Sep 2010 TRADOC Senior Leader's Conference

[Bill Jakola]

We want to ignite a discussion across the Army and beyond to take stock after nine years of war of where we are as a profession of arms and draw lessons to better prepare for future challenges.

When I listen to General Dempsey, I hear him lay out this discussion as a way to drive a series of cascading concepts that informs development and execution across Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTML-PF) domains.

The newly published Army Operating Concept (AOC) 2016 -2028 will drive our vocabulary to get beyond defining ourselves by what our enemy, opponents, or adversaries are doing to us, e.g., COIN in counterinsurgency we are defining ourselves by how we react to the insurgent.

FM 3-0 and the Tennessee chart depicting full spectrum operations (FSO) tends to constrain thinking into thematically exclusive bins of Offense, Defense, Stability and Civil Support Operations. However, the AOC now provides further expansion of FSO with the addition of two roles--Wide Area Security (WAS) and Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM). WAS is providing security, over wide areas so as a progenitor or condition setter of other missions e.g., COIN, Foreign Internal Defense, Counter Terror, or Humanitarian Operations. CAM is familiar to most as the archetypical Fulda Gap Army the U.S. possessed in the 1980s; but we may need to update this view in light of both technological and organization changes we have made specifically the interconnectivity, transparency, and speed of information and all the tools we now possess to collect, manage, and employ data, and the development of the modular Brigade force.

So our intent for this TSLC is to advance this discussion based on our experiences over the last nine years. We want to help answer what these changes mean to us as a Profession of Arms; what are we doing about them; how are we going to educate the next generation of Army leaders.

[Jason Thomas]

Bill and I will be heading out to TSLC. As I said before, we will provide information as important discussion topics fall out. If anyone has a question about what is currently going on at the TSLC send us the question(s) and we will try to run it to ground for you.
Jason

[Bill Jakola]

Bill and I will be heading out to TSLC. Jason

We made it to Kansas City and will begin the conversation tomorrow with the leaders who keep the Training and Doctrine Command in the fight. The backdrop setting the context for our discussion is the National World War One museum. Check it out at: http://www.theworldwar.org/s/110/new...id=1&pgid=1097

From an intellectual perspective this TSLC is an awesome leader development opportunity. I am certain we will advance, focus, and sharpen the most critical ideas driving our Army into the future.

Also, our mobile immersive trainer "the Cave" is here and running well (a beta test); it is a spectacular tool that represents a capability that greatly expands our ability to learn at the point of need. If you are interested in the Cave just ask me about it; or if you are in DC at the end of October come see it at the AUSA meeting.

Much more to follow.


Bill Jakola

[Jason Thomas]

We are now at TSLC. Bill and I will post the emerging points of the discussions. We hope to provide you all with some interesting insights. We will most likely post the initial outcomes on Tuesday morning. More to follow.
v/r
Jason

[Bill Moore]

AOC now provides further expansion of FSO with the addition of two roles--Wide Area Security (WAS) and Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM). WAS is providing security, over wide areas so as a progenitor or condition setter of other missions e.g., COIN, Foreign Internal Defense, Counter Terror, or Humanitarian Operations. CAM is familiar to most as the archetypical Fulda Gap Army the U.S. possessed in the 1980s; but we may need to update this view in light of both technological and organization changes we have made specifically the interconnectivity, transparency, and speed of information and all the tools we now possess to collect, manage, and employ data, and the development of the modular Brigade force.

Bill, I like the addition of WAS and CAM, but was perplexed by your statement that we need to move beyond the Fulda Gap scenario when we discuss CAM? Clearly the Stryker Bdes were not designed to deploy to the Fulda Gap and battle the USSR; they were a post Cold War concept that I think was implemented to provide the Army with more flexibility to respond to quickly world wide to any number of "potential" scenarios that required credible Army combat power. Threats projected ranged from militant groups like those in Sierra Leone to a developing nation's military forces that may be threatening an ally. While not as likely there is a still a requirement to be able to fight large scale, high intensity combat operations in places like Korea and others we where don't see the threat coming just yet.

We need the ability to move forces to the fight globally, do forced entries if required, the ability to sustain forces in remote areas of the world where we don't have mature logistics, and we always need to dominate in combat with irregulars or regulars. You're probably right, we need an updated Air-Land-Information Operations 2.0 doctrine that incorporates all the new technologies and other capabilities we have now, and at the same time recoginizes the enemy may have similiar technologies (often bought off the shelf). I don't think doctrine has got up with reality up (maybe it has, I just haven't read it yet). Looking forward to your future posts.

[Bill Jakola]

Bill, I like the addition of WAS and CAM, but was perplexed by your statement that we need to move beyond the Fulda Gap scenario when we discuss CAM? Looking forward to your future posts.

Sorry, for taking so long to respond; this conference has kept us pretty busy. We have had some particularly interesting discussions between and among TRADOC senior leaders.

Just to clarify what I was driving at in my reference to moving beyond a particular scenario, I did not mean to abandon the Fulda Gap capability but rather to expand it and more particularly to define how we might use it in other was to help resolve future conflicts.

Just as we should not have walked away from our Wide Area Security experience and capabilities we had developed during the Vietnam War, we should retain the Fulda Gap CAM experience and capability but reframe it for the next conflict. The problem with any such preparation is we do not have a crystal ball and do not know what that future conflict will look like or even who will oppose us. Therefore, I as others, seek to expand the way we think about using the capabilities we already have.

For example, can we use the current modular brigade force to conduct the type of major combat we envisioned in the Fulda Gap during the 1980s, or have our forces changed so much that such a scenario is not easily achievable; but might we use the current force in a different way to stop, or deter a comparable threat.

We need to challenge our assumptions and constantly look for the weak signal that might indicate a future challenge and figure out ways to prepare the force to respond in a timely manner to keep small problems small.

Bill Jakola

[SJPONeill]

FM 3-0 and the Tennessee chart depicting full spectrum operations (FSO) tends to constrain thinking into thematically exclusive bins of Offense, Defense, Stability and Civil Support Operations. However, the AOC now provides further expansion of FSO with the addition of two roles--Wide Area Security (WAS) and Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM). WAS is providing security, over wide areas so as a progenitor or condition setter of other missions e.g., COIN, Foreign Internal Defense, Counter Terror, or Humanitarian Operations. CAM is familiar to most as the archetypical Fulda Gap Army the U.S. possessed in the 1980s; but we may need to update this view in light of both technological and organization changes we have made specifically the interconnectivity, transparency, and speed of information and all the tools we now possess to collect, manage, and employ data, and the development of the modular Brigade force.

Do we need two more roles in the FSO, let alone two new terms? Constantly changing the terminology, when it's not really broken is a real pain, creates a ton of extra work updating publications and makes the teaching side of the house harder than it needs to be.

I much prefer CAM over warfighting which I think is a little narrow but does WAS add any value over the broader definition of Stability. Stability is those actions/operations conducted in order to maintain a stable environment from the point of view of domestic/national self-interest/objectives - what the UK have been calling countering irregular activity; CAM/warfighting crosses a line where the primary tool in use is the application of military force. Within either of these, you can have offense/defensive actions - I really don't like the depiction of off/def/stab as different functions i.e. stab being on a par with off/def.

I really look forward to the insights bound to come out of the TSLC.

[Jason Thomas]

In my thinking, CAM and WAS are core competencies. What I mean by that is they are two broad capabilities that the Army must be prepared to do (just like the requirement for initial entry). CAM and WAS help achieve particular goals and set conditions for influencing the environment. CAM achieves physical, temporal and psychological advantage. WAS consolidates those gains, stabilizes the environment and allows freedom of movement and action. The operational environment informs which competency we must focus on and in what mixture. Through different combinations of offense/defense/stability ops we can then set conditions that satisfy the operational and strategic requirements on the ground. Through the use of CAM and was the commander has a force capable of moving up and downd the spectrum of conflict. His trick becomes identifying and manging transitions as the environment changes due to his actions. All of these things enable true FSO and reduces the requirement for force optimization (COIN or MCO) it places us in a position to conduct both as required.

[BobKing]

We want to ignite a discussion across the Army and beyond to take stock after nine years of war of where we are as a profession of arms and draw lessons to better prepare for future challenges.

GEN Chiarellia, the Army's VCSA, asked a very similar question on the CAC blogs back in February of this year.

In Provide Me Your Perspectives he wrote:

In the past eight years plus our Army has transformed its organization, how it fights across the spectrum of conflict, and how we create and define mission success. From where I sit, it has been an amazing performance, but I wonder about the long term impact persistent conflict is having on our Army, our shared values, and our professional military culture.

I am interested in gaining your perspectives on how eight years of war, modularity, decentralized operations, and ARFORGEN have affected our core leadership attributes. I believe that a professional dialogue is essential to clarifying the issues we need to address to ensure the future health of our Army.

GEN Pete Chiarelli, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army

Between February and early September his query drew over 70 public comments.

The distribution of the comments is very interesting and, in my opinion, very enlightening as to the relative acceptance of open and transparent communication methods.

I broke the respondents down into five general categories: Civilian, Officers 1 (CW1 through O-5), Officers 2 (O6+), Enlisted, and Indeterminate/Anonymous.

Civilian - A handful of comments (less than 10 or so)

Enlisted - Several comments - ranging from SSG to CSM - about a dozen total.

Officers 1 - 30+ (Several warrant officers, a few Captains, mostly Majors [or equivalent] and a few Lieutenant Colonels)

Officers 2 - Five responses. Four Colonels and a follow-up comment, on Feburary 19th, from the VCSA.

In that comment he thanked everyone that had responded thus far and encouraged readers to continue spreading the word.

Analysis

This blog article and solicitation of comments is public facing and not restricted to CAC only. Across the entire Army, when solicited directly by the VCSA for feedback, only four Colonels responded and no general officers.

On March 1st BG Cardon, in his capacity as then acting CAC CG, initiated a CAC tasker "Encourage participation in VCSA blog post" which sent out to all organizations within CAC. In that tasker he did not direct participation, stressing that partication was encouraged but not mandated. At the same time, he emphasized that the Directors of the subordinate organizations should be leading by example.

Anyone caring to examine the comments in the article referenced above will readily note that tasker and the associated encouragement to partcipate provided no measurable results.

[ChipColbert]

Hello all. My name is Chip Colbert, I'm also a part of GEN Dempsey's planning group, and I'm here at TSLC along with Jason and Bill.

Today's topic is focused on the discussion Bill mentioned the other day about our Profession of Arms. As I sat in on the discussion this morning, a fairly difficult question came to mind. Before I pose the question I need to provide some background and context.

We had the opportunity to listen to several great speakers this morning - to include GEN (R) Sullivan and GEN (R) Franks. Dr. Don Snider spent a good deal of time talking about a recently released white paper on the profession of arms and a forthcoming Soldiers' handbook called Army: Profession of Arms. Dr. Snider defined a profession as a social organization for doing expert work. If the Army is truly a profession, how do we define what constitutes our expert work and knowledge? The expert work is land combat and the White Paper and the Soldiers' handbook state our expert knowledge can be grouped into four fields: Military-technical, Moral-ethical, Political-cultural, and Human Development. #Of those four fields, Dr. Snider made the point, which I completely agree with, that the Human Development field is the most important for the success of our force - both current and future.

OK, so here comes the question. Our Army is faced with the dual challenge of winning our current wars while simultaneously preparing for future armed conflict. #Due to the past nine years of war, we've obviously and necessarily placed a great deal of emphasis and priority on tactical and operational assignments and experience - or to use this lexicon, the military-technical field of knowledge. Accordingly, I think we've devalued our professional military education system, ACS opportunities, and other broadening experiences that take people out of the fight - the Human Development field.

I'm not saying this is wrong because we obviously have to do this in order to ensure we prevail in today's fights. #The question I'm struggling with is how do we restore some balance between the two? #How do we ensure proficiency in the Military-Technical field while simultaneously prioritizing the Human Development field to continue developing our leaders for tomorrow's fight(s)?

Interested in people's comments and feedback. # # # # # # ##

[Ken White]

I'm not saying this is wrong because we obviously have to do this in order to ensure we prevail in today's fights. #The question I'm struggling with is how do we restore some balance between the two? #How do we ensure proficiency in the Military-Technical field while simultaneously prioritizing the Human Development field to continue developing our leaders for tomorrow's fight(s)?

Emphasis on filling every space in the TOE with a 'qualified' individual leads to sort circuiting professional development to place persons by rank and specialty in every deploying unit. That those individuals may actually be less qualified than their apparent rank indicates is overlooked. We promote individuals to various ranks based on time in service, not actually tested and / or proven qualification. In many cases, a LT XO who's been there would be a better choice than a brand new CPT for Co cmd -- but we elect to opt for the CPT. Not enough CPTs? Reduce the time in service and ed requirements to produce more rapidly.

That really makes little sense. Can the young folks handle it? Sure -- but we aren't doing them any favors. They are being denied proper training an education to fill a perceived need. I suggest that perception is incorrect. Squads lead by Specialists. SGTs as PSGs. SSGs as acting Platoon leaders -- none of those are ideal; all work and have worked in prior wars.

Our training and education does not inculcate the basics of our trade -- and it is a trade, not a profession IMO -- so people have to learn on the job. Then we move them from job to job to rapidly so they never really master the jobs; they just do them "good enough." That can work in a major, existential war, however, it does the service, its people and the Nation no favors in peace time or in quasi peace as now. That needs to be fixed and we need to spend more time on Officer and Enlisted initial entry training -- get the basics right and it's like riding a bicycle; one does not forget. One also acquires a sound foundation on which to build...

However, to get training and education fixed, a workable personnel system that supports the Army in the field instead of itself has to exist. Good luck with that...

Oh -- and cut the size of Staffs. Significantly...

[ChipColbert]

KEN White quote:

Our training and education does not inculcate the basics of our trade -- and it is a trade, not a profession IMO

I'm interested in hearing more about why you see it as a trade and not a profession.

[ChipColbert]

While I agree with much of what you posted, I see that as being a much larger issue than the one I'm thinking of. Reframing how we view our challenges and how we see military force being employed to meet them is vitally important for the debate. However, while I can see how that process may alleviate optempo and may decrease our role and rate of employment, I don't think it changes the fact that - IMO - the Army still needs to reassess how much emphasis we place on tactical and operational assignments vice broadening and educational experiences.

In a recent interview with American Interest, Eliot Cohen said the Army is doing a good job of producing "capable brigade commanders" but that doesn't mean we're developing the next generation of strategic thinkers and general officers. I think this is due in large part because we are so focused on tactical assignments. Link to the interview is here:
http://www.the-american-interest.com....cfm?piece=857

[Hacksaw]

Chip the dynamic of which you speak has very little to do with the Army's current OPTEMPO and the subsequent focus on tactical/operational assignments. While that may accurately describe the current atmospherics (not sure it does - but I'll accept it because it doesn't matter).... it has little to do with why the Army isn't producing "strategic thinkers"

Simply put, long before the current engagements, the Army was obcessively focused on tactical assignments... whether green tab or CTC O/C... and routinely weened out anyone who thought beyond the final 300m...

Don't get me wrong, those types of assignment and that type of focus is important... but it was virtually the only path to greater levels of responsibility...

I'll defer to some of our more "seasoned" members, but it is not uncommon to refer to a LTC/COL who couldn't get promoted as too smart for their own good.

That said... how many strategic thinkers do you really need??? You certainly need them in the right spaces, but I'm not entirely certain you need a bunch of strategic thinkers...

Get past the organizational bias that you have to have been IN/AR/Arty to be able to think big thoughts and you might find you have a whole lot more strategic thinkers that may seem appearant...

Thoughts?

[SJPONeill]

Our training and education does not inculcate the basics of our trade -- and it is a trade, not a profession IMO -- so people have to learn on the job. Then we move them from job to job to rapidly so they never really master the jobs; they just do them "good enough." That can work in a major, existential war, however, it does the service, its people and the Nation no favors in peace time or in quasi peace as now. That needs to be fixed and we need to spend more time on Officer and Enlisted initial entry training -- get the basics right and it's like riding a bicycle; one does not forget. One also acquires a sound foundation on which to build...

Is there also an element of expectation management that needs to be looked at as well i.e. has there now been created as career progression expectation that a successful twenty year career should put into a LTC/COL or senior soldier position. Once a upon a time, you could retire at twenty as a Sgt or Maj and that was considered a good productive career - it also meant that the pools of experience at every level were far greater and almost every NCO and officer could 'step up' if required because of that depth of experience. Those who were being groomed (hopefully on ability and not family or other connections) were fast-tracked but even then there was a big enough pool to sustain the fast-tracked if some, for one reason of another, departed that track...

Developing senior officers is a bit out of my area but from a view looking upwards, command and leadership ability should always outscore big thinking i.e. a good leader/commander can always tap into big thinkers in their staff; it less easy for a big thinker to tap into leaders/commanders in their staff...

[Ken White]

Hacksaw and Old Eagle and I are about 90+ diverse years of cumulative military experience -- and essentially are saying the same thing. This from Hacksaw identifies a significant long standing problem:

"Simply put, long before the current engagements, the Army was obcessively focused on tactical assignments... whether green tab or CTC O/C... and routinely weened out anyone who thought beyond the final 300m..."

I submit that is the case not because it makes sense but because it worked in WW I (a brief war...) and again in WW II (a relatively brief war...) and we have not really modified our personnel or training policies significantly since 1917. The really sad thing is that penchant for muddy boots is effectively undermined by the current training and education regimens and the flawed personnel system.

It's far easier on the Personnel system to play that one size fits all game than to do what's really needed. Have a Command track and a Staff track. That works. The main reason we don't do it is simply because we didn't invent the process. As SJP Oneill said:

"a good leader/commander can always tap into big thinkers in their staff; it less easy for a big thinker to tap into leaders/commanders in their staff... "

Add this, also from Hacksaw:

"That said... how many strategic thinkers do you really need??? You certainly need them in the right spaces, but I'm not entirely certain you need a bunch of strategic thinkers..."

True. Part of the problem is that due to DOPMA and OPD and Congressional; pressure, we insist every LTC who's an Infantryman, a Ranger and Airborne School graduate and 'qualified' can command a parachute infantry battalion. Partly true; the law says they can -- but even my six year old Granddaughter is smart enough to know that some of them will do very well, others very poorly and most will just be acceptable. I'm with Old Eagle:

"Therefore, the senior leadership of the Army were great company commanders. Their ability to succeed at GO levels didn't always pan out, sometimes with embarrassing or even tragic consequences."

You can put a round peg in a square hole -- but you have to use a smaller peg...

Is that really good enough?

Chip Colbert:

I contend it's a trade based on the Webster's definition
"3.
a : the business or work in which one engages regularly : occupation
b : an occupation requiring manual or mechanical skill : craft
c : the persons engaged in an occupation, business, or industry."

I base that primarily on the parameters in sub paragraph b. above -- I think manual and mechanical skills are required (if often absent...), that Soldiering is work in which one should engage regularly and that it is an occupation that requires physical abilities and shrewdness but not necessarily superlative intellectual abilities for the majority of the practitioners.

I'm aware that it 'profession' is preferred for the social cachet and that Soldiering also meets the Webster definition for a profession:

"4.
a : a calling requiring specialized knowledge and often long and intensive academic preparation.
b : a principal calling, vocation, or employment c : the whole body of persons engaged in a calling ."

IMO, the specialized knowledge aspect is a requirement and the "long and intensive academic preparation." that is now seen as de rigeur is actually a requirement only for a few -- those strategic thinkers (more about them in a bit) but is effectively wasted money for the tactical mission requirements of an Army at War (yes, I know we are not at war more often than we are -- perhaps...). I also acknowledge that for some in the Army, another definition of Professional applies "3. an avowed religious faith ." Kidding, there are a few who elevate it to that level of commitment; most do not. That, too points toward the trade aspect...

Back to the strategic thinkers; we need a few, they should be in the right places and we should realize that we will not be able to make everyone a good strategic thinker. Just as not every LTC can become a good Bn Cdr, not every LTC can become a good strategic planner -- yet we insist that we can do that...

This, I realize falls afoul of OPD directives but the issue becomes fairness and objectivity or subjectivity and competence. I contend the Army could win that argument in Congress but the Per community has convinced the senior leadership not to do that. I would really like to be proven wrong...

Back on track. We call ourselves a Professional Army and the definitions of Professional justify that apellation:

"2.
a : participating for gain or livelihood in an activity or field of endeavor often engaged in by amateurs <a professional golfer>
b : having a particular profession as a permanent career <a professional soldier>
c : engaged in by persons receiving financial return <professional football>."

Thus I contend we can be -- we are -- Professionals -- and really are but, like Professional Football Players, we do not 'belong' to a profession.

It is said of Professions that they must possess certain characteristics, here's a typical list: (LINK). Note the first item. Much of this thread revolves around that attribute. My personal quite strong belief is that in an effort to do what that characteristic imputes we have lost much ability in the physical plane...

That is true to the extent that we Professionals are being put through hoops by a bunch of amateurs in several places in the world today...

It is noteworthy that two characteristics of professions that we respectively eschew and embrace are "testing competency" which we try to avoid like the plague and "specialized vocabulary or jargon" which we not only embrace but literally have fallen in love with. Of those two, my belief is that in demonstrating that we are a profession, the former is of far more importance than the latter, yet on which is our emphasis...

It is equally noteworthy that the characteristics of a Profession that the US Army does possess have in all our major wars, immediately gone by the wayside and the aspects of teaching the trade is immediately adopted for all ranks.

Those ranks are part of the problem. Just as the Medical Technician who takes your blood pressure and temperature is a Health Care professional, he or she is not part of the Medical Profession, so the EM and NCOs who comprise the bulk of the Army are Professional Soldiers but they do not belong to a profession (I could get really snippy about the Sergeant Majors Academy but I won't...). We have an organization wherein the bulk of the workers are in effect, tradesmen, plying their trade -- that is true, in combat, of all ranks. That advanced and specialized education for many of the staff members and a few leaders of that organization is desirable and needed is unquestioned; the such education aimed at most or all of a subset of the organization and a specialized vocabulary make the members of the organization members of a profession is, at a minimum, suspect. It is also of questionable benefit on cost and effectiveness ground, though the recruiting and social engineering aspects are admittedly good.

I submit that desire to be recognized as a 'profession' is a root cause of some of our problems of competency and misplaced priorities.

Nope, we're professionals, practicing a trade that requires a great deal of physical effort, cognitive and experentially derived ability in an organization that has attempted to substitute more and more varied classroom effort for that experience in an effort to convince the vales of Academe that we are individuals in a profession. That really has not worked at all well on several levels...

[Jason Thomas]

Since the discussion of the profession has obviuosly (and rightly) started a great debate. I would ask that we move the discussion to the new thread: The Profession of Arms that Dave so kindly set up for us. I'm truly interested to hear professional Soldiers, both active and retired, opinions on what makes us "professionals".

Jason

[SJPONeill]

1. Put the loggies, bean-counters and HR 'experts' The more we go down the HR path, the more we treat our humans as simply resources) back in their respective boxes. Yes, we all need to be 'fiscally prudent' and apply due diligence to our use of the tax-payers coin. OK, got that, we're a professional organisation and there are many other branches of government that need to tighten up their belts before the military gets squeezed anymore. Don't allow the 'efficiency' experts focussed on saving bucks to rationalise changes to to training that affect effectiveness e.g. yes, simulation has its place and is a useful tool but it should not one second be a replacement for time in the field/on the job. Similarly online learning has its place but is still not a substitute for face to face engagement between both peer groups and students/instructors.

2. Let soldiers (in this discussion soldiers = all members in uniform, NCO and commissioned) do what they want to do which is train. Give them every opportunity to apply and develop both their technical skills and experience, and their leadership ability at all levels from the newest soldier upwards. Along the same lines of professional development, encourage soldiers to read and talk about what they are reading - this may be somewhat deflating for some more senior staff as they get trounced in discussion with junior members.

3. Encourage them to follow the military as a career: 3-4 year hitches are not enough to development a smart professional soldiery that understands the contemporary environment - if this is to be an era of persistent conflict, then we don't want that experience walking out...

4. I think the experimentation with wikis, etc at CAC is a good thing (a damn good think even) as it both promotes soldier buy-in and engagement and also seeks to capture the knowledge and experience of the workface. This programme needs to be expanded as does the other side of the coin in making sure that soldiers have the best access to that current information that we can give them (I like the comments in the Sep 10 C4ISR Journal here).

[Bob's World]

OK, so here comes the question. Our Army is faced with the dual challenge of winning our current wars while simultaneously preparing for future armed conflict. #Due to the past nine years of war, we've obviously and necessarily placed a great deal of emphasis and priority on tactical and operational assignments and experience - or to use this lexicon, the military-technical field of knowledge. Accordingly, I think we've devalued our professional military education system, ACS opportunities, and other broadening experiences that take people out of the fight - the Human Development field.

Try looking at the past nine years as:
1. Not being war, and
2. Not being a problem that can be "won" through military action.

Then re-look both of your stated problems of dealing with the here and now while preparing for the potential armed conflicts of the future.

If not war, what is this and what should he military role be, and how should that role be framed?
- How can changing the context lead to shaping more effective engagement rather than simply simplifying the problem so that I can quit and go home?

What are the potential challenges that could both truly threaten us and be either deterred or defeated by military action?
- What threats can we deter, and how must we posture to do so?
- How does the military contribute to deterring those that are currently seen as "non-deterable" by most? Are there indirect ways that rob such organizations of the base of their support that can mitigate the problem? Conversely, are there ways that though well intended, will actually exacerbate the problem through engagement?
- What threats must we be prepared to defeat if not deterred, and are we postured to defeat those threats?
- What problems are cast as threats currently, but really don't pass the common sense test in today's environment? Are there policy solutions? If yes, come up with COAs and take them to the policy guys to consider. Use design to develop your position.
- What programs are crushing us with their cost, or diverting funding from programs that are arguably more important? Are there policy positions such as those described above driving these programs? Don't argue programs, assess policy.

The army is in the middle of a very tough problem-set. Being saddled with a large family of expectation driven by out-dated Cold War policies; along with a family of poorly conceived GWOT policies makes the problem-set tougher yet. Assess both, and then go back to higher and demand that they clarify what they really want, and what they really need you to do. We can't do it all, we can't buy it all. So lets buy and do what we really need.

[Ken White]

GEN Chiarellia, the Army's VCSA, asked a very similar question on the CAC blogs back in February of this year.Feburary 19th, from the VCSA...Anyone caring to examine the comments in the article referenced above will readily note that tasker and the associated encouragement to partcipate provided no measurable results.

Many Civilians do not know enough to contribute meaningfully, many who do will not contribute for fear of stating or having a different position than they THINK their Boss holds...

Many NCOs do not eat sleep live and breathe Army and most do not believe their good advice is properly respected so they tend not to have too many comments in such forums, real or virtual -- unless you strike a nerve, then they'll respond. One on one, most will respond pretty well.

Most of the WOs and Co grades will tell you what they think; most of the Majors probably will, some LTCs will. Many will not particiapate because they think their words will be ignored -- or someone's already made their point; most do not feel the need to post just to see their name on a comment.

Most Colonels are like civilians with respect to their Bosses positions. Generals are pretty much the same...

Don't know the Vice Chief. I do know that some GOs invite and accept discussion while some invite it but accept only those items that coincide with their views. Still others may seem to invite discussion but they really don't while a few seriously object to discussion. I suspect the Vice Chief fits in one of those blocs and that most of the COLs and GOs know pretty much where in that spectrum he fits. That may have a bearing in addition to the factors above.

Anecdote. Peace story, staff type: I once talked to a pretty good General Officer who was upset that he didn't know what was happening and that he thus had to operate in the reactive mode. I suggested the answer to his problem was MBWA -- Management By Walking Around, he sholud just wander about the Hindquarters and talk to the Action Officers to get a feel for things. He called four days later and said he'd tried that, didn't work. Mine was the only shop where the resident Colonel or his Deputy didn't appear and hover as soon as the General wandered in from the hallway...

Unless that syndrome disappears from the Army and subordinate are ENCOURAGED to speak their minds without fear, this and future Vice Chiefs will not get many takers in open forums on any topic likely to be even slightly controversial...