connected to the world, with some tech capabilities and actual nuclear weapons and a large diaspora and so on).

3. What happens to Saudi Arabia.

Of course, we can still go back and debate why the US invaded Afghanistan in the first place? IF it was to "deny alqaeda a safe haven" then they did not do a great job, since the salafists just moved to Pakistan, where they have continued to plot and gather recruits and so on. If they are not a huge threat now, why were they a huge threat then? IF it was to show the salafists what happens when you mess with the big chief, then that lesson is not going to be learned when they actually defeat the great satan. If it was to send a message to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia (both of whom had more to do with the salafist network than poor Afghanistan) then again the issue seems to have grown muddled over time. IF it was to blow some steam and make the rubble bounce so that New York firemen would feel better, then does the feelgood feeling last after the choppers take off from the roof with Karzai hanging from a rope ladder?

But I agree, maybe time to admit mistakes and leave. As mildly leftist American liberal, I would be totally OK with that, except that I am from Pakistan and have a not-so-secret vested interest in avoiding the mayhem that I think will follow a US defeat. I dont even have a high opinion of the US ability to meddle in that area ("our man musharraf") but I am thinking "lesser of two evils" and I am not even sure of that anymore.

Anyway, what do you think will happen if the US admits a mistake and leaves? How will the withdrawal be handled? who will be left behind? What will happen to them? Will Pakistan and India start a proxy war in Afghanistan? Will the Saudis get bogged down in Yemen or will they double down by paying the ISI to blow up stuff in Iran and get into deeper trouble all around? Does the region need a supervisor? and who might that be?

[slapout9]

Anyway, what do you think will happen if the US admits a mistake and leaves? How will the withdrawal be handled? who will be left behind? What will happen to them? Will Pakistan and India start a proxy war in Afghanistan? Will the Saudis get bogged down in Yemen or will they double down by paying the ISI to blow up stuff in Iran and get into deeper trouble all around? Does the region need a supervisor? and who might that be?

Leaving A'stan dosen't mean we have to leave the area. Maybe there is some merit to General Kruluk's plan to go with offshore balancing.

[omarali50]

How would the US get there from here? Do Afghans who got taken in by talk of "this time we will stay" be given green cards and brought to live in Wisconsin with the Hmong? What will be US policy when the taliban start stringing up the stragglers from lamp poles? Will the US somehow prevent Pakistan (and India) from restarting their proxy war in Afghanistan? Will the US continue to bomb "afpak" after having pulled out? from which bases? on what grounds?
What was the point of the whole exercise?
Will there be any price to pay in terms of credibility and does it even matter?

Just asking. There may well be excellent answers to all of those questions and those may not be the right questions either.

[tequila]

a.) How does any Western Nation actually benefit from being in A'Stan? Let's say to prevent safe havens for AQ.

Denial of an Islamist al-Qaeda victory, for one. The overall stability of Pakistan, for another.

b.) What about Somalia. Great safe haven for AQ, as is the tribal area of Pakistan. If we want to stop Poppy Production, why has it increased?

Southern Somalia is a haven for certain elements of AQ but not AQ central, the IO high command which has extensive and longstanding ties in the tribal regions. The tribal areas of Pakistan are far more threatening because of those longstanding ties, but defeat in Afghanistan is related to the tribal areas in that they would severely aggravate the problems of Pakistan.

c.) There is NOTHING we need in A'Stan. If A'Stan is actually important then the US should be deploying 50,000 more troops and the UK another 11,000. Basically all NATO nations should be prepared to commit 20-30% of their available ground forces and the US should fund and support that effort.

I would argue otherwise, but simply because the NATO nations disagree about this and the level of effort required doesn't mean that A'stan should be abandoned.

I see no shame in the US and NATO saying "We'll give up, because without an effective Afghan Government, we are simply not prepared to pay the cost."

I don't know about shame, but the spectacle of a NATO retreat and abandonment of Afghanistan would be a significant IO boost to al-Qaeda which would translate into increased fundraising, recruitment, and political will to al-Qaeda and its associated movements. It would also significantly destabilize Pakistan.

There are times when a timely withdrawal can deflate a localized insurgency, as occurred when the Soviet withdrawal led to a prolonged period of reduced recruitment and infighting amongst the mujahidin. However, when one of the primary beneficiaries of a U.S. withdrawal is represented by al-Qaeda, a transnational group dedicated to attacking the U.S. and its allies in a way that none of the mujahidin groups were dedicated to attacking the Soviet bloc, I'd argue that withdrawal under fire would result in a definite negative to U.S. national security even given the savings in treasure and lives.

This leaves the exam question of why the US and NATO could not defeat a 2nd/3rd rate Irregular force, with no ATGMs or MANPADS.

Because the US and NATO could not permanently destroy with the resources on hand insurgent forces protected by large areas of ungoverned space, a safe and robust rear area, and a cowed/supportive Pashtun and Nuristani population.

[slapout9]

How would the US get there from here? Do Afghans who got taken in by talk of "this time we will stay" be given green cards and brought to live in Wisconsin with the Hmong? What will be US policy when the taliban start stringing up the stragglers from lamp poles? Will the US somehow prevent Pakistan (and India) from restarting their proxy war in Afghanistan? Will the US continue to bomb "afpak" after having pulled out? from which bases? on what grounds?
What was the point of the whole exercise?
Will there be any price to pay in terms of credibility and does it even matter?

Just asking. There may well be excellent answers to all of those questions and those may not be the right questions either.

I agree with your questions. But if we stay how do we handle the Karzed(spelling) government which was pretty much elected by fraud and appears to be run by nothing but gangsters and drug dealers. Maybe we should hire Pakistan to invade with a regular Army and just turn it into one big country

[jmm99]

is but a single paragraph in his email to George Will (snip):

2009 Krulak Snip.jpg

It definitely requires limited boots on the ground in Astan. It could, for example, be linked with the tribal engagement concept advanced by MAJ Jim Gant. His article is linked here.

IIRC, COL Bob Jones stated that direct action (even if our only force projection in Astan) would still require "significant" US forces. He didn't state any specific numbers (which would probably be classified anyway).

[omarali50]

OK, hunter killer teams in the border region. Where do they sleep? After all, its not an uninhabited "border region". There are people living there, what if those people start hunting the hunter killers?

"Drones and Airpower (need to be close)". Where? based in bagram while the taliban rule in kabul? or do the airbase security guys also defend Kabul against the taliban? Again, what is to stop the taliban from looking up Dien Bin Phu on google and attacking these airbases? How are they resupplied? And with the rest of the country an almighty mess, how long before Congress and the American people (not to speak of "the Guardian") start complaining that this "footprint" is costly and is causing too many TV teams to go around filiming executions in Kandahar and better to leave the whole sorry place to the savages and so on...(in PC language, of course, I paraphrase).

What is to stop the Pakistani army from jacking up their prices and performing less and less? If NATO could not invade and hold Afghanistan, they are hardly in a position to threaten Pakistan.

And when the mujahideen, fresh from victory over the infidels in Afghanistan, again attack India and India attacks Pakistan and the whole place goes up in flames, what do the hunter-killers do?

So many questions, so little time.
The "Krulak plan" is no plan at all. It would have been better not to go in. But there is no way to pull back now and disguise the disaster as a victory, without actually obtaining some kind of victory. "lipstick on a pig" and all that...There are no good options. But this plan does not even sound like an option.

[jmm99]

which tells how to establish a secure tribal base point.

In 1962 in Vietnam's Central Highlands, approximately a half-dozen SF ODAs (with some military and civilian air assets) managed to secure over 200 villages (a region of several hundred square miles - lots of space for small airfields) and were running 30K+ of CIDG militia. Was done then; and could be done today.

As to Bagram and the rest of the old Northern Alliance region, the Pashtun-based Taliban would have problems in repeating their 1996-2001 sweeps. To overcome the indigenous forces (and the "Northern Alliance" part of the ANA, its largest ethnic component), the Taliban would have to concentrate forces and then would be exposed to conventional firepower.

I don't see the military problems you see.

The political problem is that drawing back into the old Northern Alliance region and establishing "tribal engagement strong points" per Jim Gant in the border regions, would result in a renewed Astan civil war. That is Steve Coll's concern in the article cited by David, along with some other scenarios which seem speculative to me.

[slapout9]

Omaral50, what would you try and do. You are General over everyone for the next 30 minutes.

[MikeF]

which tells how to establish a secure tribal base point.

In 1962 in Vietnam's Central Highlands, approximately a half-dozen SF ODAs (with some military and civilian air assets) managed to secure over 200 villages (a region of several hundred square miles - lots of space for small airfields) and were running 30K+ of CIDG militia. Was done then; and could be done today.

As to Bagram and the rest of the old Northern Alliance region, the Pashtun-based Taliban would have problems in repeating their 1996-2001 sweeps. To overcome the indigenous forces (and the "Northern Alliance" part of the ANA, its largest ethnic component), the Taliban would have to concentrate forces and then would be exposed to conventional firepower.

I don't see the military problems you see.

The political problem is that drawing back into the old Northern Alliance region and establishing "tribal engagement strong points" per Jim Gant in the border regions, would result in a renewed Astan civil war. That is Steve Coll's concern in the article cited by David, along with some other scenarios which seem speculative to me.

Steve Coll's article is impressive, but he misses one assumption- victory has nothing to do with the US or the coalition. It is all about the Afghani's. The solution is simple.

-Let Jim Gant, Mohammad Yunnis, and Greg Mortenson teach, assist, and advise the people to secure themselves, educate their children, and start new businesses.

-Let guys like me conduct UW into the ungoverned spaces to disrupt and destroy the irreconciliables.

[omarali50]

Omaral50, what would you try and do. You are General over everyone for the next 30 minutes.

I am a waffling liberal playing amateur blogger, I would make a very bad general. But I will play along; But then I want to be president, not general..

1. I would get General A, ambassador B and special rep C in one room and figure out if they can work together or not. If not, I would make changes in A, B or C as needed. Once I know what team I am going to work with, I would tell them I am not planning to be remembered as the guy who lost this war. And I have a cunning plan (Yes, I have a plan, not A, B or C...they get to fill it out, but its my plan. I have heard 244 background briefings and by now, I have a plan). This is followed by some whispering into rolled newspapers while the shower runs in the background. General A cannot believe what a ruthless SOB I really am. Ambassador B thinks he always knew I was a cold blooded shark. Rep C keeps his thoughts to himself.

2. The next day I get to talk to a bigger group, generals, assorted bull####ters and some people from the CIA, half of whom dont know it yet but are about to be fired.

3. And oh yes, I also speak directly to that tough looking woman who is ambassador in Pakistan. She is pleasantly surprised to learn that I am not only a cold blooded vulcan, I know a lot more about the natives than Charlie Wilson knew about Texas.

4. Public speculation about this or that course of action continues for the next few weeks, but well connected hacks are already writing that El Presidente is not waffling, he has a cunning plan. Others think he is waffling. A few trusted hacks are used to actually encourage certain republicans and FOX news anchors to really really go out on a limb and say all kinds of stupid things about the cowardly president. Maybe I have a mean streak...

5. Behind the scenes, we have already got some new people and machines in place. On December 6th (a day my hindu astrologers regard as specially auspicious) the turkey gets a surprise. Lady ambassador and special rep C spend the toughest day of their lives holding hands with Kiyani and making sure no one in the Pak army tries to be a hero when the 77 drones attack the same night. Next morning, I announce the 34000 troops going to Afghanistan. I also make it a point to thank Pakistan for their immense cooperation during last night's unprecedented drone offensive. In fact, some journalists are already reporting (from "unnamed sources") that Kiyani and Shuja Pasha collected 47 million dollars as bounty last night.

6. Meanwhile, Karzai and ambassador B are holding a press conference about the new unity govt in Kabul. Ashraf Ghani has a big role. Every European country gets to send money for teachers and roads. More money for Universities and colleges in the big cities. Special arrangements for direct funding of local govt in the provinces. Lots of money for building up the army and the police. More roads. Some warlords coming to the swearing in are unfortunately killed in a taliban ambush, may they rest in peace. "reconcilable taliban" are invited to join the unity govt. And so on. I cannot tell you everything can I?

7. Everybody hates America.

Btw, a few years down the road, it all goes to hell anyway. But by then I have been re-elected and several liberal hawks have offered to have sex with me in any position i desire.
How does that sound?

[Fuchs]

Every discussion about a post-withdrawal Afghanistan that I've seen so far worked on a questionable set of assumptions.

One assumption is that the Taliban would win the Civil War (the real conflict there, the one which merely got set aside temporarily by foreign intervention).
This assumption is very questionable if not outright nonsense in regard to the majority non-Pashtun Northern regions. They would not be overrun again - the Russians would prevent that, if no-one else (yes, not only the West has an interest in the containment of Islamic fundamentalists). The Taliban are numerically weak, after all - and even a domino effect in Pashtun settlements with many new fighters (w)could be countered with Northern and foreign resources.


So a reasonable scenario would be that the Taliban take over the Pashtun regions of Afghanistan and establish their rule there.

The next questionable, but usually used, assumption is that the Taliban with a foothold in AFG would intensify the Pakistani stability problems.
This assumption fails my plausibility check.
What would most likely happen? They would need many thousands of loyal men to exercise control (and hold the Tajiks, Uzbeks... in check). I expect in the short and medium term (up to about 4 years) that there would be a net Taliban personnel resources transfer from Pakistan to Afghanistan that's actually greater than today. A Southern Afghanistan under Taliban rule might actually reduce the pressure on Pakistan.
Their jihad recruitment would certainly be in quite a peril if they had little or no infidels in Afghanistan to point at.


Then there's the assumption that the enemy is stupid and unable to learn or anticipate. In other words: The Taliban would be very aggressive and outward-looking once in power. And they would harbour AQ again (in AFG).

That tale reminds me of the Domino theory, and we all know how overblown that one was. AQ's leadership would have little incentive to go to Afghanistan; it would only provoke another fall of the Taliban due to a renewed invasion (or more support to contra-Taliban forces).
AQ doesn't need Afghanistan anyway. That's a fact proven by the last years.
The dangerous AQ cells are in countries where we could easily call for action of indigenous security forces if we had enough info on that cell.


Then there's the prestige and pride thing.
Well, this happens. There's no real way out once you embarrassed yourself. Covering it up doesn't improve the situation.
Besides; prestige is 99% illusion anyway. The same goes for pride. We have enough opportunities to bolster our pride and reputation; Afghanistan is a worst possible choice for that and honestly, suffering a scratch there wouldn't even be dramatic enough to keep the TV guys attentive for more than a month.


A strange argument (usually coming from Americans) is the "we must not give up our indigenous allies" thing. There's apparently some '75 Saigon syndrome at work or such.
Seriously; disappointment is part of warfare. #### happens. They knew what could happen and they can fight for their own well-being themselves. Besides; the West fought for (and paid) them - they never fought for us, but at most for themselves. I don't see what claims they could have against us.


A withdrawal step by step coupled with subsidies for indigenous contra-Taliban forces is exactly what we need. And we should let the Russians participate in that strategy. It's their (CIS) backyard.

It would be reasonable to stay in the country with a four-digit liaison force. We don't need to train indigenous forces. The can fight themselves, no worse than the Taliban. The key quality is troop morale/leadership, not marksmanship or soldier-like appearance.
The Uzbeks/Tajiks whatever can fight the Taliban with equal quality troops; it just takes a few months for raising those warbands and a bit money to equip and maintain them.


So I look forward to a withdrawal. A complete one for the Europeans and a 90-95% one for the Americans who have more interest in the conflict and more experience in cooperation with indigenous militias.

[MikeF]

We should ask the following for every foreign policy decision,

"What are you doing to help yourself, your brother, and your neighbor?"

If they can't answer the question, then they don't deserve our help. That reasoning extends from A'stan to Pakistan to Iraq to Salinas.

Mike

[jmm99]

Inked in 2005 and renewed in 2008, I'm attaching a .pdf file of the 2005 US-Afghan joint strategic partnership declaration. Besides this, a number of other agreements exist (status of forces, Bagram lease, etc.) which I haven't tracked down to urls.

Thought all might want to read this part of the "D" in DIME. The flavor is that of US support for a strong, centralized Astan government - which I think is nuts in light of Astan's history and politics.

[omarali50]

Not that it matters to anyone else, but I have identified the reason my assumptions about post-withdrawal scenarios are more pessimistic than those of serious thinkers like Fuchs: We have very different assumptions about what (if anything) the Pakistani army WANTS to do (not necessarily what they WILL do). Fuchs seems to assume that the "pakistan stability problem" is a problem of how many taliban are coming in to fight the Pak army. I am assuming that the Pak army and the taliban will no longer be on opposite sides once the American pressure is off. My assumption is anecdotal and may be the paranoia of a Pakistani leftist with longstanding grouses about the army, but there you have it...

[slapout9]

I am a waffling liberal playing amateur blogger, I would make a very bad general. But I will play along; But then I want to be president, not general..

1. I would get General A, ambassador B and special rep C in one room and figure out if they can work together or not. If not, I would make changes in A, B or C as needed. Once I know what team I am going to work with, I would tell them I am not planning to be remembered as the guy who lost this war. And I have a cunning plan (Yes, I have a plan, not A, B or C...they get to fill it out, but its my plan. I have heard 244 background briefings and by now, I have a plan). This is followed by some whispering into rolled newspapers while the shower runs in the background. General A cannot believe what a ruthless SOB I really am. Ambassador B thinks he always knew I was a cold blooded shark. Rep C keeps his thoughts to himself.

2. The next day I get to talk to a bigger group, generals, assorted bull####ters and some people from the CIA, half of whom dont know it yet but are about to be fired.

3. And oh yes, I also speak directly to that tough looking woman who is ambassador in Pakistan. She is pleasantly surprised to learn that I am not only a cold blooded vulcan, I know a lot more about the natives than Charlie Wilson knew about Texas.

4. Public speculation about this or that course of action continues for the next few weeks, but well connected hacks are already writing that El Presidente is not waffling, he has a cunning plan. Others think he is waffling. A few trusted hacks are used to actually encourage certain republicans and FOX news anchors to really really go out on a limb and say all kinds of stupid things about the cowardly president. Maybe I have a mean streak...

5. Behind the scenes, we have already got some new people and machines in place. On December 6th (a day my hindu astrologers regard as specially auspicious) the turkey gets a surprise. Lady ambassador and special rep C spend the toughest day of their lives holding hands with Kiyani and making sure no one in the Pak army tries to be a hero when the 77 drones attack the same night. Next morning, I announce the 34000 troops going to Afghanistan. I also make it a point to thank Pakistan for their immense cooperation during last night's unprecedented drone offensive. In fact, some journalists are already reporting (from "unnamed sources") that Kiyani and Shuja Pasha collected 47 million dollars as bounty last night.

6. Meanwhile, Karzai and ambassador B are holding a press conference about the new unity govt in Kabul. Ashraf Ghani has a big role. Every European country gets to send money for teachers and roads. More money for Universities and colleges in the big cities. Special arrangements for direct funding of local govt in the provinces. Lots of money for building up the army and the police. More roads. Some warlords coming to the swearing in are unfortunately killed in a taliban ambush, may they rest in peace. "reconcilable taliban" are invited to join the unity govt. And so on. I cannot tell you everything can I?

7. Everybody hates America.

Btw, a few years down the road, it all goes to hell anyway. But by then I have been re-elected and several liberal hawks have offered to have sex with me in any position i desire.
How does that sound?

Hang in there based upon your plan and desires you probably will get to be Prseident