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    Default Hello South Africa,

    You might want to take a look at Lonnie Athens (Wiki - brief and incomplete outline of his theory of violence) - focused first on his research of violent criminals in American prisons. His general conclusion is that, to understand violence, experience is a more important factor than logic, ideology or genetics.

    Athens' theory has been considered by Richard Rhodes - generally in Why They Kill: The Discoveries of a Maverick Criminologist (a brief review of Rhodes' book - but explaining Athens' four stages in a nutshell); and specifically with respect to the SS Einsatzgruppen (in one chapter of Masters of Death).

    In both books, Rhodes concludes:

    "He now firmly resolves to attack people physically with the serious intention of gravely harming or even killing them for the slightest or no provocation whatsoever. . . . He has suddenly been emboldened and made venomous at the same time. . . . The subject is ready to attack people physically with the serious intention of gravely harming or killing them with minimal or less than minimal provocation on their part." Says Rhodes, "that is, he is ready to become an ultraviolent criminal."
    That is a valid comment re: genocides, serial killers, multiple killers and the "mind of the murderer" in general. As to genocides and Athens' theory, see Dimensions of Genocide: The Circumplex Model Meets Violentization Theory, by Mark A. Winton (2008, case study of Rwanda).

    The bottom line is that Athens' theory generally holds up (although as Winton points out, it is non-exclusive and ties in with other approaches - including some of Grossman[*]) with respect to "bad guys".

    However, if it is truly a "general theory", it should also hold up for "good guys" - with adjustments in terminology. Athens gets into that in Violent Encounters: Violent Engagements, Skirmishes, and Tiffs (Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 2005), in his Conclusion:

    CONCLUSION

    The interaction between perpetrators and victims when violent crimes are either attempted or completed can be best understood if it is seen as arising during social acts—activities that require the voluntary or involuntary participation of at least two parties for their completion. With the obvious exception of suicide, all violent crimes constitute social acts because there must be at least two parties for them to be committed—a perpetrator and a victim. Lawful violent acts constitute social acts just as much as unlawful violent acts do. In the cases of excused and justifiable homicides, as well as excused and justifiable batteries, there must also be at least two parties—a perpetrator and a victim. The same is also true in intergroup violent criminal and noncriminal violent action, except that in this case, the victims and perpetrators are collectivities rather than individuals. In collective social acts, it is groups rather than individuals who perform the separate roles, communicate through their spokespersons, assume each others’ attitudes, and try to work out a congruent social object or plan of action for carrying out the larger social act in which they are the acting agents (Blumer 1966, 540; 1969, 52, 55-56; 1981, 148).

    As in the case of individual social acts, there are two kinds of collective social acts: cooperative and conflictive. Unlike in cooperative social acts, in conflictive ones, the acting agents, no matter whether they are individuals or groups, cannot form a congruent social object or plan of action because they cannot agree on who should perform the superordinate and subordinate roles in carrying out the social act. Unsurprisingly, violent encounters do not arise during individual or collective cooperative social acts but instead during conflictive ones. It may be speculated that the violent encounters that emerge during either individual or collective conflictive social acts fall into the same three basic subtypes that differ in terms of the number of the five stages of a violence encounter that are completed: (1) role claiming, (2) role rejection, (3) role sparring, (4) role enforcement, and (5) role determination. During a violence engagement, all five stages must be completed; during violent skirmishes, only the first four of these stages must be completed; and during violent tiffs, only the first three must be completed. Thus, despite the differences in legal status between lawful and unlawful violence and between individual and collective acting units, the grounded theory of violent criminal social acts that individuals perpetrate described here could be potentially applied to violent social acts that are both lawful and unlawful and that both groups and individuals perpetrate and, thereby, to all violent social action.

    Before this extrapolation can be safely made, however, appropriate amendments would undoubtedly have to be made to the theory. Any general theory of violent social actswould have to take into account the added complexity that an increase in scale in the social act’s acting units would introduce into the proposed explanation (Blumer 1981, 148-149). Undoubtedly, the nature and size of the groups involved in a dominance encounter could significantly affect the actual social practices at work during the different stages.

    As Blumer (1959, 129-30) pointedly observes, large and small groups must utilize different social mechanisms to perform their roles or “mobilize for action” in social acts:

    “A. . . reflection of the collective factor in the case of large groups is the organization on which they must rely when mobilizing for action. A small group uses confined, simple and direct machinery. Corporate action in a large group requires the articulation of more units which are also likely to be more diverse, more removed from each other, and related through bridging links. . . . The mobilization of this extended, diversified, and indirectly connected organization requires forms of leadership, coordination, and control which again differ from those in small groups.”
    Of course, a general theory of violent social action also could not ignore the state’s approval or disapproval of the use of violence. Obviously, this is a factor that could also significantly affect both individual and collective acting units’ performance of their roles in violent social acts. Thus, future research would be needed to determine the exact nature of the amendments that would need to be made in each of the stages through which violent engagements, skirmishes, and tiffs pass to accommodate all violent social acts rather than only the criminal ones that individuals commit.
    --------------------------
    [*] I've read both of Grossman's books (On Combat and On Killing) - many parts of them more than once, since they obviously relate to actions that are in some cases "war crimes" and in other cases not. I believe Athens' theory is consistent with much of Gerossman's factual material - and also ties in with current training theories and practices for military and police.

    Regards

    Mike

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    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    You might want to take a look at Lonnie Athens (Wiki - brief and incomplete outline of his theory of violence) - focused first on his research of violent criminals in American prisons. His general conclusion is that, to understand violence, experience is a more important factor than logic, ideology or genetics.

    Athens' theory has been considered by Richard Rhodes - generally in Why They Kill: The Discoveries of a Maverick Criminologist (a brief review of Rhodes' book - but explaining Athens' four stages in a nutshell); and specifically with respect to the SS Einsatzgruppen (in one chapter of Masters of Death).

    In both books, Rhodes concludes:

    That is a valid comment re: genocides, serial killers, multiple killers and the "mind of the murderer" in general. As to genocides and Athens' theory, see Dimensions of Genocide: The Circumplex Model Meets Violentization Theory, by Mark A. Winton (2008, case study of Rwanda).

    The bottom line is that Athens' theory generally holds up (although as Winton points out, it is non-exclusive and ties in with other approaches - including some of Grossman[*]) with respect to "bad guys".

    However, if it is truly a "general theory", it should also hold up for "good guys" - with adjustments in terminology. Athens gets into that in Violent Encounters: Violent Engagements, Skirmishes, and Tiffs (Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 2005), in his Conclusion:

    --------------------------
    [*] I've read both of Grossman's books (On Combat and On Killing) - many parts of them more than once, since they obviously relate to actions that are in some cases "war crimes" and in other cases not. I believe Athens' theory is consistent with much of Gerossman's factual material - and also ties in with current training theories and practices for military and police.

    Regards

    Mike
    Thanks for posting that as I had not looked at the matter from that direction before. That being from the direction of those entering the service having already killed or needing little provocation to unleash vicious violence (and here I speak of gang members and the like). In a war time situation these people may in fact be drawn to the military in the hope of finding themselves in a position to kill (this would include your average psychopath). These people tend to gravitate towards each other and when they achieve critical mass it is perhaps when the atrocities and massacres happen. (Grossman believes they tend to gravitate to Special Forces).

    It would be helpful if these people could be identified in advance (during recruit training) and either got rid of or consciously keep separate. (I must speak to those I served with who were involved with recruit training in this regard).

    My approach had been from the point of departure of a middle class boy who grew up in a very non-violent environment and assumed that the vast majority would need some conditioning and motivation to kill in combat. I am correct in that but ignored the dangerous minority who need very little if any provocation to kill. So thank you or adding another dimension to my thinking on this.

    Back to Grossman and Section One of his book.

    I remain in disagreement with his position that the majority of soldiers will either be non-firers in combat and/or refuse to kill the enemy and as such do not believe that this should be taught as the default position to officer cadets.

    I said in post earlier post that killing becomes easier with repetition and notice the following in your Athen's source:

    "Prisoner Jean-Baptiste described his first kill.
    The crowd had grown. I seized the machete, I struck a first blow. When I
    saw the blood bubble up, I jumped back a step. Someone blocked me from
    behind and shoved me forward by both elbows. I closed my eyes in the
    brouhaha and I delivered a second blow like the first. It was done, people
    approved, they were satisfied and moved away. I drew back…Later on we
    got used to killing without so much dodging around. (Hatzfeld, 2003, p.
    23)"

    and

    " The killers described becoming crueler with time. They also described that
    there were no negative consequences for killing and that there might be
    negative consequences for failing to kill."
    It is the second part that worries me. I noted the clinical lack of emotion in the killing process among the troopies (some 18-19 year olds) with the repetition. Scary... the more I think about it.
    Last edited by JMA; 07-29-2011 at 07:19 AM.

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    Default The "normal kid"

    from JMA
    My approach had been from the point of departure of a middle class boy who grew up in a very non-violent environment and assumed that the vast majority would need some conditioning and motivation to kill in combat. I am correct in that but ignored the dangerous minority who need very little if any provocation to kill. So thank you for adding another dimension to my thinking on this.
    I'd like the dimension (of Athens-Grossman) to be expanded so as to consider not only the psychopaths, sociopaths and the "kill 'em all and let God sort 'em out" group, but also the "normal kid" who becomes capable of the same or even higher level of violence than the folks who commit "war crimes" (tying into this post).

    In connection with that, Grossman, in "On Combat", has some interesting factual material in Section Three, Chapter One (starting at p.125) "Killing Machines: The Impact of a Handful of True Warriors". He starts with "Commando" Kelly and includes Audie Murphy; but the statistics for Allied and German fighter pilots show much more quantitatively that a relatively small percentage of pilots racked up a very large number of kills.

    I'd not be surprised at that result if we were talking about hunting. In any decent sample of hunters, one or more will stand out on a consistent basis for a larger percentage of kills than the others. As to combat, I've no experience to judge. I'd suspect that the "normal kid" (who becomes an "Audie Murphy") has learned somewhere along the line to reject a subordinate role and to achieve a superordinate role by taking on the "playground bully" - reaching at least Athens' third stage in violence development.

    Athens gets into that (where the "victim" reacts with dominating violence), to some extent, in Violent Encounters: Violent Engagements, Skirmishes, and Tiffs (Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 2005) (pdf pp.19-40 spell out Athens' construct).

    If so, that "normal kid" could become one of Grossman's "sheepdogs", who has to be able to take on wolves; and is a "killing machine", but for societally-acceptable reasons and within societally-acceptable limits.

    Regards

    Mike
    Last edited by jmm99; 07-29-2011 at 03:48 PM.

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    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    In connection with that, Grossman, in "On Combat", has some interesting factual material in Section Three, Chapter One (starting at p.125) "Killing Machines: The Impact of a Handful of True Warriors". He starts with "Commando" Kelly and includes Audie Murphy; but the statistics for Allied and German fighter pilots show much more quantitatively that a relatively small percentage of pilots racked up a very large number of kills.
    Of course one must also understand that in many cases fighter pilot tactics were designed to effectively "feed" targets to those superior performers. In this I'm referring to the US practice of having wingmen mainly concerned with keeping lead's backside clear. German tactics were slightly different, but still scaled toward protecting the lead pilot.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

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    Default Can't present pro or con re: WWII fighter tactics ....

    that's well outside of any expertise I have.

    Grossman, in "On Killing" (p.182), offers this "tease bit" - the context is his discussion of the statistic (apparently from Gwynne Dyer) that 1% of Army Air Corps fighter pilots had 40% of the kills:

    Several senior U.S. Air Force officers have told me that when the U.S. Air Force tried to preselect fighter pilots after World War II, the only common denominator they could find among their World War II aces was that they had been involved in a lot of fights as children.
    That piece of hearsay upon hearsay is, of course, consistent with Athens' construct in Violent Encounters. I looked briefly for an AF source, but came up empty.

    BTW: Accepting what you say as fact ("feeding" the enemy to selected pilots), two questions: (1) what % of kills came from "feeding" vs individual hunting; and (2) the selected shooters were selected by what criteria ?

    More broadly, is the same phenom observed in infantry combat ?

    Regards

    Mike

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    Would any light be thrown on the issues under discussion here by looking at HRT-type units and the individuals working within them? Correct me if I am wrong, but I assume that the mix of ability and willingness to unblinkingly kill in the context of a situation where the very purpose is to save the lives of most of the individuals involved must bring certain things to the fore in a pronounced if not necessarily unique fashion.
    Last edited by ganulv; 07-30-2011 at 01:47 AM. Reason: wording
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    Quote Originally Posted by ganulv View Post
    Would any light be thrown on the issues under discussion here by looking at HRT-type units and the individuals working within them? Correct me if I am wrong, but I assume that the mix of ability and willingness to unblinkingly kill in the context of a situation where the very purpose is to save the lives of most of the individuals involved must bring certain things to the fore in a pronounced if not necessarily unique fashion.
    IMHO these guys have a more difficult juggling act (meaning switching on and off) than most soldiers have who go off to war for a period then come back home. These guys do it on an almost daily basis.

    In addition their actions need to be more controlled and selective to avoid collateral damage. Adds to the level of stress I'm sure. I couldn't do that stuff. In my war you didn't want to get caught in front of an RLI or SAS assault line (sweep line as we called it) as if anything moved it got "smoked" (don't you just love that American expression).

    Why I say this because is because when contact is made that tight spring gets to unwind (for soldiers) but for the police and SWAT etc they can virtually never just "let rip". Their coiled spring remain tight all the time (until they put their weapons back in the armoury).

    So these guys have to go home in the evening after a "busy day at the office" and switch off and revert to husband and daddy mode most often without time to "chill out" (as they call it nowdays).

    I wonder what the divorce rate in these units is?
    Last edited by JMA; 07-30-2011 at 09:17 AM.

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