Paper and COIN: Exploiting the Enemy's Documents

[Tom Odom]

Good piece and very relevant. We are doing better at training this as part of site exploitation. We trained it before back in the old days

The critical point you make is that it is underfunded and it lacks "sex appeal" for generating monies. That has long been a problem; the other side of this is because it is underfunded and undermanned, there is rarely any appreciable feedback. The below pic is a shot of me captured from video as the Rwandan Patriotic Army G3 Colonel Charles Muheri examined captured documents taken in a raid against an Interahamwe militia training base on an island in lake Kivu in November 1995. As I recall this was a supply request sent to the "rear" in Goma; from it we could pretty well detremine how many bad guys were training and operating on the island. It also gave us further confirmation that a command structure to include formal logistics structure was operating. The fact that we found a shed filled with USAID donor beans that had been distributed in the refugee camps also helped.

We sent in quite a bit of stuff for exploitation and never heard a peep. Understand at this time there were 2 issues on the agenda for every session of the National Security Council. One was the Balkans. The other was Rwanda and the camps in Zaire. The "question" of whether the camps were being used as training and operational bases was a White House PIR.

We answered it and heard nothing. You do that to soldiers too much and they stop looking. I think I can safely speak for both Stan and myself on this point; evals on reporting from the rear are critical motivators. Tell me I am doing good, I'll go do more good. Tell me I doing poorly, I'll try and do better. Ignore me and I'll do what I deem necessary and you get what you get. Many times I requested evals just to make sure someone was reading what we sent. DOCEX needs the same thing and that means money and manning.

Best

Tom

[Steve Blair]

This is a great article, with the point well-made through a number of relevant examples (both good and bad) of the potential of DOCEX. We did this fairly well during Vietnam, and it's a shame that the flashing lights of electronic methods seem to have at least partially obscured this most basic source.

[Cavguy]

Good piece and very relevant. We are doing better at training this as part of site exploitation.

I'll second that. Ft. Knox has the lead on the training program for that, and TRADOC is hot on the subject.

A lack of translators that can be trusted at low levels really slows the DOCEX process due to sheer volume at the tactical level.

[Merv Benson]

Is there some reason why interpreters that we and the Brits have hired in Iraq could not be used as document translators? I understand that the Brits are concerned that their guys might get killed if left behind. My guess is they would be eager to take such a job. I would guess that they have also demonstrated a certain level of trusts at this point.

[Jedburgh]

Is there some reason why interpreters that we and the Brits have hired in Iraq could not be used as document translators? I understand that the Brits are concerned that their guys might get killed if left behind. My guess is they would be eager to take such a job. I would guess that they have also demonstrated a certain level of trusts at this point.

If they're indig, no matter how long they've worked for us, how dependable they seem, or how trustworthy they appear - you can never trust them. You always have to be careful with what you task them with and how much background you impart to them.

In any case, first, the number of available 'terps still does not meet the demand.

Second, there is a significant difference between "interpreting" conversation and "translating" documents. Document translation (in general, with all the caveats that implies) requires far more precision as well as requiring a higher level knowledge of English on the part of the individual tasked with translating the documents. Hell, the guy could be a native English speaker and a near-native fluency Arabic linguist and still require specific subject-matter knowledge in order to effectively translate certain types of documents.

In many cases, the nature of the mission should necessitate immediate on-the-spot document translation. Too often, this is only really possible if you have a soldier in uniform who is fluent in the language.

Once again, this brings me to my personal fork-in-the-eye of DA's "suspension" of the language requirement for HUMINT. An assigned or attached HUMINTer who is language-capable will be able to immediately read out the doc, so the mission leader can decide whether or not that information is immediately actionable or not. But right now, damn near all the HUMINTers being produced to fill much-needed slots can't interrogate, interview, or debrief the indig - let alone translate a document - without using a 'terp themselves.

Talking With Victor Charlie: An Interrogator's Story has some good vignettes about the value of DOCEX that also illustrate my point about the need to understand specialist vocab.

[Tom Odom]

If they're indig, no matter how long they've worked for us, how dependable they seem, or how trustworthy they appear - you can never trust them. You always have to be careful with what you task them with and how much background you impart to them.

In any case, first, the number of available 'terps still does not meet the demand.

Can I get an "AMEN" for Jed's point!?!?!

Absolutely true and a point that US folks continually do not get. This applies to the interagency crowd as well. Local hires are --- local hires. Use them. Take care of them. But watch them and as the Fokker's say, "keep them outside the circle of trust."

Tom

[marct]

Interesting article, Webfoot. I must admit I'm surprised at some of your examples of soldiers burning documents or just letting them blow away in the wind; actually, "shocked and appalled" would be a better description . You mentioned that SF and MEF soldiers did a better job in this area, and I'm wondering if you could comment on why you think that is? Is it better basic training in terms of something like "collect all documents regardless"? Is it that they have a better understanding of where documents fit into the entire war effort? Is it something else completely?

[Webfoot]

marct,

Well, I know that the Marines train their folks to not only capture and evacuate POWs but to also search for documents.media, especially if it is on a body (breathing or not, makes little difference to the analyst unless the gore makes the info unreadable) and then tag and evacuate them. As for SF folks, one of their main purposes is the acquisition of intel, thus they are highly sensitized to documents, media, etc. Having been in a few mission briefs, litter pickup in and on the objective, time and circumstances permitting, was stressed.
Doesn't always happen, people forget, circumstances preclude it or time inhibits it, but the jarheads and the snake-eaters are pretty good as document vacuums. The soldiers on the other hand, don't seem to include it in their basic skills package. At least that is the answer I got from close on to a hundred soldiers from different units, all 11Bs.
Don't know why.
If you think you are appalled and shocked, you should have seen my reaction on the mountainside outside of Aranas or south at Kandahar.

The early recce missions in Iraq (2003) were horrible in regards to safe-guarding media and documents. There were several instances when large caches of documents and/or computer hard-drives were located at "abandoned" facilites of interest (Al-Kindi facilites come to mind). Because the survey teams were to small the decision was usually made to return the following day with a larger SSE team with lots of security. No security was left to monitor or safeguard the sites. Upon the morrow, when the SSEs returned to the various sites, there had been selective destruction of the documents/computer hard-drives. The SSE missions would sift through the destruction for anything worth a crap, usually finding nothing. Upon RTB, the mission would be filed as "NSTR - Vandalism preclude collection and exploitation", or words to that effect. Always amazed me that the vandalism was so selective and neatly done, with the exact items we were looking for usually laid in a tidy strip in the floor and carefully burned with an accelerant while nothing else in the cache area was even smoke damaged. My deductions of a comprehensive destruction plan conducted by "loyalist stay behinds" was noted but never recorded by ISG intelligence personnel (meaning Colonel/GS-15 and higher, the lower level intel weenies were up in arms about it). Lost a lot of info that way.

Lots of things shock and appall me when it comes to intelligence.

Webfoot

[marct]

Hi Tom,

Absolutely true and a point that US folks continually do not get. This applies to the interagency crowd as well. Local hires are --- local hires. Use them. Take care of them. But watch them and as the Fokker's say, "keep them outside the circle of trust."

Okay, you know I just can't let this one pass by .

There has to be some type of trust relationship with local hires and, I would think, that this is especially true when you depend on them for translation and cultural guidance. In some situations, they are putting themselves and their families in extreme peril by working with you. So, how far do you let them "in"?

The issue I'm thinking of is the one surrounding Iraqi translators and the denial of any backdoor safety mechanism to evac them to the US if the fecal matter hits the rotary impeller. It strikes me that you are actually enhancing the likelihood of having them turned if they do not have some type of escape route, at least for their families. At the same time, I think it also reinforces a few IO messages made by AQ (and others) that are dangerous in the long term; to whit, a) the US is only "here" to get what they can and b) the US doesn't take care of its allies.

So, while I agree it would be insane to hire an interpreter one day and give them total access the next, how do you think the relationships should be structured?

Marc

[Tom Odom]

Marc

I still say what I just said. I understand your instinct to do otherwise as you are trained to think that way. I was an intel officer as was Jed. Real world in environments like Rwanda or Iraq--the circle of trust is very small.

best

Tom

PS

On your question about safeguards and potential extraction--absolutely necessary. that was what I meant by "take care of them". But I have been down the road on seeing local hires inside the decision-making cycle in embassies--only to have them pop up later as members of the HN government.

[Jedburgh]

There has to be some type of trust relationship with local hires and, I would think, that this is especially true when you depend on them for translation and cultural guidance. In some situations, they are putting themselves and their families in extreme peril by working with you. So, how far do you let them "in"?

You let them "in" only as far as the mission requires.

You can think of this as the difference between empathy and sympathy. To develop a good working relationship, it is essential to understand the perceptions and concerns of your local hires, to listen to them, and to take of their needs within appropriate boundaries. But once you cross that line of sympathy and bond emotionally with the indig, you have compromised your position. This is very difficult for many people to grasp (other than lawyers and salesmen), because we want to be liked, and we like making friends. Addressing this effectively really requires strong leadership on this issue down at the unit level where it impacts (whether it is a military unit, or the civilian leadership at a PRT).

The issue I'm thinking of is the one surrounding Iraqi translators and the denial of any backdoor safety mechanism to evac them to the US if the fecal matter hits the rotary impeller. It strikes me that you are actually enhancing the likelihood of having them turned if they do not have some type of escape route, at least for their families.

Because of difficulties in vetting and monitoring indig employees, we have to consider that they are all "turned", reporting to one faction or another. Any other mindset is unacceptable.

And although you are definitely describing a worst-case scenario, I do agree that there should be contingency plans for evac of certain indig personnel in the event of catastrophe. However, I also strongly believe it is foolish to state up-front to indig employees that the US promises to safeguard and evac them and their families in case of mission collapse. In the end, they must feel that they are working for stabilization of their country - not working for the US.

At the same time, I think it also reinforces a few IO messages made by AQ (and others) that are dangerous in the long term; to whit, a) the US is only "here" to get what they can and b) the US doesn't take care of its allies.

The difference between empathy and sympathy is in the head of the US servicemember. It is not overt discrimination, nor should it translate into poor treatment of the indig translator, or a failure to provide basic security measures to ensure that he and his family are not endangered by working with us - it is a mindset that is simply a continual awareness that the indig may not be what they seem, and although they are partners, they are not "read on" and some things must be kept compartmented. Mission focus.

[Webfoot]

Jed,

Our cultural misunderstandings inhibit our effective use of local or even Cat II terps. I was working with various units in Afghanistan and they kept complaining about the untrustworthiness of even their Cat IIs, US citizens all. When I asked the nature of the problem I was told that while they were often quite good at rapid translation and even limited document translations, each terp seemed to have a faulty memory when it came to certain tribes. Of course, each CAT II was from the good ole USofA but had previously lived in Afghanistan. Turns out that the terps retained the tribal loyalty and "overlooked" much of what could be considered "bad news" for that tribe, even if the terp in question had been a US citizen over 20 years. My solution was to mix the terps up, as the existing policy was to send a terp originating from, say, Kandahar province (lets make him a Achakzai of Durrani background) to Kandahar area, as he "understood" the culture better. I said to send anybody of Durrani background up into the Ghilzai areas and send Ghilzai terps to the Durrani areas. Then there would be no "loyalty conflict" based on regional association. Of course, Pushtu speaking terps from tribal confederacies in Pakistan were easier, just send them deeper into Afghanistan away from the border (say, Helmand or Nimruz provinces). Not alsways workable nor a surefire solution, but much better than nothing.
Don't know if it was enacted because of the fluidity of the terp length of service and replacement policies. Please don't misunderstand, the great majority of Cat IIs were loyal Americans but they had familial and tribal blinkers that they didn't realize they had. Baggage that needs to be acknowledged.
My two cents.

Webfoot

[Jedburgh]

Our cultural misunderstandings inhibit our effective use of local or even Cat II terps. I was working with various units in Afghanistan and they kept complaining about the untrustworthiness of even their Cat IIs, US citizens all. When I asked the nature of the problem I was told that while they were often quite good at rapid translation and even limited document translations, each terp seemed to have a faulty memory when it came to certain tribes. Of course, each CAT II was from the good ole USofA but had previously lived in Afghanistan. Turns out that the terps retained the tribal loyalty and "overlooked" much of what could be considered "bad news" for that tribe, even if the terp in question had been a US citizen over 20 years. My solution was to mix the terps up, as the existing policy was to send a terp originating from, say, Kandahar province (lets make him a Achakzai of Durrani background) to Kandahar area, as he "understood" the culture better. I said to send anybody of Durrani background up into the Ghilzai areas and send Ghilzai terps to the Durrani areas. Then there would be no "loyalty conflict" based on regional association. Of course, Pushtu speaking terps from tribal confederacies in Pakistan were easier, just send them deeper into Afghanistan away from the border (say, Helmand or Nimruz provinces). Not always workable nor a surefire solution, but much better than nothing.

Don't know if it was enacted because of the fluidity of the terp length of service and replacement policies. Please don't misunderstand, the great majority of Cat IIs were loyal Americans but they had familial and tribal blinkers that they didn't realize they had. Baggage that needs to be acknowledged.

Good post. Of course, the same problems exist in Iraq. However, there is also another issue - a lot of Iraqis who are first or second generation US citizens are Christian Arabs. Many of them, especially the first generation, carry with them a tremendous amount of bigotry towards Muslim Iraqis - both Shi'a and Sunni. In far too many cases, this ultimately affects how they carry out their duties. As you implied above, if the US elements making use of their services recognize this bias, it can be dealt with. Unfortunately, a lot do not - because it often feeds into their own preconceived bias.

...Best DOCEX stuff I got from non-US, aside from the previously mentioned, was when I "acquired" about 2,000 UN intel reports....

I worked with UNSCOM in '96 - at the time the mission had been in existence for a while - and although DOCEX was a critical collection aspect of the mission, there was no standard operating procedure, policy, format etc. Myself and another MI guy ended up putting together a team policy for DOCEX during mission execution. Given how intense the hunt was for documentary and other evidentiary proof of WMD linkages and activity, I found it shocking that there was no structured procedure for DOCEX other than find'em and translate'em - let me know if they're important.

But it paid extremely well for a TDY - no Army per diem for that trip. Plus the UN flew us First Class back and forth between the US and Bahrain, putting us in at Habbaniyah on a German military bird. I got the feeling at the time that a lot of the folks were in it more for the entertainment and the cash than any sense of executing an important mission.