Good news -- the insurgency is over! Now we need a new strategy for the Iraq War.

[Fabius Maximus]

Taking skiguy's comment to the next level, we could follow Martin van Creveld's advice: bombing insurgents with the thousands of copies of the thousands of manuals-guides-books-articles about fighting insurgencies.

But that would be too cruel.

Unfortunately, these are all written by losers. If we'd win one, then we could write it up ("win" as foreigners fighting a domestic insurgency, fought after Mao brought 4GW theory to maturity).

[jcustis]

Unfortunately, these are all written by losers. If we'd win one, then we could write it up ("win" as foreigners fighting a domestic insurgency, fought after Mao brought 4GW theory to maturity).

Please feel free to clarify, or else I fear this thread will take a nose dive in short order.

[Fabius Maximus]

It's a historical fact, however shocking. Martin van Creveld discusses this at some length in the closing chapters of The Changing Face of War.

Since Mao brought 4GW to maturity, and more so as 4GW art has developed since then, insurgents have defeated foreigners. Other than in small and shallowly rooted uprisings, foreigners lose. Western, Asian, developed nations, emerging nations – it makes no difference. (domestic conflicts among locals are more complex to analyze).

There are borderline cases, as always in human events. Like Northern Ireland. But in general the record is clear.

So it follows that COIN manuals are written by folks who have not won these kinds of wars. That remains true until either we win one or our opponents write a manual for us.

4GW forces us to confront many harsh realities. Killing children-soldiers, suicide bombers, the clash of universal truths vs. revealed truths, the evolution of war perhaps making our military organizations obsolete.

None of this is new in history. Now it’s happening to us.

[slapout9]

So you are saying we don't need a military?

[jcustis]

So it follows that COIN manuals are written by folks who have not won these kinds of wars. That remains true until either we win one or our opponents write a manual for us.

Really?...And so you can say authoritatively that the book they wrote was wrong? There were not other factors that influenced events?

You're stating the obvious of sorts, but I believe that the argument you are trying to advance is flawed.

This whole COIN manual thing isn't another veiled dig at Kilcullen, is it?

And just a tip here FM, if you could for once post something without mentioning 4GW, you might be taken a bit more seriously.

[SWCAdmin]

Here we go again .

Or, perhaps, we won't get too carried away? Agreeing to disagree seems to be a critical survival skill here.

No need to keep trying to convert the altar boys here.

[Mark O'Neill]

It's a historical fact, however shocking. Martin van Creveld discusses this at some length in the closing chapters of The Changing Face of War.

Since Mao brought 4GW to maturity, and more so as 4GW art has developed since then, insurgents have defeated foreigners. Other than in small and shallowly rooted uprisings, foreigners lose. Western, Asian, developed nations, emerging nations – it makes no difference. (domestic conflicts among locals are more complex to analyze).

There are borderline cases, as always in human events. Like Northern Ireland. But in general the record is clear.

So it follows that COIN manuals are written by folks who have not won these kinds of wars. That remains true until either we win one or our opponents write a manual for us.

4GW forces us to confront many harsh realities. Killing children-soldiers, suicide bombers, the clash of universal truths vs. revealed truths, the evolution of war perhaps making our military organizations obsolete.

None of this is new in history. Now it’s happening to us.

FM,


I would welcome a sensible exposition of your ideas about this issue rather than a tired recycling of vaguely articluated, second hand (and eminently contestable) opinions.

Thrill me with your insight.

Mark

[skiguy]

So it follows that COIN manuals are written by folks who have not won these kinds of wars.

You may want to double check your facts. Are you trashing LTC Nagl too? ..but I'll stay civil, diplomatic, and out of the discussion if you are actually taking a dig at him.

By the way,why do you hide behind some fantasy name when you write your "expert" analyses?

This post was written by me, Ken Adams

[SteveMetz]

It's a historical fact, however shocking. Martin van Creveld discusses this at some length in the closing chapters of The Changing Face of War.

Since Mao brought 4GW to maturity, and more so as 4GW art has developed since then, insurgents have defeated foreigners. Other than in small and shallowly rooted uprisings, foreigners lose. Western, Asian, developed nations, emerging nations – it makes no difference. (domestic conflicts among locals are more complex to analyze).

There are borderline cases, as always in human events. Like Northern Ireland. But in general the record is clear.

So it follows that COIN manuals are written by folks who have not won these kinds of wars. That remains true until either we win one or our opponents write a manual for us.

4GW forces us to confront many harsh realities. Killing children-soldiers, suicide bombers, the clash of universal truths vs. revealed truths, the evolution of war perhaps making our military organizations obsolete.

None of this is new in history. Now it’s happening to us.

Your point is factually false:

Malaya
Palestine
Northern Ireland
Kenya
Oman
Iraq
Afghanistan
El Salvador

Second, it's irrelevant. In the post-colonial world, the only insurgency that pits what is seen as a foreign occupier against a domestic resistance force is Palestine. When foreigners are involved, they are normally in support of a local ally.

Third, I've always found the assertion that insurgents often or normally win to be patently wrong because there are hundreds, probably thousands of insurgencies that were defeated at an early stage which simply aren't well known because they were defeated.

[Gian P Gentile]

Let me ask you this: Did we need the surge to get where we are at today? Would your assessment of conditions on the ground and proposal for future action worked in December 2006 before the surge began?

I disagree with your point that the American elite and populace will soon end the war. Sadly i think the ostenisble success of the Surge has created enough optimism within the right's base to maintain this tempo of military operations in Iraq Indefinitely; to the detriment of the American Army.

[SteveMetz]

I disagree with your point that the American elite and populace will soon end the war. Sadly i think the ostenisble success of the Surge has created enough optimism within the right's base to maintain this tempo of military operations in Iraq Indefinitely; to the detriment of the American Army.

I see it differently. The whole purpose of the "surge" was to create "space" for political progress. If there is no demonstrable political progress (and, sadly, I don't think there will be), I believe the American public and Congress will say, "We gave them an opportunity. They didn't take it. We're outta here."

I think both Democrats and Republicans will base their argument on the damage the current operational level is doing to the force. I want to get a copy of the CSA's HASC testimony yesterday where, according to media reports, he made that point.

In my blog, I've compared the "surge" to the Phoenix program--a militarily successful operation that was, politically speaking, too late. If we done the surge in the autumn of 2003, it might have mattered.

[SteveMetz]

I also wanted to add that I consider the question of whether the conflict in Iraq is or is not an insurgency a red herring. Insurgency is a strategy. Most conflicts involve multiple strategies; their relative importance can ebb and flow during the course of the conflict. To me, debating whether the conflict in Iraq is or is not an insurgency is like debating whether World War II was or war not amphibious war or strategic bombing.

[Gian P Gentile]

Except for the fact that for almost all of them (the "American public and Congress") their sons and daughters are not dying daily on the streets and roads of Iraq.

[SteveMetz]

Except for the fact that for almost all of them (the "American public and Congress") their sons and daughters are not dying daily on the streets and roads of Iraq.

I think that might affect the intensity of the opposition, but not the extent. The majority of the people who opposed the war in Vietnam did not have family there.

[Kreker]

I want to get a copy of the CSA's HASC testimony yesterday where, according to media reports, he made that point.

Steve,
Here's the link.
http://armedservices.house.gov/heari...ormation.shtml
Regards

[SteveMetz]

Steve,
Here's the link.
http://armedservices.house.gov/heari...ormation.shtml
Regards

Thanks. When I Googled the HASC, I got a different site. I was going to get a copy of the testimony from a buddy on the CSA staff.

[Fabius Maximus]

Really?...And so you can say authoritatively that the book they wrote was wrong?

No, you are making a prediction about the future. I said that the institution which produced it had not won a counter-insurgency (within the parameters I gave). That's a statement about the past.

So you are saying we don't need a military?

No, I believe and have written tens of thousands of words about the exact opposite of this. Learning to win at 4GW might be necessary for our survival.

Thrill me with your insight.

My post refered to a specific article -- part of a series. Reading that will give you chills and thrills. Swaping these bits of text back and forth doesn't seem to substitute for longer exposition. For a brief summary of my views, Steve Metz's comment #171 looks perfect.

Insurgency is a strategy.

I prefer to use definitions in JP 1-02 DoD Dictionary:
"insurgency — An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict."
Seems to fit Iraq, doesn't it?

[SteveMetz]

I prefer to use definitions in JP 1-02 DoD Dictionary:
"insurgency — An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict."
Seems to fit Iraq, doesn't it?

I think that definition is horrible and have said so in writing. According to it, there was no insurgency in Iraq until June 2005. Plus it excludes the dozens of recent and ongoing insurgencies that aren't seeking to overthrow a government. Plus, there are other characteristics of insurgency other than subversion and armed conflict. Think about it--we were trying to get get Saddam Hussein's officers to turn on him while we were removing him militarily. By this definition, the U.S. government was an insurgency in March and April 2003.

Luckily, I convinced Con Crane of this when he was writing 3-24. He didn't feel he could just ignore the Joint definition so he just genuflected toward it and then ignored it.

I'm hoping that the new Joint doctrine, which is under development, will have a better definition.

[Fabius Maximus]

Wash Post: "Senate overwhelmingly endorsed a political settlement for Iraq that would divide the country into three semi-autonomous regions."

It is a powerful conclusion to the original debate on this thread, the extremely heated opposition to my article forecasting that Iraq would fracture -- and that this would be a good thing.

This should also conclude a debate going back to my first post on SWC: that there is no national government in Iraq, in that it lacks the "attributes" of a real government. The Senate resolution caps a long series of US actions showing that the US government regards the Iraq national government as a useful fiction (an almost colonial mindset). Our mercs operate without supervision by the local govt, we build bases without consulting the local govt, we aid & strike deals with insurgents without consulting the local govt, etc etc.

[Ken White]

Words fail me...