The Insurgent View vs. US Military View

[Entropy]

Interesting graphic, but I'm not sure how useful it is. For example, a significant portion of insurgents in Afghanistan are part-timers who join in for a variety of reasons where do they fit in? Are they really at the political/strategic level of thinking? The point being that insurgents are hardly homogenous and I think at the end of the day the differences between "us" and "them" are not as great as the graphic makes them out to be.

Perhaps an easier way to describe the differences are that insurgents usually have the "home field advantage." Is fighting on and for the "home field" inherently more political/strategic?

[Bob's World]

Interesting graphic, but I'm not sure how useful it is. For example, a significant portion of insurgents in Afghanistan are part-timers who join in for a variety of reasons where do they fit in? Are they really at the political/strategic level of thinking? The point being that insurgents are hardly homogenous and I think at the end of the day the differences between "us" and "them" are not as great as the graphic makes them out to be.

Perhaps an easier way to describe the differences are that insurgents usually have the "home field advantage." Is fighting on and for the "home field" inherently more political/strategic?

Mao named the three phases of Insurgency:

“strategic defensive,” “strategic stalemate,” and “strategic offensive.”

We then renamed these phases U.S. doctrine calls them “latent and incipient,” “guerrilla warfare,” and “war of movement.”

This probably goes to why Neil needed the slide. To our "task-based" way of thinking this was all tactical stuff. Mao was thinking about effects at all three phases.

Look at the Tet Offensive for example. Most NVA and VC were most likely focused on the tactical objectives that they had been assigned. Senior leaders in S. Vietnam were probably most focused on the coordination of the overall offensive on the ground.

But the true impact of this "failed" offensive was a tremendous N. Vietnamese stategic victory back in the US. Did Giap have this as his primary purpose in planning the attack? I don't know. Certainly he hoped for operational success, but I suspect he understood the strategic potential of the offensive as well.

How many battles in the American Revolution were fought with the primary goal not of defeating British forces on the battlefield, so much as to sustain the requisite moral and support of the American populace for the fight, and to garner the support of the French to come to our assistance?

At the end of the day, the tactical scorecard in both wars was largely irrelevant to the final outcome. The insurgent does not have to win the fight to win the war. This is the basis behind Niel's diagram. We have to do both.

[Entropy]

Thanks, BW, that's a good explanation. I think I got wrapped around the axle by the line "how the insurgent views things." Maybe it would be clearer if "insurgent" were replaced with "insurgency" or "insurgent movement."

[AmericanPride]

The insurgent does not have to win the fight to win the war.

Bob,

Just a note -- I agree with what you're stating, but I do not think it applies to small wars alone. The Wehrmacht had tremendous tactical successes against the Red Army in the opening phases of the Second World War, but it still did not manage to achieve a decisive or strategic advantage at any point in the conflict. In fact, its victories sunk it deeper operationally and logistically into a situation in which the possibility of victory became increasingly smaller. There is required some kind of synergy not simply between the tactics and strategy, or strategy and politics, but through the whole system from the political ends to the tactical means. It is much more simple for the insurgent/terrorist/militant IMO because his decision for war is not at all separated from his desired goals.

[William F. Owen]

But the true impact of this "failed" offensive was a tremendous N. Vietnamese stategic victory back in the US. Did Giap have this as his primary purpose in planning the attack? I don't know. Certainly he hoped for operational success, but I suspect he understood the strategic potential of the offensive as well.

... but that is not the point. Tactical failure, can still have enough effect to break enemy will (Pyrrihic victory). That is completely different from trying to suggest that actual tactical success can be counter-productive.

The insurgent does not have to win the fight to win the war. This is the basis behind Niel's diagram. We have to do both.

OK, so show me one successful insurgency that did not grow from tactical success, eroding or corrupting the Goverments will to fight.
I can only think of one, (Rhodesia/Zimbabwe) - and that was an externally force treaty because the Rhodesian's realised they couldn't win, and faced a serious threat of a conventional invasion.

Bob,
The Wehrmacht had tremendous tactical successes against the Red Army in the opening phases of the Second World War, but it still did not manage to achieve a decisive or strategic advantage at any point in the conflict.

Again this was because the strategy was flawed. At no point was German tactical success "counter-productive."

[Bob's World]

... but that is not the point. Tactical failure, can still have enough effect to break enemy will (Pyrrihic victory). That is completely different from trying to suggest that actual tactical success can be counter-productive.


OK, so show me one successful insurgency that did not grow from tactical success, eroding or corrupting the Goverments will to fight.
I can only think of one, (Rhodesia/Zimbabwe) - and that was an externally force treaty because the Rhodesian's realised they couldn't win, and faced a serious threat of a conventional invasion.


Again this was because the strategy was flawed. At no point was German tactical success "counter-productive."

Dr. King and Mr. Ghandi. But these were leader's so savvy that they realized that all operations needed to remain non-violent and focus on the strategic end.

I guess we can go with the US phase of the Vietnamese insurgency as one that has that classic line of "you know, we never lost a battle..." as an example of a kinetic insurgency that succeeded in defeating the most powerful nation in the world without tactical success. The US was able to keep them in the Phase 2 "strategic stalemate" stage, but it wore us down. After we left they were able to surge up to a successful Phase 3 "strategic offense" stage and finish off the S. Vietnamese government as well. But the main victory was achieved thru tactical defeats and strategic victories. Rope a dope.

Reminds me of a story within a Louis L'amour Sackett novel. A determined young man goes to the saturday night dance where the biggest, toughest man in the area takes him outside and publicly and decisively beats him to a pulp. The beaten man goes home, and is told to never return if he knows what's good for him and the large man returns to the dance.

The next Saturday the young man returns and is severly beaten again.

The next Saturday the young man returns and is severly beaten again, but puts up a better fight, and the county tough is less enthusiastic about the fight.

This continues, defeat after defeat, Saturday after Saturday, until finally, the tough man grows so weary of having to fight this persistent little man every single Saturday that he stops coming to the dance himself, leaving the other victorious.

Just a story, but for one who is so determined to achieve their goal that they will keep coming back no matter what, the tale of the tape in the end will be who has the most will, not who has the most might.

[Eden]

The idea that insurgents can win without tactical victories is wrong. In Afghanistan, Vietnam, Algeria, etc., the insurgents enjoyed (or are enjoying) considerable tactical success. Every government offical assassinated, every schoolteacher intimidated, every bomb that wrecks a market, is a tactical success. Every police post overrun, every rocket that hits its target, every helicopter shot down, is a tactical success.

In Vietnam, the VC and NVA quite often scored victories over conventional SVN forces, sometimes quite considerable, and instances of successful ambushes or skirmishes with US forces were numerous. It is hard for me to understand how anyone who has read any history about Vietnam would buy into the tired old saw the 'we never lost a battle'.

In Afghanistan, hardly a day went by without some form of insurgent tactical success - mostly against civilians, often against Afghan security forces, but sometimes against allied forces, and every now and then against US.

An insurgency cannot sustain itself without tactical successes. True, these do not have to come in the form of stand up fights against conventional firepower, but they have to come in some form. Neither insurgent foot soldiers nor their leaders are superhuman - like all men, they have to see some point to their sacrifices to carry on.

[William F. Owen]

Dr. King and Mr. Ghandi. But these were leader's so savvy that they realized that all operations needed to remain non-violent and focus on the strategic end.

Utterly, utterly irrelevant! It has no bearing on the military instrument. You could say L. Ron Hubbard, has managed to creates and convert folks to new religion without resorting to violence - unlike Christianity and Islam. If they don't "do violence" they don't register on the meter.

I guess we can go with the US phase of the Vietnamese insurgency as one that has that classic line of "you know, we never lost a battle..." as an example of a kinetic insurgency that succeeded in defeating the most powerful nation in the world without tactical success. The US was able to keep them in the Phase 2 "strategic stalemate" stage, but it wore us down. After we left they were able to surge up to a successful Phase 3 "strategic offense" stage and finish off the S. Vietnamese government as well. But the main victory was achieved thru tactical defeats and strategic victories. Rope a dope.

To paraphrase Eden, constant tactical failures eroded the US will to fight? Constantly wining caused the US to believe they could never force the NVA to quit?

The US had a Strategy in Vietnam and that protecting the territorial integrity of the RSVN. Unfortunately the US forces lacked the tactical and operational skill, or choose not to perform those actions that would break the will of the NVA.

The idea that tactical action is somehow irrelevant or that tactical success can be counter-productive or less relevant than the other three levels is a post modern myth! Military history simply does not support that contention.

If you can't consistently gain tactical success, you can do nothing.

[Backwards Observer]

This has doubtless been proposed more cogently elsewhere, but would it add needless complexity to suggest that insurgencies in particular may be operating in a culture-specific, symbolic realm that subsumes the political? The symbolic field may be opaque, inaccessible or even inimical to manipulation by outsiders, as much of its cultural resonance may occur offstage from the theatre of operations. Local insurgent leaders may have varying degrees of symbolic coup d'oeil, but even then struggle to maintain control over a feedback loop which operates largely within a cultural unconscious approaching the mythical.