Go look at the Royal Marines. This is exactly what they now are and doing well in Helmand. UK Para is even thinking of equipping with the same BvS-10 Armoured Vehicle, as are SF.Originally Posted by Ratzel
Now, do not underestimate the resistance SF/Rangers/Commandos have to armour. There is an incredible amount of emotional resistance, based on ignoring the facts and it is to the eternal credit of the Royal Marines that they adopted light armour, before someone died.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Which facts are those? SF/Rangers do use uparmor HMMWVs some MRAPs but we really don't need more than that. If a SOCOM element needs more armor or firepower for a specific mission then we borrow it. SOCOM units typically rely on surprise, speed and agility rather than overwhelming fire. Targets that require that kind of force will probably be passed to the units that have those assets rather than trying to make a SOCOM unit into cav or armor unit.
SFC W
The facts are my experience of doing presentations to 4-star and 1-star HQs advocating the employment of light armour to vehicles, regardless of the units preferred method of operations. UK Para initially deployed to Helmand with no organic armoured vehicles. Now everyone gets armour. The threat has not changed.
Yes, Ranger and SF units do have Armoured Hummers and MRAPs - today. How many did they have on establishment in 2003? If SF can afford dedicated Helicopter support, as they have in both the US and UK, why not dedicated protected mobility?
No threat currently seen in Iraq is new. Even EFPs have been around for years. They are all threats that folks chose to ignore. Why? I can never work it out.
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Owen_0207_RDS.pdf
The above link may be of interest. It has some bearing on this discussion.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
We had and have the what we needed for the threat we face. Outside of Iraq (and to some extent Afghanistan) there is not a significant need for the type of armor that we use in Iraq. in those cases the drawbacks to the extra armor (increased fuel usage, slower speed, maintenance issues, air transportability, etc) outweigh the benefits. As I stated before, if a target requires tanks and heavy armor to take it down then it is not a SOF target and the mission will be given to a unit that already has tanks and heavy armor.
The types of threats may not be new but the scale of these threats is new. No one has ignored these threats but there is more to consider than simple armor protection. That type of thinking is why I keep getting issued more and more body armor to the point where, if I were to wear it all, I would be fairly well protected and nearly immobile.
SFC W
@ Well the threat down here in Southern Thailand means the RTA want's more armoured vehicles. We deployed a lot of armoured vehicles to Northern Ireland, and used them in large numbers for all but the last 10 years. IRA IEDs meant there was no significant Army road movement in South Armagh for nearly 8 years.
@ Agreed, that is why the Royal Marines - and soon Para - are going for BvS-10, not Warrior or Bradley.
@ Well I think the PKM and RPG-7 were very likely to be encountered in great numbers anywhere on the planet, but yes, sensible TTPs are vital, and logistic and operational judgements and compromises have to be made - that is no excuse to base line a units equipment around something that has all the protection of a family car.
My point being, none of this is new. The sensible application of Armour saves lives. A key lesson of the Falklands war was the need to equip light infantry formations with more armoured fire support and mobility - something we, the UK chose to ignore until 1999/2000.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Try not to think about this in terms of what you understand Mechanized forces to be today. I'm talking about a new concept here. Your unit, or for that matter, any Special Operations unit would not be transformed into one of these units. Instead, this unit would be formed from, or reflagged from the regular Army.
The idea is not to turn SO into the a mech unit, the idea is turn a mech unit into a SO unit. You bring up the point about a target not being an SF target if tanks and APC's are needed. What I I'm wondering is if there's something in between?
Is there a need for an highly trained mechanized unit that can get on the ground fully in 24 hours and operate for a for a week or so in an intense environment? Mechanized units can sustain themselves longer than a regular Ranger unit. If re-supply by air is imposable due to weather or something unforeseen, this type of unit would be especially useful.
Of course, anyone who entered the military after Somalia learned the lessons of that experience. Most people now admit that armour could have saved a lot of lives there. You bring up the point about a target not being SF if tanks and APC's are needed. But in this situation, this is far from the truth. So now the question is, if we did use armour in that situation, would you rather it be from the regular Army or from the new Panzer-Grenadier-Mech-SO capable Unit? Please answer this question?
As an side, I went back to my light armour presentation notes and found a figure of 6 dead and over 40 wounded from travelling in un-armoured vehicles during the Blackhawk down thing. Can't remember where I got those figures, but they are telling in themselves.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
SF and the Rangers also have Stryker (Rangers) and Pandurs (SF - I think that's what they ended up procuring). I think the capability exists to an extent already.
"Speak English! said the Eaglet. "I don't know the meaning of half those long words, and what's more, I don't believe you do either!"
The Eaglet from Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland
That is the genesis of the light cav concept. I was with 2 ACR when it was first formed as a light cav regiment. Back then our prime mission was "expand the lodgement." The Rangers or 82nd or whoever would seize an airfield and then we would land on that airfield, push out and hold the terrain around the airfield until heavier forces could be landed and pushed into the fight. The original intent of the Stryker battalions was similar. They were designed to be carried on a C130 and then roll off into the fight and as far as I know that is still the intent. Everyone is focused on Iraq right now and not really thinking about forced entry into another country but that is what Stryker is supposed to be for.
No one ever denied that armor would have been nice to have for that raid in Somalia but it was not was up to SOF. The armor had been removed as a result of a decision by the NCA not SOF. Had the armor been available in sector then SOF would have used it. That does not mean that they need organic armor capability. In any case, even if SOF did have its own armor it would likely have been pulled out with the rest of the armor.
I have no problem at all with getting armor support from big Army on those rare occasions when it is needed. What I do have a problem with is a mech unit eating up SOF resources and budget.
SFC W
Uboat509 has an important point about funding being an issue for SOF; simply creating more Units is just spreading existing resources even more thinly.
But Wilf is on to something when he raises the example of the Royal Marines. One of the major differences between the US Army Rangers and the British Commandos is that the latter are trained, organized, and equipped for sustained as well as brief operations. The 75th Ranger Regiment is almost entirely composed of Infantry Battalions, and also a dedicated SF-Support Company or Group; no Armour, no Artillery, no Engineers, no ADA, etc, and as such, can normally only perform operations of very short duration. 3 Commando Brigade has organic Artillery, Engineers, ADA, etc., and Armour attached or on-call. Moreover, within the Infantry Commandos, there are Heavy Support Weapons and Troops; in the Ranger Battalions, the Rifle Companies are mainly left to their own devices, although that appears to be possibly changing or about to change.
When 2 Para fought at Goose Green, the presence of a few Light Tanks may have made quite a difference; I do not mean to say that Light Armour will always or even often be required in many operations by Airborne or Commando Forces, but it should be organic to Airborne and Commando Forces Formations, and therefore available if needed. Even a situation not unlike Mogadishu in '93 may have turned out rather better if a Unit akin to the Rangers found themselves in a similar situation (political factors eliminating that option for the Rangers themselves in '93).
In sum, adding a Light Tank Squadron (Company) or even a Regiment (Battalion) to a Formation such as 3 Commando Brigade would give it tactical and even operational capabilities and options that may prove very useful under certain circumstances. Even a Commando Tank Regiment (Battalion) with a few Squadrons (Companies) plus a Rifle Company or two, and with the usual attached Artillery, Engineers, ADA, etc., might make for a very potent striking force for certain roles and in certain environments.
As for the 75th Ranger Regiment, personally I would rather see it augmented into something at least comparable to 3 Commando Brigade, with sustained operations being added to its roles. That said, I am speaking from a Commonwealth perspective where having fewer troops means having to train them in a greater range of skills and for a greater range of roles. Large Armies may have the luxury of not doing this, though I do not agree with it at all.
Light tracked vehicles are the way to go where possible; the LAV-III Stryker has not turned out well in cross-country operations in Afghanistan; it works best when there is a reasonable road network to use most of the time, and it does not fare well under attack by volleys of RPGs and the like.
My read was that this would be a Mech/RANGER unit. The RANGER mission is direct action. If you specialize too much, you have no one to do the regular infantry work.
Ratzel posted - "A mission scenario would be a small invasion into Pakistan. Lets say we wanted to capture and hold some nuclear storage facilities but required the mobility of a battalion of "Mech-Rangers." Part of the unit's capabilities would be to have a whole battalion on the ground in 12 hours or so. An ABR unit would size the airfield and the "Mech-Rangers" would follow on. "
Not to pick your scenario apart, but 12 hours is a very long time to put all your assets on the ground. What part of the security would the very small and light armor provide.
I would suspect that the target of your scenario could be secured in under 6 hours by an Airborne, Ranger or Marine Battalion. Holding it would be the test. And injection would probably be by Helos or Osprey's. More focus LZ's and no form up wasted time.
When was the last airborne assualt of an objective conducted by a Ranger Battalion? Grenada? How many battalion or larger airborne assualts have been made since the end of WWII.
One in Korea if I remember correctly. 187th RCT?
None in Vietnam that I can remember?
The secure an air field in Grenada?
And to secure an airfield in Panama?
None in Iraq. Perhaps one in Afganistan in 2002??
The 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisons are fully capable of investing and holding the target you described. And to be reinforced by airborne light armor and artillery units almost immediately. That is what they train to do.
A Mech-Ranger unit is unsupportable for a host of reasons.
Too exotic and too limited in its ability. It would be an Orphan! And a waste of talent.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 02-16-2009 at 10:52 PM. Reason: Amend Granada to Grenada.
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