They can also be very cranky when it comes to getting effects on target, in that sort of terrain.The fire support by mortars becomes more important because they can touch almost all places of the terrain.
They can also be very cranky when it comes to getting effects on target, in that sort of terrain.The fire support by mortars becomes more important because they can touch almost all places of the terrain.
Interesting comment.
My experience is dated and thus refers to different weapons and ammunition (but in the same calibers other than the 120mm for 4.2" [107mm] switch) but Mortars rarely got cranky with good crews. Mountains were no problem and they generally were far more accurate there than Artillery...Originally Posted by jcustis
Possibly interesting aside, the Chinese in Korea could put a Mortar round in your hip pocket but were lousy rifle shots; the Viet Namese were not nearly as good with their mortars but were good rifle shots...
Was that success due to registered targets and shift from known point missions?
What I was basing my comment off of is the difficulty on the FOs end, especially if he is not a FO with those primary duties and commensurate degree of training.
How about rifle grenades Ken? Any familiarity with them?
That plus surprise targets and everything in between.
Lot of calls for fire by unit NCOs not FOs. While their knowing what they were doing was definitely an asset, in my observation a good FDC could talk a poor FO or even Joe Tentpeg into getting stuff on target -- that's with manual calculation on an M16 Plotting Board, of course. A good FDC can fix all sorts of FO and weapon / ammo shortfalls. The best Computers were / are former FO /FIST guys.
Part of the 'good' FDC problem is automation which adversely impacts innovative ability and part is that, unless watched, the FDC Chief will use his best plotter for everything and the others don't get to develop the skills.Yep, they had some advantages but did require a hefty amount of training for 'accurate' use (accurate in quotes because they weren't consistent), the 40mm eased the training burden and works almost as well for most things and is at least as accurate. We're better off with the 40mm and the M79 /M203 / M 32 / M320. Not a fan of the Mk 19 though.How about rifle grenades Ken? Any familiarity with them?
Besides the points answered by Ken I justed wanted to point out that the mortar has traditionally been the mountain infantry's best friend. Not only does it allow you to suppress and target almost everything within range with considerable effect, but it can also do this job deployed behind ridges, on steep slopes and possibly close a good supply route. The FOs/platoon should have the tools and training to make the best use of it.
Sending the vehicle supplied HE from afar is way easier on the backs of the humping soldiers.
Last edited by Firn; 11-27-2009 at 08:45 AM.
The Soviet experience in Afghanistan underlines this experience. They quickly found that their 82mm Vasilek "semi-automatic" mortar provided stirling, timely and in most cases devastating fire support (especially in burst fire mode) in contrast to their SP and towed arty. I wonder how far along the Dragon system is progressing for the USMC? Hope it hasn't been cancelled (...would like to hear that the Royal Marines will subsequently aqcuire them in future. Ahhhhhh, BAe, god love yah).
Last edited by Tukhachevskii; 11-27-2009 at 10:54 AM.
One comment to Tukhachevskii's Afganistan comment. During IIWW Soviet troops used this kind of launcher in Caucasus. Fuchs can say now that this is copy of Nebelwerfer
I'll use this to segue into a point I'd like to discuss - training specialists within the squad. Looking at the USMC squad composition and likely future missions, I'm considering task organizing my squads to create a squad headquarters with some specialist training, using one of the three organic fire teams. Keep in mind that these "specialists" will be cross-trained 0311s. I envision it looking something like this:
Squad Leader
Assistant Squad Leader
Radio Operator
Forward Observer
Intel Specialist
The other two fireteams would stay organized traditionally. Obviously I'm assuming some risk by concentrating these skill sets, but I don't intend to keep everyone else ignorant of radio operation, call for fire, or SSE. I do intend to have designated personnel focused on those skills, however. These specialists should ideally be mature and experienced, with a deployment under their belt, so they have a solid grounding in basic 0311 individual tasks. Most of the limiting factors that I've identified come from the practical constraints of training a company, namely a limited number of experienced infantrymen who can master these skills.
I believe the biggest benefit would be freeing the squad leader to lead his squad without worrying about the details of transmitting routine reports, conducting CFF and all of the mental calculations that go with it, or keeping track of all of the information requirements from higher. This way, he can focus on the commander's intent. Unfortunately, the fire support initiatives I have seen geared towards increasing squad capabilities have focused on training the squad leader, which I think is a bad idea. Communications, fire support, and intelligence are all becoming increasingly technical, requiring more time to achieve mastery.
I've been out of an infantry company for five years now, so I'm a little unsure of how practical this will be once my vision collides with reality. Any thoughts so far?
From a strictly time management perspective, there isn't a whole lot of separation, or flash to bang, between incidents and reporting, especially at the squad level, so I don't see "routine reporting" as a combat chore. I don't believe then that there are routine reports to be submitted, nor should someone else be relied on to maintain situational awareness of information requirements from higher. Those are elements of the squad leader's lot in life, and if delegated down to allow him to focus on commander's intent, what's left?I believe the biggest benefit would be freeing the squad leader to lead his squad without worrying about the details of transmitting routine reports, conducting CFF and all of the mental calculations that go with it, or keeping track of all of the information requirements from higher. This way, he can focus on the commander's intent.
If we are talking about static OP or fixed site security operations (for a patrol base), then there may be an advantage to some arrangement where the SL should not be the primary guy for such tasks, but squads are not the base unit usually for those type missions - platoons are.
For some skillsets like CFF, sure, they could be pushed down further to a solid lance corporal who has a knack for it and can do it, and I'd argue that the Marine with the most time available would be a great candidate, since you are addressing the mounting training requirements. The guy with the most time is almost never the most mature or well-rounded Marine in the squad, so how do we resolve that fact?
The core problem I see is the issue of radio assets. I myself do not know if each infantry squad has a PRC-117 assigned to them, but I'm pretty certain that PRC-148 and -152 radios are prevalent down to the squad and team. They serve as the conduit to the platoon, and under the rifle company experiment design, there are enablers that will be carved out from a platoon strength to do these tasks and can be farmed out down to squad levels.
I hate to say it, but right now I'd just be happy getting a basic 0311 to show me he knows how to follow a TM and zero his RCO.
Last edited by jcustis; 04-19-2010 at 04:09 PM.
Where Are The Infantry Sergeants?
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...f&AD=ADA509378
Where Are the Infantry Sergeants: An examination of the Marine Corps' policies and processes that adversely affected the availability of infantry sergeants to serve as squad leaders in the operating forces - Major Thomas M. Tennant
This is another thesis paper submitted for a military studies masters degree requirement at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. The historical section that details the history of the squad leader has a lot of researched detail about the employment of squad leaders as far back as the AEF in WWI.
Organizing Modern Infantry: An Analysis of Section Fighting Power
Link appears troublesome. Artilce is at Canadian Army Journal Vol. 13, No. 3.
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