Are we caving to AQ threats?

[Stan]

A quick read over at State's website among other things reveals...

... the Department's main goals: protecting the U.S. and Americans;

There's a big difference between "caving" and taking sensible precaution. And what exactly are we "caving" in to? Did AQAP demand that we shut our embassy temporarily for security reasons?

The idea that an embassy is anything resembling a security outpost is way off base. If they have credible information enough to get both mission chiefs to recommend/accept closing the missions, they made the right call.

Echoing Tequila and Tom - Although we don't have an Arab presence, I can't count how many times in the last 15 years the Embassy here closed their doors for no other reason than to reduce potential risk.

In a friendly country like Estonia, information funnels into the Country Team from law enforcement and the host government daily. The ultimate decision rests with the Embassy, but there have been instances where limited operations or temporary closure was recommended.

Closing or limiting the Embassy's operations simply reduces US and local employee exposure. Riots and social upheaval are no fun, and the walls and windows around the embassy are not some sort of force field

I suppose that what we are really talking about is where is that line drawn, and how are the decisions both arrived at and communicated.

I wished I had a better answer for you Marc. Fact is, even here in snowy paradise the communicated closure or limited operations is rather fuzzy and generates all kinds of rumor with the US expats and local population.

I'm certain Yemen will be handsomely rewarded under any number of programs such as counter terrorism, non-proliferation and security assistance.

[tequila]

Anything that "looks" like we flinched/blinked is as good a victory for AQ as is actual physical combat.

Really? So have we just scored a crushing victory over AQ by reopening the embassy?

I'm betting the "average" Yemeni does not actually tool around with bin Laden tire covers, nor does he know or care much that the U.S. and U.K. embassies were closed briefly this week.

I achieved this bit of inside knowledge by polling the Yemeni families who own two of the local bodegas around my neighborhood. See, I'm at least as reliable as Tom Friedman now.

[Tukhachevskii]

Really? So have we just scored a crushing victory over AQ by reopening the embassy?

I'm betting the "average" Yemeni does not actually tool around with bin Laden tire covers, nor does he know or care much that the U.S. and U.K. embassies were closed briefly this week.

I achieved this bit of inside knowledge by polling the Yemeni families who own two of the local bodegas around my neighborhood. See, I'm at least as reliable as Tom Friedman now.

Just some quick thoughts to clarify what I meant in the previous post...

First of all I have no idea what a Bodega/s is/are. I hope you will enlighten me.

Secondly, lets examine things from the PoV of a Yemeni and how he would understand the chain of events (having actually lived there for nine months I think I am, respectfully, best placed to know how they think if only in limited form).

1) Our glorious Son of Islam (the Underwear bomber) outsmarts the US and tries to blow-up a US airliner on Christmas day (or kafir day). He fails. No matter. It is jihad all the same (see Metrics 1, 2, 3, 9 below)

2)US “panics” and closes embassy in Yemen (where a previous attempt by AQ of Arabian Peninsula had failed just short of the main gates). Ha! They run if we sneeze! Not at all like China.

3) Yemeni government- the takfiri collaborationist government of Ali Abdullah Saleh and his gang of GPC cronies who are all on the US payroll -“claim” to have killed an AQ “mujahedeen”. We don’t believe them, of course, because they make claims about everything. Besides, if “they” have killed anyone its probably one of my tribal cousins. That irks me no end.

4) US reopens embassy.

5) Salih is in cahoots with the hated and vile United States of Kafiroona (this merely proves what we suspected all along) therefore I will shift support (if I haven’t already) to Islah, will continue ignoring the various groups operating in my midst, which I support tacitly or overtly and to which my son belongs, pray for the speedy victory of AQ and the destruction of the Takfiri government of Salih.


Yes. We blinked. Yes. We reopened our (UK and US) embassies. No. It did nothing to prove our resolve or courage (thereby undermining what Joseph Nye called Soft Power). In a culture in which honour, prestige and face have been taken to their logical extremes we have handed them a propaganda victory on a plate by “blinking” while simultaneously proving whatever conspiracy theory they may have fastened onto (and there are many). I have every reason to believe Saleh’s government acted in the manner it did, by (allegedly) “killing” an AQ member, to prevent even the talk of US involvement in Yemen (which would destabilise it) by committing an act which, by perceiving to “help” the US, will increase tension in Yemen and thus ultimately ......destabilise it. Saleh gets to wring more money out of the US (having proved that previous aid is being put to “good” use) which he will then use to pay off the major tribal confederacies, and anyone else whose feathers were ruffled, and stay in power a little while longer. Meanwhile his Political Security Organisation will continue to “allow” the escape of AQ members (amongst others) as they did (in)famously in 2006 while clamping down on domestic reformers (after all, he needs the tribes and their AQ/Foreign Fighter friends to eliminate the Houthi rebellion in the north). I do not call that a victory but a net loss. The previous attack on the US embassy was neutralised by Yemeni forces (with the aid of the 4 dshka armed Toyota pickups that dot the entrance). The internal reception of that event in Yemen was disassociated from the US. Causally nothing the US did in Yemen (or the ongoing Iraq/Afghan imbroglios) justified it and thus the Yemeni’s (gov and people) could compartmentalise the episode. The fact that Yemenis died (including newlyweds) actually helped the government gain a degree of legitimacy (a miracle in itself) when its forces killed those concerned. Meanwhile, at the US embassy it was business as usual. “Damn it”, Moe Yemeni thought, “these people are practically immovable. Either I plan something awesome or I give up the idea altogether and go back to my hut and chew Qat”. So, yes, the closure was, in my unlearned eyes at least, a monumental failure in strategic communication/signalling.

Thirdly, we have a problem in defining the meaning of “Victory”/”Success”. We have NO common strategic vocabulary with our opponents (hell, we didn’t even have one with the Soviets during the Cold War, even though, ostensibly, they spoke “our language” culturally speaking...deterrence anyone?). Our metrics are qualitatively dissimilar/diametrically opposed. Our enemy’s metrics have been ably explored and explained by J. B. Cozzens, ‘Victory from the Prism of Jihadi Culture’, Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 59, 2009;

Metric 1 Victory can be understood as the perpetuity of fighting

Metric 2 Victory is found in obeying the obligation to fight Islam’s enemies, not in the outcome of battle.

Metric 3 The Institutionalisation [actually, rather more a case of the maintenance] of a culture of martyrdom is a victory.

Metric 4 Victory comes by pinpointing Islam’s enemies through the refining process of Jihad, and thus maintaining its identity.

Metric 5 Establishing pride, brotherhood and unity in the face of threats to the Ummah is a form of victory.

Metric 6 Creating a parity of suffering with Islam’s enemies- especially the Jews and crusaders-is a victory.

Metric 7 Victory is seen in the maladies afflicting God’s enemies, especially economic recession and natural disasters.

Metric 8 The presence of Miracles in Jihad foretells of Victory for the Mujahedeen

Metric 9 The promotion of the heroic template is itself victory.

The closing of the embassies is equivalent to what the social psychologist Albert Bandura called “vicarious reinforcement” (the actions of others, when seen to result in positive outcomes, Makes those actions appealing or reinforces such CoA). In terms of these metrics and the war of ideas our closing of embassies sends the wrong signals to our foes and means that, IMO, we lost this bout.

[tequila]

1) A bodega is a Spanish slang term for a neighborhood corner store in the boroughs of New York City. More commonly used in the outer boroughs than in Manhattan, unless you're in Harlem or north of 110th St.

Secondly, lets examine things from the PoV of a Yemeni and how he would understand the chain of events (having actually lived there for nine months I think I am, respectfully, best placed to know how they think if only in limited form).

2) I lived in Iraq for 8 1/2 months, but I don't think I'm nearly as well tuned into the thoughts of the average Iraqi youth (as if there was such a thing) as you are into the Yemeni. I suppose I'll just have to take your word for it.

[Stan]

Just some quick thoughts to clarify what I meant in the previous post...

Hey Tukhachevskii !
Quite a set of quick thoughts and a very nice post !

Permit me a short but precise response based on more than a decade in Embassy life in some of the most inhospitable places on earth...

Yes, we are to an extent culturally challenged when it comes to considering some subliminal message we're sending regardless of the action or event.

So what exactly happens in that fish bowl called an Embassy ?

Theoretically speaking a threat is received: The Country Team is mustered and the subject beaten to death and a show of hands.
"Stan, what say you?"
"Sounds off the mark, but I'm not willing to take responsibility for 500 that would perish if they blow the building, SIR !"
"RSO, what say you?" Dito, SIR !
And it goes from there 13 to 15 iterations of DITO and the decision is done.
The CMD makes the call, notifies DOS and the Embassy personnel and the building is closed, or operations limited for the prescribed length of time. Employees and expats are reminded to stay off the streets, etc.

Closing or limiting the Embassy's operations simply reduces US and local employee exposure. Riots and social upheaval are no fun, and the walls and windows around the embassy are not some sort of force field

The closing of the embassies is equivalent to what the social psychologist Albert Bandura called “vicarious reinforcement” (the actions of others, when seen to result in positive outcomes, Makes those actions appealing or reinforces such CoA). In terms of these metrics and the war of ideas our closing of embassies sends the wrong signals to our foes and means that, IMO, we lost this bout.

I can only guess that Albert never served a day in a hostile environment responsible for the lives and well-being of others in an Embassy. I assure you that looking at your dismembered team members is far more horrific than some "loss of face" with the enemy...

... when they in fact scored zilch by blowing a building when nobody was home

[Bill Moore]

Posts by Tukhachevskii

lets examine things from the PoV of a Yemeni and how he would understand the chain of events (having actually lived there for nine months I think I am, respectfully, best placed to know how they think

I find this statement to be extreme and that is putting it lightly. I have lived overseas for many, many years in different countries and don't pretend to understand how the average anyone thinks. Based on post, the average Yemeni is a jihadist, which is highly doubtful. The average anybody simply doesn't give a flying hoot if a foreign embassy closes for a day. If you work in the Embassy you're confusing your issue with everyone's. I'm sure someone in Yemen was hurt in a vehicle accident today, outside their family and friends, no one cares. Oh my fellow pissant jihadis, the evil West has closed their embassies for "a day", so they could then hunt down and kill our operational cell, but darn it, they closed the Embassy for a day". I suspect the AVERAGE Yemeni couldn't give a flying hoot either way.

Our metrics are qualitatively dissimilar/diametrically opposed. Our enemy’s metrics have been ably explored and explained by J. B. Cozzens, ‘Victory from the Prism of Jihadi Culture’, Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 59, 2009;

Your point here is well taken, and it does seem to define one of our major theorical challenges since 9/11, but surely you're not suggesting we dance to their music? I advocate continuing to dance to our music instead by telling them to kiss off, we're going to live our lives the way we desire, and by the way, unlike these wingnuts, we value human life, so yes we'll take appropriate security measures while our security forces hunt them down and kill them. We're not conducting jihad, we're fighting those who are. And we sure as hell have demonstrated our courage as a nation on multiple occassions.

We risk our lives because of what we believe in, not because were cowards who cowardly commit suicide while killing innocents because they're looking for an easy way to paradise and virgins. Don't forget who the cowards really are.

[Old Eagle]

I find the various points of view, based on diverse experiences, both amazing and enlightening. Because I am one of the Stan and Tom club, when I originally heard that the embassy was closing temporarily for force protection concerns, I didn't think twice about it. As someone else has already mentioned, we do it all the time, usually for valid reasons. Point to Stan -- sometimes it just becomes the default dedcision because nobody wants to be the one who allowed innocents to be killed.

As temporary measures, we sometimes reduce daily manning, limit or close some operations (e.g. consular, etc.), or lock the doors for a coupla days.

That our adversaries might pounce upon this process as a victory is unfortunate, but understandable. When our own armchair rear echelon weanies choose to make it into a political issue -- that really concerns me.

[Ken White]

he ^ said...

[slapout9]

I find the various points of view, based on diverse experiences, both amazing and enlightening. Because I am one of the Stan and Tom club, when I originally heard that the embassy was closing temporarily for force protection concerns, I didn't think twice about it. As someone else has already mentioned, we do it all the time, usually for valid reasons. Point to Stan -- sometimes it just becomes the default dedcision because nobody wants to be the one who allowed innocents to be killed.

As temporary measures, we sometimes reduce daily manning, limit or close some operations (e.g. consular, etc.), or lock the doors for a coupla days.

That our adversaries might pounce upon this process as a victory is unfortunate, but understandable. When our own armchair rear echelon weanies choose to make it into a political issue -- that really concerns me.

Because of today's world we live in we lock down High Schools in our own country all the time when the situation demands it......what's the big deal about locking down an Embassy in a half hostile/half friendly country half way around the world

[Stan]

... and by the way, unlike these wingnuts, we value human life, so yes we'll take appropriate security measures while our security forces hunt them down and kill them.

Bill, I gotta tell ya, that Sierra gave me goosebumps! When the nominations roll in for Ken at the White House and best sentence of the year... You da man

I find the various points of view, based on diverse experiences, both amazing and enlightening.

Colonel, where in creation is Rocky Mtn Empire? Is that like abroad

Regards, Stan

[Fuchs]

This "in our world everything is fine, so there is no problem" doesn't bend reality for the 95% people who read the Yemen embassy news.

The answer to the thread title may be a weak "no". The widespread impression appears to be the opposite, though. That's what counts in regard to info war.


"We lost no battle in Vietnam!" - "So what?"

[Tukhachevskii]

Based on post, the average Yemeni is a jihadist, which is highly doubtful. The average anybody simply doesn't give a flying hoot if a foreign embassy closes for a day. I suspect the AVERAGE Yemeni couldn't give a flying hoot either way.


We risk our lives because of what we believe in, not because were cowards who cowardly commit suicide while killing innocents because they're looking for an easy way to paradise and virgins. Don't forget who the cowards really are.

Sir,

I appreciate yours, and everyone else's, comments. Forgive me for taking a rather "high and mighty tone" with the learned and most experienced members of the SWC (unfortunately that is a hazard of our medium) but unfortunately my post was written on the back of a simultaneous argument I was having whilst on the phone! The comments were based upon meetings I had with Yemeni's from various strata of society (though usually village folk). Anyway, I think one of the problems when examining Islamic/Islamist conflicts/warriors, for me at least, is that we assume that there are jihadists and non-jihadists when, IMO (and IMO only), the "jihadist" phenomena is really a question of a "spectrum/continuum of adherance"; jihad is a universal obligation upon Muslims but just why, where, how, and for whom a Muslim becomes an actualised "jihadi" is case dependant. AQ and other organisations are mutually imbricated or rather are interpenetrated with other networks (tribal, social, ethnic, sectarian) and are able to tap into existing preconceptions, greivances, &c. AQ may exist at the fringes of the wider Islamic social system but it draws its strength from the centre...

As for our percieved cowardice and the routine closure of embassies etc. my comments were specifically aimed at Yemen and further more the notion that the "enemy gets a vote" and that "war is a contest of wills" and the related concepts of perception management &c. The entire thrust of the point I was attempting to make, and which seemingly failed monumentally, was based upon the following assumption from an article by Harold D.Lasswell, "The Strategy of Soviet Propaganda", Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. 24, No. 2, (Jan., 1951)

[/QUOTE]Political propaganda is the management of mass communications for power purposes. In the long run the aim is to economize the material cost of power.[/QUOTE]

I was attempting to make a point about not having to un-necessarily add to the enemies arrayed against us by at least economising our matierial power with ideological/psychological/informational power (i.e., not appearing weaker, and thus a tempting target, where we don't need to). Nonetheless, good points all round and I hope I write clearer posts in future,

Regards,

T

[marct]

Hi Tukhachevskii,

I was attempting to make a point about not having to un-necessarily add to the enemies arrayed against us by at least economising our matierial power with ideological/psychological/informational power (i.e., not appearing weaker, and thus a tempting target, where we don't need to). Nonetheless, good points all round and I hope I write clearer posts in future,

Obviously I can't speak for Bill who, I believe, most of this post was sent to, but I did want to comment on a few things.

As you noted, the medium we are using can cause difficulties with communicating our actual intentions. There are two other things that cause difficulties. First, the medium, despite emoticons, really doesn't allow us to convey a lot of emotional tonality which, in English at least, is responsible for a lot of the contextual meaning of a particular message. Second, we are talking about highly emotionally charged issues, which makes it even more difficult since the medium restricts / reduces the emotional content of our signals.

Or, to quote that great philosopher Stan - "Sierra happens" !

Personally, I happen to agree with your position and, especially, your comments about jihad being a continuum. I also believe that we (the west broadly construed) and the irhabi are fighting totally different wars, with the bulk of their perceived AO being in the construction of perceptions for both global and local market places.

I suspect that we (the posters on this thread) will continue to disagree on what should have been done in this case, but as long as we can agree to disagree, then things should work out. Who knows, we may all be wrong !

Cheers,

Marc