Mike
I think we're saying the same thing- conditions, cost, and management
To a point, but you must consider these against your objectives, if you consider them independently it is impossible to determine if the cost is worth it.

Slapout,

True, but really don't you need to do both?which is why I say get local population envolved as soon as possible.
Rarely is anything in COIN (or any other military operation) a simple stand alone task with one specific task, but rather a part of a much larger whole. We didn't get in this Iraq and Afghanistan initially, instead we focused heavily on the singular objective of head hunting HVIs, and too slowly we learned that it didn't work as a stand alone activity. Too much network theory crap imposed upon the force. Draw a network on a powerpoint slide (nodes and links), and then the theory was if you eliminated a key node or two the network would collapse and you could go home victoriouly. We should continue to do this, but this is not decisive (conventional warriors think it is).

You have to understand your presence patrols (or any other type of military activity) send a message that will be perceived by the populace, and if you shape your message correctly (and most importantly, the message is supported by your actions), you'll start achieving success through a number of unintended positive consequences. If one of your goals is to convince the population that the insurgent can't win, and that you will make every effort to protect the citizens, and over time when the populace realizes you'll actually walk your talk they'll start providing intelligence by the cupful, versus by the teaspoon full. This will creat a momentum that can change the tide of the fight, and that is what you're striving for. You won't get this tidal change by removing one or two key enemy nodes (high value individuals), you have to interact with the populace to create this tidal change in this type of fight. We did NOT do this in Iraq initially.

The military needs a plain clothes division
It's good to see some unconventional thinking going on. The Brits did this in a couple of conflicts (they took casualties, but the results were probably worth it, although how do you really measure the worth of a man's life?). However, your best plain clothes operatives are going to be your host nation folks, and ideally they'll be police or specially trained covert operatives. By all means we should facilitate this, the enemy should not sleep well at night, and when they walk the street at day they should be suspicious of everyone and each other. We want to install a deep fear, which will make them more receptive to other messages later.

MikeF,
When is our presence patrolling counter-productive? Throughout this thread, we're explaining how we will or should patrol, but ultimately, it's up to the host nation to secure. We may run the risk in certain areas of A'stan of causing more problems when we flood an area.
This is the million dollar question. If Special Forces are being employed correctly, they'll be participating in these patrols with local nationals in the lead. The larger hammer forces will be in close proximity to respond if they end up kicking a hornets' nest. However, if the HN forces are distrusted, and it is in our national interests, then our troops may have to do this.

Every situation is different so the strategy must be adjusted to that particular situation based on a number of factors and our objectives.