Ukraine (closed; covers till August 2014)

[AmericanPride]

AmericanPride, wouldn't it be more easy to handle Eastern Ukraine problems without Russian special services guys acting as provocators? I speculate that without Taliban it would be easier to promote peaceful solutions in Afganistan. Isn't easier to solve problems without spoilers?

Yeah - probably. But is it realistic to expect that?

EDIT: Also, I'm willing to bet that the Kremlin's masters are thinking something similar: wouldn't it be easier to maintain Ukraine's allegience without American money and political interference acting as spoilers?

[carl]

Yeah - probably. But is it realistic to expect that?

EDIT: Also, I'm willing to bet that the Kremlin's masters are thinking something similar: wouldn't it be easier to maintain Ukraine's allegience without American money and political interference acting as spoilers?

Heck yea it's realistic to expect Russki spec ops types not to be there. You oppose them and force them out. There are many ways. They range from shooting them dead or putting a lot of pressure, actual real live that really hurts pressure, on Vlad the would be Great to withdraw them. But it requires action.

Yea you're right the Kremlin masters are probably thinking that. They probably thought the same thing about Western support for pesky Polish shipyard workers in the old days.

[AmericanPride]

Yea you're right the Kremlin masters are probably thinking that. They probably thought the same thing about Western support for pesky Polish shipyard workers in the old days.

And that's the point. The morality of it is irrelevant. As you said, "results matter". And the result thus far has been continued Russian success, Ukrainian instability, and Western posturing. I don't think Moscow wants escalation any more than Washington does, insofar that escalation increases the chances of a decision point between credibility and costly intervention. The low-level agitation works in Moscow's favor and it'll be interesting to see how it shapes the elections - assuming they're going to be held. What we should be doing is attempting to mitigate any further losses rather than reversing Russia's gains.

[carl]

And that's the point. The morality of it is irrelevant. As you said, "results matter". And the result thus far has been continued Russian success, Ukrainian instability, and Western posturing. I don't think Moscow wants escalation any more than Washington does, insofar that escalation increases the chances of a decision point between credibility and costly intervention. The low-level agitation works in Moscow's favor and it'll be interesting to see how it shapes the elections - assuming they're going to be held. What we should be doing is attempting to mitigate any further losses rather than reversing Russia's gains.

You say "...we should be doing...". That is the key and effectively we are doing nothing right now. Mitigate, reversing, prevent, defending-we can figure that out but none of it can be done unless we get to doing.

[Fuchs]

I take the freedom to dump a text from my blog here, since it relates to the topic. The properly formatted version is here.

Putin's approach to aggressions is an interesting one. It appears he
has recognised the limitations of his freedom of action, found and began to
exploit loopholes.

An all-out conventional invasion, 1914-style, is apparently out of question to
him. Russia lacks the forces to pull this off on a grand scale, at least without
exposing itself too much.
His exploits appear to range up to army corps size instead (South Ossetia
2008) - with all other power being held in the back, as a political equivalent
to a "fleet in being". This restricts the freedom of action of other great
powers. Small powers can probably not pull off the same risky games for they
lack this component - even if they could easily muster forces equivalent to
the ones employed actively.

Traditional Cold War deterrence rested on the fear that a too bold move
might lead to World War III, and the demise of European civilisation. There
were no aggressive moves done in Europe proper after the Berlin blockade;
both blocs were content with keeping their own line*. Bold moves were
largely restricted to Asia, with proxies and at times small numbers of
opposing great power troops fighting against each other**.

There as a fear that some bold, yet incremental, moves could be dared in
Europe - and it was difficult to define when exactly such incremental
offenses should lead to mobilisation or war. A British satire (a "Yes, Prime
Minister!" episode, see 7:04 minutes and after) explained this better than
articles or books ever did. Also remember the metaphor of boiling frogs.


Putin appears to have thought of this incremental approach when he decided
to send paramilitary troops without national insignias into the Crimea.


He did apparently also take into account that the Ukraine is not allied with
any country.


Finally, the third ingredient; international law had been stretched somewhat
prior to the move.


Putin did stretch his freedom of action in face of International Law
proponents prior to the conflict with Georgia in 2008 by exposing
'peacekeeper' troops. Georgia proceeded to attack South Ossetia at some
point and this included firing on peacekeepers. At that point Putin had a
semi-plausible excuse for intervention. His intervention was not as blatant as
the intervention of Kuwait 1990, for example. Him withdrawing after fait
accompli avoided troubles as well.


The stretching of International Law for the invasion(s) of the Ukraine wasn't
done by Putin himself. This damage was done by Western great powers which
had a fit of arrogance and short-sightedly decided that rule of force suits
them better than rule of law. Rule of law was supposedly a concept to be
applied on other powers only.

Except that the "other powers" includes some great powers which evidently
can behave arrogantly as well.

2014-02 Hypocrisy in effect

It would help if the same Western great powers reaffirmed the importance of
international law in a non-hypocritical way. They could admit guilt, seek and
accept a ruling about compensations and - most importantly - refrain from
further violations.

This won't happen, of course.Only losing aggressors have to show regret in
this world.

Another approach to close the loopholes would be to expand the collective
defence systems; offer an alliance of some kind to the Ukraine. This is most
unlikely as well. It would lead to further conflict and might end up being
much too expensive. The Ukraine is not too big to fail, after all. Nothing in
there is really crucial to the West (for historical reasons), while much in there
is crucial to Russia.

Finally, one could tune up the reaction to incremental moves and effectively
turn incremental moves into too big moves thereby. This appears to be the
preferred approach among Western great power governments.

[kaur]

Fuchs, without describing Putin's motives (and ideologue) carrying out his actions, your post is not so good. Do you agree with this column?

http://www.spiegel.de/international/...3.html#ref=rss

What paramilitary troops? There were conventional Russian troops in Crimea. Even Putin admitted this month later.

Putin appears to have thought of this incremental approach when he decided to send paramilitary troops without national insignias into the Crimea.

[OUTLAW 09]

I take the freedom to dump a text from my blog here, since it relates to the topic. The properly formatted version is here.

fuchs---would have rewritten the article focusing on the concept of Russia using a strategic UW strategy in the conducting of a political war against both the Ukraine and the West (the West as his Duma speech indicated is viewed as being a "liberal democracy" and "western capitalism" as pushed by the US/IMF). By the way both qualities found in the EU which is also a Putin concern.

Then I would focus on the current five legs of a Russian stool that is in fact the current Russia political society/animal 1) the security services, 2) the military, 3) the oligarchs, 4) Russian mob/gangs and 5) the Russian Orthodox Church and the seat of the stool being in fact a new Russian ideology --"ethnic nationalism". Especially focusing on the interplay between each of the groups and Putin's foreign policies.

This new ideology "ethnic nationalism" is being driven by the following spokesperson Alexandra Dugin who pushes what he calls the "New Euroasianism" and/or "Nationalbolshevism" that is tied into the Russian nationalist groups who are in turn tied into European wide Nationalist groups who in turn have extensive media outlets supporting them ie what one sees currently in use in Russia airing proUkrainian videos and radio interviews.

This new ideology if one reads the Duma speech--- Putin inherently wants to lead globally.

Putin's' use of a strategic UW strategy is in fact being carried out by all five elements just mentioned.

This strategy is just not a rehash of version 2 of the Cold War but something new and needs to be fully understood by all players in the West as they is currently not a single counter UW strategy seen anywhere out there.

It is a strategy that can be turned on and off at his will anywhere on the borders to Russia proper as well as the ME ie Syria and he can sustain it virtually forever unless a counter UW strategy is found in a hurry and we fully understand in the West the term "political warfare".

[Fuchs]

I was aiming at the core, not trying to write a comprehensive analysis of Europe's security situation or of Russia. And I don't think the reference to a poorly defined concept ("UW") helps in pointing out the novelty in there.
I was NOT satisfied with merely calling it "UW"; I wanted to show what I think is the core of the matter.

And that is core of the matter is that he has identified and is exploiting gaps in the European security architecture.