What are the top 5 things we've learned from OIF

[Tom Odom]

Rob,

As a historian and a lessons learned type I would echo Gian Gentile's concerns and go a bit further. We have opportunities now to look at insights but I seriously doubt that "we" have "learned" anything. I say that because no one on SWJ can really define who "we" is at this stage; that definition is citical to what is even considered worthy of learning. As examples, I would several key senior leaders who judging from their books or their pronouncements never learned a damn thing: Tenet, Wolfowitz, and Bremer are examples. Finally I would say that as you consider what insights are worthy you must always keep in mind that OIF is not over; the fat lady is still chowing down and has no intention to sing in the near future.

With those cautions in mind, I would offer a few:

Quantity has a certain quality all its own when it comes to post-war stability.

Intelligence is often a question of user intelligence

Speed in shifting forces means you uncover stabilized areas faster

The host people chose their insurgents

Cultural ignorance is stupidity


Best

tom

[Stu-6]

1. Ends and means should be clearly laid out at the start. Bumper sticker slogans like we fight for freedom are a poor substitute for real stagey.

2.War can be started unilaterally but it can only be ended multilaterally. It aint over till both sides say it’s over.

3.Low tech stealth (i.e. car bombs, pretending to be innocent civilians, etc) can defeat high-tech weapons.

4.Don’t assume they want the same thing as you.

5. Your enemies are under no obligation to fight your kind of war.

I stress "should" because we should have learned some of these from Vietnam (or other places). I think this is what Col. David Hackworth was thinking of when he use to talk about CRS disease (Can't Remember ####)

[RTK]

no one on SWJ can really define who "we" is at this stage;

Concur,

Perhaps you breakdown "we" further into subcategories. Though this is not an all-encompassing list (I came up with this after five minutes of scribbling and mind dumping onto a piece of paper) I think each of the following groups has learned something different:

- Military (Tactical level)
- Maneuver, Fires and Effects
- CSS
- Intelligence
- Civil Affairs
- Psychological Operations
- SOF
- Medical
- Aviation (fixed and rotary)
- Military (Operational level)
- Maneuver, Fires and Effects
- CSS
- Intelligence
- Civil Affairs
- Psychological Operations
- SOF
- Medical
- Aviation (fixed and rotary)
- Military (Strategic level)
- Maneuver, Fires and Effects
- CSS
- Intelligence
- Civil Affairs
- Psychological Operations
- SOF
- Medical
- Aviation (fixed and rotary)
- Political Appointees
- Political Electees
- Department of Defense
- Department of State
- Law Enforcement
- PRTs
- MiTTs/SPiTTs/BiTTs
- Logisticians
- Merchant Marine Transport
- Strategic Air Transport
- Procurment
- Acquisition
- FAO specialties
- Research Development
- Doctrine Development
- Linguists
- Academics
- Anthropologists
- Historians
- Economists
- Citizens

[Steve Blair]

I would also hazard a guess that the learning has occurred relatively quickly at some levels and not at all in others. The higher one goes, the less that really seems to be "learned," and also the further one gets into areas that do not have vested interests in the outcome in Iraq the less that is learned or retained.

I guess that's where it ends up for me: how much of what we gather will actually be retained? We learned a great deal in Vietnam (the hard way), and much of it was dumped as soon as the shooting stopped (if not before). I agree with Tom in that the singing hasn't even started yet (in fact the ol' cow ain't even warming up yet). Goesh has a nice summary of many good points, and I could add more. But I still worry about how much of it will be retained.

[kehenry1]

From my perspective, looking over the battles in most third world nations, either the ones that we've been involved in to the ones that we just watched unfold, ethnic or sectarian tension or conflict seems inevitable. From the first Gulf War, where it was the Shia that rose up against Saddam, to the Balkans, to Rwanda, Somalia, etc, etc, etc, particularly wherever political repression and economic depression exist.

We seemed to be blissfully unaware of or simply ignored the possibility or probability. Maybe it is "hindsight", but we should have anticipated both the Shia death squads and the Sunni insurgents. When one ethnicity or sect has been oppressed by the other, they are going to want "justice" or "revenge". If that isn't forth coming immediately by either the invading force or by the constituted "representative government", one side will take matters into their own hands and it likely will not be as controlled or limited as a government might be and the needs to reduce the possibility of all out civil war.

In some regards, though I understood the need for the Iraq government (now Shia dominated) to appear "just" as a new kind of government, different from the old, and our own desire to collect intelligence, it might have been more prudent to move along trials of the top offenders and get that out of the way.

At the time, we were operating under the assumption that the appearance of "justice" would stem the tide of the insurgency. In all honesty, it didn't. Instead, the length of the trials allowed such malcontents to use it as an excuse to take revenge and fueled the Sunni insurgency. Accepting, of course, that part of the problem was the Al Qaida presence and attacks being loosely associated with some Sunni local insurgents.

Still, "justice" should have been done much sooner. This was not post WWII Germany where the population had been bombarded into glazed eyed acceptance of the end and could not mobilize to protest the long trials or the occupation.

Had the Iraqis moved forward quickly with trials, even under a very imperfect system and with summary decisions of guilt (as if there was going to be any other...another complaint heard among Iraqis) and execution, the Shia may even have been mollified enough to allow the system to work, even a little more slowly on the rest. It might also had the Shia less concerned about high ranking Ba'athists coming back and allowed the rest of the reconciliation problem to move forward.

As they say in the west, "No justice, no peace."

Accepting that third world nations are likely to have such tensions or conflict, we should be much more cognizant of the layers of society and prepared to deal with them. Somehow, the idea that Iraqis were "educated" and had lived together for years without conflict, made us forget that the Ba'athist organization was largely Sunni and had oppressed the Shia violently, thus the probability of conflict.

Further, that, most of the Sunni not being unutterable destroyed or decimated in battle, meant that they were less likely to see themselves as "totally defeated" and thus ready to accept the new paradigm of a Shia dominated government. It's the sociological idea that the abuser actually fears the return abuse that they may receive when they no longer have power.

We should be looking for the divides and not pretend they don't exist. We should prepare for that divide and the desire for revenge.

That is a good reason to have anthropologists and other cultural experts on board before we decide to go. And, we should be more willing to listen to them. Does it stop war? No. But it may keep a four year insurgency from occurring.

[Tom Odom]

We seemed to be blissfully unaware of or simply ignored the possibility or probability. Maybe it is "hindsight", but we should have anticipated both the Shia death squads and the Sunni insurgents. When one ethnicity or sect has been oppressed by the other, they are going to want "justice" or "revenge". If that isn't forth coming immediately by either the invading force or by the constituted "representative government", one side will take matters into their own hands and it likely will not be as controlled or limited as a government might be and the needs to reduce the possibility of all out civil war.

Kat,

We were aware in 91 what was likely to happen in Iraq should we go north. I sat on the NIEs that examined the issues. That awareness was very much alive in 2002-2003; it was ignored because it was inconvenient to an established agenda.

In Rwanda in 1994, the probability of genocide was ignored and downplayed, magain because it did not fit with established agendas. From 1994 thru 1996, we were again ignored when we warned that a larger, more dealy conflict was imminent, one that began in 1997.

I don't disagree with any of your thoughts concerning anticipating such conflicts; I did that for a living, None of that, however, alters the reality that the decision makers must be willing to listen. If they don't, then the best analysis in the world is simply fuel for historical study when it comes to light.

Best

Tom

[Watcher In The Middle]

01 Snipers. Use, availability, training, support, and that fact that for what appears to be the first time in a very long time, we didn't have to go back & re-learn all our previously hard won knowledge. It seems like in virtually every previous conflict, we basically relegated our sniper community to a back room, and forgot virtually everything we had learned. Did not appear to happen this time around.

02 Widespread high speed Internet access. This has changed so many different aspects, and we still don't have our minds fully around all of the consequences. Everybody thinks of the AQI videos, but there's also the Mike Yons of the world, the milblogs, moveon.org, support organizations like Soldiers Angels and anysoldier.com, not to mention the impacts on the effects on MSM. Biggest Impact goes to SWJ, IMO. /shameless pandering

03 Personal digital electronics. Back in GWI, some, but very limited. Nowdays, stuff is everywhere, and in every variety (cell phones, digital cameras, .MP3 players, iPods, DVD's and players, portable USB hard drives loaded with both music and movies, notebooks & tablets, etc., etc.). Appears to have a real impact on stress reduction, and behavior problems.

04 Logistics. To me, this is one of the more interesting areas. Many non-military (civilian) logistics entities are always watching and studying how the US military runs their logistics, particularly in and out of hostile environments. There's a whole lot of respect out there for US military logistics operations.

05 US Military Adaptability. This is actually pretty impressive, particularly as relating to operations in/around hostile environments. From an outsider vantage point, seeing the military strongly pursuing areas like HTTs and other similar things, and then attempting to rapidly integrate these wholesale changes into front line combat units in a hostile environment is very impressive. There are any number of very large multinational corporate entities which can only wish they were as adaptable as the US military has shown itself to be.

Anyway, these are just some of the items noted from an outsider "looking in" viewpoint.

One other point I might make is that many of you who are inside might in fact be "too close" to fully appreciate exactly how impressive some of these accomplishments appear from the outside.

[kehenry1]

02 Widespread high speed Internet access. This has changed so many different aspects, and we still don't have our minds fully around all of the consequences. Everybody thinks of the AQI videos, but there's also the Mike Yons of the world, the milblogs, moveon.org, support organizations like Soldiers Angels and anysoldier.com, not to mention the impacts on the effects on MSM. Biggest Impact goes to SWJ, IMO. /shameless pandering

03 Personal digital electronics. Back in GWI, some, but very limited. Nowdays, stuff is everywhere, and in every variety (cell phones, digital cameras, .MP3 players, iPods, DVD's and players, portable USB hard drives loaded with both music and movies, notebooks & tablets, etc., etc.). Appears to have a real impact on stress reduction, and behavior problems.

I would say not to forget that we were able to put video recorders, mp3 voice recorders, lap tops and cell phones into the hands of informants who were able to tape or otherwise provide information on the networks. Most reliable assets.

[Ender]

to multi-culturalization:
1. Speak their language and understand their lingo, whoever they may be. Both literally and metaphorically which ties into...
2. Ethnocentrism kills. Try to make anyone else look like us in our minds and we only waste time and lives, but if we just try to see the world from their eyes everything will click.
to us:
3. We are still our own worst enemy. No one hits us as hard as we do.
4. We need to go back to basics, they are. Strategy has been left unchanged throughout the centuries but if stone age tech can still effect us we should go back to history and study the tactics of the ancients. I feel union between old and new perspectives will provide a proper foundation for future war fighting.
to the enemy:
5. They are playing for keeps, they want us dead and they are not going to stop unless someone forces them.

[RTK]

1. Iraqis want the same thing we want; safety and security for their families.
2. Fundamentals are fundamentals are fundamentals. Whether its a tank on tank battle or a counterinsurgency, basic fundamentals of maneuver, fundamentals of offensive operations, fundamentals of defensive operations, fundamentals of security, and fundamentals of reconnaissance apply, it's just their application that changes.
3. IF you try to learn the language and culture and make a concerted effort to communicate, no matter how bad you are, you'll make more money with the populace than if you play the "ugly American."
4. You must live amongst the populace to influence the populace.
5. Nothing you do is stealthy in a counterinsurgency. Someone is always watching you.

[Rob Thornton]

Some great thoughts in the previous posts - I'll try not to duplicate. Some of these would seem to be things we could have remembered from previous wars - as Ken might proffer - the more things change, the more they stay the same.

1) The nature of a war can change before the first shot is fired, and the longer the war goes, the more likely change will occur. The leadership who can anticipate that change and adapt faster will retain the initiative. This is along the lines of seeing things as they are vs. how we'd prefer them to be.

2) Technology, while it can be a fantastic enabler, is not as substitute for leadership, judgment and reason. War is a social occurrence involving people trying to kill each other - there are dangers in an over reliance on technology on all levels.

3) War will consume resources far beyond those anticipated - the consequences it creates have impacts that go far into the future and create 2nd and 3rd order effects that often rival the original rational for going to war. As such trying to put a dollar amount up front can lead you to a false sense of security in the decision to go to war.

4) The exact quality of a professional military at the onset of war is deceptive to people who have had no hand in its construction. Recruiting, training, sustaining and retaining the type of professionals present in the U.S. military in 2001 requires a great deal of resources (time, money and leadership) - it is not a simple task to replace or increase the quality while trying to sustain or increase quantity. If security matters and the use of military force is likely to be required, then pay the price for retaining a large professional force, so that when the course of the war out runs the projections,or when military options are needed elsewhere - you'll still have options.

5) This has something to do with #4 - but given the climate - perhaps its worth giving its own bullet. Contracting does not automatically equate to commitment or competence on the scale required to attain the war's objectives. When war becomes a business venture, or seeks efficiencies over effectiveness it jeopardizes the legitimacy we seek in our national culture. Again - it means that a larger professional military force with leaders who have increasingly valuable attributes and skills will need to be retained - but in the long run we stand a better chance of attaining a political outcome we can live with.

Best Regards, Rob

[Reid Bessenger]

Tough to encapsulate so complex a set of issues and observations in a list like this, but for me they include:

1. Conflict is a human phenomena that takes place in a global environment. The global environment provides advantage to those best able to quickly and consistently communicate their desires, intentions and thoughts to a variety of audiences. Read "internet," "television" etc, and leaders who maintain a responsive, cogent presence.

2. The subordination of national interest to partisan political interest, while a deplorable state of affairs, needs to be taken into consideration by those seeking to fulfill responsibilities to national constituents rather than interest groups (I include all political parties in this category of interest groups). The fix here needs to address general popular apathy.

3. Hubris cannot be tolerated. I know strong leaders who listen. If a person in a position of authority has always been the smartest person in rooms they occupied, they will do wrong.

4. Priority must be given in all organizations associated with a whole-government approach to conflict to maintaining members within each who are relatively unconstrained in their application of thought to the conflict's environment, and within it the ends, ways and means that are pursued.

5. The "short-term/simple" addicition impedes our pursuit of interests. "STS" inculcates a comfortable ignorance of second and third order effects and complexity in general, and relies on the fallacious, alchemical assumption that nonlinear complexity can be unilaterally reduced to a linear proposition.