All matters MRAP JLTV (merged thread)

[William F. Owen]

A General Concept of Infantry Mobility

I would be interested in the board’s opinions as to MRAP and JLTV “type” vehicles as a base line for general (not all) infantry mobility.

Generally,

1. They are better protected than APCs, in general overall terms. (mines and direct fire)
2. They have very low comparative running and acquisition costs.
3. They have less dust and noise signature for the same given weight.
4. They have less mobility under certain soil conditions (deep mud).

YES, we will still need APCs (tracked and wheeled) but as a general approach, for addressing purely protected mobility, against most likely threats they would seem to have considerable merit. Some are designed better than others and some features are better thought out than others, but opinions on this may be worth discussing especially if specific designs are suggested as starting points.

[Fuchs]

A General Concept of Infantry Mobility

I would be interested in the board’s opinions as to MRAP and JLTV “type” vehicles as a base line for general (not all) infantry mobility.

Generally,

1. They are better protected than APCs, in general overall terms. (mines and direct fire)
2. They have very low comparative running and acquisition costs.
3. They have less dust and noise signature for the same given weight.
4. They have less mobility under certain soil conditions (deep mud).

YES, we will still need APCs (tracked and wheeled) but as a general approach, for addressing purely protected mobility, against most likely threats they would seem to have considerable merit. Some are designed better than others and some features are better thought out than others, but opinions on this may be worth discussing especially if specific designs are suggested as starting points.

"better", "less" - in comparison to what?


The cross-country mobility of MRAPs has to be poor on all soft or hard but uneven terrains judged by the mean maximum ground pressure and the running gear.
Such vehicles only provide road mobility. They can negotiate difficult terrain sometimes, but not reliably enough to be used off-road regularly.

The protection is highly specialized against blast, crude EFP and obsolete RPGs. I bet that these vehicles don't have bomblet protection.

The costs are much higher than the costs of unprotected trucks and trucks with protected cabins.

MRAP is huge, even the "smaller" versions. These vehicles cannot easily be hidden against competent enemies with modern sensor technology.


But let's ignore the technical aspects for a while. The focus on armour to enhance survivability seems to me as an outgrowth of LI warfare. It worked because the opponents have only very limited lethality.
An opponent with modern lethality would easily destroy such vehicles despite their armour. There's a reason why so many people demand equal protection of IFVs and MBTs - even IFVs are not really survivable enough in a HIC.
Survivability in HIC requires to keep one's position unknown. Vehicles need to be easily concealable and if possible be silent and leave no traces offroad.
MRAP-sized vehicles cannot be easily hidden and their protection won't help much against battlefield weapons, so I'd say they're the wrong choice.

In short:
MRAP/JLTV look fine as LIC survivable mobility tools if the fuel supply is guaranteed (fuel consumption could be much lower without tons of armour).
I don't trust light armour as stand-alone survivability solution in higher intensity warfare.

[William F. Owen]

In short:
MRAP/JLTV look fine as LIC survivable mobility tools if the fuel supply is guaranteed (fuel consumption could be much lower without tons of armour).
I don't trust light armour as stand-alone survivability solution in higher intensity warfare.

So what's the solution to giving all infantry formations sustainable and viable protected mobility? What do you suggest?

[VMI_Marine]

So what's the solution to giving all infantry formations sustainable and viable protected mobility? What do you suggest?

Leather cadillacs and e-tools?

I had an MRAP for two months on my last tour. Fantastic vehicle for convoy ops - it's like having a Tactical Escalade compared to the Humvee. Useless offroad, though. We couldn't travel more than 10-15 kph offroad, and even then you had better be strapped in tight. I operated with an M113 briefly, until my CoC told me to cease and desist from operating Army vehicles, and in retrospect I loved the mobility it provided me over the MRAP. I think tracked vehicles are going to continue to be a better solution for all-around mobility. If we rely on MRAP-type vehicles, we've done part of the enemy commander's job for him by canalizing ourselves on existing roads.

[William F. Owen]

I think tracked vehicles are going to continue to be a better solution for all-around mobility. If we rely on MRAP-type vehicles, we've done part of the enemy commander's job for him by canalizing ourselves on existing roads.

I think that long fast road moves are going to become increasingly important. That means putting tracked APCs on low-loaders and that takes a lot of time and then you are road bound anyway.

I perceive protected road mobility as extremely important, in all conflict. The security of paved surface for wheeled traffic has been pretty inherent to conflict for the past 80 or so years. The world is becoming more and not less paved.

It's worth just taking a look at this,
http://www.defense-update.com/products/w/wildcat.htm

It costs about 1/3rd of what Stryker does, and to my mind is more capable, in that given a choice, I would select this over Stryker.

[Fuchs]

I perceive protected road mobility as extremely important, in all conflict. The security of paved surface for wheeled traffic has been pretty inherent to conflict for the past 80 or so years. The world is becoming more and not less paved.

Mostly correct.
But consider this; how much would the infantry travel on roads? Let's assume a road speed of only 50 km/h. A five-hour move would certainly be an exception for infantry, happening only once in some weeks. The average truck might be moving less than one or two hours per day (logistics vehicles would move much more).
That's 22-23 hours per day without movement (albeit possibly waiting on or next to a road). Do you want a huge protected but difficult-to-conceal truck (an invitation to concentrate the squad in the vehicle especially in cold climate) or a smaller, easily concealed vehicle?

Concealed vehicles wouldn't need to be guarded as much and the lower weight and fuel consumption reduce maintenance and logistical requirements.
Some off-road capability is required for many tasks. Engineering vehicles for earthworks and lower echelon supply vehicles as well as vehicles for ATGM or mortar crews need to be off-road capable.

Furthermore; the armour employed in MRAPs is not quantity production material. Even if they used simple RHA we would still have a supply shortage in the event of a major war that requires ten thousands, not only about 2,000 vehicles per year. What's our equipment good for if you cannot produce it in wartime quantities, if you cannot equip your mobilized army?


Israel is a special case. It has rather high force densities in the event of a war, hard ground surfaces in many areas, many hilly terrains (Negev, Sinai, Lebanon, Golan) that don't permit much off-road activity anyway and its possible opponents cannot expect to achieve much with their reconnaissance or artillery.

[Surferbeetle]

I enjoyed using the HMMWV before all the armor hit. The stryker looks interesting but I have never been in one during a combat tour so I can't say.

What have/do our allies use(d)?

From Wikipedia the Dingo

The Daimler Scout Car, known in service as the "Dingo" (after the Australian wild dogs), was a British light fast 4WD reconnaissance vehicle also used in the liaison role during the Second World War.

From Defesanet the Dingo 2

The DINGO 2 is a consistent upgrade of the DINGO 1 all-protected carrier vehicle transport vehicle introduced into service in the year 2000 and proven in many foreign missions. For as many as eight crew, it currently affords the highest level of protection against modern hand-held weapons, artillery fragments, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines as well as against NBC combat agents. With its highly mobile off-road chassis, it reaches maximum speeds of more than 90 kph and a radius of action of approximately 1,000 km. Moreover, the DINGO 2 is air-transportable on C160-Transall, C130 Hercules and the future A400M aircraft.

[Fuchs]

So what's the solution to giving all infantry formations sustainable and viable protected mobility? What do you suggest?

I see no all-round solution. I doubt that infantry that's properly embedded in the population really needs armoured trucks for road travels in COIN.
I'd integrate local militiamen into community-embedded platoons/companies anyway; the locals would create a safe environment and warn of dangers more thoroughly with some of them on every "foreign" vehicle anyway.
Soldiers could also use local transport vehicles on raids and intelligence missions.


For higher intensity conflict I'd suggest light trucks (a new category of light trucks!)

- partially fragmentation protected (up to level I (~ 9x19mm ball short barrel, a bit more protection than old kevlar flak vests), also the tarpaulin, windshield and door windows)
- minimized ground clearance when parking (hydropneumatic suspension)
- low height (folding windshield, fragmentation protection panels and roll-over bar)
- probably small enough for civilian car garages (folding mirrors, cabin accessible through folded windshield, bumpers all-round)
- prepared for quick camouflage and de-camouflaging with nets (also capable to fake urban objects with different camouflage materials)
- very low noise level
- self-recovery winch on 50% of vehicles
- several large fuel tanks, several small fresh water tanks, high mpg
- capable to cross irrigation trenches, fences, wet grassland
- driver sits in center, left and right sit gunners with good automatic firepower (pintle mounts)

Such a truck would survive indirect HE fires less well, but it would be much less likely under such and other fires. The small signature to enemy reconnaissance would increase the uncertainty for the enemy.
Imagine an infantry company occupies a community close to a major city to block an important road nearby. It's no rural community, so there's no barn. MRAPs cold be parked under gas stations , but most of them only in the open.
An enemy 5 lbs drone makes a fly-over and the enemy knows almost all truck positions and the defender strength. 320mm MRL and 142mm SPH flatten the community with HE, a mech company approaches combat-like and clears the ruins.
Imagine a company occupying the community with my light truck design; you could send much better recon assets, even drive through with some recon AFVs and would still not become aware of the occupation.

In high intensity warfare you need to defeat their sensors, not their munitions for survivability.
Some people believe that "stealth" doesn't work on the ground. They think too much of Arab deserts imho.

[Randy Brown]

I would be interested in the board’s opinions as to MRAP and JLTV “type” vehicles as a base line for general (not all) infantry mobility.

...

YES, we will still need APCs (tracked and wheeled) but as a general approach, for addressing purely protected mobility, against most likely threats they would seem to have considerable merit. Some are designed better than others and some features are better thought out than others, but opinions on this may be worth discussing especially if specific designs are suggested as starting points.

I'm not sure whether I've unpacked your last paragraph correctly, but I am curious as to why your "MRAP and JLTV" query did not also mention the Stryker family of vehicles, as well as the Armored Security Vehicle. I recently attended a short briefing on the former, and was struck by some tactical and organizational advantages in its current use. For example:

• Tactical: Moving quietly on the battlefield.
• Organizational: Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) are organized one battalion "heavier" than other BCT types.

Regarding the ASV, I note that some U.S. infantry with which I am affiliated deployed to OIF Security Force (SECFOR) missions were issued ASV, rather than armored Humvees. I don't know whether this was in order to make them provisional Military Police in all but name, but it did have implications for how they moved and fought.

I mention the Stryker and ASV as two other possible conceptual platforms from which to generate (or should I say "dismount?) some discussions, observations-insights and lessons regarding infantry mobility.

(Just saw your new post regarding the "Wildcat" concept. Must've hit the "send" key around the same time.)

[William F. Owen]

I mention the Stryker and ASV as two other possible conceptual platforms from which to generate (or should I say "dismount?) some discussions, observations-insights and lessons regarding infantry mobility.

(Just saw your new post regarding the "Wildcat" concept. Must've hit the "send" key around the same time.)

I tried not to mention Stryker but the points raised sort of forced me into it for the sake of clarity - something i guess I should try harder for!! -

Both Stryker and ASV seems to have very poor levels of protection. I think technology, operational reality and threat have all left Stryker far behind, but it's here now so folks will have to deal with it.

Another interesting vehicle is the Australian Bushmaster

[J Wolfsberger]

1. They are better protected than APCs, in general overall terms. (mines and direct fire)
2. They have very low comparative running and acquisition costs.
3. They have less dust and noise signature for the same given weight.
4. They have less mobility under certain soil conditions (deep mud).

Could you point me to the source of your information, or explain your reasoning? Based on my knowledge, the first assertion is completely wrong, and the next two are debatable.

APCs offer more protection than either of these. In addition, the MRAP's gain underneath mine protection at the expense of vehicle dynamics and increased vulnerability to blast from the side (i.e. they blow over easy).

[jcustis]

I must have missed those points previously, but JW is dead on methinks.

[William F. Owen]

Could you point me to the source of your information, or explain your reasoning? Based on my knowledge, the first assertion is completely wrong, and the next two are debatable.

APCs offer more protection than either of these. In addition, the MRAP's gain underneath mine protection at the expense of vehicle dynamics and increased vulnerability to blast from the side (i.e. they blow over easy).

Sure. The sources generally come from wide variety of documentation as well as talking directly with the manufacturers of both MRAPs and APCs. The reasoning is basically as follows.

a.) They are better protected than APCs, in general overall terms. (mines and direct fire)

I can't find an data for an existing and in service APC/MICV meets STANAG 4569 level 3 and/or 4, for both direct fire, fragmentation and under wheel and chassis mine detonation. I can find APCs (M113 variants) that can meet STANAG 4569 level 4, for direct fire, but not under-wheel mine detonation. I think Boxer may, meet both (ARTEC won't say) but it's 32 tonnes compared with 18 tonnes for some MRAPs. - which is why I caveated the statement with "in general overall terms."

b.) They have very low comparative running and acquisition costs. This is from manufactures and pure extrapolation from those designs using COTS technologies and those requiring or that have already incurred extensive development costs. Compare the costs of developing Boxer to that of even the better MRAPs. Running costs is based on the same assumptions. Wildcat and costs the same to run as a commercial TATRA truck.

c.) They have less dust and noise signature for the same given weight.
Four wheels produce less mechanical noise and surface disruption than eight or six.

...but I am not claiming these as absolute or categoric statements in support of some argument. Data indicates that MRAP examples show very good levels of ALL-ROUND protection versus a WEIGHT and COST argument that I do not see APCs readily matching right now.

I am not attempting an MRAP versus APC argument. Mobility alone assures APCs bright future

If you have open source data that shows any of these assumptions to be flawed, I'd be extremely and genuinely grateful. As a Clausewitzian, I am far more comfortable clinging to orthodoxy, than I am wrestling with innovation and all the attention it attracts!

[jcustis]

The clarity makes sense.

[arty8]

I got back late last year and fought in Mosul, inside the city for the most part. My squad had uparmoured humvees and a single ASV. I liked having an ASV, it was great to haul broken humvee's and is fast and agile, although the crew was stuck inside for the durationof the patrol.

The humvee simply cannot haul enough troops around for any mout senario, 3 dismounts per truck isn't nearly enough to search multiple buildings. This is assuming a 4 truck patrol. I really envied the infantry with the stryker-fast, really quiet and it held enough troops to be useful and was resistant to most IED's despite having a flat hull. The humvee, on the other hand has close to zero armour on the bottom.

Frankly, for the US this conversation should have been taking place twenty years ago. The US army failed to learn the lessons of the Rhodesian/South African and Northern Ireland conflict and adopt mine protected vehicles. Just another example of a cold war army adapting to a 'modern' counterinsurgency.

[B.Smitty]

A General Concept of Infantry Mobility

I would be interested in the board’s opinions as to MRAP and JLTV “type” vehicles as a base line for general (not all) infantry mobility.

Perhaps a better concept for "general infantry mobility" might be the humble HMMWV. It has the following benefits:

* It comes in a wide variety of unarmored, semi-armored, or armored configurations.
* It can go places that MRAPS don't dare.
* It has a lower life-cycle cost than any APC or MRAP.
* It has a much lower logistics footprint than an APC or MRAP.
* It has a much lower deployment footprint than an APC or MRAP.

Yes, the HMMWV is not well protected vs IEDs, mines or HMG fire (or really anything). But that's what APCs and IFVs are for right?

[Fuchs]

... and now imagine the length or pass time of a reinforced infantry company driving in vehicles with an average of only 2-3 men per vehicle, with proper military safety spacing (100 m, at the very least 50 m) and economical cruise speed of 80 kph.

Next, imagine what happens with all those vehicles once infantry dismounts to sweep a village. Would an entire platoon stay back to secure the many, many vehicles so school-aged boys cannot set them aflame?



This vehicle size (capacity) is of interest for dispersed actions, for skirmishing on an operational scale. It's no good logistically as general infantry vehicle.

[B.Smitty]

You can fit an entire squad on a suitably equipped HMMWV troop carrier.

http://www.amgeneral.com/files/specs...stic-04-10.pdf

That means at minimum four troop carriers per platoon.

An argument could be made to stretch that to six and use a mix or troop carriers and armament carriers.

[Fuchs]

Add reasonable amount of fuel, tools and other equipment, individual backpacks, netting, foodstuff, ammo, one or two crew-served weapons, some AT munitions, spare parts (tires!) ... no more than 6 per vehicle is reasonable.

[B.Smitty]

Six in back plus two up front is fine. With six HMMWVs, even with six additional drivers, there's still enough space for the entire platoon.

Add external stowage racks for rucks, spare tires and other gear.

BAE produced a field-installable armor kit for the M1152 that provides armor protection for troops in back as well as five weapon stations.

http://www.baesystems.com/ProductsSe...152_troop.html