Hi Steve,
LOLOL You're more likely to get brownies than elves with that ! Anyway, after having seen your monster barbeque, I suspect that you have way too much cold iron around for that to work !
That's the one I had in mind specifically. I think it is a really good framework, especially part 3.
Marc
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
One day I hope that people who support the 'global insurgency' theory can explain to me:
1. Which accepted school of International relations theory they subscribe to that accommodates this theory. Realism certainly does not, nor does any theory that acknowledges or accepts an essentially anarchic global system.
2. What is the "global" order that the "global insurgents" are trying to overthrow? (Does one assume that they are intuitively neo-rationalists? How does that accord with the fact that many of the commentators who support the theory actually decry the UN, International Law and the liberal interpretations of relations between sovereign states?)
3. How can we can have a 'global' insurgency of Islamists,that actually is not global?
As someone who spent awhile(ok, I am slow) in getting my masters in international relations, I have a bit of an issue when historians, anthropologists, sociologists and any other bloody 'ologists' (and the plain ignorant) all of a sudden start offering theories that impinge upon IR theory without clearly having the faintest clue about the subject.
end rant.
Last edited by Mark O'Neill; 07-20-2007 at 01:44 PM.
This is one of the reasons I get hung up on semantics. I'm one of those "quaint old folks" (well...not really old...not quaint...ok, stubborn bastards) who thinks there is a difference between insurgents and terrorists. To me, the core difference is that insurgents have viable goals and adversaries. Terrorists do not. Their entire construct is aimed at killing and general destabilization. Nothing more. However, the framework of insurgency (especially a "global insurgency") gives terrorists cover and a certain legitimacy they might not otherwise enjoy. I don't buy into the GWOT structure, but I do think there are distinct differences between insurgents and terrorists and that those differences are important.
end rant.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Steve,
I am in violent agreement with you, as my old oppo in Mozambique would say 'you are deadly right'. The one qualification I would offer is that I think 'terror' is a common weapon that many insurgents choose to use if and when they think that the situation is appropriate.
Cheers
Mark
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
I can't think of a group that relies on terrorism to the exclusion of all else that is effective. What makes AQ dangerous, in my opinion, is its combination of terrorism and an effective psychological/ideological campaign. I guess I would refer to a group that relied on terrorism to the exclusion of all else "nihilists." Ultimately I think it helps our thinking to group opponents by their objectives or, perhaps, their worldview, rather than by their techniques. AQ didn't pick us as an adversary because we used combined arms operations but because of what they perceive as our political objectives and worldview.
I've never thought of "global insurgency" as a theory of international relations, but as a strategy adopted by a non-state organization. I guess the "global order" that they are trying to "overthrow" is the political/economic hieararchy in which advanced, non-Islamic states dominate the world. And I don't think the word "global" means that they are in every nook and cranny of the world. We spoke of "global communism" even though they didn't literally operate everywhere. (We didn't allow any in South Carolina, for instance).
Steve,
we have to make sure that our words mean precisely what we want them to mean, or we will confuse simple folk. (or find ourselves replicating a scene from 'Alice in Wonderland').
Social Science 101 tells us that a theory must hold true to a set of understood or declared rules, and be replicable and consistent in order to qualify as a theory.
If we start to swap the terms 'theory' , 'strategy' and 'description' we are in world of hurt. I think we have a bit of mission creep if folks are now proposing that the alleged phenomena of 'global insurgency' is not a theory ('cause that is certainly the way it appeared in David's piece) but now a 'strategy'.
Daily changing callsigns are a good opsec measure on tactical radio nets, but a poor substitute for replicable theory.
As for South Carolina... I guess that even communists recognised the limits of futility
Last edited by Mark O'Neill; 07-20-2007 at 02:07 PM. Reason: spelling
Funny, maybe I read it wrong, but that is how it always struck me. How else can you propose counters such a disaggregation (or any other approaches) as a strategy if you have not established a theoretical understanding of the phenomenon you are trying to defeat?
It seems to me that if you have not made a theoretical construct to quantify and understand the problem you are trying to counter then you are essentially plucking ideas out of your backside in the hope that one might work. I know that David does not work like that, I believe that his 'countering global insurgency' essay was based on a developed theoretical construct that he believed / possibly still believes, accounted for the phenomena he was proposing a counter for.
of course.. I could be mistaken - it is after midnight on Friday night here.... I need to get a life....
Mark: I always had the feeling that “Global Insurgency” and “GWOT” were place holders for things people did not fully understand but wanted everyone to know that they did and something was being done about it.
Interesting set of questions though . . . especially #1 <<Which accepted school of International relations theory they subscribe to that accommodates this theory.(Global Insurgency)>> You might know this better than I, but I think much of the IR theory has been advanced by Western thinkers. If so, “Global Insurgencies” aka, ideologies radiating out of the Middle East may not fit a current theory. I am not an IR guy so don't spank me if I am off. If I am on – then there is your PhD dissertation.
M
Hi Mike,
I believe that you are spot on about IR being largely a 'western field'. And, to my mind somewhat Euro and East- coast USA centric. Your point about whether the current models / schools can accommodate the challenges arising out of the Middle East at the moment is well made, and undoubtedly a good start point for a dissertation. I have missed the boat on that topic, as I am fast approaching the 'hump' point on my dissertation ( he typed hopefully...), and I am 100% convinced that I do not have the will to do another one!
Your observation about the ideas being 'place holders' suggests an interesting question / point. Many of the ideas that State representatives and other actors espouse,and act on ,seem to be deriative of these ideas. What does that say about some of the courses we are on if the base premise was dodgy? (rhetorical question).
There is more to this than just a 'smart' point about IR theory. I think that COIN can be 'lost' at each level of war - the tactical, operational and strategic. But I believe that it can only be 'won' at the strategic level, as that is the only point where all of the compenent elements of a nation state / society/ polity intersect and can be resolved in a conclusive fashion. This is also the level at which IR theory explains state behaviour. If we fashion strategy in response to 'global' COIN or 'terrorism' issues based on an possibly inadequate conception of state behaviour, then we are behind the proverbial eight ball before we start.
Now the IR field is not a precise social science, and many of is theoretical schools are in competition and disagreement. Imperfections notwithstanding, it remains man's best effort to understand the nature of our political world. As such I think that some knowledge of the field, beyond the 'sound bite reductionism' featured in much of commentary on either the war in Iraq or the wider 'GWOT' would be a good start point for some of the pundits offering solutions. (I am not referring to DK here, more so the proliferation of experts on the blogosphere and OPED columns).
Cheers
Mark
Last edited by Mark O'Neill; 07-21-2007 at 01:24 PM. Reason: clarification, syntax
This is my first post on this blog. I am reading for my undergraduate dissertation on the use of robotics in COIN and I came across a mention of this book in P. W. Singer's Wired For War. I was disappointed to see that it seems unlikely to be published.
Is this the case, is the book likely to be published at some point, or is there some way that I could get hold of any part of it?
Thanks,
Joe.
Hi Joe,
I haven't been able to find it online, but you might want to PM Steve and see what's happening with it; it might have come out under a different title.
Cheers,
Marc
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
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