Alternatively, many in the the British Army after the First World War, were more than happy to go back to 'real soldiering' - colonial policing the North West Frontier and other parts of the Empire. Far more exotic, and cheaper to live in, than in Aldershot or some other cold dank place in Britain.
If you can ever find who actually ever said "get back to real soldiering" I'd love to know. I simply do not believe it was ever said, and if so it is taken out of context.Originally Posted by GI Zhou
WW1 was an anomaly. We have never seen anything like it before or since, and warfare has never developed as fast as it did in those 4 years. It is unique. The British Army of 1918 was unsustainable for any other conflict in the form it existed.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
WW2 only followed 19 years later. The Germans went from the Me-109D to rpo the Me-262, the US from a handful of B-17Ds in 1939 to B-29s and nukes in 1945.
What I want to know is where 'it is better to wound than to kill' was originally written down in doctrine.
The Germans flew the He-178 in 1939, so not such a big leap. Yes Nukes was huge, but I still submit that the scale and application of innovations seen in WW1 has never really been matched.
It never was and it's rubbish. The idea dates from the 1930's but it really came out of a book called "Overkill" written in the 1970's and taken from the US use of 5.56mm in Vietnam, as in the round "was not meant to kill."What I want to know is where 'it is better to wound than to kill' was originally written down in doctrine.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
COIN and Army/USMC Doctrine
Perhaps the place of COIN within our doctrine would be more clearly understood if there were a better definition of what it is and what it is not. Some months ago Gian Gentile famously called it "a strategy of tactics"; to my way of thinking it is neither strategy nor tactics, but rather an operational technique for fighting insurgencies and other low-intensity conflicts.
Fighting conventional wars will always be the primary mission of our armed forces for those existential conflicts which threaten the survival of our nation, as well as that of our closest allies. Therefore combined arms doctrine and the need to train in core warfighting competencies will never go away--in any event the use of combined arms, small unit tactics, and proficiency with weapons are every bit as much part of COIN as they are for full-blown conventional warfare.
In one of Tom Ricks' recent blog pieces "Hunter," a National Guard battalion commander and USMA graduate, stated that "First, do no harm" was one of the goals he put into his Commander's Intent when his battalion was in Iraq. Possibly that principle could be integrated into the Law of Land Warfare instruction troops are given during Basic Training, AIT, and precommissioning courses. Conduct that does gratuitous harm to local populations is not merely a violation of COIN principles, in most cases it violates the Geneva Conventions and the UCMJ as well. Last but not least, truly reprehensible behavior drags the colors of our services through the mud, as My Lai did many years ago for the U.S. Army.
To my way of thinking the need for instruction on COIN begins at the officer and NCO level. At officers' basic and career courses, as well as at NCO leadership courses, COIN doctrine should be part of the instruction at our schools, maybe ten percent or so. Instruction in COIN as an operational technique should be reserved for the CGSC level, and even there it should not replace teaching on fighting conventional wars.
When all is said and done. COIN or no COIN, infantrymen have to be taught infantry skills, artillerymen how to fire their howitzers, aviators how to fly and maintain their helicopters, and so on. In closing, the old expression "the best is enemy of the good" should guide our changes to training to make room for COIN. A good solution now that can be modified as required in the future would be better than staffing the subject to death for five years to find the best solution.
Last edited by Pete; 05-02-2010 at 10:31 PM.
Hot TRADOC Babes
To read the latest chapter of my work in progress, Internet Insurgency: Jerking Ken White's Chain, please click here . However, be forewarned, this link includes scenes of gratuitous sex and violence and is not for the faint of heart.
My Chain has seen masny jerks...
However, on to the Sex and Violence...
I briefed De Puy once and talked to him twice. He was not a jerk, he was better than most but he was a product of a system -- and, as could be expected, he perpetuated that system while doing a few good things and paying lip service to "Preparing the Army for modern war."
You should speak to your Therapist re: the Hot Babes...
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