Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[JMA]

Again, killing the target, in this case Assad, is no guarantee that the next person in line is better, or that there will even be a orderly transition of power.

Yes that is always a consideration when one considers an assassination.

The result could be total anarchy. At least with Assad in power you have someone to negotiate with.

Yea, over the bodies of 160,000 civilians.

I guess you don't understand the concept I propose. No matter.

Seems to me you want to know what you are going to get next before you pull that trigger.

Obviously.

You want to anticipate the consequences, intended and unintended, of all actions before proceeding.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Yea, over the bodies of 160,000 civilians.

I guess you don't understand the concept I propose. No matter.

I think I understand it, I just think it is simplistic.This is from research on killing the head of terrorist organizations as a tactic, but the principal is the same.

In general, the study found that the decapitation strategy
appears to have little effect on the reduction of terrorist activity. The most notable trend from the statistical analysis was that decapitation strikes on religious terrorist groups tended to be followed by sharp increases in fatalities. This could be an important indication that decapitation strikes should be carefully considered on the basis of the type of group targeted. As this strategy is currently viewed to be effective by policy makers and is supported by public opinion, more data should be gathered in order to thoroughly study the efficacy of the tactic.

The British finally gave us these types of targeted killing of IRA members in part because there was never anyone in power long enough to negotiate a final peace. Killings don't change the nature of the grievances, the reason people fight, or the dynamics of the game, it only alters the players.

I doubt that killing Assad, even if accomplished in the early days of the conflict, would have resulted in a lower death toll. It is not a solution that can bring a conflict to an end. There will have to be trials for war crime, reintegration of fighters, and a peace and reconciliation commission to bring closure to the war.

Without a massive commitment of forces from outside Syria, it will end in one of two ways. Assad, or someone like Assad (probably more brutal) wins; or the country is divided with Assad remaining in power in "South Syria" and a food fight over the north. That food fight will be just as bloody.

[JMA]

I think I understand it, I just think it is simplistic.This is from research on killing the head of terrorist organizations as a tactic, but the principal is the same.

Your reference relates to: "Does Killing or Capturing its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Group’s Activity?"

Did I ever say that it did?

Would that be the only possible reason to target insurgent leadership?

You clearly neither understand what I stated nor the wider view towards he targeting of insurgent/terrorist leadership.

Then again we see from the following study: Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark where it concludes:

Ultimately, however, leadership targeting alone is not enough to effectively fight a strong and emboldened terrorist organization.

Again, I would ask the author - with tears in my eyes - why she assumes that leadership targeting is the sole strategy employed to fight the organisation.

The British finally gave us these types of targeted killing of IRA members in part because there was never anyone in power long enough to negotiate a final peace. Killings don't change the nature of the grievances, the reason people fight, or the dynamics of the game, it only alters the players.

I am not aware of the British policy in this regard but would assume that the legality of 'murdering' citizens of their country was a significant factor.

I doubt that killing Assad, even if accomplished in the early days of the conflict, would have resulted in a lower death toll. It is not a solution that can bring a conflict to an end. There will have to be trials for war crime, reintegration of fighters, and a peace and reconciliation commission to bring closure to the war.

No, no, no. Where do you get this stuff from? Syria is not the US and they have never been concerned with what the US thought - certainly since 1971 when daddy took charge. Let us assume that the CIA was in fact a competent outfit and they had an accurate assesment of the Syrian hierarchy and the importance and value of each of the component role players. They would be in a position to identify the demise of which persons would lead/contribute to the strategic result sought by the US in Syria (taking into account any possible negative or unintended consequences).

Without a massive commitment of forces from outside Syria, it will end in one of two ways. Assad, or someone like Assad (probably more brutal) wins; or the country is divided with Assad remaining in power in "South Syria" and a food fight over the north. That food fight will be just as bloody.

No...

Once again you miss the point.

The world is now faced with the outcome - 160,000 dead and massive infrastructure damage - as a result of the actions (or inaction if you prefer) over the last few years. In any such situation it is always a matter of who dies/gets killed. In this case we have seen (the majority of the) 160,000 killed being as civilians and citizens rising up against an illegitimate and brutal dictatorship. I certainly would not be outraged if the dead comprised the military and supporters of the Assad regime. Because of the carnage there must be no doubt that the need for revenge (a beast alive and well in the heart of the Arab) will have its day and this is not only as a result of the years under the brutal Assad dictatorship but in addition the 160,000 deaths in the last few years. Yes the blood will flow... and probably with some justification. Why would you want to protect the perpetrators?

Now please read this:

Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns

Is killing or capturing insurgent leaders an effective tactic? Previous research on interstate war and counterterrorism has suggested that targeting enemy leaders does not work. Most studies of the efficacy of leadership decapitation, however, have relied on unsystematic evidence and poor research design. An analysis based on fresh evidence and a new research design indicates the opposite relationship and yields four key findings. First, campaigns are more likely to end quickly when counterinsurgents successfully target enemy leaders. Second, counterinsurgents who capture or kill insurgent leaders are significantly more likely to defeat insurgencies than those who fail to capture or kill such leaders. Third, the intensity of a conflict is likelier to decrease following the successful removal of an enemy leader than it is after a failed attempt. Fourth, insurgent attacks are more likely to decrease after successful leadership decapitations than after failed attempts. Additional analysis suggests that these findings are attributable to successful leadership decapitation, and that the relationship between decapitation and campaign success holds across different types of insurgencies.

Thanks for the references, Mike

[TheCurmudgeon]

Once again you miss the point.

The world is now faced with the outcome - 160,000 dead and massive infrastructure damage - as a result of the actions (or inaction if you prefer) over the last few years. In any such situation it is always a matter of who dies/gets killed. In this case we have seen (the majority of the) 160,000 killed being as civilians and citizens rising up against an illegitimate and brutal dictatorship. I certainly would not be outraged if the dead comprised the military and supporters of the Assad regime. Because of the carnage there must be no doubt that the need for revenge (a beast alive and well in the heart of the Arab) will have its day and this is not only as a result of the years under the brutal Assad dictatorship but in addition the 160,000 deaths in the last few years. Yes the blood will flow... and probably with some justification. Why would you want to protect the perpetrators?

I am afraid that I am missing your point. I will go back over the conversation and see where I missed the mark. If there is a post you made that has your central thesis please point me to it.

Now please read this:

Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns

I am familiar with this paper. I don't like it for two reasons. The first is that, while Mr. Johnson complains about other research using poor data sets, he cherry picks his data to include only instances where there was an attempt on the life of key leaders. He then breaks it into two groups; successful and unsuccessful attempts. There is no comparison to any other situation where an insurgency or civil war ended.

He also considers success in a very short term temporal way. For example of the 44 successful decapitations Chad appears 3 times, Indonesia – 3, Philippines – 2, Pakistan – 2, Sri Lanka – 2, Algeria - 6 times, and India a whopping 11 times. So India successfully decapitated the insurgent leaders eleven times but did not find peace. In Algeria the government killed the leader of the same group, the GIA, 5 times. This is what the author sees as success. Of the 44 instances of successful decapitation only 8 nations appear only once on the list. One of those is the US and the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi which allegedly ended the insurgency in Iraq. So no, I find this work less than convincing.

He is using a well recognized effect, the short term disorganization that occurs after a key leader is killed, to extrapolate that killing key leaders is an effective tactic for ending insurgencies. There is little in this paper that changes my opinion that you cannot truely end an insurgency or civil war without addressing the key issues and bringing closure through the appropriate trials and tribunals.

Thanks for the references, Mike

No problem, I just wish I could link to articles on JSTOR, but most people don't have access.

[JMA]

I am afraid that I am missing your point.

Yes you are in assuming that advocates of targetting insurgent leadership believe it is a 'sliver bullet' for ending the conflict.

It is not... if correctly implemented it can and does dislocate the insurgent's command and control and thereby its operations as a component of the overall strategy.

US and Brit special forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan have 'taken out' (probably) hundreds of 'leaders' over the years. They are replaced by more junior and less experienced fighters and the war continues... but each time a little less effectively.

I would accept any criticism that the McChristal/Lamb team placed way too much emphasis on such killing. They may have had their reasons for doing so.

[davidbfpo]

A short BBC story, by Newsnight, which in summary was a British military designed option:

The plan was called Extract, Equip, Train... a shock and awe attack that would allow the Syrians themselves to defeat Assad....Once the Syrian force was ready, it would march on Damascus, with the cover of fighter jets from the West and Gulf allies.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-28148943 and http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...an-rebels.html

[Bill Moore]

David,

Assad is a tyrant and a leader who made a relatively small crisis a regional crisis due to his poor response to it. On the other hand, what I fail to understand is why the West and others are so adamant that getting rid of Assad at this time is in our interests. I believe the greatest threat to the West is AQism linked extremists. Assad is fighting the same adversary we are for very different reasons. Removing Assad could expand the safe haven for AQ, not shrink it. We assume that if Assad is removed a moderate government will form, and go after the al-Nusra and ISIS. Maybe, but that seems to be a very optimistic assumption. Thoughts?