Motivation vs. causation

[jmm99]

Hi Marc

As to this:

from marct
The ex nihil, nihil fit? Hmmm, maybe, but the problem I have with the concept of "objective knowledge" is not that it can not and does not exists but, rather, the assumption that we as individual humans can perceive it and, after such a perception, communicate it inter-subjectively.

juries do it everyday in civil cases by allocating causation and fault.

Yes, that is "inter-subjective communications" based on their perceptions. The problem, of course, is that another jury given the same facts could come up with a different allocation. Thus, a problem in predictability.

There are jury verdict reporting services (used by insurance companies and trial lawyers) which give ranges in different situations - "fuzzy patterns", which provide some guidance and perhaps an argument in settling cases.

So, in my book, "Causation" is something of a voodoo science - a mixture of credo and scio. PS: the only reason I use those terms is that my high school Latin teacher drilled them into my skull.

When you put together your model on "Causes" and the "Narrative", please let us know. This sounds interesting, but difficult:

I'm more focused on the modelling so that I can figure out the mechanisms of local adaptation more than anything else. I already have a pretty good model that describes how local adaptations take place in categories and relationships, but it's still not good enough to really work that well; it describes the process nicely, but falls down on projecting outcomes....

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

I think BW has valid points if we're discussing insurgency. There's a certain problem in applying those points to our current conflicts, though, because we're not fighting against insurgencies. One of the reasons our current problem set looks so complex is that we keep slamming square pegs into round holes and trying to impose grandiose but imaginary and counterproductive constructs such as "war on terror" and "global insurgency".

We're fighting a war against AQ, but AQ is not an insurgency, unless we stretch the definition of insurgency far beyond the breaking point. AQ is not populace-based or nationally based, nor is it directed toward the overthrow of an existing government. It's never been able to muster sufficient support in any national environment to drive a true insurgency, though it has managed to exploit existing insurgencies that it did not create. AQ doesn't need to move the populace of any given nation to establish a COG and overthrow a Government, it draws its strength from diffusion and holding a relatively small but very highly motivated core of true believers spread out among a large number of national environments. An insurgency needs to establish a support base among a national populace, a terrorist group does not.

I don't see the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan as insurgencies either. We didn't start these fights to defend a government from insurgents, we started them to remove governments we found distasteful. We succeeded, and created power vacuums in both areas. What we are seeing now is not insurgency against established governments, it is armed competition to fill that vacuum. In each case we support one one of the contending parties, which we choose to call a government.

In this environment "good governance" may be less an issue than it would be in a traditional government vs insurgent scenario. The armed parties are not fighting for good government, they are fighting for power, which they will use to advance their own interests. The populace is less concerned with good governance than with staying out of the line of fire and with supporting whatever faction they think will best advance the interests of the groups they actually identify with, more likely to be defined by family, clan, tribal, or sectarian distinctions than by any concept of nationhood. "Good governance" is only an issue to the extent that it is defined as "governance that brings benefits and protection to me and mine".

In some cases, especially in Afghanistan, people may be fighting not because they object to bad government but because they simply don't want to be governed. In this case any external government constitutes bad government.

In short, I think BW makes valid points about what we might call the Cold War pattern of insurgency. I'm just not sure our current fights fit into this pattern.

[jmm99]

Hi Dayuhan et al,

My two centavos worth since I cite two posts.

We may be on the same page.

As close as I can come, AQ is waging global special operations warfare. If you want to say they are waging global unconventional warfare, that's OK since AQ's operations take place in areas it regards as "eneny-occupied" territory. See this post:

Hi John - part 2

As to "global", but not "insurgency" (except as part of the toolkit), see this post:

You're moving in the right direction

Those are my current best shots at the 25m target.

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

As close as I can come, AQ is waging global special operations warfare. If you want to say they are waging global unconventional warfare, that's OK since AQ's operations take place in areas it regards as "eneny-occupied" territory. See this post:

I can agree with that. The problem I have with calling AQ an insurgency is that the term seems to invoke a reflexive "COIN" response, which in turn assumes a set of conditions that I don't believe are pertinent to this particular problem.

[Bob's World]

Nice to see more people noticing that "Global Insurgency" is a concept that probably confuses and hinders efforts against AQ far more than it helps.

Consider the following items that AQ lacks:

1. A state.
2. A populace.

Makes it kind of hard to hold a decent insurgency when you are lacking the two key ingredients. Like conducting a Global Margarita party, except without Tequila or Limes...

But one needs neither a state nor a populace to conduct UW. One only needs the will to incite and support insurgency among the populace of another's state, and the means to do so. The current information age provided AQ the Means to develop a UW network that incites and supports insurgency among Sunni Muslim populaces in a wide range of countries. To include your own, where ever you might currently be.

If you feel the urge to conduct COIN, I suggest, like charity, you begin at home. Ensure the populace of your own country is experiencing "Good Governance." That every significant segment of the populace perceives itself to be included; to be respected and have justice under the law; to have legitimate and effective means available to them to address their grievances and participate fully in the governmental process. That is good COIN. Do this and you will immunize your populace from possible infection from those like AQ who would come to your home and conduct UW for their own selfish, political ends.

COIN is typically waged in the countryside of lands far away; but Insurgency is won and lost in one's very own capital cities. Insurgency in the Philippines will fade when the Government in Manila finally decides to provide good governance to all of its populace equitably. Similarly in Kabul and Afghanistan.

When one can see COIN as simply governments doing what governments are supposed to do, day in and day out; with the military component of COIN only being implemented when the civil governance has lost control and needs some assistance, one is prepared to prevail. To think of COIN as warfare that is caused by insurgents is to let our politicians off the hook for their failures. Good COIN is “peacefare.” It denies Causation; and when Causation is denied, Motivation falls flat.

[Dayuhan]

Nice to see more people noticing that "Global Insurgency" is a concept that probably confuses and hinders efforts against AQ far more than it helps.

I noticed that about 30 seconds after reading the term for the first time. It took that long because I had to read it several times to convince myself that I was seeing what I thought I was seeing. Unfortunately, I was.

But one needs neither a state nor a populace to conduct UW. One only needs the will to incite and support insurgency among the populace of another's state, and the means to do so. The current information age provided AQ the Means to develop a UW network that incites and supports insurgency among Sunni Muslim populaces in a wide range of countries. To include your own, where ever you might currently be.

I wouldn't say AQ has been terribly successful at this. I think they've been more successful at using pre-existing insurgencies as tools and cover than they have at actually generating or exacerbating those insurgencies. In most cases where AQ is involved in local insurgency it is the local issues, not the AQ agenda, that drive the insurgents to fight.

COIN is typically waged in the countryside of lands far away; but Insurgency is won and lost in one's very own capital cities. Insurgency in the Philippines will fade when the Government in Manila finally decides to provide good governance to all of its populace equitably. Similarly in Kabul and Afghanistan.

In the Philippines probably true, though I wouldn't be holding my breath: Manila has neither the capacity nor the will to govern Mindanao effectively. in Afghanistan, I suspect we're discussing good governance when the actual problem is non-governance. To have a good government you have to have a government first, and I'm not sure the assemblage in Kabul qualifies. if it can't govern at all it certainly can't govern well, and our calling it a government doesn't make it one.

If the "government" is perceived as an externally imposed entity that is not likely to outlast external support backed by questionable commitment, it's not likely to attract much support. The key issue is not that governance is good or bad, but of acknowledgment that a legitimate government exists. That's why I suspect that in Afghanistan we're not seeing an insurgency fighting a government but an armed competition to fill a perceived political vacuum.

[Bob's World]

concur. What each populace requires of its governance is unique to that populace. As to your last point that goes to heart: Legitimacy. No government perceived as lacking legitimacy in the eyes of its own populace is likely to prevail when faced with a determined insurgency.

Said another way: If one is going to commit the blood, treasure, and reputation of their nation in the support of the government of another that is facing insurgency, ensure it is perceived as legitimate before the first drop, penny, or promise is spent.

Or said another way: If one backs an illigitimate government against an insurgency, expect that those same insurgents will target you as well. Particularly if they perceive that what legitimacy that government does have comes more from you than from sources that they recognize.

Also that "Official" does not necessarily mean the same as "Legitimate." In the eyes of the afgan people they probably recognize that the Karzai government is "official." Few, however, see it as "legitimate."

[Entropy]

Dayuhan,

All great points. I think one could argue that Afghanistan remains in a state of civil war.

[marct]

Hi Mike,

juries do it everyday in civil cases by allocating causation and fault.

Yes, that is "inter-subjective communications" based on their perceptions. The problem, of course, is that another jury given the same facts could come up with a different allocation. Thus, a problem in predictability.

Totally agree. I remember a while back reading about some experiments looking at perception effects in jury decisions where test juries sat on a case or listened to a transcript being read or just read the transcripts. Apparently, since it was an experiment, the accuracy rate of the juries increased along the same line. Sort of similar to the eye witness testimony problem .

So, in my book, "Causation" is something of a voodoo science - a mixture of credo and scio. PS: the only reason I use those terms is that my high school Latin teacher drilled them into my skull.

LOL - yeah, I tend to agree although the dolls used are just a tich different .

When you put together your model on "Causes" and the "Narrative", please let us know. This sounds interesting, but difficult

I will, if I can ever get it done . I've been struggling with it for years now and, while it's gotten better, I'm still not happy with it. Oh well, we'll see....

Cheers,

Marc