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Thread: COIN Counterinsurgency (merged thread)

  1. #281
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    Default A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army

    I have been waiting and hoping that he would put his thoughts into a well-developed article, rather than the distilled versions that he was forced into by editorial constraints of newspaper op-eds. Behold...

    A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army

    by COL Gian P. Gentile

    Population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) has become the American Army’s new way of war. The principles and ideas that emerged out of the Army’s counterinsurgency field manual (FM), FM 3-24, published in late 2006, have become transcendent. The field manual has moved beyond simple Army doctrine for countering insurgencies to become the defining characteristic of the Army’s new way of war. In the American Army today, everyone is a counterinsurgent. It is easy to find examples of FM 3-24’s permeating effect in other Army doctrinal manuals such as FM 3-0, Operations, and FM 3-07, Stability Operations. Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV, the American Army general charged with writing the Army’s doctrine, recently stated:
    The future is not one of major battles and engagements fought by armies on battlefields devoid of population; instead, the course of conflict will be decided by forces operating among the people of the world. Here, the margin of victory will be measured in far different terms than the wars of our past. The allegiance, trust, and confidence of populations will be the final arbiters of success.
    The idea of populations as the prize in war, that they are the focus, is drawn directly from the pages of FM 3-24.2

    In a sense, population-centric counterinsurgency has perverted a better way of American war which has primarily been one of improvisation and practicality. Over the course of American history there have been strategic shifts in terms of the threats and enemies that the United States had faced. With each of these shifts came a different approach, or way, to fighting wars or preparing for them in peacetime. For example, in the American Civil War, General Ulysses S. Grant carried out a strategy of exhausting the southern armies through large-scale combat. A quarter of a century later in the Philippines, the American Army improvised and adapted to fight and ultimately defeat an insurgency against the US colonial government. As historian Brian Linn has shown in criticism of Russell Weigley’s classic The American Way of War, the US military’s approach has not been an ideological one of only wanting to fight wars consisting of big battles. A close reading of Linn’s work shows that the true American way of war has been one of adaptation and flexibility, and not a rigid ideological attachment to seeking out the next Napoleonic battle of Austerlitz.

    Regrettably, the American Army’s new way of war, otherwise called population-centric counterinsurgency, has become the only operational tool in the Army’s repertoire to deal with problems of insurgency and instability throughout the world. Population-centric COIN may be a reasonable operational method to use in certain circumstances, but it is not a strategy. There are flaws and limitations that need to be exposed and considered.

    Read the rest at Parameters

  2. #282
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    It is a good read and it makes you think. But I don't think he is exactly right or exactly wrong.

    One of the things he says is that because GEN Petraeus says - although Afghanistan is not Iraq, some of the principles wrt COIN learned in Iraq are applicable in Afghanistan - that this means those principles now drive our thinking on Afghanistan, and by extension drive all our operational thinking. For me, and for many I know, the idea expressed by GEN Petraeus is similar to other principles, or fundamental things you want to consider given conditions and objectives. There are similarities between the two operational environments I think when you consider we are the most foreign element there and that the enemy is using that to their advantage, and we may want to make it a disadvantage, or at least contest it. The desire to contest it or deny it to the enemy support multiple ways, however in light of political objectives (stated, inferred or likely to be acceptable) those ways are at least somewhat constrained for better or worse to an approach which secures the population and isolates it from the enemy - it is perhaps just who we are.

    A second thing I disagree with is that COIN has become the issue which will define us as a military or an an army. While it may be the one which occupies a significant amount our current efforts this seems appropriate given that it has been the constituted the bulk of the chosen operational approach by the commanders charged with achieving some sort of political objective tolerable to the United States. This is the generating force responding to the operational requirements described by those CDRs - theaters which consume the bulk of our ground force structure, and drive force generation. COL Gentile can make the argument that their operational approaches are flawed, but he does not have the responsibility to solve the political problem that they do.

    I'm not sure how much journalists and think tankers really drive operational thinking either. I believe to some degree they may believe they do, but I think generally they pick up on what they hear, or see being done and do a good (sometimes no so good) job at describing and articulating it. For those not in uniform, it may appear they have significant influence, but most of the ideas I've read from them I can trace back to some man or woman in uniform who was confronted with a problem and either started doing something that worked, or kept saying it loud enough till someone listened. What they do provide is a means to get things out to people who would not listen because they believe if it came from the military it can't possibly be right. To wit, innovation and adaptation are alive and well in the ranks - after all, platoon sergeants still teach lieutenants that in some cases its better to ask forgiveness than permission.

    I'm not sure but I don't think there is a task breakdown for COIN that walks you from an overarching mission task to supporting collective tasks, leader tasks and individual tasks. If there is not I'm not sure we can really measure what COIN capabilities we have, or what capacities we have in those capabilities. So, I just don't see the evidence that that it has reshaped our thinking and our force management practices to a point where we are posturing to be a Pop-Centric COIN force to support nation building.

    What I have seen is a push to ensure we plan for the range of things we may have to do because: we planned to do them; were told to do them; or created conditions which required us to do them. I've been seeing it in our experimentation, and in our PME - which I think is a good indication of how we are posturing for the future. I think our other DOTMLPF processes are following suit - and I believe this supports a more capable force.

    Now - where I do agree with COL Gentile's argument. I have grown tired of hearing, "its the hardest thing we've ever done, or will ever do", and "its the graduate level of war". Really, so events like the amphibious landings in WWII and Inchon or even Grant's Wilderness campaign simply don't compare? WWII was a real cake walk right? "Hard" is a relative term. It may be the hardest thing we've done in a while, or the hardest thing we've done this year - it may even be harder than comparative operations - but it is a relative term. How about crossing the Zagros - would that be hard? How about fighting in N. Korea - would that be hard? Truth is I think its all hard, and I think war as opposed to training is the graduate level - meaning you've graduated from training and now your doing the work you trained for. Every man and woman who serves in combat gets a graduate degree in war.

    I thank COL Gentile for continuing to stress our thinking on this issue, even while I disagree with him. The greatest danger may be that we get to comfortable with the status quo, and get intellectually lazy.

    Best, Rob

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Thumbs up Good find, Schmedlap and excellent post, Rob

    Particularly these four thoughts which all merit repetition:
    A second thing I disagree with is that COIN has become the issue which will define us as a military or an an army.

    For those not in uniform, (Think tanks and journalists) may appear they have significant influence, but most of the ideas I've read from them I can trace back to some man or woman in uniform...

    "Hard" is a relative term.

    The greatest danger may be that we get to comfortable with the status quo, and get intellectually lazy.
    All totally correct. The first item will not occur; simply look at how quickly the hard learned lessons of WW II, Korea and Viet Nam were discarded...

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    Default The Intellectual Straight Jacket

    I liked the article, I experienced the full range of emotion while reading it, during one paragraph I was cheering, during another I was shaking my fist, during another I was calllng the author a fool, then on another I said he was brilliant. If you haven't read it, I recommend it.

    All quotes are from COL Gentile's article.

    Good strategy, however, demands the consideration of alternatives, yet the American Army's fixation on population-centric COIN precludes choice.
    I couldn't agree more, and our attempt to frame this conflict as a global insurgency that in turn requires us to re-build the globe so every country will allow us to operate through, by and with their forces is a deeply flawed approach that can't be supported by our means or our diminishing diplomatic power in a multi-polar world. This approach is doomed, yet we're fixated on it and not exploring alternatives.

    Second, history has shown that insurgencies can be defeated by means other than the population-centric approach. Consider the recent defeat of the Tamil Tigers by the Sri Lankan military.
    Yes and no, actually there was a considerable amount of population-centric supporting activities, and equally important what COL Gentile may not know is that the LTTE were largely a peer conventional force to the Sri Lankan Army as they had a large maneuver army, their own navy and few lame airplanes that they could throw grenades out of. The Chinese invested heavily in Sri Lanka and this funding enabled the Sri Lankan Army to sustain their fight against the LTTE this time around (they were successful many times in the past, but simply ran out of money and political will to drive the stake in the LTTE's heart). This was far from a classical COIN effort, it was more along the lines of mini American Civil War.

    The term itself "counterinsurgency" is so heavily loaded with historical context, assumptions, myths, and aburdities that it has become almost meaningless.
    Three cheers! Now every problem is an insurgency, and we apply the same template blindly to solve it. We don't really bother figuring out what is really going on.

    He talks about the number of articles challenging Army doctrine approximately 30 years ago compared to now when there is relatively little challenge and debate over the new COIN doctrine.
    What has appeared is a series of articles touting the triumph of the Surge, a narrative that has steamrolled the American Army into accepting this new way of war.
    I find his repeated assertions that the surge wasn't effective to be the larger distractor from his otherwise good arguments. GEN Petraeus got it right with the surge. It isn't hubris to believe that a large security presence suppressed the level of violence and facilitated some political maneuvering. Thumbs down on these repeated unsubstantiated attacks on the surge, it was appropriate for the situation in Iraq. Give it its due and move on.

    In fact, COIN is arguably less complex precisely because it is less "kinetic."
    I hate it when some fat guy who can't make it in combat arms loves to gloat about how smart he is because he read a book on COIN. On the other hand, COIN isn't less complex than conventional war. The level of complexity perhaps switches, for senior officers the complexity level for large scale war fighting such as WWII is more complex than COIN, while at the lower levels COIN is more complex for the foot soldier. Don't confuse complex with easier or harder, that isn't my point. The author misses the point when he claims the degree of politics is the same for the PLT Sgt talking to a village chief today as it was for a PLT Sgt charging the beach in Normandy. The complexity in COIN is the political and social aspects at the tactical level combined with the kinetic piece, so no the platoon sgt bravely storming the beach in Normandy isn't conducting political warfare, he is maneuvering to kill German conventional forces. The political aspect of the war is largely above his level (he has enough to deal with). The Platoon Sgt talking to a tribal chief in Afghanistan or Iraq is engaged in political-warfare at the tactical level. Both are hard, but they're not the same.

    The COIN experts seem to believe that they are the "young Turks" who figured out the true political nature of war compared to the old,
    Well the Young Turks who actually shifted from a largely ineffective conventional strategy to a COIN strategy did figure out a better approach to fighting the war in Iraq. I like to know where the author thnks we would be if we didn't make the transition?

    Intead of American Army officers reading the so-called COIN classic texts of Galula, Thompson, Kitson, and Nagl, they should be reading the history of the British Empire in the latter half of the 19th century.
    the British Army and government did understand the value of strategy They understood the essence of linking means to ends.
    I agree, in "addition" to reading the classic COIN texts, they should read about the demise of the British Empire. No doubt there are many relevant lessons.

    The new American way of war has eclipsed the execution of sound strategy, producing never-ending campaigns to nation-building and attempts to change entire societies in places like Afghanistan.
    I know Rob and Ken didn't concur with this, but from where I sit, I tend to agree that DoD is getting pushed into this model, and it is now a blind assumption that it is the right approach globally without a lot of intellectual rigor being applied. I support his comment about the "new" COIN doctrine being an intellectual straight jacket to a large degree.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Well it' no secret that I admire and respect Gian Gentile as solid historian and military thinker, so I am in strong agreement with the vast majority of the article. - So what?

    What I felt was under emphasised was the intellectually lazy and faith based approach of those advocating "POP-COIN" in it's wonderfully context free nature.

    The whole edifice of "POP-COIN" comes to rest on the assumption that "protecting the population" is a method in and of itself. Additionally it assumes that merely doing it, creates the desired end state. So why not protect the population by killing the insurgents?

    "POP-COIN" manages to argue that killing insurgents equals killing innocent people in the same way Manoeuvre Warfare argued that doing stupid things was bad and past this off as insight.

    Doing stupid things is always stupid. Killing the right people for the right reason, always works. We have 3,000 years of history to prove it.

    The only quibble I would add is that of the "strategy built on tactics." Callwell accurately observed that if something was not "tactically feasible" it could not be used as part of a strategy - so the tactical feasibility does form strategy in a very real sense.

    Poor tactics, as in irrelevant tactical action, is always bad - see Hannibal, as in his inability to destroy the Roman Army, by besieging Rome, despite beating them in battles. If besieging Rome was not tactically feasible, why go to Italy?
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
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    For the most part, I agree with COL Gentile. However, I am not overly concerned largely for reasons that Rob stated about COIN not being as widely embraced as many seem to think it has. It was reassuring to read Rob's post. I still know a lot of combat arms, Active Duty Officers in the Army. Most of them are field grade officers. They all are pretty skeptical of COIN being the wave of the future. The good news, imo, is that they are now commanding battalions or doing the Leavenworth thing (not the jail!). Maybe the think tanks are full of the COIN stuff, but the guys who are actually leading Soldiers and shaping history and who will be the future leaders of the Army are the guys who are less star struck with the prospect of joining a think tank or publishing books.

    One of my old BCs strongly considered getting out, but decided to stick around to take command of a BDE and told me that he intends to remain in as long as possible, in large part because "this generation of Officers will make it to Company Command and beyond without ever doing combined arms operations. We need to stick around to make sure the Army still knows how to do that stuff." I suspect he will have a lot more influence upon how the Army trains and fights than Nagl or Exum.

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    Thumbs up Yep...

    Bill Moore:
    I tend to agree that DoD is getting pushed into this model, and it is now a blind assumption that it is the right approach globally without a lot of intellectual rigor being applied. I support his comment about the "new" COIN doctrine being an intellectual straight jacket to a large degree.
    True in both cases but DoD being pushed by the flavor / Admin / Think Tankette du jour and DoD adopting are two very different things. Dead right on the strait jacket bit, it is that. Dumb, too...

    Schmedlap:
    Maybe the think tanks are full of the COIN stuff, but the guys who are actually leading Soldiers and shaping history and who will be the future leaders of the Army are the guys who are less star struck with the prospect of joining a think tank or publishing books.
    Yep...

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    Default Maybe but,

    Posted by Schmedlap

    I am not overly concerned largely for reasons that Rob stated about COIN not being as widely embraced as many seem to think it has. It was reassuring to read Rob's post. I still know a lot of combat arms, Active Duty Officers in the Army. Most of them are field grade officers. They all are pretty skeptical of COIN being the wave of the future.
    "this generation of Officers will make it to Company Command and beyond without ever doing combined arms operations. We need to stick around to make sure the Army still knows how to do that stuff." I suspect he will have a lot more influence upon how the Army trains and fights than Nagl or Exum.
    I agree with you and Rob on the points above, BUT while many Army leaders have not have embraced COIN as the "end all be all", we have a generation of officers that have practiced nothing else. The risk isn't based on what mid and senior level officers believe (as you stated), but due to the cycle of rotations into the box, recovery, then pri mission training to go back into the COIN box, thus the high end combat skill sets are eroding, and in that sense our Army is becoming a defacto COIN force.

    We still have our conventional high end combat ground capability, but that blade is getting increasingly dull. The danger is an entire generation of up and coming officers have missed their most important training/education opportunity, which is mentorship by senior officers during high end combat exercises. The risk isn't the think tanks (and their assumptions about the future, which are too often mistakenly stated as facts), but the very real OPTEMPO and the fact we don't have time to train on high end combat.

    As an SF guy, I used to complain that we were too focused on conventional warfighting tasks (unilateral ODA missions), which was eroding our UW capabilities, now it seems that our GPF brothers are experiencing the same challenge from a different perspective.

    The SECDEF stated we have to train and equip to win the war we're fighting today, but we also have to strive to maintain some semblance of balance. I'm not sure we're allowing the GPF to do that.

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    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Bill,

    Well said (and Happy Thanksgiving out there in the far west). I'm just not sure current conditions support training on much more than those tasks that support the current mission set (at least at the unit level). Doing a good MA at the unit level may better refine those tasks, and we'll probably see that many of the small unit battle drills are required - but I'm not sure the conditions will support much more as I suspect there are lots of other tasks that are probably close to the top.

    However the classroom and experimentation still looks balanced from my perspective - that is good. It may be the one area where we can retain contact with those skills so when conditions support or require we can make a faster transition.

    A couple of months ago I heard the CSA speak at Bragg about the rotational dwell he desires and believes the Army needs. He spoke candidly and we appreciated it - there are no firm predictions on when that dwell will be achievable. The military will geographically shift weight, but not really shift too far along the spectrum.

    One thing I've not heard is what is the readiness level on combined arms tasks which we believe we cannot fall below? I'm not sure that has been identified, and I think you'd have to pull a random sampling of units and place them in the box to really measure their level of performance. Identification of such would give us a better idea of where we are really at, and as such what the gap is between there and where we should be. This will help us develop a generating force training plan (and place the right amount of emphasis in the other DOMLPF areas as well) to mitigate that risk when the conditions support it, or when we believe the risk is simply to high.

    Best, Rob
    Last edited by Rob Thornton; 11-26-2009 at 08:52 PM. Reason: meant all combined arms "tasks" instead of using just the word "attacks" in the last paragrpah.

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    While I will certainly concur that I cannot find any historical examples, and certainly no foundation in the fundamentals of insurgency for "population-centric" COIN to be a solution for insurgency (too rooted in the belief that effectiveness of governance and control of a populace that perceives itself to be experiencing injustice or disrespect with no means of effective legitimate redress will bring it into the fold); I also remain adament that the British approach of crushing every generation or so that element of a populace that you are exploiting for your own purposes that dares to rise up to challenge your presence and actions, is no COIN victory either. The first dabs at the symptoms of the governments shortcomings on the government side, and the second dabs at the symptoms of the governments shortcomings on on the populace's side. Neither bothers to attempt to identify and address the true grievances leading to insurgency.

    A populace bribed by a government is not one which necessarily supports the same.

    An insurgency fought and "won" every 20 years is one that has only been suppressed and never truly resolved.

    Aspects of both approaches have a place in a good COIN campaign, but neither stands alone.

    So I would say that Gian is right about what is wrong, but I would also say that he is wrong about what is right.
    Robert C. Jones
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    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Happy thanksgiving everyone! If this comment is incoherent, please blame the turkey and wine.

    Overall I liked the piece.

    The more I read Col. Gentile the more I tend to think he is really looking to the future and is trying to strangle the baby in the crib. I agree (as one who is not in the Army) with others that pop-centric COIN isn't as pervasive as Col. Gentile makes it out to be, but it really seems to have gained traction in some policy and pundit circles and they are the ones who will ultimately drive the bus.

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    Default Our own JFC Fuller

    My first day as a registered member and I am motivated to write something--as opposed to having something worth writing.
    I greatly admire COL Gentile and his efforts; he reminds me of Fuller in the interwar years: got it right with tanks and maneuver; missed out on the primacy of the combined arms thingy.
    I feel the colonel is absolutely correct in that we are losing our mid-intensity warfighting capability. We have guys becoming majors who may have never taken a company through unit tank gunnery or its field artillery counterpart. A friend of mine's son (FA) has spent two tours in Iraq and they haven't even brought their guns with them.
    But, you have to prepare to fight the war you in, not the one you think you might be in in the future. The skill set--especially at the small unit level--is so different you have to pay your money and take your chances. However, the drawdown in Iraq (assuming it comes to fruition), and the differences in tactical operations between it and AFG are such that time may give us the opportunity to recover our non COIN skills.
    I actually think the greatest damage done to the Army is the reorganization into small combat brigades, if only because--once we sit down in an environment where the overarching pressure is no longer rotations and dwell time--it will be more difficult and take longer to remedy the errors in it. There was a lot to said for the robustness of the ROAD division and its Division86 follow-on, although the eventual AOE division did give up some of that. But that is a different topic.
    Back on thread, I applaud the colonel for doing everything he can to ensure there is perspective brought to the doctrinal/organizational fight.
    OBTW, did you see the Ricks post where he called the colonel the COINhata?

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by libertariansoldier View Post
    My first day as a registered member and I am motivated to write something--as opposed to having something worth writing.
    I greatly admire COL Gentile and his efforts; he reminds me of Fuller in the interwar years: got it right with tanks and maneuver; missed out on the primacy of the combined arms thingy.
    I think the big difference between Gentile and Fuller is that Fuller was more vocal than insightful and spent a great deal of his time being wrong.

    The "Fullers" of this world can all be found reading FM3-24, and writing about COIN as if they've discovered gravity.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    I agree with you and Rob on the points above, BUT while many Army leaders have not have embraced COIN as the "end all be all", we have a generation of officers that have practiced nothing else. The risk isn't based on what mid and senior level officers believe (as you stated), but due to the cycle of rotations into the box, recovery, then pri mission training to go back into the COIN box, thus the high end combat skill sets are eroding, and in that sense our Army is becoming a defacto COIN force.
    Good point.

    I don't know if this is the analogy that you had in mind, but as I read your comment, I thought about why the Army opted to ignore Vietnam and focus on HIC in the 70s and 80s. A generation of leaders who did HIC in WWII and Korea found themselves in a war in Vietnam where HIC had less utility. They wanted to get back to what they knew. Likewise, we're now raising a generation of officers who are not only being ordered to execute COIN ops, but they are also a generation that (from what I can tell) chafes more readily at authority and revels more at the thought of being Lawrence of Arabia rather than George S Patton. It seems plausible that in ten years we could send a few brigades someplace to fight a regional HIC and get our balls stomped and then conclude that our mistake was failing to intervene in the region five years earlier via a COIN op.

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    For several years now, many Marines and Soldiers alike have bemoaned the lack of combined arms training that is occurring in our regular training cycles. This is certainly disconcerting since we all know that combined arms skills require continual fine-tuning, and they atrophy relatively quickly. Moreover, those skilled in the combined arms arena understand the challenges inherent in executing such operations and tend to take exception to the whole “COIN is the graduate level of warfare” credo for the reasons that Gian cites; such a statement demeans the difficulties associated with executing such missions. I doubt that is the intent, but it is the result nonetheless, and I don’t think that many will argue the intellectual prowess required to conduct truly effective combined arms warfare.

    However, I’m not sure if our lack of maintaining rigorous combined arms training these days is as much a result of a fundamental shift in the manner in which we view warfare as it is simply an unfortunate by-product of our deployment schedules. Units in CONUS are essentially either getting ready to deploy or just returning from deployment, and so time really is a precious commodity. Eventually, OIF and OEF will wind down, and when that does happen, I suspect we will return to a more balanced approach to our training and preparedness. I sure hope so, anyway…

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    I too agree with COL Gentile's criticisms of POP-COIN, especially that it is an operational method rather than a strategy. I also take issue with "the population is the Center of Gravity" mantra that gets thrown around to mimic thought.

    However, I don't think the current COIN chic culture is a crisis. Yes, the military has focused almost exclusively on COIN in recent years, but prior to September 11th our skills at COIN had atrophied to non-existence. We've been playing catch up, and eventually we'll be caught up and balance will be restored to the Force. We do need to be able to do both COIN and HIC. Only a Sith deals in absolutes.

    At least, in the Marine Corps the COIN wave is beginning to crest. Not only is CAX coming back, but a new-improved CAX is coming. Maybe things are worse in the Army, I could be wrong.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Schmedlap View Post
    Likewise, we're now raising a generation of officers who are not only being ordered to execute COIN ops, but they are also a generation that (from what I can tell) chafes more readily at authority and revels more at the thought of being Lawrence of Arabia rather than George S Patton.
    Someone has to get it beaten into the US military that T.E. Lawrence was a not a good soldier or that effective. He was invented by a US newspaper writer and then went on to drink his own bath water. The men who need to be studied and copied are men like Allenby, not Lawrence. T.E. Lawrence -himself- simply holds no lessons for the serious student of warfare.

    It seems plausible that in ten years we could send a few brigades someplace to fight a regional HIC and get our balls stomped and then conclude that our mistake was failing to intervene in the region five years earlier via a COIN op.
    So to conclude with hindsight, based on what evidence? The only folks who would want to think like that are those pumping the COIN agenda.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Wilf,
    We're not in disagreement. I'm just saying that I can see us going down those paths if the current crop of Soldiers who have done nothing but COIN react in the same way to a future HIC as the WWII/Korea folk who did nothing but HIC reacted to Vietnam.

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    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Someone has to get it beaten into the US military that T.E. Lawrence was a not a good soldier or that effective. He was invented by a US newspaper writer and then went on to drink his own bath water. The men who need to be studied and copied are men like Allenby, not Lawrence. T.E. Lawrence -himself- simply holds no lessons for the serious student of warfare.
    Wilf

    Not a good soldier in the mold of the day? Nope and Lawrence said that himself.

    But I will disagree to the degree that you dismiss Lawrence. Inflated by the media, yes. Inflated by Lawrence, yes. But he did play a role in the arab Revolt and that role is quite worthy of study, albeit with a degree of scepticism.

    As for the COIN agenda and the non-COIN agenda, they deserve each other. Personally I would rather have the think tanks AEI, CNAS, and others mud fight in speedos and bikinis. That would be more useful than listening to either continue to try and overstate their case.

    Tom

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Schmedlap View Post
    Wilf,
    We're not in disagreement. I'm just saying that I can see us going down those paths if the current crop of Soldiers who have done nothing but COIN react in the same way to a future HIC as the WWII/Korea folk who did nothing but HIC reacted to Vietnam.
    Point taken, well made.
    Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom View Post
    But he did play a role in the arab Revolt and that role is quite worthy of study, albeit with a degree of scepticism.
    Yes he did, but let's study the revolt, and not the man. The revolt was not his idea, and he was one of several tasked with the role.
    As for the COIN agenda and the non-COIN agenda, they deserve each other. Personally I would rather have the think tanks AEI, CNAS, and others mud fight in speedos and bikinis. That would be more useful than listening to either continue to try and overstate their case.
    I hear you, but if someone keeps telling that "COIN is the Future" or "the graduate level of war" or any of the statements that can do serious damage, then I need to get my bikini on and jump in - but having some class I only wrestle in Jell-O!
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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