Quote Originally Posted by Cliff View Post
What else is war about?
Most warfare is not about directly breaking will, but about doing something that has an indirect effect on the enemy leadership's will, around several corners.

Hmm, how do you think the Wehrmacht, or say the Iraqi Military in 1991 felt about this? Pretty secondary quality huh...
It's secondary quality because it requires a huge amount of effort and damage in order to reach the real goal very indirectly.

This time "indirect" does not mean "smart", it means "poorly aimed".

The meagre quality becomes more visible if you assume that the same would have been attempted with a copy of the Iraqi air force, negating the extreme disparity in resources. Hint: The Wehrmacht failed in 1940 against the British with pretty much the same as the U.S.A.A.F. attempted in 1942-1944.


Can you explain why you think this is a misunderstanding, or a surrender?
He offers so many targets to attack that I can only conclude he failed to find the real lever.

Warden's strategy worked out pretty well for us in Desert Storm - it pretty much allowed the US to achieve its objectives. I know that many folks in the ground services scoff his theories... but then again, he is an airpower strategist. He is pretty well respected in the USAF, and his theories are taught at the USAF professional schools.
None of this is really an argument in itself, especially not the firs ton, for his actual proposal for Desert Storm had been rejected in favour of a less fancy one - and that one produced some interesting and unanticipated effects.

I think part of the problem with Col Warden's theories is that people want to use them like an Army FM on the Military Decision Making Process, like a cook book rather than a guide.

I think there's plenty of airpower strategy out there - the doctrine is fairly well established.

V/R,

Cliff
There's almost always something "well established". Infantry and cavalry doctrine were "well established" in 1913.

The actual air power in use was
- successful in Iraq 1991 with an extreme resource disparity in near-perfect terrain
- semi-successful at most with various punitive strikes during the 1990's
- successful in Yugoslavia 1999 with an extreme resource disparity, yet still thoroughly embarrassed tactically, technically and strategically.
- successful in Afghanistan 2001 with a total resource disparity that didn't even encounter noteworthy resistance
- successful in Iraq 2003 with 'beyond extreme' resource disparity in very good terrain, but still with major gaffes
- failing in Iraq 2003-2007 with total resource disparity against an elusive enemy
- failing in Afghanistan 2005-2011 with total resource disparity against an elusive enemy (probably even with a negative net effect!)


Well, if I go to a funfair and easily pling all targets there, and tomorrow I go into the wilderness with a shotgun and miss almost all the rabbits, hitting many trees, squirrels and cats instead - does this mean that my marksman skill is well established and satisfactory?


The only thing that's well established is the orchestration/'synchronisation' of strike packages.
Airpower strategy of the last two decades has been a joke; I saw only a primitive application of brute force.
The whole idea of elegance is totally gone missing because too many resources were at hand for too many conflicts.

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Just an example; scenario 1999 Kosovo Air War against Yugoslavia, what I would have done:
(1) negotiate an electricity embargo against Yugoslavia by all neighbours, employ observers along the high voltage power lines.
(2) Take out all powerplant turbine rooms in Yugoslavia (save for the one of the nuclear power plant; instead cut its nodes in a safe distance) with a single B-2 sortie (JDAMs were already available).

Offer a deal:
Yugoslavia re-establishes autonomy for Kosovo and accepts foreign (military) police forces of its choice (no more than 50% slavs, though) as reinforcements for a mostly prejudice-free maintenance of security in Kosovo.
NATO repairs the damage ASAP and asks the neighbours to lift the electricity embargo.

How many months would they have accepted a life with electricity restricted to hospitals, the upper class residence area of Belgrade and state buildings? In resistance to what? Basically a gift!
I guesstimate they wouldn't have accepted it for much longer than they endured the resistance-provoking bombardment.

THIS is elegant strategy.