What we really need is a better crystal ball

[davidbfpo]

(Taken from a Hybrid Warfare thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...?t=7360&page=2 and a post by Bill Moore (No.37).

I'm not a fan of hybrid warfare....we all recall more than one senior officer during OIF saying "no-one told me about this threat"....What we really need to invest in is a better crystal ball.

I am mindful of a number of recent threads that try to "look forward over the horizon", notably the thread on the Deterrence of Irregular Threats. We have looked at human terrain, language skills, CIMIC, developing informants and lots more. Elsewhere open source intelligence is touted. I understand this need has been looked at within "The Beltway".

This thread is at a more strategic level - for Small Wars - how can 'a better crystal ball' be developed and invested in? What is a better crystal ball?

[William F. Owen]

This thread is at a more strategic level - for Small Wars - how can 'a better crystal ball' be developed and invested in? What is a better crystal ball?

Errr.... let's not even try. You cannot predict the future. It's nonsense. We have pumped millions into "predicting future threats" and we have ALWAYS BEEN WRONG.
The problem isn't the Crystal Ball. It's the humans looking into it.

What you can predict, with reasonably high accuracy, is the capabilities that threats might have, and how they will use them. Problem is that this area gets corrupted by not very smart folks trying to secure funds, and usually based on no evidence.

[AmericanPride]

From a junior officer's perspective:

We need a better system of historical, political, and military analysis. This means greater tolerance for and encouragement of our national security community's "prophets" (i.e. Rick Rescorla). While the specifics of any particular pending event may be incomplete or unavailable, they nonetheless fit into a general pattern of behavior of that actor. The attack on Pearl Harbor was not Japan's first surprise lightning naval strike against a world power, and the British attack on the French fleet in WW2 was a long-time used strategy of the Admiralty to cripple the use of third party warships by a continental threat. Neither the Battle of France or the Battle of the Bulge was the first time the German army went on the offensive through the Ardennes. Combined with Wilf's point about the predicting "with reasonably high accuracry the capabilities that threats might have and how they will use them", it's just a matter of packaging the analysis and finding someone willing to hear you out. But from the pattern I've seen, our institutions (or institutions in general?) do not have that capability. And the people who should have listened usually say in reply: "hindsight is 20/20". You'd think by now we would have learned to better develop foresight then.

Maybe we need a brain trust not invested (i.e. compromised by its organizational interests) in the system. Kind of like a GAO for strategic thinking.

[Entropy]

I mostly agree with Wilf. Instead of trying to predict threats, what we really need is a robust and diverse intelligence collection and analysis system that will provide warning when and if threats emerge. As threats emerge, then resources can be allocated to the problem.

Unfortunately, the US intel system does not like to "waste" resources sustaining a diverse analysis and I&W capability. The money, promotions and benefits go to the high-visibility areas and the threat du jour. The policymaker and intelligence system's obsession with current intelligence is a result. Most analysts (including myself) are forced to spend most of their time on current intel instead of the research necessary to obtain a deeper understanding of an intelligence problem. It's probably my biggest complaint about our intel system.

[William F. Owen]

What I base my opinion on is the following.

a.) Since 1945, we (UK/US) are usually wrong about where and against whom we will be fighting. This is not likely to improve. Why do we keep trying?

b.) Since about 1973, we have seen very little, if any, in the way of "technical surprise" in the conduct of warfare. Almost every weapon encountered is very well known.

• Every weapon Hezbollah used in 2006, was well known to IDF intelligence.
• The Taliban are using 40 year old weapons, within an entirely predictable tactical doctrine.

Yes there are emerging technologies, but they usually don't have a proven and coherent military application, so are not really much of a threat.
If you have some understanding of potential technical capability then how that capability is used, is usually mind-numbingly obvious.

[Bob's World]

What I base my opinion on is the following.

a.) Since 1945, we (UK/US) are usually wrong about where and against whom we will be fighting. This is not likely to improve. Why do we keep trying?

b.) Since about 1973, we have seen very little, if any, in the way of "technical surprise" in the conduct of warfare. Almost every weapon encountered is very well known.

• Every weapon Hezbollah used in 2006, was well known to IDF intelligence.
• The Taliban are using 40 year old weapons, within an entirely predictable tactical doctrine.

Yes there are emerging technologies, but they usually don't have a proven and coherent military application, so are not really much of a threat.
If you have some understanding of potential technical capability then how that capability is used, is usually mind-numbingly obvious.

A senior guy at the 5-sided building offered that, we've been surprised by the conflicts we've gotten into because we've successfully deterred the ones we foresaw.

I think he may be giving our deterrence efforts a bit too much credit, and letting off the hook those whose job it should be to identify the indicators of growing threats vice over-analyzing the ones we are already focused on.

[Ken White]

The difficulty is that people in power will not listen to analysis that provide problems counter to their desires or understanding of what the problems should be.

Wilf is correct, you cannot predict the future but you can ascertain trends and possibilities-- even probabilities (though many in the Intel business do not like to do that for a variety of good and bad reasons). American Pride is correct in that good analysis relying on patterns can give insights that may not be totally predictive but which still provide indicators.

Entropy really sums it up:

The policymaker and intelligence system's obsession with current intelligence is a result. Most analysts (including myself) are forced to spend most of their time on current intel instead of the research necessary to obtain a deeper understanding of an intelligence problem. It's probably my biggest complaint about our intel system.

Though I believe the policymaker is really the problem; I've watched junior intel types come up with good stuff for years only to be told by their intel bosses to stifle it -- because that intel boss is catering to the policymaker he works for. I've also watched a very few good Intel Bosses take sound products to their Policymaker knowing he would not like what he was going to hear. In a few cases, I've seen the Policymaker accept it -- in too many I've seen it shot down...

IIRC, prior to and during the Battle of the Bulge, there was only one Corps G2 out of all the US Army Group, Army, Corps and Divisions who consistently got it right and would speak up. The belief from Eisenhower and Bradley was that it was over; few wanted to tell the Emperors otherwise...

So if anyone can come up with a way to fix policymakers so they're more open minded and less devoted to the way that was and convinced only they can know all that must be known, we'll have answered David's question by removing the myopia that occludes the crystal ball...

ADDED: I think Bob's World's comment just above effectively corroborates that. We can successfully deter (perhaps...) those we (The Policymakers) foresee -- while ignoring those for which adequate warning has been available and provided but didn't fit in 'our' worldview so they went on the back burner (See international Islamist terrorism from 1972 forward)...

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Ken

My observation has been that our predictive capabilities are quite good.

The difficulty is that people in power will not listen to analysis that provide problems counter to their desires or understanding of what the problems should be.

Posted by AmericanPride

Maybe we need a brain trust not invested (i.e. compromised by its organizational interests) in the system. Kind of like a GAO for strategic thinking.

Seems you're both addressing the same issue. Maybe our predictive analysis isn't deeply flawed (though I remain suspect), but analysis without a political/business agenda (more F22s, more submarines, etc.) just doesn't get floor time.

There is little concensus on which nation-state presents the next serious threat, and even less consensus when we discuss where irregular warfare will trend to in the future, and then how we should prepare for it. We generally think we're going to be involved in more of these irregular warfare conflicts, and the irregular enemy "can be" very adaptive due to their small size and relatively non-existant bureaucracy. They can turn on a dime while we have to turn on a quarter (or a 50 cent piece). We evolve, then they evolve (if they're not defeated). The concern is when we evolve it generally means evolving the entire Army (or another service), which can cost expotentially more than our foe is spending. The EFP is a perfect example, I was playing with field expedient shape charges in the late 70's, and now that concept has evolved into an EFP, which is still a relatively cheap technology compared to the expense of uparmoring the entire force. It won't be too long until they find a way to defeat our new armor and new vehicles, then at great expense we'll adapt to the new threat. It would be nice to get ahead of the threat, instead of reacting to it, thus the desire for a better crystal ball.

The beter crystal ball is one piece, but assuming we had a better crystal ball, it won't mean squat if we don't have a military and industrial process that can adapt quickly. Adpation can take place in many ways, training, education, technology, organizational change, etc. What has changed and it can't be denied, is the speed of change. Will be able to adapt quick enough in the future?

[Ken White]

I was playing with Shape Charges in the late 70's, now they're called EFPs. Of course they evolved the principle remains the same. No one really put two and two together that someday an irregular force would actually being using these against our vehicles...

Demo training on SBH in the early 60s taught and we used EFPs. Many would be amazed at what 12 pounds of C4 and a Manhole cover will do to a steel door to an Ammo Bunker. The VC used EFPs all through the Viet Nam war in addition to dozens of other IEDs -- a 250 pound bomb will do amazing things to human bodies. We knew all that. We just buried it because it wasn't in line with the power structures ideas.

As an aside, I've been advocating putting a giant Earmuff charge on the Hoffman Building since 1961...

We got introduced to Islamist international terrorism in 1972. Nixon convened a cabinet level commission to study the problem and over the next five years, they predicted much that has happened since. Those in power did not want to hear it. Been dozens of studies and commissions since, many had some good ideas -- all diligently ignored.

Every incident since then has been a pointer; there were people who saw and raised flags. Those in power did not want to hear it.

Aside from that, there are many recorded cases of the intel being available and not wanted by higher echelons. I'm a little jaded on that; 1st MarDiv was capturing Chinese PWs in Korea in early November 1950 -- and G2, FECOM, MG Charles Willoughby himself responded sharply that we were mistaken, there were no Chinese in Korea because MacArthur had already assured the President there were none.

Said Chinese, BTW, were also using IEDs in the early 50s, a technique they learned from the USSR -- who, surprisingly enough, spent a great deal of time teaching people throughout the ME and South Asia how to fight evil capitalists.

In the 70s that you mentioned, Joe Cincotti and a bunch of other folks were working on SBH to rebuild UW capability; a lot of people were pointing right where we are today -- and the upper echelons of the Army didn't want to hear it. In the 90s, in spite of all evidence, we made a number of really poor command and organizational decisions -- that includes all the services and SOCOM -- and we're paying for them today.

We adapted over time with better armor and new vehicles. The enemy has adapted with new TTPs to mitigate our progress...

The 'new' armor was developed in the 70s. We didn't buy it then. Other nations did. The 'new' vehicles were also being bought by others ten, fifteen years before us. We didn't adapt, we, as usual, were simply forced to cobble together some half assed fixes and come late to the party because we refused to anticipate and look ahead. There's nothing wrong with leaning forward in the foxhole -- except that these armed forces of ours are pretty much opposed to it.

We do do that quick fix thing -- and we do it well sometimes, not so well others. The MRAP purchase being an example of not so well (dumb vehicle) and, at the same time, one of doing it okay (keeps people alive). We can cobble stuff together pretty good...

What has changed and it can't be denied is the speed of change.

The change has not been that speedy -- our failure to pay attention and adapt has simply made it seem so. There's nothing around today that wasn't known or seen 15 to 20 years or more ago. Just that no one in charge wanted to hear it.

All that is an answer to your question:

Will be able to adapt quick enough in the future?

Probably not.

[William F. Owen]

What has changed and it can't be denied, is the speed of change. Will be able to adapt quick enough in the future?

I know Ken commented on the same, but allow me to elucidate.

Really? I mean how fast are things really changing? 2003 was 6 years ago. World is still pretty much the same. Compare that to 1914-18, or 1939-45, or even 1989-95?

Military technology is actually not changing that much. We do see some change in applications, but generally the technology is not changing that rapidly - and the fields that are, are going relatively unnoticed!

Adapting is something that only becomes an issue, if you were unprepared in the first place. "We must be able to adapt" takes it as a given that we do not prepare.

[Rick M]

IEA chief economist Fatih Birol continues to sound the alarm on oil supply, most recently in an interview published this morning in The Independent (UK). Mr. Birol also mentioned the fact that oil is essential for our global food system and that it “is a strategic asset for the military.”

This morning’s Independent article is here:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/sc...t-1766585.html

It also contains the link to a related article by Jeremy Leggett who asks, "Why haven't more people in government, and the oil industry itself, seen this particular crisis coming? Why aren't they acting proactively to soften the blow?"