Size of the Platoon and Company

[William F. Owen]

Accuracy differences between the systems are indeed significant steps forward.

For MLRS it's a step forward but for we've had <8m accuracy for some time. I think Copperhead, was around during GW1 and there has been a similar Russian systems in service for the last 5 years.

I fully accept it's an improvement, but it's not a game changer. Go back 30 years and 207mm artillery could hit bridges and individual vehicles, in the low trajectory, though it required some adjustment of fire.

[jcustis]

For MLRS it's a step forward but for we've had <8m accuracy for some time. I think Copperhead, was around during GW1 and there has been a similar Russian systems in service for the last 5 years.

I fully accept it's an improvement, but it's not a game changer. Go back 30 years and 207mm artillery could hit bridges and individual vehicles, in the low trajectory, though it required some adjustment of fire.

Wilf,

I totally disagree on the terms of the game changing or not, and here is why:

In this day and age, low CEP delivery systems have everything to do with the decision to employ those fires in the midst of a collateral damage calculus. I don't think Copperhead is really a player when you look at the comparative ranges involved, and the target designation requirement. You don't need to designate with the rocket systems.

HIMARS and the GMLRS rockets it employs are like night and day when compared to a Copperhead round, when you take into account the GPS guidance package.

In this day and age...in our small wars...we are frequently presented with a tactical problem that doesn't allow for adjusted fires. Pin-point accuracy (yes, a relative term) is required.

And as for airspace deconfliction, I'm not so sure that the rocket systems present a different problem than standard tube artillery. The three forms of deconfliction remain the same whether the round is dumb or not - lateral separation, separation by time, and separation by altitude. Determining the rocket path and telling aircraft to stay above or to the side of that path is an easy proposition, even if the rocket is going to alter it's course enroute; the stay-above has to be easy to plot and account for. Clearance delays are likely imposed due to the nature of the C2 system employed, not the calculations involved. Tighten up the procedures and all you have to deal with is flight time.

Am I a rocket fanatic? No...but if I can be ranged by rocket artillery where tubes cannot play, I''m not going to look down my nose at the support.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf,

I totally disagree on the terms of the game changing or not, and here is why:

So what we might be "disagreeing" over is the expression "game change?"

GMLRS is a good thing, but it's just one stick in the golf bag, and it's advantages are all relative - that is my point. GMLRS is not, in and of itself going to alter how the infantry work. I base this purely on an historical perspective.

There are numerous precision fires technologies, such as Loitering Munitions, GPS and laser guided weapons and even armed UAVs which will all bring highly reactive accurate supporting fires to the combined arms battle, but as you yourself have alluded, the challenge remains the C2/C3I.

[tankersteve]

Gents,

Army used GMLRS, from tracked MRLS launchers, extensively in Iraq. I am not sure if it is used in Afghanistan yet although I am pretty sure that either the 82d or 18th Airborne artillery were to get the HIMARS.

In Ramadi, the GMLRS allowed one to drop an entire building with very little damage to adjacent buildings. I have a great video feed of a GMLRS destroying a car being used by an IED emplacement team. So if you want to talk about accuracy, it can take out a stationary car on a city street.

Tube artillery is right in the game. Copperhead is pretty much forgotten as designating with a laser and getting the correct reflection angle was apparently more work than it was worth. Now we have Excalibur with the same capabilities as GMLRS but with less range and a greatly reduced warhead size.

All this does is give the commander multiple options, with different warheads providing different collateral damage radii. And yes, there really is an upper airspace deconfliction piece when shooting GMLRS.

Tankersteve

[Cavguy]

Gents,

Army used GMLRS, from tracked MRLS launchers, extensively in Iraq. I am not sure if it is used in Afghanistan yet although I am pretty sure that either the 82d or 18th Airborne artillery were to get the HIMARS.

In Ramadi, the GMLRS allowed one to drop an entire building with very little damage to adjacent buildings. I have a great video feed of a GMLRS destroying a car being used by an IED emplacement team. So if you want to talk about accuracy, it can take out a stationary car on a city street.

Tube artillery is right in the game. Copperhead is pretty much forgotten as designating with a laser and getting the correct reflection angle was apparently more work than it was worth. Now we have Excalibur with the same capabilities as GMLRS but with less range and a greatly reduced warhead size.

All this does is give the commander multiple options, with different warheads providing different collateral damage radii. And yes, there really is an upper airspace deconfliction piece when shooting GMLRS.

Tankersteve

Steve,

I coordinated in that GMLRS you mention on the Racetrack. A week prior 1/6 MAR lost 4 marines to an IED which annihlated a HMMWV at that very location. It was some sweet payback. The leaked video doesn't show nearly the detail we had. (which is a good thing) If the Marines hadn't had called in the strafing run, I'm sure the locals would have thought the IED exploded on the emplacement team. It was perfect.

(BTW, that video was leaked by someone, and shouldn't have been, but it's out there now)

In Ramadi, I held the record (at the time) in theater with 22 GMLRS missions shot through the RFCT TOC. We liked it for all the reasons you mention. I think this was covered in another thread awhile back, but I mentioned that commanders liked the option of destroying rooms without destroying the building, among other things.

Niel

[AlexTX ret]

Well, this is my first post on a forum. Cut me some slack, please!

I'm a strong believer in using all assets at my disposal. If HiMARS is one of them then I must learn to use it at its fullest. However with a 40 mile range, who has control of them. If it's a Battalion or higher FO then I can see it's usefulness. However, what if it is some scared 2lt who feels he's in over his head trying to manage the additional assets of his platoon and he has found out that the proverbial stuff hit the fan? How does it help him and his platoon when it adds orders of magnitude of difficulty to his job?

Wilf,

In this day and age...in our small wars...we are frequently presented with a tactical problem that doesn't allow for adjusted fires. Pin-point accuracy (yes, a relative term) is required.

This is the problem that Israelis have had recently everytime that they have tried to use their well reguarded prowess. They have the ways and the means to defeat any Mideast power and the HAMAS should be no match for them. However, Hamas hides its assets within centers of civilian populations. The Israelis are hamstrung because they are sensitive to world opinion and one rocket that goes out of its chosen path can ruin their whole day.

Ever since Stalin's Organs and Nebelwerfers, the idea of artillery rockets have had a certain appeal. The Newer versions such as HiMars are unbelievable accurate and have longer ranges than anything before them. However, are they only to be used in Fulda Gap senearios or Afganistan type battles where a little colateral damage isn't a great game breaker? And again it comes down to the skills of the soldier that calls in the mission order. If a unit is that seperated from its parent group, wouldn't a airstrike be a better action? The HiMars rocket system maybe accurate but it's still dumb. It can only react to the coordinates that are given it by who's ever on the ground.

Sorry for the long post. I'm not trying to demean 2lts. God knows, I was there once. However, it is in light of my experiences that I learned to ask questions. Because it is your butt on the line, not the tactical genius that came up with system.

[William F. Owen]

I'm a strong believer in using all assets at my disposal. If HiMARS is one of them then I must learn to use it at its fullest. However with a 40 mile range, who has control of them. If it's a Battalion or higher FO then I can see it's usefulness. However, what if it is some scared 2lt who feels he's in over his head trying to manage the additional assets of his platoon and he has found out that the proverbial stuff hit the fan? How does it help him and his platoon when it adds orders of magnitude of difficulty to his job?

I think it's a mistake to assume that the design, capabilities, and application of any modern weapon system is based primarily on logic, because the evidence suggests it is not.

However, how to apply weapons capability in support of a platoon, should not be something that worries the 2nd Lt. If it does, then something about the training, organisation and communications is very wrong.

[RJ]

Originally Posted by AlexTX ret

I'm a strong believer in using all assets at my disposal. If HiMARS is one of them then I must learn to use it at its fullest. However with a 40 mile range, who has control of them. If it's a Battalion or higher FO then I can see it's usefulness. However, what if it is some scared 2lt who feels he's in over his head trying to manage the additional assets of his platoon and he has found out that the proverbial stuff hit the fan? How does it help him and his platoon when it adds orders of magnitude of difficulty to his job?

Responce by William F. Owen.

I think it's a mistake to assume that the design, capabilities, and application of any modern weapon system is based primarily on logic, because the evidence suggests it is not.

However, how to apply weapons capability in support of a platoon, should not be something that worries the 2nd Lt. If it does, then something about the training, organisation and communications is very wrong.

Gentlemen,

After 7 years of war, I suspect that any well trained Marine Coproral could be capable of handling the details of a fire mission describe above.

And in the Hindu Kush, I do not believe that the ability to surround yourself with innocent populations, whilst attacking a small Platoon outpost, or combat patrol would be an option.

I have a sense the young men in the fight are a lot more capable of any group we may have belonged to or worked with, if we have been retired or seperated from the Armed Forces for more than 10 years.

If the Marines are comfortable with Reserve artillery units firing support missions for their infantry units, I doubt they would allow them the responsibility they have given them with this new to the Marine Corps weapons system.

[RJ]

Gentlemen, pardon the missed "un" in uncomfortable

If the Marines are uncomfortable with Reserve artillery units firing support missions for their infantry units, I doubt they would allow them the responsibility they have given them with this new to the Marine Corps weapons system.

[AlexTX ret]

Originally Posted by AlexTX ret

Responce by William F. Owen.

However, how to apply weapons capability in support of a platoon, should not be something that worries the 2nd Lt. If it does, then something about the training, organisation and communications is very wrong.

From RJ

After 7 years of war, I suspect that any well trained Marine Coproral could be capable of handling the details of a fire mission describe above.

(snip)

I have a sense the young men in the fight are a lot more capable of any group we may have belonged to or worked with, if we have been retired or seperated from the Armed Forces for more than 10 years.

If the Marines are comfortable with Reserve artillery units firing support missions for their infantry units, I doubt they would allow them the responsibility they have given them with this new to the Marine Corps weapons system. (I assumed the "un" in uncomfortable already

I added both quotes because both bring up good points.

I bow to people who are invoved in military operations in the here and now because the last conflict I was in was Gulf War 1. I retired soon after that.

However, I have reservations about the fundamentals from listening to present day veterans.

After observing my boy's training, I feel it is much more situation oriented. The training I recieved was better suited to WW2, Korea and the plains and forests of Europe. Not exactly the thing I needed leading a Airmobile rifle platoon in the Vietnam.

But no matter how long I've been out, the fundamentals haven't changed. A unit leader is about leading soldiers into combat. If you have a good noncom supporting you, the better you're able to accomplish your mission. However,
your whole reason for being is to lead. It's your butt that will end up in a sling if something goes bad. Of course "fragging" is not an option lower ranks have to voice their opinion of your abilities.

The more a unit leader is straddled with optional assets that have to be dealt in "real time", the more he is distracted form his primary mission which is to lead.

The modern day soldier is much more motivated and mission focused than any that I saw in my time in service outside of such groups the airborne, rangers or their earlier bretheren, LRRPS. This can only be a good thing though I have heard of failures do to leaders overreaching their mission parameters or simply getting over their heads. This is where experience becomes more important than ever.

However, I've observed an exercise or 2, and the walk through that I witnessed was impressive. Nevertheless, I saw experienced officers abducating a lot of their responsibilities to lower leaders as they managed the extra tasks their positions required them to attend to. The one thing that I learned as I rose through the ranks was to simplify my job as much as possible. Not run away from responsibilities, just attach priorities to what must be done and then do it. The more missions we give our leaders to do (a leader has a finite amount of attention span to acomplish the tasks he needs to fulfill) the less he's there to accomplish is primary mission which is fighting his unit.

As far as calling in a fire mission, present day protocals have made it so simple that possibly a girl scout with a bit of brains could do it. Also, be it tube or rocket batteries, the Fire Control Officer position, while more and more important, has been stream lined so that he can more easily deal with multiple fire missions. I personally wouldn't be afraid that my artillery assets were reservist. I think that RA and NG/Reservist get basically the same training, so a reservist battery ability lies less with training and more to do with experience. However, the major component is the soldier who called in plotted the target position and called in the mission.

Also, I can accept that as I rose in rank, my focus changed as to priorities I used to evaluate my unit. In my opinion, unfortunately, it wasn't the better leaders that got my attention, it was the leaders that failed to live up to the Armies expectation of what their job performance should be. For in the end, I couldn't get rid of them so I had to find was to make them as competent as possible. And anything that weakened their already weak situlational awareness was something to be worked around not welcomed.

I'm sorry for such a long post. I've probably shown my age as many younger officers thnk of me as some sort of dinosaur. (However, "Barney" I am not) Also, I realized as a young officer, I had a great failiing, I couldn't keep my mouth shut. Why it didn't affect my performance reports I'll never know.