I hope everyone is keeping in mind as they read any of the articles that I have written, or the strings of commentary provided here, that what I am proposing, in its simplest terms, is merely a change of priority and focus, and a corresponding change of who is the supported agency for U.S. engagement abroad. Not a call to coddle criminal actors.
Instead of focusing on keeping any particular government in power regardless of their relationship with their own populace so long as they support our Government; Instead of chasing “threats” on an ever expanding list of “Violent Extremist Organizations” with the goal of "defeat the threat, defeat the problem"; Instead of either of these approaches I simply suggest that the true COG, the source of all strength and power, for any government and any Insurgency is the populace from which it arises.
To date, even where the populace is recognized as important, the position is usually one of “how can we get this populace to support its government and how can we separate them from the insurgent”? This is usually coupled with an engagement program aimed at building host nation capacity to defeat the insurgent and facilitating that effort with U.S. enablers; while at the same time essentially trying to bribe the populace with all types of aid based upon what WE think they need.
What I am suggesting is to simply begin with the populace in mind, and to always keep them in mind as the focus of your engagement throughout. If there is an insurgency (not to be confused with a handful of violent nut jobs like Tim McVeigh), then by definition there is a movement with some degree of active and (primarily) tacit popular support. You must understand why that is before you can aid a government in addressing the problem.
Rare is the government that is going to admit its failures and shortcomings. Insurgent acts are criminal acts, so the government is technically and legally correct to blame the insurgent and to prosecute him for his actions. That will not, however solve the problem. He exists for a reason. Determine that reason, and design a program of engagement to address it. The focus of this engagement must not be on dumping aid on the populace (which often makes the problem worse by highlighting the failure of their own government to provide such services), but to instead focus on fixing the failures, with any engagement with the populace being executed with and through the populaces own government.
Meanwhile, if you have VEOs operating in the area, they must be dealt with AS A SUPPORTING EFFORT to the larger operation. First, sort out the PURPOSE for each organization operating. If it is a nationalist insurgency, is it a revolution, a separatist movement, or is it a resistance movement (that you likely gave rise to with your own clumsy misguided intervention efforts in the first place)? Tailor your engagement, again working through and with the Host Nation security forces, accordingly. If it is merely a criminal organization, deal with it as such. If it is an isolated group of malcontents, likewise. If it is a cell of either state or non-state actors working to incite insurgency to support their own agendas (unconventional warfare); then you must tailor a “counter unconventional warfare” campaign to deal with the specific threats. One cannot simply apply a blanket Counterterrorism approach to every group that uses terrorism as a tactic. To do so tears at the very fabric of the populace you are trying to support (yes, it is the job of government to support the populace).
So again, I am not saying that we need to stop doing anything, we just need to change our priorities, change our focus, change our leads, and do a better job of seeking first to understand WHY things are the way they are before going in and apply a “Made in America”, one size fits all, solution.
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