Iran, Nukes, Diplomacy and other options (catch all thread 2007-2010)

[Tukhachevskii]

Legitimacy in whose eyes? Certainly among hard-core ideologues in the regime, but it really doesn't resonate much among many ordinary Iranians.

On the contrary, it is common to hear complaints in Tehran about all the money "wasted" on Hizbullah and Hamas. I was frequently asked about Israeli politics by curious students when I was there. In a half dozen or so public lectures at various universities and think-tanks, I received only one anti-Semitic question—to which several members of the audience either complained, or walked out in protest at the question. On the other hand, when I criticized Ahmedinejad's Holocaust denial, I was applauded.

A 2002 Gallup survey showed that only 10% of Iranian TV viewers "frequently" watch news on the Arab-Israeli conflict, compared to 60-75% in most of the Arab world, and 15-20% in Turkey and Pakistan.

Regionally, yes: Iran's anti-israeli stance resonates well among the Arab public. Among the Iranian public, however, the effect seems strikingly limited.

Yes, sorry I meant regime ideology. Funnily enough most Yemenis I spoke to detest the Palestinians because they think they get a good deal by being a "diaspora" (i.e., the Arab states "throw money at them" and so does the international community, whatever that is).

[Bob's World]

Yes, sorry I meant regime ideology. Funnily enough most Yemenis I spoke to detest the Palestinians because they think they get a good deal by being a "diaspora" (i.e., the Arab states "throw money at them" and so does the international community, whatever that is).

These are important points in remembering that this is not a single monolithic problem, or a global insurgency; but rather many unique and distinct points of friction between populaces and their governments.

Is there a synergy? Well, certainly that is AQ's goal; but such UW efforts by AQ do not make everyone who talks or works with them into AQ as well to be resolved through CT. AQAP, AQIM...these are clusters of nationalist insurgent movements where AQ conducts UW to seek such synergy. Large, common ends such as a Caliphate? Highly unlikely.

An Iran of course is completely unrelated to all. They don't blame their poor governance on the US as these others often do (and of course are largely
Shia). They took care of that problem back in the 70s, the current problem is their own and they know it. This is why the Iranian populace is our greatest resource in keeping the Iranian government in check, or "deterred." Taking positions that alienate the Iranian populace only weaken our position in that region.

[JMA]

Taking positions that alienate the Iranian populace only weaken our position in that region.

Would you care to illustrate what "positions" these would be?

[Bob's World]

Would you care to illustrate what "positions" these would be?

Well, the largest one is this issue of nuclear weapons. Reports I have seen indicate that even those who are least satisfied with their government are outraged that the West should dictate to them as to if the nation of Iran can have such weapons or not.

We all know that we would feel the same way if the shoe were on the other foot.

[JMA]

Well, the largest one is this issue of nuclear weapons. Reports I have seen indicate that even those who are least satisfied with their government are outraged that the West should dictate to them as to if the nation of Iran can have such weapons or not.

We all know that we would feel the same way if the shoe were on the other foot.

So let them go ahead and develop such weapons and who... (the students, you say?) will deter the regime from ever using them?

[JMA]

Until one day the guy with the jackboots finds himself running for exile in another country (if he's lucky) or hanging from a lamppost (if he's not). It's happened before, it'll happen again.

And then one set of jackboots will be replaced by another... and the cycle will continue.

[Dayuhan]

And then one set of jackboots will be replaced by another... and the cycle will continue.

Not necessarily so; quite a few countries have gotten rid of dictators, kings, etc and moved forward. Doesn't happen overnight, but it happens... and what's the alternative? Some foreign deus ex machina coming in and "installing" democracy?

So let them go ahead and develop such weapons and who... (the students, you say?) will deter the regime from ever using them?

Deterrence is achieved by the certainty of overwhelming retaliation. Whether or not to "let them" develop weapons is not really an issue, as there is no effective and acceptable way of stopping them. The US is not in a position to tell other countries what they are and are not allowed to do within their borders.

[Bob's World]

So let them go ahead and develop such weapons and who... (the students, you say?) will deter the regime from ever using them?

Deterrence of activity and development of capability are two very different things. Though as your comments point out, are quite often confused.

[JMA]

Deterrence of activity and development of capability are two very different things. Though as your comments point out, are quite often confused.

Maybe you are attempting to sidestep the issue?

Lets try it this way then.

Once the Iranian regime has a nuclear capability what will in your opinion be the effective deterrent to their ever using them?

[davidbfpo]

JMA & Bob,

:Originally Posted by Bob's World:
Deterrence of activity and development of capability are two very different things. Though as your comments point out, are quite often confused.

From JMA:

Once the Iranian regime has a nuclear capability what will in your opinion be the effective deterrent to their ever using them?

I am sure there is a third leg to this strategic stance Iran is going for; activity, capability and understanding - of the consequences and more of having nuclear weapons.

No-one doubts the intelligence of the Iranian people, some admire their state's diplomatic dexterity, but in the open world how much understanding do they have?

[Bob's World]

So let them go ahead and develop such weapons and who... (the students, you say?) will deter the regime from ever using them?

Denial of a capability and deterrence of inappropriate employment of a capability are two very different things that should not be confused.

The question for the US is "Would we be taking the same position we are taking today if it was, say, 1970 and the Shah was still in power?" Point being, is the issue Iran becoming a nuclear state, or is the issue the nature of the relationship between our governments currently? I would argue that it is primarily the latter.

I see the US falling into the same trap with Iran on this nuclear issue that it has fallen into with China over Taiwan. It is not that there is any great evil that would necessarily occur if China forced a unification with Taiwan or if Iran developed a nuclear capability. The issue always boils down to one of we can't allow them to do something that we have committed ourselves to denying or preventing.
It becomes an issue of face, an issue of influence. Personally, I think we should pick these issues more carefully, and become more adept at evolving our positions over time to as to be able to gracefully divest ourselves of positions that have lost the relevance that drove their adoption in the first place.

Taiwan, for example, is a sucker's bet. If the PRC made a play for Taiwan and was defeated, but the US lost a Carrier or two in the process and several top of the line aircraft, it is a moral victory for the PRC; and the U.S. best case situation is to merely reset the conditions of failure. Does anyone think that China is going to someday stop thinking of Taiwan as being part of China? Similarly, does anyone think that China is going to do anything to disrupt the economy of Taiwan if they reunified? I suspect the PRC enjoys the predicament the U.S. has placed itself in, and plays it to their advantage to build their own influence regionally and globally and to erode U.S. influence regionally and globally as well. More importantly, it has a very negative effect on the US-Chinese relationship (and our relationship with every other state in the region) so that the Costs far exceed the benefits.

Anyway, as to Iran, if we focus on the relationship rather than the weapon we can have a grown up conversation with Iran as to why it is they feel it so important to possess such a weapon and look for alternative ways to address those concerns; or failing that, ways to ensure that their development of the weapon is not done in such a manner as to destabilize the region. Would this piss off Israel and Saudi Arabia and their powerful lobbies in the U.S.? Undoubtedly. But this is another benefit of this COA, as far too many around the globe see the U.S. as a big stupid puppet of these two little states currently, and doing something clearly counter to their interests but supportive of our own would likely build U.S. influence in the long run.

[Rex Brynen]

Anyway, as to Iran, if we focus on the relationship rather than the weapon we can have a grown up conversation with Iran as to why it is they feel it so important to possess such a weapon and look for alternative ways to address those concerns; or failing that, ways to ensure that their development of the weapon is not done in such a manner as to destabilize the region. Would this piss off Israel and Saudi Arabia and their powerful lobbies in the U.S.? Undoubtedly. But this is another benefit of this COA, as far too many around the globe see the U.S. as a big stupid puppet of these two little states currently, and doing something clearly counter to their interests but supportive of our own would likely build U.S. influence in the long run.

Bob, I think you're right at one level (A), but it isn't so easy at another (B).


(A) The Iranian nuclear program started under the Shah, and the West was fine with it. When Khomeini came to power, the nuclear program was stopped.

In 1980, Iran was attacked by Iraq, half a million people died, and CW were used against the Iranians and Kurds with hardly a peep from the West—on the contrary, the West armed Saddam, escorted Iraqi and Kuwait oil exports, and even shot down an Iranian civilian airliner (due to carelessness, I know--but that doesn't matter much in Iranian eyes). That is the Iranian strategic perception.

At this point, the Iranians—quite sensibly, given their strategic situation—thought a deterrent might be useful, and restarted their nuclear program. I'm not saying that this is a good thing, but it I am saying that there are wholly understandable Iranian reasons for doing so.

On this level, therefore, I agree that there is value in a dialogue on Iranian strategic interests that could be quite useful in assuaging their concerns and convincing them to abandon any quest for a weapon, except...


(B) ...it is not at all clear that the Iranians want such a dialogue under the current President and Supreme Leader, or in the current political climate. You'll find former senior Iranian officials in Tehran who will, reluctantly and off the record, suggest that while dialogue would have been possible between Khatemi and Obama (had they been in office at the same time), it just won't fly under Ahmadinejad any more than it flew at the US end under Bush. In the eyes of many of the current regime, the US is part of the Axis of Evil.

I think the US is right to offer dialogue as an option. No matter how well that is done, however, I have little confidence (sadly) that it will get us anywhere anytime soon given present realities.

[Bob's World]

Bob, I think you're right at one level (A), but it isn't so easy at another (B).


(A) The Iranian nuclear program started under the Shah, and the West was fine with it. When Khomeini came to power, the nuclear program was stopped.

In 1980, Iran was attacked by Iraq, half a million people died, and CW were used against the Iranians and Kurds with hardly a peep from the West—on the contrary, the West armed Saddam, escorted Iraqi and Kuwait oil exports, and even shot down an Iranian civilian airliner (due to carelessness, I know--but that doesn't matter much in Iranian eyes). That is the Iranian strategic perception.

At this point, the Iranians—quite sensibly, given their strategic situation—thought a deterrent might be useful, and restarted their nuclear program. I'm not saying that this is a good thing, but it I am saying that there are wholly understandable Iranian reasons for doing so.

On this level, therefore, I agree that there is value in a dialog on Iranian strategic interests that could be quite useful in assuaging their concerns and convincing them to abandon any quest for a weapon, except...


(B) ...it is not at all clear that the Iranians want such a dialog under the current President and Supreme Leader, or in the current political climate. You'll find former senior Iranian officials in Tehran who will, reluctantly and off the record, suggest that while dialog would have been possible between Khatemi and Obama (had they been in office at the same time), it just won't fly under Ahmadinejad any more than it flew at the US end under Bush. In the eyes of many of the current regime, the US is part of the Axis of Evil.

I think the US is right to offer dialog as an option. No matter how well that is done, however, I have little confidence (sadly) that it will get us anywhere anytime soon given present realities.

One of the major strengths of taking a firm, but supportive position and seeking dialog is that it marks us as the rational (rather than hypocritical) party, building international support to our policies, as well as building support within the Iranian populace. Secondary benefit is that it also puts the lie to much of AQ's propaganda about the US simply being anti-Muslim. Not that any Sunni likely wants Shia Iran to possess such a weapon, but that it cannot be painted as just an other example of the US countering anything Muslim and supporting anything Israel.

President Obama's instincts are right, but our Cold War inertia is strong on our foreign policy. When President Bush spoke he always said "Iran" lumping the people and the government as one. President Obama is much better at distinguishing that it is the "government of Iran" that he is addressing on policy issues, and that the US supports the "people of Iran." Taking a similar approach with our allies would be a smart move as well; particularly those whose people have little say in government as is often the case in Muslim states.

[Rex Brynen]

Not that any Sunni likely wants Shia Iran to possess such a weapon, but that it cannot be painted as just an other example of the US countering anything Muslim and supporting anything Israel.

Interesting side-note: while almost all other Middle East regimes don't want Iran to have nuclear weapons, this isn't necessarily the case among their (Sunni) populations. According the the University of Maryland/Zogby 2010 Arab public opinion poll, a plurality of respondents felt that the net effects of a nuclear Iran would be positive.

[Fuchs]

(B) ...it is not at all clear that the Iranians want such a dialogue under the current President and Supreme Leader, or in the current political climate. You'll find former senior Iranian officials in Tehran who will, reluctantly and off the record, suggest that while dialogue would have been possible between Khatemi and Obama (had they been in office at the same time), it just won't fly under Ahmadinejad any more than it flew at the US end under Bush. In the eyes of many of the current regime, the US is part of the Axis of Evil.

IIRC Iran's government offered a great deal of cooperation in 2001/2002 in a wave of anti-terror sympathy - and GWB rejected it.

Maybe they weren't serious, but if they were - then this should be rated amongst GWB's 5 greatest mistakes.

[SWJ Blog]

Iran and the IAEA Nuclear Weapons Program Report

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[davidbfpo]

Mod's Note

New thread for this recurring topic started for 2011 and so this thread is closed or locked.