It seems to me that this is comparing apples and oranges. I think somewhere between McMasters and Dunlap is the right place...

Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
that military power does not come from maximizing capabilities. Seems to me he's saying that they should be doctrinally based on needed capabilities, not the same thing as our current technique, thus his use of the words "so-called."

He's also aware of our (and most everyone's) problem of political dithering and meddling in the force design process.
You need to have a spectrum of capabilities. The effects or capabilities based doctrine is supposed to mean that you don't use a jackhammer when a chisel is required or vice-versa - IE, you look at the strategic objectives (ends), determine the effects required to achieve them (ways), then determine what forces can best achieve those effects (means). I am sure most people here agree with that. You can't predict what future war will be like, so you must organize/train/equip a spectrum of capabilities as a hedge against your vision of future war being wrong.

I don't see OIF as a renunciation of the effects based doctrine. I see it as an example of the wrong effects being used... due to not understanding the actual effects required to achieve our objectives. As far as defeating Saddam's fielded forces and removing him from power, we did pretty well... quick victory and fairly low casualties - hardly a failure. The following ops were just the opposite - we didn't understand the effects required.

It should not be a zero sum game... IE, having the ability to dominate at the high end with "transformational forces" should not exclude having the capability to do a manpower-intensive lower end COIN war... we need to maintain a spectrum of capabilities. If the nation can't afford both, then maybe we should avoid COIN ops/nation building-if you're not willing to do it right/spend the money to do it right, then you shouldn't do it at all. Clearly we must be able to protect our survival and vital interests, which typically won't involve COIN but more high intensity conflict. So if we are funds limited, you have to make choices, and maybe the low end, nice to have capabilities fall out. I personally think that we can afford to maintain a reasonable high end force (380 F-22s, new bombers, B-2 replacement for the AF, 300 ships for the Navy, FCS for Army) and still afford the low end (COIN aircraft, increase size of SOF forces, maintain robust light infantry forces). It seems that rejecting the RMA is just as invalid as thinking that the RMA's transformational charachteristics will apply to all wars. If we failed in Iraq by thinking that it would follow the OEF model, won't we potentially fail in the next war by thinking that it will follow the 2005-2008 OIF model?

I agree wholeheartedly for the need to reform the interagency process. I'll be very curious to see if the next president does this... a new Goldwater Nichols for the interagency?

Not having been there I can't be certain, but folks who were involved in Anaconda at both the strategic/operational level (in the CAOC) as well as the tactical level (some of the first A-10s on scene) all have said that the Army and AF were NOT well coordinated prior to Anaconda. While Col McMasters' statements about UAV surveillance may be true, I don't think the AF was ready at all for Anaconda. It seems that both services are at fault- the Army for not making sure the AF was ready to support/wanting the support, and the AF for not making sure they knew what the Army had planned and lining up the proper support. Not our joint forces finest hour...

Anyway definitely a well thought article!

V/R,

Cliff