Returning to a Division Centric Army

[SJPONeill]

I'm not sure that this cncept of looking at the % of a formation in combat at any one time is not a bit of a red herring...a large proportion of the force will (should) be committed to reserves at each level - I think 1/9 at each level from distant memory e.g. a section/squad at company level, a platoon at bn level, a coy at Bde level etc - that's a lot of troops when you roll them all up but I don't think it's correct to say that they are necessarily 'out of combat/contact' and thus not necessarily out of the span of comamnd equation.

I'd argue that the NZ Div on Crete and at Minqar Qaim was pretty heavily committed, as was pretty much every airborne div immediately following a combat drop in WW2...

[Fuchs]

There's usually no reserve up to company level in many armies; instead, the combat troops are meant to be capable of counter-attacks without a dedicated reserve. That's more responsive.

A battalion reserve is often not much more than a platoon, if there's any at all (a Verfügungsplatoon - a platoon directly under command of the Bn Cmdr - is an enticing idea from the Cold War; it could serve as recce Plt, as couriers, as HQ guard, as traffic organizers, as CO escort and as Bn reserve).


The share of reserves grows on formation levels, unless these formations are overstretched (on the other hand some experts think that reserves are even more important the more you're overstretched).

[Fuchs]

Kiwigrunt, I'm no fan of Storr's considerations about how few companies of a force are typically involved in combat at once. He exaggerates the point. That's especially ironic as he focuses much on the human side of war in that book.

Let's say a division has never more than ten companies at once in combat. Could it b replaced by a 10 company brigade? No!
There would be no rotation, the companies would quickly be exhausted if not depleted.
There would be no reserve, and thus no good tactics.
There would be no security elements, and thus great opportunities for OPFOR.
Perfect anticipation would be required to have these ten companies at the points of action.
OPFOR could deploy in a way which would require more than ten companies to counter.


It's one of the weaker parts of his book. My reasoning in favour of brigades rests on completely different foundations.

[TAH]

I would contend that we never stopped being division centric.

We still retain Division HQs. We still deploy Division HQs for C2.

What changed was how divisions are structured/organized.

We went from "Type" divisions (Light, Armored/Heavy, Airborne, Air Assault etc) to Modular.

So what's different? The Division "Base", the types of units organic to the division not including its maneuver battalions.

These were: ADA Bn, MI Bn, Signal Bn, Engineer Bn(s), Cavalry Sqdrn, number and types of tube/rocket Artillery Bns and their controling HQs (DIVARTY), the number and type of CSS/Support Bns and their controling HQs (DISCOM), number and type of aviation Bns and their controling HQs (Division AVN Bde) as well as MP and NBC/Chemical Companies.

In many ways, the modular BCT are acknowledgement of how we task organized maneuver brigades for operations with supporting artillery, engineers and CSS units.

The issue to be solved/re-solved is how do modular divisions operate. Who plans fires for the modular division? A section on the division staff or folks over in a assigned/attached Fires Bde? Same question/issue for division level Aviation operations.

If we follow existing CSS doctrine, Sustainment Bdes are NOT just replacements for DISCOM/COSCOMs. They are supposed to be assigned/attached to a theater-level Sustainment HQs (A TSC or ESC) and provide "area support" to all units within their designated AOR. Currently none of the deployed division HQs/CDRs are allowing that to happen. They have TACON (a command versus support relationship) of their supporting Sustainment Bde.

No adequate replacement has been found/resourced for the Division Cavalry Sqdrn. For lots of reason, its NOT a Battlefield Surveillance Bde (BFSB).

We have also not solved the issue of, I need more X but not a whole modular Bde of X, where to I go to get it?

[Ken White]

two star + 2 one star spaces plus the Staffs. In peacetime -- and the US Army has been at peace since 1945 -- flags and spaces mean more than capability and competence.That's why when we ostensibly went 'modular' we deliberately did not restructure the EAD echelons to cope with that 'modularity.'

The Div Cdrs insist on TACON of CSS elms in their AO because they want control of all forces in an AO if they're going to be held responsible for that AO. That is simply perfectly logical self protection in an Army that, at this time, hates decentralized execution and where few trust people they do not know -- a factor stems partly from mediocre training and partly from institutional bias....

Span of control depends little on the technology or communications ability available; those factors are a crutch to allow marginally competent commands / commanders to function with an enhanced degree of success. The tech stuff can be a force multiplier but there are absolutely no guarantees that it will be.

The effective span of control really rests on state of training or experience at all levels AND ability plus willingness of the Commander(s) to delegate and trust their subordinates. Really good units / people can do a span of 9 or 10, really poor units / people have trouble with 2. An average of 3 to 5, mission dependent, is a rule of thumb, -- and thus a design parameter -- and little more. It very much depends on people and that level of training or experience...

If you recruit, train, promote and retain your entire force for great competence you can design small elements with a large (~10) span of control. If you do the same things to achieve mass and thus aim for acceptable competence, you can got to a span of ~5. If you're in need of greater mass, you'll have to accept less competence and may be constrained to a span of two or three.

Since people change with time and the Peter Principle exists, there is little chance of ensuring an acceptable design size of the span for other than a year or two at a time. Any attempt to design for specific people and mission s will probably have to change when the parameters change; thus the need for a simple, generic organizational template / TOE that allows then current Commanders to tailor their forces for specific missions with little effort. If that is done reasonably well, then the span of control issue sorts itself out with no problems and you may well have a Bn commanding a 300 plus man Co Team; seven independent Platoon Task Forces and have two Co Cdrs assigned to CP guard along with their Hq elms.

[TAH]

two star + 2 one star spaces plus the Staffs. In peacetime -- and the US Army has been at peace since 1945 -- flags and spaces mean more than capability and competence.That's why when we ostensibly went 'modular' we deliberately did not restructure the EAD echelons to cope with that 'modularity.'

The Div Cdrs insist on TACON of CSS elms in their AO because they want control of all forces in an AO if they're going to be held responsible for that AO. That is simply perfectly logical self protection in an Army that, at this time, hates decentralized execution and where few trust people they do not know -- a factor stems partly from mediocre training and partly from institutional bias....

Since people change with time and the Peter Principle exists, \

1. But we did restructure EAD, no more COSCOMs, no more CSGs/ASGs, no more ACRs, no more Corps Artillery/FA HQs or Corps Eng Bde or dedicated, organized Corps anything.

2. Agree with your comments regarding controlling everything in your sandbox. Thought/think the Area Support part of CSS doctrine is flawed from the start.

3. Amazing how many times in the past few years I have mentioned the "Peter Principle" and had to explain it in detail. The Army is THE case study of it.

4. Read somwhere that two of the characteristics of organizations that easily and readily accept and introduce bold change are small and young. The US Army is neither small (500K+AC, 1M+ total) nor young (200+years)

TAH

[Tukhachevskii]

...what's the "Peter Principle" that both TAH and KW are refering to?

[Ken White]

1. But we did restructure EAD, no more COSCOMs, no more CSGs/ASGs, no more ACRs, no more Corps Artillery/FA HQs or Corps Eng Bde or dedicated, organized Corps anything.

Yep, did that -- but 'forgot' to remove the Div to force those organizations you cite to operate on an area basis and to do so without interfacing with a Div, thus forcing the structure to work a bit harder. Was that omission just an oversight? I suspect not...

The US Army is masterful at complying with the wishes of Congress -- without at all actually complying. Then some wonder why many subordinate Cdrs do only what they want to do.

2. Agree with your comments regarding controlling everything in your sandbox. Thought/think the Area Support part of CSS doctrine is flawed from the start.

It was / is flawed based on what is; not sure it's all that bad based on what should be.

Given the risk averse culture of today, the Div Cdr has little choice; I also suspect many CS/CSS Cdrs don't mind all that much -- that way they blame screwups on the Div; many people like a little cover, many also like to be told what to do and how to do it (it's easier that way) -- they have no place in a decent Army but they exist everywhere...

3...The Army is THE case study of it...

Yup, I'm a living example...

4. Read somwhere that two of the characteristics of organizations that easily and readily accept and introduce bold change are small and young. The US Army is neither small (500K+AC, 1M+ total) nor young (200+years)

However, the Army could easily develop small and young Corps, Bdes, what have you and support forces for 1.5 year activate and trainup; 1.5 year deployment cycle (2x6mo deployments / mission asgmts) and a year of stand down, schools prior to the next activation, etc. That could be done relatively easily within the Cbt Arms Regimental System and need not necessarily be done for a lot of CSS elements. Of course, that would require trusting Commanders and not micro managing. It would also mean the massive HRC infrastructure would probably be unnecessary. Those two things may be beyond us.

However, there are other ways to skin that. Lots of ways to foster innovation and imaginative operating techniques. Unfortunately, they would require admitting that what we've been doing since 1917 with little change was and is probably wrong...

[Infanteer]

Infanteer, I’ll tread carefully because I may be reading you completely wrong. Like my fellow Kiwi, I’m really just trying to get my head around this.

I'm not sure that this cncept of looking at the % of a formation in combat at any one time is not a bit of a red herring...

Kiwigrunt, I'm no fan of Storr's considerations about how few companies of a force are typically involved in combat at once. He exaggerates the point.

I put forward the argument to address the discussion on Span of Control(Command) that arose with Fuch's proposal of the "Division-less" Force. Storr speaks to reserves and their importance while pointing out that formation reserves can get inefficent due to span of command issues. He also points to a natural adjustment to this in WWII with US and German Divisions moving to smaller formations based on more potent Brigading in the form of "Kampfgruppes" or "Combat Commands". In a sense, a more effective division focuses on looking down and improving the Brigade (if that makes sense).

He has given his take on the span of command as a human issue based off of data he presents. Other takes on the span of command(control) are presented and many seem to be based on that common "military wisdom" that puts forward an idea as fact with no objective data or information to back it up. I will give Storr's argument that smaller formations are more flexible, efficient and effective (he looks at the Div level; Corps and Bde may have different considerations and thus different factors) credit for at least trying to draw validity from the historical record.

Before we get too far in the weeds and I end up taking Storr's argument as my own, I'll say this. We all have ideas of the perfect fighting force. Whether it be by some radical change which is too extensive to discuss here or through better training and delegation, I think it is safe to say that the "perfect" concept is just that, a concept. When making decisions, I'd ere to the side of the 80% solution based off data from our imperfect past as opposed to the current theory of the day.

[Rifleman]

The debate so far has been about eliminating the division and having seperate brigades work directly for the corps commander. Some are for it and some think it will cause span of control problems. No one has mentioned the possibility of flattening the structure by keeping the division but eliminating the corps.

Better idea, worse idea, or just the same span of control problems at a different level?

It doesn't seem to me like a regional commander could handle any more divisions without a three star HQ in between than a corps commander could handle brigades without a two star HQ in between.....but I don't know.

As Kiwigrunt said, "I confuse me, I'll stop here."

[Fuchs]

The corps is the largest army structure that's affordable for most European countries unless the horizon darkens. It's going to stay in one form or another.

This means that with all those compatibility efforts at NATO level it would make little sense to delete U.S. corps because this would mean one unnecessary level of command in multinational campaigning.

We might experience in our lifetime that corps HQ morph into theatre HQs, though.

[Rifleman]

The corps is the largest army structure that's affordable for most European countries unless the horizon darkens. It's going to stay in one form or another.

That sounds sensible from a European standpoint.

This means that with all those compatibility efforts at NATO level it would make little sense to delete U.S. corps because this would mean one unnecessary level of command in multinational campaigning.

I asked if eliminating the corps would be practical because the U.S. does business through it's regional Unified Commands. If the four-star commander (are they still called CinCs or "sinks"?) already has a couple of three-stars working for him does he still need corps commanders between him and the divisions? Don't know, maybe he does.

But the discussion is usually about flattening the command structure by eliminating the division. I never see any talk of eliminating the corps and keeping the division so I thought I'd ask.

[Tukhachevskii]

The debate so far has been about eliminating the division and having seperate brigades work directly for the corps commander. Some are for it and some think it will cause span of control problems. No one has mentioned the possibility of flattening the structure by keeping the division but eliminating the corps.

Better idea, worse idea, or just the same span of control problems at a different level?

It doesn't seem to me like a regional commander could handle any more divisions without a three star HQ in between than a corps commander could handle brigades without a two star HQ in between.....but I don't know.

As Kiwigrunt said, "I confuse me, I'll stop here."

..what I was thinking. Wasn't the enitre evoluton of the divisional HQ (as apposed to manouvre formation0 because CORPs began to become unweldy after that dminiutive Corsican wih the perpetual chp-on-the-shoulder invented them? Corps staffs couldn't hndle the number o formatin being assigned so div HQ were formed as intermediary lnks in the command and control chain. Or I am wrong? t just sees we're going backwards only to relearn the same lesson.

@TAH I think you're right, US dctrine nevr envsaged disolvng the Div level HQ just tas organsied permamnently to BDE groups.

(this keyboard is 8888ed! Srry if nne of the above makes sense...of curse it migt not mak any snse anyway)

[Fuchs]

The old limit for practical corps size was 25,000 to 30,000 and was defined by march duration and pass time. Think of men marching in column. Width is 5 men on one road, average spacing is 1.5m. Total column length for 30,000 men:
6000 * 1,5m = 9 km. Pass time at 4 km/h: 2.25 hours.

Now keep in mind all those frictions and it becomes visible why larger formations were unwieldy.

Another reason for corps size limitation was overview over a battlefield (few km width can be controlled by a single commander with telescope, flag signals and courier horsemen).

None of this is relevant today.


(Btw, a pre-radio army or corps commander had much more direct subordinates than three!).

[Fuchs]

Or I am wrong? t just sees we're going backwards only to relearn the same lesson.

It is not the same lesson. The resemblance of outcome is coincidental.

[TAH]

TAH I think you're right, US dctrine nevr envsaged disolvng the Div level HQ just tas organsied permamnently to BDE groups.

Agree.

The Transformation/modularization of the US Army is a relatively recent effort that appears to be driven, at least to some extent, by the period of extended combat/conflict.

"Flattening" of the C2 structure pre-dates transformation by about 5-10 years (late 90s, early 200xs).

Had a thought the other day of why not making the Division HQs/Base its' own brigade type. C2/staff/HQs Bn + Signal Bn + Troops Bn (MPs, NBC, local security force units, other odds & sods), + CAV Sqdrn/Recon Bn.