Human Terrain & Anthropology (merged thread)

[Tom Odom]

As a former FAO I am a believer in cultural intelligence and as an anthro minor, history major, I would have to class myself with the social science crowd.

I was and still am a believer in the concept of a dedicated human terrain capability. But I will say after a year as the POLAD in MND-B, the human terrain capablity never was applied in anything near to what it advertised.

There were bright, even brilliant spots on the human terrain teams. Some were antthropologists, most were not. What was lacking was a system to direct and capture relevant information based on the CCIR, not on a whimsy of a social scientist who felt that the Iraqis were not really happy having us there. Gee, who knew? The same fellow wanted to take the summer off because Baghdad was hot.

There were too many like him and not enough of the brilliant ones. None of them really got the concept of telling the commander what he needed to know versus telling him what they found to be "interesting" on any given day.

I again say that the concept is sound but its fielding was done so haphazardly that it left commanders and staffs puzzled on how to best integrate these teams. When those in the system don't have a system to begin with, integrating that system into military planning is systemically doomed to failure.

Best
Tom

[slapout9]

When those in the system don't have a system to begin with, integrating that system into military planning is systemically doomed to failure.

Best
Tom

That is Quote of the week stuff!

[Sparapet]

First off let me say this is a great little debate. I have interacted with HTTs in Iraq quite a bit and instead of pursuing my love of Anthropology and Political Science into grad school chose to pursue my love of the M1A2 after college. My experience with HTTs and other non-targeting intel gathering is that the whole concept of "understanding" my environment is somewhat foreign to the officer corps.
120mm points out his experience in OEF with assessing the environment but I would hazard a guess that he is a rare, rare exception. In general, Tom's opinion of piss-poor implementation of non-targeting intel is spot on. I have observed time and again Bn and Bgde commanders absolutely clueless about what the HTTs do, while the HTTs are confused about what they are supposed to do and get creative or settle into an atmospherics routine.
Whatever our ideological leanings, occupations require local understanding. The more distant the cultures of occupiers from occupied the more the learning curve and the greater the distrust (WWII is a prime example).
As a maneuver leader I spent several months putting together a coherent tribal/leadership picture in my sector because the units before me never got past the key leaders whom they could pay to get things done. My anthro/poli sci background helped me ask the right question and notice the right patterns. By the end, the sector made sense. A year or two of an HTTs effort in a 7 yr occupation would have cut that learning curve and allowed me to implement effective IO in early/mid tour instead of at the end.

At the end the bigger point is the one that started this thread. The anti-intellectualism, especially against the social sciences, in the officer corps is borderline criminal. Considering we are often the de facto governors from Company and up for months and years at a time the fact that we rarely value anything that is education while thinking that training is all you need (current article series on Design is a perfect example) is one of our biggest handicaps and I am convinced it has cost lives, many of them.

[Pete]

When I did Army medical supply work in Bahrain years ago some military people thought I was out touristing around if I wasn't in the warehouse kicking boxes. I needed to know the area of operations, such as where I could rent forklifts and trucks, where the good hardware stores are, and which compressed gas companies could test our medical oxygen cylinders. It also helps to know your way around town so you don't have to take the same routes every day, as well as which neighborhoods are Sunni, which are Shia, and areas to avoid during periods of ethnic tension.

[Pete]

It's everyones' responsibility to learn about the Area of Operations where they are -- it's not just an intel function, or something that somene else should inform you about via distribution. First off, scout the lay of the land in the area, so if you have to conduct infantry operations you'll have a feel for the area. With more recon and scouting around you'll learn a bit about the demographics, ethnic and sectarian things, road networks, so forth. Learning how to say and understand things in the local language helps too.

The main impression of the U.S. Army intelligence community I've gotten is that they mainly like to fiddle around with organizational charts about how info is processed. They also like their secret handshakes and Walther PPKs, it makes them feel important. Years ago I went to OCS with the guy who now commands Fort Hootchie-Coochie, but as they say, "Three tears in a bucket ... "

Right before I got the old heave-ho out of the Army a former Special Forces guy begged me to join SF, he said I was the sort of guy they needed. I was amazed, I could barely pass the PT test.