Courageous Restraint "Hold fire, earn a medal"

[Greyhawk]

That sounds so simple in a classroom...There are so many different scenarios in war.

Yes, was keeping it to a broad hypothetical starting point. From that point there are as many examples as there are soldiers. Didn't mean to imply anything's simple or easy.

Hypothetically, is there a situation where a guy could get a Silver Star for actions under fire and a reprimand for 'allowing' his unit to be attacked?

Sometimes doing nothing is the right thing, and going for blood is the wrong thing. We should reward doing the right thing, whether that is charging an enemy machine gun nest or refusing to let the enemy bait you into harming innocents.

Exactly right, says I. But that part of the conversation is countered (in media reports and elsewhere) by claims that we're confusing young soldiers with mixed signals, sprinkled with quotes re: "this 'courageous restraint' award will only be given posthumously" then wrapped into the "ROE are getting our troops killed" narrative, and met with exclamations about the "wussification of the military."

...if Commanders are "just now recognizing" valor in actions like this, then something is wrong... I hope that we're not "just now recognizing" the value of actions like this.

Is this really a quandary? Again, five years ago, a platoon in my battalion caught heat...

More likely an ongoing discussion ("are we sure we're rewarding the 'right' behavior?" - one that should be held at all levels) made public BECAUSE it can be wrapped into the ROE/'wussification' story line. (Which, btw, can also be blamed on Obama - see Limbaugh, Rush.)

But whether ongoing or inexcusably late, I don't think the discussion itself is "bad."

Why, Greyhawk, I'm surprised you listen to him. Never heard the guy speak, m'self.

But then I tend to ignore all the taking heads as they rarely contribute much.Perhaps you're correct but I'm more inclined to blame sloppy main stream media reporting and editing added to civilian lack of knowledge...

Hopefully it's clear I agree with your second paragraph. To the first: ouch. Actually I caught that via Matt Gallagher, who has his own story from experience at that link. Knowing him I doubt he's a Rush listener either. But an awful lot of people are, so like it or not, he's influential.

And here's more of what his listeners heard this week:

"US troops in Afghanistan could soon be awarded a medal for not doing something, a precedent-setting award that would be given for 'courageous restraint' for holding fire to save civilian lives. ... 'The idea is consistent with our approach,' explained Air Force Lt. Col. Tadd Sholtis. 'Our young men and women display remarkable courage every day, including situations where they refrain from using lethal force, even at risk to themselves, in order to prevent possible harm to civilians. In some situations our forces face in Afghanistan, that restraint is an act of discipline and courage not much different than those seen in combat actions.' Soldiers are often recognized for non-combat achievement with decorations such as their service's commendation medal. But most of the highest US military decorations are for valor in combat. A medal to recognize a conscious effort to avoid a combat action would be unique. ... 'We absolutely support the right of our forces to defend themselves,' Sholtis said."
We have to say that? We're not talking about a basketball team is not allowed to go to Arizona here, folks! We're talking about the US military. We have to say this? We've got this guy saying, "We absolutely support the right of our forces to defend themselves." Well, that's comforting. Is that in the policy manual someplace, somebody have to take a test on that? "'We absolutely support the right of our forces to defend themselves,' Sholtis said. 'Valuing restraint in a potentially dangerous situation is not the same thing as denying troops the right to employ lethal force when they determine that it is necessary.' A spokesman for the 2.2 million-member Veterans of Foreign Wars, the nation's largest group of combat veterans, thinks the award would cause confusion among the ranks and send a bad signal.

Of course "we have to say that" because of people like Rush Limbaugh, but that irony is likely lost on most of his listeners.

[Schmedlap]

The difference between showing "courageous restraint" and showing gallantry under fire is that in the former situation you have more control over the degree of danger that you face. You can opt at any moment to not restrain your actions. In the latter situation - say, for example, braving enemy gunfire to save a wounded comrade - you don't have quite so much control over the situation. If things turn worse, you can't tell the enemy to stop shooting.

Maybe I'm "old school" having now passed a whole 2 years since ETS. Our Soldiers didn't kill people if they didn't have to. What is now apparently "new math" to our senior leaders (kill 2 gunmen and create 8 more) was "common sense" to our Soldiers at least five years ago and understood by many at least seven years ago.

Now if we can just rack our brains to try to remember how we influenced those Soldiers to do the right thing...

[82redleg]

Hypothetically, is there a situation where a guy could get a Silver Star for actions under fire and a reprimand for 'allowing' his unit to be attacked?

You're being fascetious, right?

That is EXACTLY what happened to CPT Matt Myer following our VICTORY in the battle of Wanat in 2008.

[Ken White]

But that part of the conversation is countered (in media reports and elsewhere) by claims that we're confusing young soldiers with mixed signals, sprinkled with quotes re: "this 'courageous restraint' award will only be given posthumously" then wrapped into the "ROE are getting our troops killed" narrative, and met with exclamations about the "wussification of the military."

I submit we are now as we have for a great many years confusing young soldiers with mixed signals. Mostly because we don't train them adequately but partly because the leadership is often hypocritical and inconsistent -- that mostly the fault of poor selection but also due to inadeqaute training (and education...).

The quotes you cite and the influence you mention of the Limbaughs and other talking heads in this country are due to the poor education proffered by the bureaucracy of this nation...

The ROE issue is problematic due to a lack of clarity in order to allow loopholes and a lack of candor by DoD in this as many other things. Not only the ROE issue but this unnecessary award kerfuffle could be avoided if they were more forthcoming and rejected reaction for pro active public affairs policies. I hate that 'pro active' phrase -- but here, it's appropriate.

The wussification issue is quite real (but then, I'm really old...) in many senses but certainly not in all. Suburban living trends that way. It was exemplified a few years ago when the Mountain Ranger Camp invited back a bunch of old, retired former Ranger Instructors to view current training. At a sit down afterward, they were asked for their opinions. The generic comment: "...place is full of wusses." The 4th Bn Cdr replied that, yes, the students were soft. The old guys responded "Yeah, them too..."

...BECAUSE it can be wrapped into the ROE/'wussification' story line. (Which, btw, can also be blamed on Obama...)

WHAT! He replaced Clinton? Why wasn't I informed...

I had just gotten clear that it was Clinton and not Carter as I long suspected...

[Schmedlap]

The wussification issue is quite real (but then, I'm really old...) in many senses but certainly not in all. Suburban living trends that way. It was exemplified a few years ago when the Mountain Ranger Camp invited back a bunch of old, retired former Ranger Instructors to view current training. At a sit down afterward, they were asked for their opinions. The generic comment: "...place is full of wusses." The 4th Bn Cdr replied that, yes, the students were soft. The old guys responded "Yeah, them too..."

Aint' that the truth. I went through the last hard class. I hear that they now allow the students to wear boots. When I went through the mountain phase (in January), we learned that the best way to deal with the cold was to wait for your extremities to go numb. We didn't even have boots in our rucks, let alone on our feet, because that was precious space that could be filled with something heavier, like more 7.62 ammo.

[Ranger94]

I held fire in '05. Was ridiculed by the team that replaced mine, by my 1SG and had to explain my actions to the XO (Acting CO; CO was on leave). I asked "Sir, if I ordered SPC Joe ####head to shoot, would it have been legal?".

Three days later they came back with a "Yes". If we shot, for 72hours, we would have not known if we were going to Ft. Leavenworth for 30years.

Most of you on this site advocate a new (or at least a redefined) type of war (This includes Gentile). Yet, most of you also fail to advocate for a new type of recognition.

This is a failure of leadership

[Ken White]

in Viet Nam and even in Korea. METT-TC. Nothing new in that, either. There have been races between punishments and rewards for showing -- or not showing -- restraint during combat actions for a great many years.

Most notably and within the memory of some, a few people involved at My Lai in Viet Nam refused orders to fire on civilians and / or tried to stop that criminal stupidity; most got in trouble initially and were only later properly vindicated and rewarded.

[William F. Owen]

Most of you on this site advocate a new (or at least a redefined) type of war (This includes Gentile). Yet, most of you also fail to advocate for a new type of recognition.

This is a failure of leadership

Just because it is new to some in the US does not make it new. War cannot change. Warfare is changing very slowly and in no way we cannot comprehend.

The failure of leadership is to recognise and explicitly state the above.

[Bob's World]

Just because it is new to some in the US does not make it new. War cannot change. Warfare is changing very slowly and in no way we cannot comprehend.

The failure of leadership is to recognise and explicitly state the above.

I'll agree with WILF as to his statement above, but then drive him to an immediate reply with my follow-on comment:

The nature of war indeed does not change quickly, though TTPs adjust continually to technologies, METT-T, etc. HOWEVER; what I see here is that perhaps leadership is coming to recognize that looking at intervention in the insurgency of some foreign country as warfare is to put it in the wrong category to begin with.

It is not that war or warfare is changing, it is that we are slowly coming to realize that this is far more Military Support to Civil Authorities for a very violent Civil Emergency than it is warfare. Our ROE and Tactical Directives are slowly working us around to the back door on this realization, as we are hard set to be macho warfighters in name, but realizing that macho appoaches simply don't fit.

Were not being overly wussified warfighters, as Ken discussess; instead we are being overly machofied MSCA providers.

Once we properly categorize the nature of our engagement, the logic of the tactical directives begins to fall in place as well.

Okay, WILF, fire away...

[William F. Owen]

Okay, WILF, fire away...

Dammed decent of you Sir! Don't mind if I do. Rude not to!

The Army is an armed force. It uses armed force against armed force. It cannot do anything else well, apart from to kill or threaten to kill. Thus it uses these things to defeat the armed element of an insurgency. ALL else is Politics.

Are we violently agreeing?

[Hacksaw]

I held fire in '05. Was ridiculed by the team that replaced mine, by my 1SG and had to explain my actions to the XO (Acting CO; CO was on leave). I asked "Sir, if I ordered SPC Joe ####head to shoot, would it have been legal?".

Three days later they came back with a "Yes". If we shot, for 72hours, we would have not known if we were going to Ft. Leavenworth for 30years.

Most of you on this site advocate a new (or at least a redefined) type of war (This includes Gentile). Yet, most of you also fail to advocate for a new type of recognition.

This is a failure of leadership

This thread has become rather long... so I understand why it may appear as if it is composed of a bunch of old has beens bitching about how things used to be... but that is pretty far from the truth...

I think you might find that "almost" everyone is in full agreement with McCrystal... valor is valor, sometimes bravery is to assume risk to self so as not to endanger the non-combatant, but this isn't new and we don't need a new type of medal to recognize such actions.

Restraint has and always will play an important role in combat (or support to Civil authorities) operations... to be honest I think this one has played out...

Wilf and COL Bob are about to discuss the differences between how a military force should do employed from a policy perspective and how best to employ a military force... or in other words... if all you have is a hammar and you need to secure two pieces of nice lumber... do you hammer in the screw or wait for a screwdriver they may never emerge, then again maybe you don't need to even secure the two pieces

[Ken White]

...what I see here is that perhaps leadership is coming to recognize that looking at intervention in the insurgency of some foreign country as warfare is to put it in the wrong category to begin with.

Your final clause is absolutely correct. However, I wish I was more convinced that "leadership" was beginning to recognize that; more importantly that they would do something about it...

It is not that war or warfare is changing, it is that we are slowly coming to realize that this is far more Military Support to Civil Authorities for a very violent Civil Emergency than it is warfare. Our ROE and Tactical Directives are slowly working us around to the back door on this realization, as we are hard set to be macho warfighters in name, but realizing that macho appoaches simply don't fit.

The really sad thing about that statement is that many realized that -- variously -- before, during and after Viet Nam. That realization, however got buried for the sake of political expediency and a major misreading of goat entrails.

We really need to avoid repeating that mistake.

Were not being overly wussified warfighters, as Ken discussess; instead we are being overly machofied MSCA providers.

We're both correct -- and thus, we risk creating a creature that is neither an effective warfighter or a competent MSCA provider.

What will hopefully be realized is that both those functions are required and the key to successful employment of the Armed Forces in each role is designing a force that has structures and organizations that are trained and equipped to do both. That is not impossible, it is not even particularly difficult or overly expensive.

What is difficult is getting senior policy makers to agree to a course and then getting our political masters educated about capabilities.

And developing in both the above the will required for the proper use of the correct amount force at the right time...

Once we properly categorize the nature of our engagement, the logic of the tactical directives begins to fall in place as well.

...Yes...

[Schmedlap]

I held fire in '05. Was ridiculed by the team that replaced mine, by my 1SG and had to explain my actions to the XO (Acting CO; CO was on leave). I asked "Sir, if I ordered SPC Joe ####head to shoot, would it have been legal?".

Three days later they came back with a "Yes". If we shot, for 72hours, we would have not known if we were going to Ft. Leavenworth for 30years.

If that is accurate, then it is an indictment of the leadership in your unit and nothing more. Drawing larger conclusions from that example would require that we assume that all leaders suck as bad as yours apparently did. That's not reasonable.

[Infanteer]

This seems to be alot of gusto for nothing too much - or maybe I'm not looking at it right. The military has meritorious awards and gallantry awards; just issue the meritorious rewards to those who show things like "courageous retraint" to further the mission, a high-degree of cultural awareness and an affinity for operating amongst a foreign populace. Heck, we recognize Majors for designing fancy training support stuff, you think we could give a Sergeant the same award for being good at "Small Wars".

It's all in how you write the citation.

[Ranger94]

in Viet Nam and even in Korea. METT-TC. Nothing new in that, either.

The 'C' was not taught in Army schools until the late '90's.

Pre-deployment training did not include "Shout, Show, Shove, Shoot (to Warn), Shoot (to disable), Shoot (to Kill)" unitl 2004.

Aurguments for/against "Strategic Corporal", "4GW" "COIN" etc are irrelevant. We are asking new troops to conduct this type of "war". More importantly, Senior officers and NCOs are asking new troops to conduct these types of missions while the tactics are still being defined. (I submit David Kilcullen's 28 Articles from 2006 as example

As for the charges that the new troops need a "medal for being timid", I counter with the reality that every Battalion/Brigade CO forces every patrol to drive the MRAP. All these "leaders" can quote FM3-24 yet fail to see how a big metal box seperates us from the local population.

The leaders are timid.

[Ken White]

The 'C' was not taught in Army schools until the late '90's.

after the turn of the Century IIRC. Before that, for about 25 years it was METT-T. The The third 'T' was added in the 70s to remind people they had to adapt to the developing foolishness of MDMP.

I say foolishness because there will not be time to do that in a war of movment. Viet Nam taught the Army some really bad habits and it also was buried so people forgot why we had those bad habits...

When I started, it was just METT but METT there was and those four are the parameters that'll determine based on your interpretation whether you live or die. The added '-TC' is just nice to have stuff, it isn't necessary as are the first four letters.

Only METT was used in Korea and Viet Nam, however, the 'third T problem' existed even without MDMP and though it was not part of the mnemonic at the time. The 'C' problem existed in spades -- thus accusations (accurate) of mass killing of Korean civilians and literally hundreds of incidents in Viet Nam. The new kids in both those war (and even further back, much further. Picture the problem in the Civil War...) had to deal with the same parameters and problems, they just had more aggressive leadership and a little more inclusive training.

Pre-deployment training did not include "Shout, Show, Shove, Shoot (to Warn), Shoot (to disable), Shoot (to Kill)" unitl 2004.

For the 'Army' as a whole perhaps and for some units, others units did variations on that theme as far back as 1/82's deployment on OEF 1.5 in 2002. They did it again before going to OIF 2 -- and again before going back to the 'Stan...

Good units have always been better trained than the Army norm and have generally led the institutional army to new techniques.

...We are asking new troops to conduct this type of "war". More importantly, Senior officers and NCOs are asking new troops to conduct these types of missions while the tactics are still being defined. (I submit David Kilcullen's 28 Articles from 2006 as example

Same thing occurred in Korea where there were some guerrilla activities and for ten years in Viet Nam with Galula precursor to Kilcullen just as Rex Applegate did for Korea (and WW II...). So none of this is new; it's just new to the people who are doing it now.

That's not a problem, the kids can cope -- it's the more senior types who have trouble adapting. That leads, if those leaders are into overcontrol, to hideound, ill-adapting units...

I'd also suggest the tactics had better be continually being defined -- and redefined and questioned and modified in view of experience. If they are not, the Army with static tactical principles will produce a lot of unnecessary dead bodies.

The leaders are timid.

We can agree on that. (that,too is a VN hangover... )

[Schmedlap]

Pre-deployment training did not include "Shout, Show, Shove, Shoot (to Warn), Shoot (to disable), Shoot (to Kill)" unitl 2004.

It did the for Balkans rotations prior to 9/11 and it was incorporated into our new ROE while in Iraq in 2003, soon after we began the occupation. In fact, most of us with Balkans deployments under our belts (vast majority of NCO's in my unit and a few of us O's) simply fell back upon the peacekeeping ROE and instructed our Soldiers to abide by it. If not incorporated into OIF pre-deployment training until 2004, well, that seems about as early as it could have been. Most units replacing us in late 2003 weren't really sure what to expect. But they got the same ROE brief that we did when they RIP/TOA'd. And, really, the "five S" rule isn't all that complicated.

As for "new"ness, I still remember my NCOs lecturing their men often in 2003: "we're going to pick our fights carefully. You piss these people off today and they'll be shooting RPGs at you tomorrow. Our job is to identify the dickheads and let everyone else just do their thing so we don't make more enemies." That's about what I would have told them at the time, but I didn't even need to. It was almost common sense. Today it's new math that our senior leaders have apparently just discovered in the past couple of years or so.

[gute]

I finally read something about this medal and I gotta say the idea is one of the dumbest I've ever heard. I realize I did not add much to the discussion, but come on!

[sapperfitz82]

Perhaps this was really just an all points bulletin to encourage commanders to do exactly what most here would advocate is needed to run a successful counter-insurgency.

What the senior commanders in Astan seem to be trying to do is change the paradigm from the battalion sweep in MRAPs to the population-centric fight.

The trick is how to go about doing that, given the units in country come from all different commands and backgrounds. Find what is common to all and tweek it would be one way. Awards fit that bill.

I'm not sure that this was the intent (pure conjecture here) but were I to try to tackle the problem, this might be a method.

Nonetheless, I see a great deal of room for this to go wrong without some further clarification. The level of uncertainty on this forum alone makes one wonder what S-1 is churning out for the citation of the new ARCOM-R medal.

[Ken White]

Nonetheless, I see a great deal of room for this to go wrong without some further clarification. The level of uncertainty on this forum alone makes one wonder what S-1 is churning out for the citation of the new ARCOM-R medal.

I have no problem with the basic intent -- but do believe the current award / reward / deterrence / punishment systems can cope with the issue.

The problems, if any, would come with implementation as different Commanders add their take on who, what, when, where and how. It is yet another non-problem that appears to be significant but is not and the perception exists simply because some poor commanders and Leaders cannot get things done the way the current Boss want 'em done. Instead of fixing the problem, in the best military tradition, this idea attacks a symptom.

It really erupts only due to someone who should know better simply thinking out loud. I'm reminded of one the better Creighton Abrams quotes:

"Generals should be noted for their silences..."