A wise strategy is one where the expected benefits--increased security--justify the expected strategic costs (blood, money, lost opportunities). This does not meet that standard.
A wise strategy is one where the expected benefits--increased security--justify the expected strategic costs (blood, money, lost opportunities). This does not meet that standard.
Malala Yousafzai - getting better every day - YouTube
The first part of the video is a Sky News report detailing the scheduled reconstructive surgery planned to be carried out on Malala Yousafzai at Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Birmingham, England.
A titanium plate is to be fitted to Malala's skull and a cochlear implant to help her recover hearing in her left ear.
The second part of the video is news footage of Malala set to the music "It's getting better" sung by Cass Elliot.
The video concludes with the following end message from me Peter Dow for my AfPakMission channel video as follows.
We love Malala.
We hate the Taliban.
We are the good people.
The Taliban are evil.
The good people of Pakistan and all the world wish Malala
to get better every day.
Our military should kill every Taliban and help the world
to get better every day.
First the victory prize by wiping out the Taliban.
Then there will be peace
and time for peace prizes.
We have a war to win first.
Malala spoke to the camera before her surgery and the following video was released after her surgery.
Malala Yousafzai Announces Malala Fund to Support Girls' Access to Education (YouTube)
Support the Malala Fund | Vital Voices
Then after her surgery ...
Malala Yousafzai speaking after surgery in England (YouTube)
Malala Yousafzai speaking to her consultant after surgery to reconstruct her skull and to implant a hearing device.
Broadcast on BBC News on February 4, 2013
Transcript
Malala says
"I'm feeling alright and I am happy that the operations, both the operations are successful and you know, it was that kind of successful that now they have removed everything from me and I can also walk a little bit, I can talk and I'm feeling better and it doesn't seem that I had a very big operation, it seems that just a little bit anaesthetic injection just for five hours and then I wake up."
Consultant says
"Yes, but it was five hours, it was not a small procedure but you look remarkably good for it"
Malala says
"But it was very nice because there is no drainage system and I think everything is fine, it's better."
Consultant -
"Good"
Malala
"Yeh"
Consultant -
"and what are you looking forward to next?"
Malala
"I think that I will just get better very soon and there will be no problem, I would hear after one month, in this ear, I hope and the thing is that my mission is the same, to help people and I will do that."
Consultant -
"Yes and what do you think of your treatment so far then, can you remember that?"
Malala -
"If I try to speak about my whole treatment, it started in Pakistan and they did a very successful and a very good operation of me and God gave me a new life because of the prayers of people and because of the talent of doctors.
Here in Birmingham in Queen Elizabeth Hospital, here they did the operation of my nerves so after four or five months my left hand side of the face would work, Insha' Allah.
They took care, a lot of care of me, intensive care and I think I'm inspired from the doctors and nurses - they are like my mother and father because for ten days my mother and father were not with me but I had a lot of doctors and nurses who took care of me as if they were my parents."
Peter Dow of AfPak Mission channel says -
Please subscribe to the AfPak Mission channel on YouTube offering videos and links to inform the West's mission to help free the people of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the rest of the world from the terrorism of the Taliban and other jihadi Islamo-fascist terrorist enemies by achieving a final, total victory over the enemy by the adoption and execution of a competent military strategy to crush the enemy utterly and thereby to win the war on terror, and not ever to contemplate peace negotiations with the enemy Taliban nor with any of their state-sponsors.
If you would like to beat the enemy Taliban then this AfPak Mission channel is the channel for you.
Please watch the videos in the featured Playlists, especially the uploaded videos and the two videos in the Secret Pakistan playlist.
Visit the channel links
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and to the AfPak military strategy blog posts.
A new image for the For Freedom Forums gallary avatars -
Supply Line Warfare
The requirement to defend military supply lines in war, to expect the enemy to attack and to attempt to cut any long supply lines is a basic part of classical military strategy.
If there was ever to be a sustained resistance to our invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan then any competent military strategist could have predicted that the enemy would wish to attack our supply lines in Iraq and Afghanistan and if we didn't do the correct thing according to classical military strategy and defend those supply lines then it was inevitable that the enemy would mine and ambush our undefended, or poorly defended, supply lines.
Now the US does indeed have academic military experts who do indeed know the importance of this requirement in war and have published relevant articles on the internet, such as this fine example -
but that ancient yet essential military knowledge, that ought to be taught to every officer at every military academy, doesn't seem to be in the brains of the US, British or other NATO generals, who seem to think "patrolling" or "ever bigger MRAPs" is a better plan to try to keep our soldiers safe on otherwise undefended supply routes.Army Logistician
Supply Line Warfare by Dr. Cliff Welborn
The U.S. military has also disrupted the enemy’s supply chain to weaken its fighting capabilities. When we think of a military supply line, we often think of the logistics considerations necessary to keep our own supply chain flowing. However, just as important to military success are tactics for disrupting the enemy supply line. A defensive strategy is to protect our own supply chain; an offensive strategy is to inhibit the supply chain of our enemy. The United States has used both offensive and defensive strategies in many wars, including the Revolutionary War in the 1770s and 1780s, the Civil War in the 1860s, the Plains Indian Wars in the late 19th century, World War II in the 1940s, and the Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s.
Actually, the better plan is simply establishing a secure perimeter around your supply route which is watched 24/7 from static guard posts all along the route, either side of the route, and a mobile reaction force to reinforce wherever and whenever the enemy concentrates to attack the supply route.
I've suggested in this thread a detailed plan to defend supply routes in Afghanistan but no doubt there are many variations on that theme.
Don't get me wrong, big MRAPs have their uses as a back-up if and when the enemy makes it through the defended perimeter of a supply line but there does clearly need to be a secure perimeter established in the first place otherwise your supply routes remain effectively uncleared territory and anything on the route not protected by tons of armour is simply easy meat for the enemy.
Certain items in my plan, about seizing satellites and what to bomb in Pakistan is new, specific intelligence for the war on terror and is maybe a bit much to expect on day one from our military.
But for military leaders not to know the requirement to defend supply routes, and therefore foolishly to lead our soldiers to die from enemy road side bombs and ambushes - this is unforgivable ignorance on the part of our generals, defense secretaries and Pentagon, NATO and UK MOD civilian support military "experts".
Those in charge don't seem to know the military basics. It's like the donkey-generals who led brave lion-soldiers to their deaths advancing on foot against machine gun nests as in world war 1 - all over again.
It's another famous military disaster and it is no way to win a war (even though we will likely win this war on terror eventually but at a very high cost in blood and treasure.)
Peter, I think you'll find that troop numbers is what it comes down to – and that is a wicked problem.
“[S]omething in his tone now reminded her of his explanations of asymmetric warfare, a topic in which he had a keen and abiding interest. She remembered him telling her how terrorism was almost exclusively about branding, but only slightly less so about the psychology of lotteries…” - Zero History, William Gibson
Well that's 2 replies I have now had here and whilst I would welcome a serious criticism of my proposed strategy or further questions and a debate, the throw-away comments I have received so far do not hold out much hope of that.
Steve hasn't said anything about my strategy. The only single word he used to refer to my plan was "this".Originally Posted by SteveMetz
"This"?
If Steve has nothing specific about my plan to say in criticism then OK but let's not pretend that Steve has made a serious contribution what all Steve has said is "this".
Steve's opinion is no more substantial and relevant than when Steve says "this is a good movie", or "this is a good meal". Steve is entitled to hold and express Steve's unfounded opinion but Steve's opinion doesn't amount to a significant criticism.
Steve doesn't say what strategic costs he expects from plan, nor why he thinks, if he does think that, the costs of my strategy would be more?
The costs of my plan wouldn't be more, they would be less. If Steve could say why he thinks they would be more I could reply and say why I think he is wrong.
But Steve doesn't say anything specific about my plan. All he says is "this" and he could have said "this" even if he had not read my plan and for all we know, Steve didn't read it.
So I initially declined to reply to Steve's vacant vague opinion but now there is another comment to reply to so I might as well kill two birds with one stone.
What about "troop numbers"? Doesn't anyone here actually ever explain what they mean?
For the dedicated NATO auxiliary supply route protection force of mostly Afghans but possibly supplemented by troops from neighbouring countries if necessary to get reliable troops of the appropriate quality, the funding would come from a re-allocation of the funds the US and others pay for the Afghan National Army.
My plan is to cease international especially US & other NATO countries funding of the ANA.
There's something like, last I heard, 200,000 troops on the (corrupt) books of the ANA which we are paying for.
Are those 200,000 troops, not achieving a whole lot on their own, "a wicked problem" according to bourbon? Only bourbon knows but bourbon isn't telling anyone what he means.
My plan is to quit paying for the ANA under Karzai and his generals. Instead, reallocate the money saved to pay for the NATO auxiliary supply route protection force I have described.
Now as for the numbers of troops required for this force, I proposed, including a 25% reserve -
So the total number of troops required depends on what length of supply route you require to defend.
So supposing the routes to be defended were something like this -
That's about 1500 miles or 2400 km of supply route which at 25 / km or 40 / mile = 60,000 infantry plus support troops.
If you only need to defend a shorter length of supply route, then it's fewer infantry whereas if you need to defend a longer length then it's more infantry required.
So instead of spending whatever it is on 200,000 ANA the plan is NATO countries reallocate that money, our own money, and spend it on the supply route protection force.
There's nothing more "wicked" about my troop numbers than the troop numbers we are already paying for.
Most of the measures in my plan require no more money nor more resources than is already being spent.
Clearly, if it was necessary to invade Saudi Arabia to stop the Saudis funding terrorism that invasion would cost more to do but on the other hand we could seize Saudi oil to pay for our costs. Most everything else I have proposed could be done on the same budget as is already being spent.
Further savings could be made by stopping funding state sponsor of terrorism countries such as Pakistan and Egypt who both get about $2 billion from the US every year.
So that's $4 bn / yr saved at the stroke of pen before the rest of my plan goes into operation.
If you are looking for an efficient victory, you have come to the right plan.
Thank you!
Last edited by Peter Dow; 04-23-2013 at 07:28 PM.
So if I understand you correctly, you want to substitute the corrupt Afghan National Army for a "NATO auxiliary supply route protection force" composed of.....former members of the corrupt Afghan National Army, and bodies rented-out by tribal warlords?
“[S]omething in his tone now reminded her of his explanations of asymmetric warfare, a topic in which he had a keen and abiding interest. She remembered him telling her how terrorism was almost exclusively about branding, but only slightly less so about the psychology of lotteries…” - Zero History, William Gibson
Nasprofor!
First of all, let me thank you for asking for clarification because there is even more to this than first meets the eye.
The ANA is institutionally corrupt because of the lack of accountability over how the money is spent.
That doesn't mean that all the individual Afghan soldiers are junkies, thieves, rapists, absconders, lazy, clueless, illiterate, phantom-names-existing-on-paper-only, Taliban-agents, green-on-blue-trigger-happy etc - just that Karzai gets paid more for more bums-in-uniform irrespective of the actual job they do and he who pays the piper doesn't call the tune here because as a national president we don't get to fire the Afghan president if we think he is corruptly misusing our money. Our sole method to account for how our money is used is to stop paying it over to Karzai to waste in the first place.
Now I have heard various stories from various sources as to the percentage of acceptable soldiers in the ANA and therefore I can't be specific as to what percentage would shape up for a real soldiering job. My purpose here is just to explain how we make up the numbers if there is a shortfall and there may not be.
NASPROFOR
For the "Nato Auxiliary Supply-route PROtection FORce" ("NASPROFOR"
Other factors come into play, for example, we know NATO relations with Iran are particularly tense at the moment so Iran may be the last country to ask to contribute mercenary troops for this new force because they may execute any Iranian mercenary who served NATO loyally or pretend to go along with NATO's plan but send undercover members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to act as double agents, seeming to serve NASPROFOR but secretly allowing Iranian weapons to pass along or across the supply line to Iranian-backed terrorists to attack our supply lines, bases or indeed anything in Afghanistan they wanted to burn to the ground which may be a lot of it which has come under Western influence recently.
Consider hiring mercenaries whom we can get for the price of Afghan soldiers but who can actually do the job competently and loyally and we can get in the numbers we need to form cohesive infantry units, meaning soldiers and their officers need to be able to communicate with each other easily, at least in the lower enlisted ranks and junior officers up to rank of "Reaction Captain".
So for example, one could imagine an Uzbek-staffed NASPROFOR component manning a stretch of supply route near where the supply route approaches the Uzbek border.
"Bodies" are no good if they can't follow orders loyally and perform adequately in all the roles I have set out for the job. That's the test.
Last edited by Peter Dow; 04-24-2013 at 12:56 AM.
Road-side bombs again. We need a secure perimeter for the supply roads
Road-side bombs again guys and it's an attack that works for the Taliban just because we haven't secured the few main highways we must use by building a secure perimeter around the road - barbed wire, guard posts, minefields - and thereby keeping the enemy far away from the road at all times.Bombs Kill 3 NATO Troops, 9 Afghans
By AMIR SHAH Associated Press
KABUL, Afghanistan April 30, 2013 (AP)
Roadside bomb attacks in Afghanistan killed three NATO service members and nine Afghans on Tuesday, officials said, clear evidence that the insurgents' annual spring offensive is underway.
The service members died in southern Afghanistan, the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan said in a brief statement that provided no other information.
In another attack in the south of the country, a roadside bomb in the Shah Wali Kot district of Kandahar province killed three civilians and wounded five, said Jawed Faisal, a spokesman for the provincial governor.
The Taliban and other insurgent groups make heavy use of roadside bombs. They are among the deadliest weapons in the Afghan war for civilians.
In the north, in Archi district in the province of Kunduz, a roadside bomb killed two people, including a local police commander who had been credited with reducing the number of insurgent attacks in his area, said Abdul Nazar, a local council member.
Commander Miran and his driver were killed and two other police officers were wounded when the car they were driving toward Kunduz City was destroyed by a bomb hidden on the road, said Nazar. Like many Afghans, Miran only used one name.
On Tuesday evening, a roadside bomb exploded in Uruzgan province in central Afghanistan, killing four civilians in a car and wounding two, said police spokesman Fareed Ayal.
Instead, our generals have for years stuck with the same old bad patrolling plan and so the enemy just watches the road and after one patrol has passed and before the next patrol arrives, the enemy times it correctly to sneak up to the road and lay their road-side bombs.
The enemy can sneak up to the road so easily because they don't have to cross a minefield, they don't have to penetrate barbed wire and there isn't guard posts with guards with machine guns watching over the land either side of the road 24/7, defending the approaches to the road the whole length of the road.
Then the next patrol or some other vehicle later on comes along the road and gets blown up by the road-side bomb we failed to stop the enemy planting in the first place.
Here's what my solution to create a secure perimeter for the supply roads might look like.
Secure supply route border defences plan diagram (described in full in posts #4, #5 & #6)
Can you see how that brings the road "inside the wire"? That's a plan that could work to keep the main highways safe to use.
Mine is not a plan for the small side-roads far away from the highways. We don't have to use these side-roads to supply our main bases. We should only have our main bases next to the main supply roads. We should not have isolated bases which are difficult to supply. We need to abandon those isolated bases in bandit territory and fight the enemy there using air-power, aerial bombing, drones, attack helicopters, airborne raids and so on. There's no need to drive to those out-of-the-way hideouts the enemy has.
Last edited by Peter Dow; 05-01-2013 at 12:33 AM.
Obama's counsel of despair. US forces drawdown or ROUT?
Where is Obama's drawdown leading to for Afghanistan?
Could a feeling of strategic despair pervading the White House mean President Obama's drawdown plan could turn into an unseemly rout of US and other NATO-ISAF forces?
It looks to me like President Obama is getting some "Dark Counsel" as regards pulling out from Afghanistan.New York Times: U.S. Considers Faster Pullout in Afghanistan
President Obama, frustrated in his dealings with President Karzai, is considering speeding up troop withdrawals from Afghanistan and even leaving no American troops after 2014
WASHINGTON —
Mr. Obama is committed to ending America’s military involvement in Afghanistan by the end of 2014, and Obama administration officials have been negotiating with Afghan officials about leaving a small “residual force” behind. But his relationship with Mr. Karzai has been slowly unraveling, and reached a new low after an effort last month by the United States to begin peace talks with the Taliban in Qatar.
Mr. Karzai promptly repudiated the talks and ended negotiations with the United States over the long-term security deal that is needed to keep American forces in Afghanistan after 2014.
A videoconference between Mr. Obama and Mr. Karzai designed to defuse the tensions ended badly, according to both American and Afghan officials with knowledge of it. Mr. Karzai, according to those sources, accused the United States of trying to negotiate a separate peace with both the Taliban and their backers in Pakistan, leaving Afghanistan’s fragile government exposed to its enemies.
First to explain the phrase "Dark Counsel". Have you seen Lord of the Rings? Remember King Theoden and his adviser, Grima Wormtongue, who told him he was weak, could not fight and hope to win, turned out Grima was secretly an agent for Saruman?
OK remember now? That's "dark counsel".
So who is giving Obama, "dark counsel", who is his Grima Wormtongue?
Well maybe a lady called Robin Raphel, a former agent for Pakistan, a Washington Lobbyist in the pay of the Pakisan state. Obama has taken her on into her team, in charge of non-military aid to Pakistan, that's billions of dollars worth.
Raphel is the enemy within. I would not let this woman within a mile of the White House, but there again, I'm not King Theoden, I mean, President Obama.
YouTube: The Lord of the Rings: The Two Towers (2002) - Gandalf Releases Theoden
The best outcome for America would be to sucker the Chinese into running the show AND paying for it.
The best outcome for the Chinese would be to have America pay for it, Pakistan to supply warm bodies and China to get whatever it is that people imagine they can get out of that region.
The likeliest outcome is that America pays for it and nobody benefits except a few people who manage to stash cash in Dubai and time their exit correctly..
As an American, I think Obama may be right. Avoid the sunk costs fallacy. Cut your losses and leave. Let Allah sort them out.
As a Pakistani, I think the aftermath will be long and bloody. I wish the CIA had actually succeeded in whatever nefarious conspiracy they were up to. Their failure will embarrass them ,but it will terminate a lot of poor people in Afghanistan and Pakistan (and probably India...bakrey kee maan kab tak khair manaey gi...how long will the goat's mother stay lucky in all this?). With maximum prejudice.
Of course I hope I am wrong. I hope some brilliant new plan from Washington will actually work. One can always hope.
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