The Army: A Profession of Arms

[Chris Case]

Huh? So Policy only comes into being when the "profession of arms" starts acting?

No. I thought the context of the discussion would make it clear that here I only mean to discuss policies of using military force to achieve goals. I apologize if you somehow thought that my comment meant that I think that other government policies (education, Social Security, Medicare, etc.) somehow could not be created or enacted without military actions.

Now that it is clear that I am referring to policies regarding the use of military force, my claim is that it is political policy and that military professionals do have a part in creating it and advocating for or against it. This is just to deny your earlier claim that the "profession of arms" merely serves policy. That claims is just not true. For example, GEN Powell proactively took the use of force off the table for other policy makers by going to the press with his doctrine on when the US should resort to force. He was so popular and influential that this guided political policy. GEN Abrams tried to do the same thing with his reforms after Vietnam and GEN Petraeus influenced policy prior to the surge based on his influence and popularity as well. If you think strategic military leaders do not create, but only carry out policy, fine. I just don't see the evidence that this is true.

Policy has to exist in order to frame the actions needed to set it forth. Yes, policy is "modified" by actions. So what?

Show me any text of Clausewitz discussing "ethics."

First, I did not claim that Clausewitz discussed "ethics," this is related to the previous point about the relationship of military professionals to policy creation. War is an extension of politics according to Clausewitz and military professionals do create policy. This point is merely to say that I find it odd that you posted this:

Read Clausewitz!

and

Adhere to and study Clausewitz.

followed by this:

The profession of arms serves policy.

For Clausewitz war is policy and politics. My claim, based on actual actions from military professionals, is that they don't just serve policy, they create it as well. That is all. You can disagree, but I don't see evidence that strategic military leaders only serve policy. If your claim is that for soldiers at lower levels this is different, fine. But I think the blanket claim about "the profession of arms" is false.

What has any of this do to with my assertion that "all policy" is ethical and the military has duty to set forth policy - NOT make ethical judgements.
IF an action undermines policy - then it is probably "un-ethical." - thus what is "ethical" flows from the Policy.

Soldiers need to understand the relationship of their actions to policy, because they serve policy makers.

None of the above has anything to do with this. This is from a different post. That post was an effort to begin questioning your assertions in regards to the the difference between something being legal, ethical or moral. You said:

I find it very disturbing that this debate even got going.

You cannot teach "ethics" and morality. You teach Law. You teach what is written. Policy is always ethical. That is what policy "is."

I think there is very great danger that TRADOC has managed to elevate something pretty simple, into a pseudo-science, which lacks a grounding in the simple and classical teachings that have proven effective historically.

I think the second and third sentences are false. TRADOC may try to do pseudo-science (I don't know), but the "classical" teachings (if you mean in western civilization) challenge your claim in the second sentence. I take the "classical teachings" to be precisely about trying to teach what you claim can't be taught. I take them to be attempts to reflect on what we think is right in order to reconcile what is legal with what is right--in other words, creating a civil order in which we can be good people while also being good citizens. Or, maybe I just don't know how to read Plato, Aristotle, etc., or they are not "classical teachings," or maybe all the "classical teachings" worth reading are just about the law and why we should just follow it without reflecting on its correctness because it is based on what the powerful want and there is nothing we can do about it.

Further, if this discussion is disturbing to you I would refer you to what Hannah Arendt called "the banality of evil." I am guessing that you mean something different in your use of the term "ethical" than I do. I am sure Eichmann and those at Nuremberg would have loved it if the juries decided that doing what is ethical just reduced to whatever the law and policy happened to say. Or are these just examples of "victor's justice?" Is it that might equals right, the ethical reduces to the legal and the only thing Eichmann and his compatriots did wrong was to lose--is that the simple lesson of history?

This is all just to say that the law may be influenced by what we take to be ethical at any point in time, but to say that the ethical is reduced to law is not a view I find appealing. You are obviously free to disagree and think that I am missing the simple lessons of classic teachings and history. I think it is an interesting discussion and not disturbing at all.

Regard,
Chris

[slapout9]

Chris Case, I think CvC did talk about ethics,cain't remember the passages but he talked Moral COG's and the Military virture of the Army and it's commander.

[Chris Case]

Chris Case, I think CvC did talk about ethics,cain't remember the passages but he talked Moral COG's and the Military virture of the Army and it's commander.

Slapout9,

My recollection of Clausewitz is that he refers to "morale" and that it is sometimes conflated with "moral." I am pretty sure that the passages you are referring to are about "morale" by which he means something like "spirit" or "esprit." He does think this is vital, but I don't think his usage has anything to with what is moral or ethical necessarily unless what is ethical or moral reduces to being successful. Some may think this is true, I just don't think it is. I could also be wrong and am open to being corrected on this.

Also, he may have discussed ethics in something I have not read--it is clearly possible. I think that if he did, it would be important to understand what he means when he uses the term and in order to do that one would have to have an understanding of Kant and Hegel. That said, I think understanding Kant and Hegel (to some extent) is important for understanding Clausewitz in general, not only in regard to any ethical or moral theory that Clausewitz may hold.

Regards,
Chris

[slapout9]

Chris,
here is a link to an article by Dr. Joseph L. Strange called "Centers of Gravity: What CvC really meant." About halfway through the article you will see a pretty extensive discussion on Moral Centers of Gravity.



http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0735.pdf

[Chris Case]

Chris,
here is a link to an article by Dr. Joseph L. Strange called "Centers of Gravity: What CvC really meant." About halfway through the article you will see a pretty extensive discussion on Moral Centers of Gravity.



http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0735.pdf

Thanks for the link. The argument in the article is focused on what Clausewitz meant by "centers of gravity." While it uses the word "moral" I don't see anything in it that differs from my interpretation of Clausewitz's use of the term as something akin to "spirit" or "esprit" and its relation to his concept of "will."

The discussion of moral centers in the article is a discussion of the popular will and its relation to centers of gravity. The article calls the "moral centers": the leaders, the ruling elites and a strong-willed population.

For example:

"Two central elements common to these moral centers of gravity are the will to fight and the ability to command resources." (p.26)

I don't see how this has anything to do with "moral" in the way that the term is used in discussions of ethics or moral philosophy. The authors give the example of Saddam Hussein as a "moral center of gravity" that the coalition forces failed to adequately address in the first Gulf War (p. 26). This may be true, and it may be a good interpretation of Calusewitz's concept, but I would argue it has nothing to do with moral theory qua moral theory and everything to do with success in achieving policy objectives.

Regards,
Chris

[jmm99]

From Book 8, Ch 6 (1873 Graham trans; Paret's at home and too much to type out anyway) (emphasis added):

Influence of the Political Object on the Military Object
......
In one word, the art of war in its highest point of view is policy, but, no doubt, a policy which fights battles, instead of writing notes.

According to this view, to leave a great military enterprise, or the plan for one, to a purely military judgment and decision, is a distinction which cannot be allowed, and is even prejudicial; indeed, it is an irrational proceeding to consult professional soldiers on the plan of a war, that they may give a purely military opinion upon what the cabinet should do; but still more absurd is the demand of Theorists that a statement of the available means of war should be laid before the general, that he may draw out a purely military plan for the war or for a campaign, in accordance with those means. Experience in general also teaches us that notwithstanding the multifarious branches and scientific character of military art in the present day, still the leading outlines of a war are always determined by the cabinet, that is, if we would use technical language, by a political not a military functionary.

This is perfectly natural. None of the principal plans which are required for a war can be made without an insight into the political relations; and, in reality, when people speak, as they often do, of the prejudicial influence of policy on the conduct of a war, they say in reality something very different to what they intend. It is not this influence but the policy itself which should be found fault with. If policy is right, that is, if it succeeds in hitting the object, then it can only act on the war in its sense, with advantage also; and if this influence of policy causes a divergence from the object, the cause is only to be looked for in a mistaken policy.

It is only when policy promises itself a wrong effect from certain military means and measures, an effect opposed to their nature, that it can exercise a prejudicial effect on war by the course it prescribes. Just as a person in a language with which he is not conversant sometimes says what he does not intend, so policy, when intending right, may often order things which do not tally with its own views.

This has happened times without end, and it shows that a certain knowledge of the nature of war is essential to the management of political commerce.
.......
If war is to harmonise entirely with the political views and policy, to accommodate itself to the means available for war, there is only one alternative to be recommended when the statesman and soldier are not combined in one person, which is, to make the chief commander a member of the cabinet, that he may take part in its councils and decisions on important occasions. But then again, this is only possible when the cabinet, that is the government itself, is near the theatre of war, so that things can be settled without a serious waste of time.

The bottom line here is "CIMIC" (Civil-Military Coordination/Cooperation) - in effect, some kind of "executive committee" system. The devil is in the details, especially getting down to the field level (e.g., CORDS in Vietnam).

Regards

Mike

[Pete]

... the Army and it's commander.

Halt, this is the Apostrophe Police. The word "its" only has an apostrophe when it is a contraction of "it is." Drop and give me two zero and go and sin no more.

[slapout9]

Halt, this is the Apostrophe Police. The word "its" only has an apostrophe when it is a contraction of "it is." Drop and give me two zero and go and sin no more.

Forgive me Father for I have sinned.

[Ken White]

Me too...

[Pete]

From Wikipedia:

General Sir Charles James Napier, Order of the Bath (August, 10, 1782 – August 29, 1853), was a general of the British Empire and the British Army's Commander-in-Chief in India, notable for conquering the Sindh Province in what is now Pakistan.

[Paragraphs omitted]

In 1842, at the age of 60, Napier was appointed Major General to the command of the Indian army within the Bombay Presidency. Here Lord Ellenborough's policy led Napier to Sindh Province (Scinde), for the purpose of quelling the insurrection of the Muslim rulers of this region. They had remained hostile to the British Empire even after the end of the First Anglo-Afghan War. Napier's campaign against these chieftains resulted in victories in the Battle of Miani (Meanee) and the Battle of Hyderabad, and then the subjugation of the Sindh Province, and its annexation by its eastern neighbors.

His orders had been only to put down the rebels, and by conquering the whole Sindh Province he greatly exceeded his mandate. Napier was supposed to have despatched to his superiors the short, notable message, "Peccavi", the Latin for "I have sinned" (which was a pun on I have Sindh). This pun appeared in a cartoon in Punch magazine in 1844 beneath a caricature of Charles Napier. Later proponents of British rule over the East Indians justified the conquest thus: "If this was a piece of rascality, it was a noble piece of rascality!"

[Paragraphs omitted]

General Napier put down several insurgencies in India during his reign as Commander-in-Chief in India, and once said of his philosophy about how to do so effectively: "The best way to quiet a country is a good thrashing, followed by great kindness afterwards. Even the wildest chaps are thus tamed."

[Paragraphs omitted]

[Ken White]

From your quote, Pete:

""The best way to quiet a country is a good thrashing, followed by great kindness afterwards. Even the wildest chaps are thus tamed.""

Some things don't change much. The passage of time does not insure subsequent generations are more advanced in all aspects...

[William F. Owen]

Now that it is clear that I am referring to policies regarding the use of military force, my claim is that it is political policy and that military professionals do have a part in creating it and advocating for or against it. This is just to deny your earlier claim that the "profession of arms" merely serves policy. That claims is just not true.

...and once you get told "get on it," with go do it. It is then the Policy makers job to alter the military objectives to fit an altering policy - again, soldiers can advise at to Ways and Means. - Witness Allenby who was given more to do with less forces and just did it, without complaint.

For example, GEN Powell proactively took the use of force off the table for other policy makers by going to the press with his doctrine on when the US should resort to force.

Proves my point. Powell was dead wrong and crippled US Foreign Policy as a result. He should have stuck to his pay grade.

If you think strategic military leaders do not create, but only carry out policy, fine. I just don't see the evidence that this is true.

The evidence would thus show most of the military men who seek to dabble in policy are misguided.

War is an extension of politics according to Clausewitz and military professionals do create policy.

As far as I know, Clausewitz never said "extension." He did say "continuation" on two occasions. In 1827, on his 10 July Note, and on page 605.
....but the military serves policy, once it is in place. These actions "cost" so you see a modification and adaptation. If the military start formulating policy then to what end would they craft to policy? To be better served by war?
War is a very blunt instrument. It can only serve certain policies. To quote Ashkenazi "Do not ask me what to do. Tell what you wish done and I will tell you if it is possible."

For Clausewitz war is policy and politics. My claim, based on actual actions from military professionals, is that they don't just serve policy, they create it as well. That is all.

Well aware and my point is that this does not work well.

Further, if this discussion is disturbing to you I would refer you to what Hannah Arendt called "the banality of evil." I am guessing that you mean something different in your use of the term "ethical" than I do.

I live amongst a good few Shoah survivors, so I am well aware of the path I tread. Hitler believed himself to be entirely ethical, as did Eichman, and all the Nazis. THAT IS MY POINT. The Nazis' "taught" ethics. Ethics is politics. Law is what generally what prevents the Holocausts (which is why Hitler changed to law to allow it), but when you want to have a holocaust you have to get people to believe it is "Ethical" to do it. - those ethics get taught. Rwanda would seem to provide good example. The US believed it served Policy = thus ethical - do deny it was genocide to avoid involvement. The men doing that saw their actions as "ethical."

I think it is an interesting discussion and not disturbing at all.

That is why I find the discussion disturbing. Teach Law! - Written Law )not perfect, but best). Do not teach "morality and ethics." They are products of prejudice and fashion.

What was "ethical" in the minds of a US citizen, on Sept 9th 2001 had changed by Sept the 14th.

[Chris Case]

Proves my point. Powell was dead wrong and crippled US Foreign Policy as a result. He should have stuck to his pay grade.

The evidence would thus show most of the military men who seek to dabble in policy are misguided.

Well aware and my point is that this does not work well.

If you were making a claim about what ought to be the case, great. The point I was challenging was the descriptive claim that the "profession of arms serves policy." I claimed that it creates policy. You are now saying that it causes problems when it does that. Fine, but that is not I was challenging. If the point of your earlier post that I disagreed with was just to say that it ought to X because when it does Y it leads to bad results then I wouldn't have responded the way I did. What I am trying to be clear about is that many in the military hold the view that there is an absolute distinction between creating and carrying out policy and that the military does only the latter. This is descriptively false whatever we may think about what ought to be the case.

I live amongst a good few Shoah survivors, so I am well aware of the path I tread. Hitler believed himself to be entirely ethical, as did Eichman, and all the Nazis. THAT IS MY POINT. The Nazis' "taught" ethics. Ethics is politics. Law is what generally what prevents the Holocausts (which is why Hitler changed to law to allow it), but when you want to have a holocaust you have to get people to believe it is "Ethical" to do it. - those ethics get taught. Rwanda would seem to provide good example. The US believed it served Policy = thus ethical - do deny it was genocide to avoid involvement. The men doing that saw their actions as "ethical."

That is why I find the discussion disturbing. Teach Law! - Written Law )not perfect, but best). Do not teach "morality and ethics." They are products of prejudice and fashion.

What was "ethical" in the minds of a US citizen, on Sept 9th 2001 had changed by Sept the 14th.

I still don't find this argument convincing at all. In fact I think you have it precisely 180 degrees wrong. Also, I think your examples prove my point rather than yours. The Nazi's may have taught ethics, big deal, that doesn't mean they were right about it. However, they also taught law and they used that law to murder innocent people legally as you point out. This seems to make the case that the law is more dangerous because it has the force of government behind it and can license all variety of immoral behavior. I think law is more the product of prejudice and fashion and that your Nazi example shows this. I also think that it is through moral theory and the study of ethics that we try to improve the law (ideally) in order that the force of law does not license such immoral behavior. It is not a knock against ethics or morality that Nazis were so confused and barbaric.

Rwanda don't prove your argument unless you think that what is right reduces to whatever some person happens to think is right. Bill Clinton thought he was right to ignore genocide, now he thinks it was wrong. What does that have to do with the fact of whether what happened was actually right or wrong? Does the moral status of the Genocide in Rwanda really depend on what people believe?

If your claim is that we just can't know if anything is ever right or wrong and all we have to rely on are people's beliefs, fine. And further, that these beliefs should not be subject to reflection outside of what the law says, I don't see how that view makes the law any more appealing than anything else. In fact, to me it seems that it should be less appealing because you are giving power to the state in matters where all actions it takes according to the law will be (in regards to questions of right and wrong) either arbitrary, capricious, indeterminate, or based on beliefs which may be either true or false depending on what people happen to believe at a given time absent any further reflection. How has the law changed if it is not subject to reflection outside its own mode of thinking? In addition, at least here in the US, you are giving that state power over people's lives while acknowledging that there is no way to know right or wrong other than opinion. If there is nothing but what people happen to believe and to enshrine in law to determine right and wrong than it seems to me that we should really be careful about how much power we give to the law.

Regards,
Chris

[slapout9]

This is from the article and is a direct quote from CvC but it does not cite the exact passage.

“The moral elements
are the most important in war.
They constitute the spirit that permeates
war as a whole, and at an early
stage they establish a close affinity
with the will that moves and leads the
whole mass of force. . . . History provides
the strongest proof of the importance
of moral factors and their often
incredible effect.”


But here is my interpretation of that. Moral is what is right and wrong and if you are morally right you will have high morale (spirit to fight for what is right)
and the physical manifestation of both Moral and Morale will be your Leaders and the enemies Leaders. And that would make them COG's for both physical attacks and propaganda attacks (morally wrong war).

[Chris Case]

This is from the article and is a direct quote from CvC but it does not cite the exact passage.

“The moral elements
are the most important in war.
They constitute the spirit that permeates
war as a whole, and at an early
stage they establish a close affinity
with the will that moves and leads the
whole mass of force. . . . History provides
the strongest proof of the importance
of moral factors and their often
incredible effect.”


But here is my interpretation of that. Moral is what is right and wrong and if you are morally right you will have high morale (spirit to fight for what is right)
and the physical manifestation of both Moral and Morale will be your Leaders and the enemies Leaders. And that would make them COG's for both physical attacks and propaganda attacks (morally wrong war).

slapout9,

That may be your interpretation, but I don't think it has anything to do necessarily with what is right or wrong. I think it is a charitable interpretation and would be happy if that is what it actually meant. I just don't see the evidence in Clausewitz. It may be there and he may mean that the right side will win because their morale will be high, again, I just haven't read that part. Even given your interpretation, I don't know how from any of this (the quote + the interpretation) we can determine anything about what is "right and wrong" other than through "history" and the "effects" of the spirit and its close affinity to the will. If you are correct, does it mean that Clausewitz is telling us either that the good will always win because they will have high morale or whoever wins just is good because they had high morale, based on the right morals and we discover those things based on who won a contest of wills? How does the relation between morale and the moral work to determine what is right or wrong? Or, am I missing the point?

If we interpret Clausewitz as saying something about the will in reference to Kant and "the Good Will" then we may be on to an interpretation that could include determining "right and wrong." But, I don't think that is the point of this discussion or whether the texts support that view.

Regards,
Chris

[slapout9]

Chris,
1-I think CvC is saying that is why we have wars. Right and Wrong is often just somebodies opinion.

2- Which is why I believe in situation ethics. I posted this on another thread but I think it has bearing here. Especially important to the military because what is right or wrong will depend on the situation, A moral METT-TC if you will. This was popular in the 60's so you will see that the ultimate moral is "God is love" I learned it from my grandfather as God = good, close to the Kantian idea of Good will as a duty but you may not agree.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Situational_ethics

[Bill Jakola]

...and once you get told "get on it," with go do it. It is then the Policy makers job to alter the military objectives to fit an altering policy - again, soldiers can advise at to Ways and Means. - Witness Allenby who was given more to do with less forces and just did it, without complaint.

Proves my point. Powell was dead wrong and crippled US Foreign Policy as a result. He should have stuck to his pay grade.

The evidence would thus show most of the military men who seek to dabble in policy are misguided.

As far as I know, Clausewitz never said "extension." He did say "continuation" on two occasions. In 1827, on his 10 July Note, and on page 605.
....but the military serves policy, once it is in place. These actions "cost" so you see a modification and adaptation. If the military start formulating policy then to what end would they craft to policy? To be better served by war?
War is a very blunt instrument. It can only serve certain policies. To quote Ashkenazi "Do not ask me what to do. Tell what you wish done and I will tell you if it is possible."

Well this is a discussion worth having.

Colin Gray addresses the military role in policy formulation and execution in his book "Another Bloody Century", published in 2005, pg 363.

"The question, 'who controls whom' in the conduct of war, does not admit of a simple answer, except as a matter of principle. There is no dispute over the theoretical primacy of policy and policymaker in relation to the military instrument. In practice, though, different cultures and changing historical contexts can ignite, or re-ignite, ancient difficulties in civil-military relations. To cite just one recent example, in the summer of 2002 Eliot Cohen argued in his major study of Supreme Command that war is much too important to be left to the generals. 36 Political leaders need to assert themselves over the military conduct of war if they are to be certain that war will be waged as vigorously as policy requires."

Gray uses the analogy of a doctor patient relationship with the Army profession of arms represented by the medical profession and the political leadership as the patient.

"It is argued that just as a person with a brain tumour is obliged to trust his expert brain surgeon, so a society at war should be obliged to take the military advice of its military experts."

I see a very blurred distinction between doctor and patient roles and responsibilities, at least in practice. It seems to me, the profession, either medical or 'of arms', must dialogue with the patient or the political leaders in our case. Each must complement the other influencing policy, strategy, operations, and at time even tactics. However clearly these roles are spelled out in purely legalistic terms in practice the distinctions are far less recognizable. For example, political leaders are still ultimately responsible for setting policy and strategy but these are developed with the advice and often advocacy of the military.

The acts of setting and developing strategy are so intertwined and inseparable that the political and military leaders must do this as a combined team effort and not, as Bob Woodward's book "Obama's Wars" depict, military leaders making strategy irrespective of political input.

Is our profession of arms role to provide advocacy or merely advice?

[Ken White]

The acts of setting and developing strategy are so intertwined and inseparable that the political and military leaders must do this as a combined team effort and not, as Bob Woodward's book "Obama's Wars" depict, military leaders making strategy irrespective of political input.

And to do that means the answer to this:

Is our profession of arms role to provide advocacy or merely advice?

Must be yes to both.

Both are required today due to the lack of military knowledge on the part of most professional * politicians today; their relative ignorance helped place us where we are today. The failure of the Armed Forces advocate sensible solutions and to just do what they were told with only minimal advice provided is also partly responsible.A question thus formed is at what point the advocacy must cease and the Guidon becomes planted.

That's really the question...

* They aren't really professional other than in the sense that's what they do for a living. Some of them are Professionals, Doctors and Lawyers. The Armed Forces are not themselves professionals, warfare it is not a profession, it an endeavor and it can be a trade for some or even for many but it isn't a profession any more than playing baseball, basketball or football for a living is a profession. Attempts to make it a 'profession' are in fact a part of the problem this thread discusses. Professions are allowed to have their own rules and to police themselves -- armed forces are not really permitted to do either.

[Bill Jakola]

* They aren't really professional other than in the sense that's what they do for a living. Some of them are Professionals, Doctors and Lawyers. The Armed Forces are not themselves professionals, warfare it is not a profession, it an endeavor and it can be a trade for some or even for many but it isn't a profession any more than playing baseball, basketball or football for a living is a profession. Attempts to make it a 'profession' are in fact a part of the problem this thread discusses. Professions are allowed to have their own rules and to police themselves -- armed forces are not really permitted to do either.

Right, "warfare it is not a profession"; but that is not what we are talking about. We are attempting to define the profession of arms, a group that specializes in the application of lethal force to achieve political ends. Because there are many things a military can do that other non-military organizations can do as well, e.g. build roads, schools, or provide humanitarian relief. However, only the profession of arms speciallizes in the application of lethal force, (and yes, there are exceptions, like police and mercenaries). And there are times when these other groups cannot operate due to security considerations and only the military will do. In these cases, where we require an organization that can build infrastructure while also providing secuirty and conduct combined arms maneuver or counterterrorism, in such cases only the profession of arms will do.

I agree, "warfare it is not a profession". Quoting Gray pg 37, "war is a relationship between beligerants, warfare is the conduct of war", but neither is a profession. War is such dangerous business that we need a profession of arms to maximize our ability to conduct war; that is, rather than warfare as a profession, the profession is expertise in warfare.

The problem is how do we develop, cultivate, standardize, evaluate this expertise. If the military is to provide advice and advocacy to the political leaders, when and how do we learn to do this. Do we learn in any coherent manner or is this largely self taught? If we are to be this profession of arms that is truely the expertise in warfare, how does the profession gain this expertise?

[slapout9]

The problem is how do we develop, cultivate, standardize, evaluate this expertise. If the military is to provide advice and advocacy to the political leaders, when and how do we learn to do this. Do we learn in any coherent manner or is this largely self taught? If we are to be this profession of arms that is truely the expertise in warfare, how does the profession gain this expertise?

Bill,I don't think that is the problem. Your are very professional(expert), the Army is very professional(expert) but politicians are often temporally elected amateurs or opportunist and that can be deadly to a expert.