Warrior Ethos

[CPT Foley]

All warfare is political. Read Clausewitz. Dead civilians are a political problem, not a moral one. There is only one kind of WAR and very few types of warfare.

A Paediatrician is only useful if he produces political effect. If he treats kids and everyone still hates you, his work is useless.

So a video on Youtube has greater political effect than 3,000 casualties in 24 hours? Seriously?

There is no new Paradigm. FACT. Nothing you are doing in COIN is new or hasn't been done by other armies. Regardless of the frequency you actually do it, Killing and Capturing, or gain advantage from it's threat, is still your primary function. It's what militaries do.

You do not need to respect the culture or protect noncombatants to win in COIN. Your actions should merely not needlessly create enemies, and you only need to protect those civilians relevant to the mission.

I'm not trying to be a hard ass here, but everything you are saying is symptomatic of the "new COIN" that seeks to portray it as something other than what it is. It is not armed social work, or summed up with silly expressions like "hearts and minds." It is a form of warfare.

It is armed social work, and that's the paradigm shift. Read Toffler. Warfare is different in the information age. To bemoan, that killing/capturing "is what militaries do" denies the changing nature of warfare - warfare in a 24 hour news cycle where seemingly minor acts of disrespect can be seen by hundreds of millions within hours. An insurgency is a competition between the insurgent and government for the support of the civilian population. Your narrow mission-oriented approach reminds me of a combined exercise rehearsal I was at for a simulation exercise. I was the most junior person in the room, which included two retired Generals. An LTC was reviewing some proposed message traffic about our helicopters scaring the sheik's sheep. He quipped, "I don't think we will be sticking around to help herd them up." The room exploded into laughter. I was incredulous. The LTC and everyone in the room, myself included, has been conditioned to put the mission first and make sure SP's are met. But from just finishing a tour with SF in Iraq, I was dumbfounded, and frankly disgusted, that our senior leadership didn't recognize that pacifying the sheik was exponentially more important to overall mission than meeting an SP. And that even if the helicopters did have something equally urgent awaiting them, pacifying the sheik was certainly worthy of consideration versus laughter. That's the new paradigm.

[Entropy]

Count me as one who doesn't like the "warriorization" of our armed forces one bit. The rewriting of the service creeds is particularly bad - I absolutely cannot stand the new AF creed. I am not a warrior - I'm a citizen airman whose duty lies with my nation and constitution, not some warrior "ethos." There's good reason it's "citizen solidier/airman" and not "solider/airman citizen."

[William F. Owen]

It is armed social work, and that's the paradigm shift. Read Toffler. Warfare is different in the information age. To bemoan, that killing/capturing "is what militaries do" denies the changing nature of warfare - warfare in a 24 hour news cycle where seemingly minor acts of disrespect can be seen by hundreds of millions within hours.

Sorry but that's rubbish. No one in the military, or military thought takes the Toffler seriously. Are you seriously advocating the Tofflers over Clausewitz?
Killing someone is an act of disrespect. Did any of the US beheadings on the internet cause a strategic shift? Of course not.
The only news stories that can create strategic effect are stories about events which have strategic effect. Do not confuse the two.

An insurgency is a competition between the insurgent and government for the support of the civilian population. Your narrow mission-oriented approach reminds me of a combined exercise rehearsal I was at for a simulation exercise.

It is only a competition is that if effects a political end state or outcome. Insurgents sometime do not need the support of the population, they just need to scare them into submission. I witnessed this in Sierra Leone.
My narrow mission oriented approach comes from being trained in "COIN" as a very young soldier and studying and reading about COIN for over 28 years. Since I am not American, COIN is not new to me. It is merely a form of warfare.

I am pretty sure Warfare and war in the next 20 years is going to be like the last 20, with Sierra Leone, Georgia, Gaza, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Darfur, and Machetes, High Explosive and AKs will create more political effect, than 24 hour news channels.

[CPT Foley]

Sorry but that's rubbish. No one in the military, or military thought takes the Toffler seriously. Are you seriously advocating the Tofflers over Clausewitz?
Killing someone is an act of disrespect. Did any of the US beheadings on the internet cause a strategic shift? Of course not.
The only news stories that can create strategic effect are stories about events which have strategic effect. Do not confuse the two.

It is only a competition is that if effects a political end state or outcome. Insurgents sometime do not need the support of the population, they just need to scare them into submission. I witnessed this in Sierra Leone.
My narrow mission oriented approach comes from being trained in "COIN" as a very young soldier and studying and reading about COIN for over 28 years. Since I am not American, COIN is not new to me. It is merely a form of warfare.

I am pretty sure Warfare and war in the next 20 years is going to be like the last 20, with Sierra Leone, Georgia, Gaza, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Darfur, and Machetes, High Explosive and AKs will create more political effect, than 24 hour news channels.

I'm not suggesting Toffler replaces Clausewitz, but they aren't necessarily mutually exclusive. Sorry, but the idea that the military establishment scoffs at Toffler only confirms my sense he's probably on to something. To suggest that the media/internet doesn't have enormous impact on strategic events seems to defy credulity, e.g., Abu Ghraib, Gitmo, etc. By your reasoning these are just military detainment facilities. The mission is to keep prisoners from escaping and extract intelligence information. Why would we interfere with such military police operations with fuzzy public relations concerns? Because COIN is a big PR battle. It impacts support at home, host nation, IGOs, NGOs, coalition, etc.

I genuinely respect your considerable service in the COIN environment, but I find David Galula's views more persuasive, as best illustrated in his work "The Pacification of Algeria."

[Ken White]

with also some SF experience and as one who served as (non SF) advisor to two foreign Armies, I do not disagree with much you say and I do very much agree that Warrior is a bad term for the reasons you state and more, I still have some questions on your comments in this thread.

Given that I disagree with Wilf that the wars of the next 20 years for the US will only be like those of the last 20...

That will be true only if we allow that to happen -- we certainly need to be prepared for COIN support and FID but we should also avoid it if at all possible -- and we can do that if we wish -- one question is why would we not want avoid such warfare if at all possible?

To suggest that the media/internet doesn't have enormous impact on strategic events seems to defy credulity, e.g., Abu Ghraib, Gitmo, etc. By your reasoning these are just military detainment facilities. The mission is to keep prisoners from escaping and extract intelligence information. Why would we interfere with such military police operations with fuzzy public relations concerns? Because COIN is a big PR battle. It impacts support at home, host nation, IGOs, NGOs, coalition, etc.

Impact, yes, I agree -- but have those impacts truly affected anything?

I genuinely respect your considerable service in the COIN environment, but I find David Galula's views more persuasive, as best illustrated in his work "The Pacification of Algeria."

How did that effort in Algeria work out for Brother Galula and the French?

I ask that not to be snide or snarky but as a very serious question. Recall that the French had the same advantages in Algeria that the British had in Malaya; they were the government, there was no host nation to deal with -- we will always in any FID situation have the problem of dealing with the host nation and quite probably, also dealing with a coalition. Thus I question whether either Malaya or Algeria provides and guidelines we'd really want to follow. We did after all follow French guidelines in Viet Nam and we know where that got us.

As an aside, I'll point out that the Algerians were not like the Viet Namese as the French discovered, the Viet Namese were not like the Malays as we discovered -- and hopefully, we will realize that the Afghans are not like the Iraqis.

[Brandon Friedman]

I left active duty in 2004 before the U.S. Army began its intensive focus on COIN techniques and theory. I’m not “trained” in counterinsurgency. I’ve never been to the Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence and I’ve never studied the theoretical luminaries at ILE or the Army War College. I have only my own reading and experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan on which to base my views.

I was part of the QRF that got the call when the initial stages of Operation Anaconda turned into one big FAIL. As a rifle PL, I played a small role in what became a combined arms effort to literally blast our way into Afghanistan's Shah-e-Kot Valley to put an end to the AQ/Taliban resistance there. It was a kinetic fight to the max (to the point that I couldn’t stand having planes fly over me for several years). Throughout that week, there was no thought given to COIN, nor should there have been. It was all about the basics--shooting, moving, and communicating. And aside from the normal combat snafus (like occasionally shooting at each other), we were pretty good at it.

But when I arrived on the outskirts of Hillah, Iraq a year later during the invasion, the situation was entirely different. It was still a kinetic fight—we were still massing forces, utilizing air power and artillery, and aiming to seize and hold ground—but suddenly there were civilians everywhere. To survive and thrive in environment, we had to take the approach espoused by Mr. Owen when he says:

Dead civilians are a political problem, not a moral one.

and

Regardless of the frequency you actually do it, Killing and Capturing, or gain advantage from it's threat, is still your primary function. It's what militaries do.

and

You do not need to respect the culture or protect noncombatants to win in COIN. Your actions should merely not needlessly create enemies, and you only need to protect those civilians relevant to the mission.

and

It is not armed social work, or summed up with silly expressions like "hearts and minds." It is a form of warfare.

It was all about the mission of “taking Hillah.” We were only concerned with the population insofar as they assisted or inhibited our mission. And that was it.

However, when we arrived in Baghdad a few days later, with tracers still lighting up the night sky, the whole dynamic changed again. 3ID and the Marines had already punched through the cities defenses and the Iraqi Army had dispersed, leaving us to deal with intermittent snipers, masses of looters, and the capture of weapons systems (like all the locked and loaded AAA still positioned throughout Dora). Within 48 hours of my arrival in the city, the physical enemy was no more. Even the sniper attacks stopped. Our enemy had suddenly become a lack of public services.

At this point, our mission transitioned into the one described by CPT Foley when he says:

It is armed social work, and that's the paradigm shift.

I’m sorry, but that’s true. While many of my own leaders didn’t realize it at the time, our mission had quickly become an effort to pacify the population by keeping them happy. Officially, we were tasked with going after Saddam’s HVTs, but those were wild goose chases for the most part. Our real mission was to fill the vacuum left by Saddam’s government—which we attempted to do. Our real mission was preventive.

When you’re in a situation like that, you have to place a priority on the following tasks: 1.) Treating other people as you would have them treat you, 2.) listening to what the locals are saying, 3.) responding to their concerns, 4.) understanding their backgrounds and motivations, 5.) showing genuine empathy for their plight, 6.) and, all the while, somehow maintaining your ability to fight with unparalleled viciousness, should the need arise. It not only keeps you alive, but it also furthers the completion of the mission—which has now become political.

In fact, for the next three months, no one in my battalion fired a weapon. I have a photo that shows a list written on a wall of all the jobs guys in my company did during that time—after we left Baghdad and moved north to Tal Afar. Here’s the list:

1. Infantryman
2. Police officer
3. Gas station attendant
4. Painter
5. Water delivery guy
6. Security guard
7. Repo man
8. Chauffeur
9. Public relations officer
10. Graffiti prevention and removal officer

In Tal Afar and throughout northwestern Iraq, we kept a lid on things. While central Iraq smoldered and grew more violent by the day, aside from one incident in July, the AO of the 101st Airborne Division--under Petraeus--was the safest in Iraq. We didn’t go looking for fights and we focused on being “Officer Friendly.” I spent an entire day helping to coordinate transportation for Iraqi college kids trying to get to Mosul to make up their missed finals. We helped troubleshoot a pump station. We started learning Arabic. I yelled at one of my soldiers for shoving an Iraqi kid. I had one of my NCOs discipline another for throwing a water bottle from a moving truck at some guy’s sheep. We helped set up local elections. We hired locals to feed us and we hired locals to translate for us.

And when an insurgent or terrorist finally killed two of our guys on July 19 on the highway between Mosul and Tal Afar, the people of Tal Afar came out and brought flowers to the front gate of our HQ in the city.

By October, however, the fighting that began in central Iraq was no longer contained to that area. It spread north and, like everyone else, we were sucked into the cycle of violence. Thus, by the time I left Iraq, I had come full circle. My time in combat ended on a street in Tal Afar as it had begun in Afghanistan—in an all-out shooting gallery between combatants.

What I took from this overall experience is that these are three distinct techniques for success that should be applied as necessary. There’s the conventional, kinetic aspect of war, there’s the combination of kinetic operations with civilians on the battlefield—in which COIN techniques must be utilized—and there’s the preventive COIN environment, in which you spend the bulk of your time trying to keep the locals happy and safe—where it is “armed social work” and where you do “need to respect the culture or protect noncombatants to win," despite what Mr. Owen argues.

So my main question, I guess, is why doesn’t the military think it can train its troops for all three? Do we not think troops are able to adapt? We had never been trained in the differences, yet when placed in those environments, my company—through fits and starts and mistakes—was able to adapt. Why is there this conflict between people like William F. Owen and CPT Foley? The ideas aren’t mutually exclusive. There's a time and a place for both mentalities.

[Ken White]

are idealists, mostly. Regrettably the world is not an ideal place. Yet most of us develop our views of what's right and tend to try to do that and barring the proverbial epiphany we'll keep right on doing that. Some have had an epiphany, some have not, some think they might have...

.. is “armed social work” and where you do “need to respect the culture or protect noncombatants to win," despite what Mr. Owen argues.

That's true and one sometimes has to do that; what concerns many is that the attitude to do that sort of thing can remove a combat edge and such removal is not good when you may be confronted with more -- and especially, more intense -- combat.

There's also the fact that Wilf comes from the British tradition where the civilian side of the FID effort used to be very much in charge and that system worked well for them. Thus he wants the Army to do Army things. CPT Foley is an SF Officer ergo he's into FID; different backgrounds lead to different approaches. Our system has always reversed the Briotish process and the Armed forces have always had the lead. I think current British practice shows they've lost their civilian edge to an extent -- and that our history shows that our system is not particularly effective -- or desirable. My solution to that problem is develop the civilian structure and get the military out of the lead for such efforts Even better, diligently avoid such efforts unless there is a really good reason to get involved.

That, of course, means educating politicians -- and good luck with that...

As to full spectrum; fortunately, I'm old and have watched several good units make the switch between armed social work, a little casual door kicking, a few fairly stiff fire fights over a few days and the losses of weeks on end of continuous grinding combat. The switch isn't as hard as some believe; most people -- not all -- can do it fairly well.I've seen units switch back and forth and do so readily and easily.

So my main question, I guess, is why doesn’t the military think it can train its troops for all three? Do we not think troops are able to adapt? We had never been trained in the differences, yet when placed in those environments, my company—through fits and starts and mistakes—was able to adapt. Why is there this conflict between people like William F. Owen and CPT Foley? The ideas aren’t mutually exclusive. There's a time and a place for both mentalities.

In order of your questions and comments:

Because we adopted a pathetically bad training process in the 1970s that tries to drill down to basic tasks and thus imputes that the troops being trained (ALL ranks) are incapable of absorbing more complexity. This in the face of an Army that did it all in WW II and Korea (less well educated and largely draftees as opposed to today's well educated professional force) and one that managed to train for full spectrum warfare all through the early 1960s. Quite simply, the Army lost its way in the aftermath of Viet Nam.

There are some today who do not think the troops can adapt -- they're terribly wrong -- and there are others that see the greater degree of work and effort required to do it right -- they also are terribly wrong (in a different sense). There are still others who say 'we cannot afford that.' That's just untrue and is IMO, a cover for the other two rationales or lack thereof...

The Troops will always adapt and pull the senior leaders fat out of the fire -- that's a pretty poor way to habitually operate but that has been the 'system' since the mid-60s. The big problem is, as you know, that having to learn by doing is time and effort consuming, subject to much error and can create other problems. Not too smart when there are massive bodies of work explaining all the things needed for every step on the spectrum of conflict. We owe the Troops and the Nation a better way of doing business.

The conflicts you cite are between those who do not really disagree on the desired end result; just on the route to arrive at that nirvana. The issue is really not tactics and techniques but what, philosophically, your force should do. There are those who think Armies break things; there are those who think Armies should fix things (to pick two polar views and, as you know, there are thousands of other views between those two). The problem, as a cursory reading of history shows, is that Armies have to be able to do both so the philosophies are something to argue about but reality -- and Politicians -- dictate what Armies actually do and the answer is "all of the above." As you note. As I noted, people are mostly idealists; they want what they think should be the focus to be that focus. Reality again is that systems make focal decisions and the idealist in us doesn't like that...

Yep, time and place for both -- and you never know which will be required. Or where...

Awful wordy but discussion boards aren't the best comm medium and I'd rather put too much in and let you discard what you don't need (or want, probably don't need any of it) than leave out something that might, barely, make sense...

We need to be full spectrum and globally capable. Period.

[slapout9]

We need to be full spectrum and globally capable. Period.

That should be a SWC quote of the day,week,month or however that is done.

[selil]

We need to be full spectrum and globally capable. Period.

This is exactly what I've been saying about cyber. Cyber is one chunk of the spectrum of conflict. It isn't high intensity conflict it isn't thermonuclear war and it may be in many ways like guerilla warfare. But, it isn't guerilla warfare. It is just one part of the spectrum of conflict.

COIN is not wrong or missing anything. It is part of the spectrum. It isn't going to replace high intensity conflict, armor operations, or anything else. it is another part of that spectrum. Counter to the USAF propaganda carpet bombing isn't the be-all it is just one part of the spectrum.

COIN has it's place within the spectrum. War is not a thing with walls it is a plateau with a horizon. All along that broad plateau the spectrum of war can be fought grabbing chess pieces of conflict. It is the intellectual minimalist that defines something as broad as war in a narrow space. What skill, strategy, process, tool, weapon, ideology, system, or person will bring about the desired result within the realm of conflict? Certain tools are the brushfires of destruction while others move through without disturbing a blade of grass. These tools are picked by the generals. The correct ones are picked by the good generals.

[Brandon Friedman]

My solution to that problem is develop the civilian structure and get the military out of the lead for such efforts Even better, diligently avoid such efforts unless there is a really good reason to get involved.

That, of course, means educating politicians -- and good luck with that...

Ha. Tell me about it, Ken. That frustrating struggle has been part of my day job for the past two years. As you've implied, politicians are, in most cases, more loyal to both their constituents and their own intuition than to someone else is telling them what's right or wrong. So you can only accomplish so much through lobbying. The bottom line is that if you really want to affect policy change, you have to work to get your own people elected to office--and that means people with military experience.

[William F. Owen]

—in which COIN techniques must be utilized—and there’s the preventive COIN environment, in which you spend the bulk of your time trying to keep the locals happy and safe—where it is “armed social work” and where you do “need to respect the culture or protect noncombatants to win," despite what Mr. Owen argues.

Sorry, but this strike to the heart of the issue. There is no such thing as "COIN techniques" - 99% of actions performed in COIN are applicable in other forms of warfare. What you are talking about is not something exclusive to something called COIN. It is a means to end, to applied as and when necessary, and within a political context.

Talking about "armed social work," and "respect for culture" utterly misses the point, of
a.) Don't let civilians, who are under your protection, come to needless harm, either by your action or ... worse.. inaction, because it will/may negatively impact your military operations.
b.) Do not do those things that will needlessly create offence, because it will/may negatively impact your military operations.

Now is statement A or B incorrect?
Are they actually different from saying "social work" and "respect for culture". I submit that A is not Social work, and B is good behaviour, not respect.
You are going to have to do things that are not synonymous with "respecting their culture" - killing, searches, etc, so why back yourself into that corner with sloppy semantics?

[Brandon Friedman]

Sorry, but this strike to the heart of the issue. There is no such thing as "COIN techniques" - 99% of actions performed in COIN are applicable in other forms of warfare. What you are talking about is not something exclusive to something called COIN. It is a means to end, to applied as and when necessary, and within a political context.

Call it whatever you like.

You are going to have to do things that are not synonymous with "respecting their culture" - killing, searches, etc, so why back yourself into that corner with sloppy semantics?

If you're not willing to empathize with the population--to try and put yourself in their shoes--and to show respect for their culture and history, then you'll never know your enemy.

And what do killing and searches have to do with not respecting their culture? Nobody said when you search a house you have to completely toss it. And you can be shooting at a guy and still respect his culture. You just don't have to respect the fact that he's trying to kill you. It's not personal. And if you've laid a solid foundation of mutual respect with the locals prior to that, then they tend to understand.

[CPT Foley]

Sorry, but this strike to the heart of the issue. There is no such thing as "COIN techniques" - 99% of actions performed in COIN are applicable in other forms of warfare. What you are talking about is not something exclusive to something called COIN. It is a means to end, to applied as and when necessary, and within a political context.

Talking about "armed social work," and "respect for culture" utterly misses the point, of
a.) Don't let civilians, who are under your protection, come to needless harm, either by your action or ... worse.. inaction, because it will/may negatively impact your military operations.
b.) Do not do those things that will needlessly create offence, because it will/may negatively impact your military operations.

Now is statement A or B incorrect?
Are they actually different from saying "social work" and "respect for culture". I submit that A is not Social work, and B is good behaviour, not respect.
You are going to have to do things that are not synonymous with "respecting their culture" - killing, searches, etc, so why back yourself into that corner with sloppy semantics?

I don't think someone referring to COIN techniques would dispute that 99% or maybe 100% of the techniques would be used in other conflicts, e.g., large conventional ops, etc. I'm puzzled that people seem to question premise that the composition and frequency of tactics used in a COIN environment would differ from that of large conventional conflict. Agreed, a lot of the same tactics would be used in both, but it would be a different mix. It's like saying there's no such thing as MOUT because all of the things in MOUT are done in non-MOUT ops. It's a question emphasis. I don't think it's unreasonable to refer to COIN techniques to describe non-kinetic ops, but I agree that there are definitely kinetic elements to COIN.

[Surferbeetle]

As to the French Experience in Algeria, I wasn't there, however I find that Alistar Horne has something to say on tactics in his book A Savage War of Peace, Algeria 1954-1962

Of all these measures, the most ambitious-as well as the one that was to leave the most lasting imprint of Soustelle's regime-was the formation of the S.A.S corps. Their aim, essentially, was to take into their protective net populations in the remoter bled that might otherwise become subject to the rebels, or buffeted by the army-or both. Some 400 S.A.S detachments were created, and each under an army lieutenant or captain who was an expert in Arabic and Arab affairs and could deal with every conceivable aspect of administration; from agronomy, teaching and health, to building houses and administrating justice. The kepis bleus, as they were affectionately called, were a selflessly devoted and courageous band of men, who made themselves much loved by the local populace, and for that reason were often the principal targets of the F.L.N., suffering the heaviest casualties of any category of administrator. Foreign journalists who saw them at work in the remoter bled, isolated and in constant danger, never ceased to be impressed. Unfortunately, there were always too few kepis bleus with all numerous qualifications that the job required; and, inevitably, there were the bad ones who transformed the S.A.S into "intelligence centers" where torture was not unknown.

Looking to the US experience I note that after MCO was over in WWII we moved into rebuilding/stabilization/globalization operations with respect to Germany and Japan...a combined operation kinetic/nonkinetic operation from the macro view which resulted in not a few years of peace. GEN Lucian Clay had a couple of thoughts on the necessity of such a strategy.

Moving to B.H. Liddell Hart (a WWI veteran)in his book Strategy:

Strategy not only stops on the frontier, but has for its purpose the reduction of fighting to the slenderest possible proportions.

This statement may be disputed by those who conceive the destruction of the enemy's armed force as the only sound aim in war, who hold that the only goal of strategy is battle, and who are obsessed with the Clausewitzian saying that 'blood is the price of victory'. Yet if one should concede this point and meet its advocates on their own ground, the statement would remain unshaken. For even if a decisive battle be the goal, the aim of strategy must be to bring about this battle under the most advantageous circumstances. And the more advantageous the circumstances, the less, proportionately, will be the fighting.

As an Iraq veteran I am here to tell you that combat operations did not occur 24 hours per day during my year (03-04), and that indeed, indirect/armed social work/non-kinetic operations reduced violence levels. I also lived through the results of reduced indirect/armed social work/non-kinetic operations and the resulting increase in violence. For the datapoint, I worked 7 days a week 'outside the wire' for the first six months and 6 days a week 'outside the wire' for the next six months and traveled fairly extensively during both periods.

Another datapoint to think about...From Wired: North Korea: The Mother of All Stability Ops?

Let’s assume that the U.S. and Republic of Korea forces succeed — with brute force, or without — in smashing North Korea’s no-tech army. Then what? Well, you might have to deal with a few more consequences. Try dealing with millions of starving North Koreans, for starters. Add to that the threat of a few loose nukes. And finally — this is the really hard part — try administering a country that has been under the control of a Stalinist regime for six decades. I wouldn’t expect a swift transition to democracy or a painless reunification.

In a recent conversation I had with strategist and Pentagon consultant Tom Barnett, he made precisely that point. “North Korea is not really a war scenario, let’s be honest,” he said. “It’s a humanitarian scenario; it’s a hunt for the weapons of mass destruction scenario.” And you thought Afghanistan and Iraq sucked.

[William F. Owen]

There's also the fact that Wilf comes from the British tradition where the civilian side of the FID effort used to be very much in charge and that system worked well for them.

Correct. - not surprisingly! The British "tradition" to countering an insurgency is based on being the existing government or having the explicit support of an existing government - which has the appropriate structures in place or having the resources and support to create them. - again, Sierra Leone is an excellent example.

I think current British practice shows they've lost their civilian edge to an extent -- and that our history shows that our system is not particularly effective -- or desirable. My solution to that problem is develop the civilian structure and get the military out of the lead for such efforts

I think the Basra fiasco was purely down to a lack of resources and political will - and the bad guys knew it. If operational success had been absolutely essential to UK foreign policy, the UK conduct of Iraq would have been very different. You can see the same issues in A'Stan.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Warfare is different in the information age. To bemoan, that killing/capturing "is what militaries do" denies the changing nature of warfare - warfare in a 24 hour news cycle where seemingly minor acts of disrespect can be seen by hundreds of millions within hours.

I would posit if you change "warfare" to "politics" then you have a more accurate paradigm shift for the 21st Century. That doesn't obviate the fact that war is always war, and at its root it is all about killing. If they do convert, fine.

That is, of course, as long as the "conversion" doesn't occur while they are holding your vulnerable flank!

It is armed social work, and that's the paradigm shift.

COIN may involve some "armed social work" but that "revelation" is not a paradigm shift, COIN has almost always had an element of soldiers doing non-soldier jobs, when they were not killing the bad people. The FFL did it for nearly 100 years in North Africa.

As to laughing at the sheik's predicament that's just crass insensitivity, nothing more.