Why democracies don't lose insurgencies

[Cavguy]

Cav,

Merely some suggestions, but I would also suggest you look at the role physical land and territory in your thesis.

The IRA was aiming at a unified Ireland.
The PFLP and PLO wanted land and territory - still do.
The South Thailand Insurgency wants the states with a Muslim majority to be part of Malaysia, or secede from Thailand, in some form.

Insurgencies are generally about the control of terrain. I might add that pure terrorist groups on the other hand, generally aims at a change of policy, rather than terrain, but that needs to be held to rigour.

I have found the same so far - most post-cold war "insurgencies" seek separatism of some form - not regime change or overthrow.

The definitions are imprecise and have overlap between political terror, civil war, and insurgency, which makes the inclusion/exclusion of certain cases somewhat subjective - my key is not to introduce bias by excluding a case which potentially undercuts the theory and can reasonably be called and insurgency.

I have other quibble issues across the dataset, but the inclusion of my quibbles doesn't change the empirical observation. (For example, including Chechnya II, Iraq, or Afghanistan as an insurgency against a democracy doesn't change that democracies don't outright lose (yet))

[William F. Owen]

The definitions are imprecise and have overlap between political terror, civil war, and insurgency, which makes the inclusion/exclusion of certain cases somewhat subjective - my key is not to introduce bias by excluding a case which potentially undercuts the theory and can reasonably be called and insurgency.

May I offer,"Pedants will be able to cite exceptions, and thus undermine useful (insightful) theory. Their depredations must be firmly resisted by one simple test: does the theory generally aid understanding of useful military problems? If so, then exceptions are permissible."

[John T. Fishel]

While not only democracies are legitimate (departing from Weber: traditional and charismatic legitimacy) democracies do have what I would call "face legitimacy." Look at our SWORD Model article in the Journal - especially at the Host Government Legitimacy variable in Table 3. The first varible in the table specifically relates to democracy (electoral). Corruption is a classic driver of insurgency or, simply, electoral turnover. As long as you can throw the rascals out by election there is no need for armed rebellion. Same with "motivation of the people" which here refers to the ability of the government to deliver the basic "goods & serices" such as security demanded by the people. The last of the most important variables really asks if there are alternatives to political violence such as free, competetive elections. If all these are present one is dealing with a democracy and that democracy is perceived as legitimate by its population. Given that legitimacy is the single strongest internal dimension explaining the outcome of an insurgency, then it seems clear that deocracies will generally defeat insurgencies directed against them. The correlation should range from very high when using a rigourous definition (criteria) for democracy to high for a less rigorous formulation.

Cheers

JohnT

[Eden]

As I look over your database (and I am by no means an expert on many of these insurgencies) it occurs to me that insurgencies in a democracy results when a particular group feels that it is vulnerable to the tyranny of the majority. In other words, there is no overt mechanism (such as our bill of rights and judicial review) that protects minority political/cultural/economic rights that they consider vital to their security or to their identity - usually both.

I also note that in most of the cases the democracy in question is not one with a long democratic tradition. Therefore minorities are less trusting that, in the long term, the democratic values of the majority will serve to resolve their grievances.

Finally, in most of the cases, the insurgents occupy a geographically distinct part of the country - that is, they have a coherent (usually defensible) base from which to operate, as opposed to being a faction 'immersed' in the majority.

All this means that an insurgency within a democracy will normally be able to force the government to a political settlement acceptable to both sides more easily than one fighting against a totalitarian state. In the former case, achieving overt safeguards against the tyranny of the majority (autonomy, voting rights, guaranteed representation, etc) will be acceptable substitutes for "total victory" in the eyes of the insurgents, and will be seen by the government as acceptable concessions within the framework of a democratic state. Especially when the alternative is continuing a debilitating, costly insurgency. In the latter case - insurgencies against totalitarian states - the stakes are far higher and the capacity for compromise far lower, making it easier to sustain the will of both sides to continue the fight.

Thus I would question whether I would characterize a political settlement as a loss for the insurgents - it merely allows them to continue the struggle through other means.

[Steve Blair]

"How Democracies Lose Small Wars" might provide you with some interesting information as well. Granted the author's focus is more on the involvement of democracies in external small wars as opposed to internal insurgencies, but he does have some good observations about the ability of democracies to conduct wars that might be unpopular with a segment of their own electorate.

Eden makes a good point regarding a political settlement. In some cases it might actually be a victory of sorts for both sides. Sounds like an interesting topic, although you may need to be mindful of the Cold War political impacts within some of the earlier insurgencies mentioned. By that I mean the actual motivations and driving forces behind some of those movements, which might have made them more vulnerable to political settlements by the government (i.e., grant concessions to some of the local insurgent demands [land reform, minority representation, etc.], thereby undercutting the political leverage of some elements of the insurgency.

[UrsaMaior]

I found the below study.

Lyall, John, ’Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents?’, 2007, Available at: http://www.princeton.edu/~jlyall/DemoWar.pdf

I would appreciate your opinion about it.

THX in advance.

[Cavguy]

I found the below study.

Lyall, John, ’Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents?’, 2007, Available at: http://www.princeton.edu/~jlyall/DemoWar.pdf

I would appreciate your opinion about it.

THX in advance.

Thanks for the good read. However, it is a little apples to oranges for the following reasons:

1) Dataset is 1800-present. I have a big issue equating democracy pre-1945 with democracy post-1945 in structure - lots of variables change in that period. One could successfully argue in the pol-sci sphere that the US was not a full democracy (in the pol-sci sense) until either 1920 or the 1960's, as significant populations (women and African Americans) were denied full voting rights - for example. Using this standard, there are actually very few democracies pre-1945 in the world. The post 1945 dataset helps compare apples to apples.

2) They count Malaya, Kenya, Vietnam (FR) , Algeria, India (UK), etc. as "insurgencies" against democracies. I would say they are insurgencies against colonial powers who tend to be democracies at home. The population of those countries were not participants in the democracy fought against. Therefore, I would exclude them from my test, as I am evaluating indigenous insurgent success against sovereign democracies.

In other words, the population generating the insurgents must have voting rights in the state.

My observation from the RAND data was based on those cases. I think introducing anti-colonial insurgencies where the affected population was denied suffrage into the mix skews the data heavily.

I'll take a harder look. Thanks!

[UrsaMaior]

Thanks for the good read. However, it is a little apples to oranges for the following reasons:

1) Dataset is 1800-present. I have a big issue equating democracy pre-1945 with democracy post-1945 in structure - lots of variables change in that period. One could successfully argue in the pol-sci sphere that the US was not a full democracy (in the pol-sci sense) until either 1920 or the 1960's, as significant populations (women and African Americans) were denied full voting rights - for example. Using this standard, there are actually very few democracies pre-1945 in the world. The post 1945 dataset helps compare apples to apples.

2) They count Malaya, Kenya, Vietnam (FR) , Algeria, India (UK), etc. as "insurgencies" against democracies. I would say they are insurgencies against colonial powers who tend to be democracies at home. The population of those countries were not participants in the democracy fought against. Therefore, I would exclude them from my test, as I am evaluating indigenous insurgent success against sovereign democracies.

In other words, the population generating the insurgents must have voting rights in the state.

My observation from the RAND data was based on those cases. I think introducing anti-colonial insurgencies where the affected population was denied suffrage into the mix skews the data heavily.

I'll take a harder look. Thanks!

Thank you very much for your answer sir.

In my really humble opinion statistics is not a good way to approach such a complex phenomenon with so high number of variables and so little number of cases (opposed to Entropy's opinion).

[Rank amateur]

To somewhat echo Wilf's coments, I'm not sure that it will produce a lot of valuable insight, though I guess part of the process is that you never know what kind of insight you'll find until you go looking.

I think you also need to consider situations where the insurgents didn't win, but the democracy came to an end. In other words, one reason democracies don't lose is because if the weak kneed liberal Democratic politicians start to lose, the military stages a coup. Pakistan comes to mind. There may be some examples in Central and South America.

Also - I meant to mention this a couple of times - it seems to me the French defined victory as maintaining their colonies and the British defined victory as giving their colonies independence. Since what most of the insurgents wanted was independence from the British, it seems to me that democracies have a lot more ability to spin the definition of "victory." For that matter, changing the definition of "democracy" invalidates your thesis:

There is debate about how closely the South Vietnamese government was linked to the United States, which was a strong supporter of South Vietnam. The country is alleged by many historians to have been nothing more than an American-backed puppet government, but many others claim that it was genuine democracy (or, at the least, a patriotic movement with genuine concern for the Vietnamese people). An individual's views on the matter generally correspond closely to their views on the Vietnam War in general - supporters of the war often believe that South Vietnam was a democracy, and thus worthy of defence, while opponents of the war often believe that South Vietnamese democracy was a sham.

[William F. Owen]

To somewhat echo Wilf's coments, I'm not sure that it will produce a lot of valuable insight, though I guess part of the process is that you never know what kind of insight you'll find until you go looking.

I think it may well produce some insights.

I kind of hope they may support the bones of my basic thesis that Insurgencies are merely a style of warfare and subscribe to all the Clausewitian doctrines.

[Rank amateur]

I think it may well produce some insights.

I kind of hope they may support the bones of my basic thesis that Insurgencies are merely a style of warfare and subscribe to all the Clausewitian doctrines.

OK, then to completely disagree with Wilf, my concern would be that if everything depends on how you define things, it might be hard to gain a lot of insight.

To me, Democracy is a lot like sex. Its great if everyone involved wants it, but if forced upon you it is rape. To carry that analogy probably one step too far: If the Uncle Sam would improve his message and delivery, he'd probably find a lot more willing takers...

To carry it further, if you're carrying an assault rifle, no matter what happens, some people will never believe it was voluntary.

[Cavguy]

Good input all, these are the kinds of holes/skepticism I want to hear before I head too far down my research path.

RA, understand your point about democracy change, but the dataset allows for regime change during the insurgency (Indonesia is a key case - autocracy to democracy)

To Bob's World, I would definitely opine that the focus of my paper would not be to justify forceable democratic change, but to determine why, out of 89 insurgencies (as classified by RAND) observed since 1945, there are 25 insurgent "wins" against autocracies, anocracies, monarchial, and colonial governments, but none against democracies.

Like the "democratic peace" question - I am curious as to the reason - is it a facet of democracy that prevents insurgent victory, or some other reason?

Again, my initial findings indicate that not only are democracies resistant to insurgent victory, they actually directly politcially settle LESS than other forms of goverment.

[Gian P Gentile]

why do you confine yourself to the post world war II period? Is there something special about that period that interests you or do you see it as more relevant to the present day than other previous periods? Perhaps instead of taking 15 or so cases from that period you should expand your historical horizon and move farther back into time.

[Ron Humphrey]

OK, then to completely disagree with Wilf, my concern would be that if everything depends on how you define things, it might be hard to gain a lot of insight..

Whenever approaching any study such as this definitions do tend to effect what you see, that however doesn't represent the truth of what they are.

Given that one approaches the subject in such a manner as to tracing the roots and from there following up the tree this could turn out to be very insightful

To carry it further, if you're carrying an assault rifle, no matter what happens, some people will never believe it was voluntary.

While perhaps true that nonetheless fails to prove that it wasn't voluntary.

Lots and lots of "some people" out there. Never gonna please em all

[Rank amateur]

Lots and lots of "some people" out there. Never gonna please em all

And every one of them is a potential insurgent.



Neil, another factor to consider is that in a democracy, the environment isn't binary. In other words, if people hate the government the insurgents aren't their only alternative. (I believe you have a wee bit of experience in what happens when you give people a third option. )

[jmm99]

The conclusion of UM's link (p.24) is interesting:

While better measures of democracy may lead to a reassessment, it appears that regime type has little analytical utility for explaining COIN war outcomes and duration. Instead, emphasizing battlefield dynamics (the “how” of fighting) may prove a better theoretical bet than focusing on regime-specific variables (the “who” of fighting). Indeed, the degree of a military’s mechanization, its status as an external occupier, and the level of material support for insurgents all proved more consequential for explaining outcomes and duration. In short, democracies do struggle to defeat insurgents — but not because they are democracies.

Wilf, is this your position - more or less ?

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Some more articles by the same author are here.

[Ken White]

...For that matter, changing the definition of "democracy" invalidates your thesis:

"...The country is alleged by many historians to have been nothing more than an American-backed puppet government, but many others claim that it was genuine democracy (or, at the least, a patriotic movement with genuine concern for the Vietnamese people). An individual's views on the matter generally correspond closely to their views on the Vietnam War in general - supporters of the war often believe that South Vietnam was a democracy, and thus worthy of defence, while opponents of the war often believe that South Vietnamese democracy was a sham.[/URL]

stupidity in the discourse on Viet Nam. It was emphatically a democracy but one in the Asian model; an oligarchy at the top, elected politicians below -- particularly at Province and local level. The leaders responded to the populace. Anyone who contends it was a puppet government in verging on idiocy. The Viet Namese ran their country, took little to no advice from the Americans (unless we offered a healthy bribe; even they'd demur frequently) and did what they wanted to -- frequently stymieing US goals.

To echo Ron Humphrey on your later comments:

OK, then to completely disagree with Wilf, my concern would be that if everything depends on how you define things, it might be hard to gain a lot of insight.

Doesn't almost everything depend on how one defines things? Acknowledging that 'one' is human and we are infinitely variable.

All inquiry starts with a postulation, not the postulation...

To carry it further, if you're carrying an assault rifle, no matter what happens, some people will never believe it was voluntary.

Oh, I dunno, I carried a rifle for years, it was purely voluntary. Still do on occasion; still voluntary. As an aside, 'Assault Rifle' is a term invented by the mostly ignorant popular media and perpetuated by even more ignorant Congroids who banned all "Assault Rifles" except those they didn't ban. A rifle is a rifle, not really any such thing as an 'Assault Rifle' (other than in the eyes of the US Congress. I rest my case...). That also excuses people who carry just pistols or who carry SMGs, MG, RPGs and such, I guess...

If, OTOH, as opposed to what you said, what you meant was if someone carrying a weapon was strolling about, any changes in the local milieu brought about by the elements that person represents will not be viewed as voluntary by some observers in the population of the locale where said weapon carrying soul then I'd say you're correct. I'd also suggest that the number so viewing that issue in that light will depend on many things and that for the most part, there will always be some nervous, whiney types who will see danger in anything but that most people have enough sense to judge things based on reality instead of ideology.

For example, the Gendarmerie in France has been wandering about with Rifles, Pistols and SMGs for years and a few people in France see that as threatening -- most of the French nation and its visitors, however, do not.

[Rank amateur]

It was emphatically a democracy but one in the Asian model

Didn't the insurgents win that one?

A rifle is a rifle

I suspect that if anyone asked you to carry one of these around Vietnam, you may have had a slightly different opinion.



but to keep the conversation on topic, weapons obviously matter: both physically and symbolically.

[reed11b]

I find this whole thread misleading and dangerous due to the vast assumptions going on to fuel it. One, a true democracy of "one person, one vote" is essentially mob rule and where the majority is in violent opposition to the minority then there is strong fuel for insurgency. If the minority is either, by coalition, a larger force then the nominal majority or has better support and resources, then they can "win". period. Too assume otherwise is foolish. Second it assumes that a democracy is what everyone really really wants in there hearts of hearts and if only they could truly experience it, the world would be better. The insurgencies that we face today are often fueled as much by international ideology, particularly radical Islamic ideology as they are by national or sub-national concerns. Don't get to hung up on the west vs. Islam either, because that can change just as quick too. Third it assumes that terrorism and insurgency are unique and cleanly separate from each other, they are not, terrorism is a means or technique of insurgency. Focus on the realities of the fight you are in, instead of trying to develop a COIN master plan because in order to do that you have make assumptions, and when you assume it makes an ass out of u and me.
Reed

[Ken White]

I find this whole thread misleading and dangerous due to the vast assumptions going on to fuel it.

Your prerogative. Couldn't you say so without being confrontational?

One, a true democracy of "one person, one vote" is essentially mob rule and where the majority is in violent opposition to the minority then there is strong fuel for insurgency.

There are several places where that isn't entirely true; the mob rule aspect, I mean. As for the other, did you mean where the minority is in violent opposition to the majority?

If the minority is either, by coalition, a larger force then the nominal majority or has better support and resources, then they can "win". period.

Can you validate that with examples? I can't think of any right off hand but since you mention it, I'm sure you can provide a couple of examples.

Too assume otherwise is foolish.

Is that fact or your opinion?

Second it assumes that a democracy is what everyone really really wants in there hearts of hearts and if only they could truly experience it, the world would be better.

I did not see or assume that. Why do you think so?

The insurgencies that we face today are often fueled as much by international ideology, particularly radical Islamic ideology as they are by national or sub-national concerns. Don't get to hung up on the west vs. Islam either, because that can change just as quick too.

Probably true.

Third it assumes that terrorism and insurgency are unique and cleanly separate from each other, they are not, terrorism is a means or technique of insurgency.

Why do you say that? I do not see such a linkage in the postulation.

Focus on the realities of the fight you are in, instead of trying to develop a COIN master plan because in order to do that you have make assumptions, and when you assume it makes an ass out of u and me.

That's all very well for a COIN Master Plan -- but the man said he was doing it for his Graduate School Thesis -- a very different thing. Thus, I'm not at all sure why you're objecting to it...