Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[Bill Moore]

Crowbat

all this theory, guessing and speculation is not going to help anybody. One can't go demanding from some insurgents to do this or that like if they are a state: they are insurgents, not a state, otherwise they wouldn't be insurgents but the state. So, clean the table first (and the backyard too, then obviously the table is never going to get clean without the backyard getting cleaned), help the insurgents become a state and then demand things from them.

This approach will lead to a huge humanitarian disaster, if insurgents are just insurgents, then they're just thugs, and I don't think they're just thugs. They have a political agenda, unfortunately too many competing ones to be successful. We can help them establish a shadow government now and begin training/educating those who will need to fill critical positions to avoid a vacuum. I understand your point about cleaning the backyard, but they can and should begin the critical preparation work for the next phase. If they don't those with the plan like MB will take over.

[CrowBat]

Crowbat

This approach will lead to a huge humanitarian disaster, if insurgents are just insurgents, then they're just thugs, and I don't think they're just thugs.

Bill,
If 10 million of Syrian refugees (inside and outside the country), 400,000 dead (arguably, 'only' 200,000 of these 'confirmed'), and deployment of chemical weapons is no 'huge humanitarian disaster' already, I don't know what else might ever become one.

The insurgents haven't had any other political agenda except removal of the regime. It was Turkey, followed by the USA and the West (France, UK, Germany, etc., etc.) that began requesting from them to declare political agendas - even imposing ultimatums on then to do so. Even as of mid-2012, when they were assaulting Aleppo for the first time, insurgents continued attempting to avoid any such declarations. And thus they received no aid when there was time to provide it - and thus prevent the spread of extremism.

Instead, they were left to their own device - and exposed to extremists that arrived with pockets full of cash.

Then, in autumn 2012, there was something like a 'last ditch attempt' - a series of efforts by different parties to 'sort insurgents out'. The only result of this was friction between insurgents along all imaginable lines, precisely because of insistence upon their declarations of political agendas.

Syria is not functioning that way. Syrians do not think 'well in advance': grossly oversimplified, it can be said that 'they do and then think'. That might not sound 'logical' or even 'reasonable' to us, but that's the way they function.

Correspondingly, one can't demand (or, better said: one shouldn't have) from them to state political agendas before they remove the regime: that's begging for precisely the kind of trouble we've seen emerging there ever since.

Next point that should be kept in mind is this: Syria is never going to be something like 'unified political entity'. Syrians are traditionally diverse, not only in regards of their ethnic groups or religion, but especially in regards of their political interests. They are insistently (yet respectfully) 'pluralist' by their nature, history and tradition: 'insistently' because they insist on their own standpoints, 'respectfully' because - with few exceptions (see Jadid, Assad Sr. etc.) - they know to respect differing standpoints. This means: they'll always quarrel about politics. Always. Now, tomorrow, in 10 and in 100 years.

Therefore, there is absolutely no need to now go 'teaching' them about establishing shadow governments, filling critical positions etc. After three years of all sorts of failures in doing exactly this, I would say it is about the time to realize: this is NEVER going to work.

Again: they do not function that way.

This does not mean there would be some sort of 'political vacuum' and 'anarchy' if the insurgents would topple Assad 'tomorrow in the morning'. Syrians are very good at self-organizing themselves, even with bare minimum of resources (or none at all). Despite all they went through, they're reasonable too, and know to reconciliate. In that sense, some recommended 'viewing':

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=al2fXeAvg38

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LwSnyQYy5SE (Probably the best part is one guy's definition of 'moderate Islam' in this report)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FavaA3w6eXw

[CrowBat]

Kobane is about to fall: reports from late afternoon indicate the Daesh entering the town and the local CO of YPG forces announcing they'll fight to the last man.

Daesh is already posting videos like this one, showing them on the south-eastern entry into the town:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EfJWgjj96-4

...while the US air is still blasting empty houses around Hassaka and the Tabqa AB...

[davidbfpo]

It is all very strange Crowbat and I've yet to spot an official explanation from the allies (the UK bombers are only for Iraqi targets).

We can all speculate. Notably is Turkey responsible, as it fears the Kurds as much as ISIS? Or a brutal calculation that pushing tens of thousands of Kurds from the Kobane pocket into Turkey, will bring Turkey in - to create a "safe zone". Incompetence is not a factor, although it appears there are no spotters on the ground to direct attacks.

[CrowBat]

It's extremely strange, indeed.

Firstly: 'allied air strikes'. Except for those official reports about four RSAF F-15S' flying a sortie against Syria, and a female UAEAF F-16E-pilot taking part too, from 23 September, all I've found so far was a brief 'news ticker' on the website of the Jordanian Ministry of Defence about involvement of the RJAF. Nothing has been said about number of sorties flown, though, and one of my contacts helping me with Arabic (my skills in that language are rather rudimentary) told me his understanding is that the RJAF's missions in question were actually 'flying recce over southern Iraq'...

Yesterday I caught a glimpse at some report on the AJE, about the 'allies' - that is five air forces including the QEAF (Qatari Mirage 2000s), RBAF (Bahraini F-16Cs), RJAF, RSAF, and the UAEAF (F-16Es) - flying a total of 23 sorties in all of the time between 23 and 30 September.

In words: twenty-three sorties in six days.

Haven't found any kind of written confirmation for this online yet, but must admit: I gave up trying after the first few days.

Overall, to me it appears as if Dempsey and Co were hard at trying to up-claim their participation, but the Gulf Arabs (and Jordanians) didn't actually do anything at all - except to provide bases.

And regarding Turkey: wherever I check this evening, conclusion is the same. Obama is purposedly scarifying Kobane for Turkey to get involved in a war, move in and establish a 'buffer zone' inside Syria, in turn providing an 'instant ground force' to fight the Daesh with support of US air power - stationed at Incirlik, for example (and, this evening the Turkish parliament voted for a law granting permission for military to act in Syria as necessary). Turkey would profit from such a situation too - because the fall of Kobane, followed by Turkish troops moving in to establish the buffer zone demanded so much by Istanbul in recent days, would prevent creation of a large Kurdish-held area inside NE Syria. I.e. should it come into being (something I doubt Obama is going to left happen that easily), the Kurdish statehood would be limited to what the Kurds hold in Iraq, and a small part of Hassaka Province in Syria.

Re. does Turkey fear Kurds as much as the Daesh: despite the fact that of candidates for Turkish presidency (and then the one with third highest number of voters) is a Kurd, Turkey is actually fearing Kurds more than the Daesh. Whether due to negligence or by design, it has left all possible Jihadists use it for entering Syria in the last two years. It has left the Daesh use local facilities (like hospitals) too. But, it has never left the YPG - which is de-facto Syrian off-shot of the PKK - to cross the border (into Turkey), get reinforcements or supplies: any YPG member trying to do that is immediately arrested.

Finally, regarding 'spotters on the ground': according to all reports, and with exception of arranging Allen's meeting with various leaders in Jordan the next week, the US admin didn't contact any of Syrian insurgent groups ever since announcing incoming air strikes, on 22 September. Washington is not communicating with insurgents, and that's it.

So, it might be no 'military incompetence', after all, rather political, but... well, they say that the way to hell is plastered with good intentions.

[Bill Moore]

It is all very strange Crowbat and I've yet to spot an official explanation from the allies (the UK bombers are only for Iraqi targets).

We can all speculate. Notably is Turkey responsible, as it fears the Kurds as much as ISIS? Or a brutal calculation that pushing tens of thousands of Kurds from the Kobane pocket into Turkey, will bring Turkey in - to create a "safe zone". Incompetence is not a factor, although it appears there are no spotters on the ground to direct attacks.

Not really an explanation, but a couple of days on the news (NPR) the Pentagon spokesman was getting grilled my the press on this issue and his explanation was stunning. He said they didn't have an agreement to defend Koran as though that was a satisfactory answer. I suspect Crowbar is right about Turkey having something to do with it.

We need remember there is a Kurdish nation even they don't have a state, so I see this explanation helping us Iraq since we're relying heavily on the Kurdish there. Those poor folks can't get a break.

[Bill Moore]

Also of interest today in the news is that moderate sunnis in Aleppo said that ISIL made some mistakes, but that they were still brothers. I'm sticking with my belief we shouldn't be involved. We will get played like a violin by the Arabs, while we'll be convinced we're in charge. Seems we may be intentionally helping them eliminate the Kurdish in that area. If true are we supporting ethnic cleansing.?

Provocative comment, but as a nation we need to do a better job of balancing realism and adhering to our values. Values we seem to be drifting away from.

[CrowBat]

AFAIK, in most of the EU, and in many of federal states in the US, 'holding the ladder' for a thief trying to enter a home through the window, is equal crime to actually climbing that ladder and emptying the house. In some it's punishable to even turn the other way without alerting security services. Or isn't it?

So, if one declares a war on the Daesh, and then looks the other way and bombs the JAN or some empty houses while the Daesh is slaughtering Kurds in Kobane and forcing 160,000 others to flee to become homeless refugees in Turkey.... what shall one think about this?

Should somebody happen not to care about Kurds: well, imagine the outcry if the Daesh would force 160,000 Israelis to flee their homes....?

Now, I have no doubt that some might say, 'hey, that's a part of the strategy, called 'let them rot' and designed to let the extremists ruin their reputation between the locals on their own which in turn should prompt the locals to act on their own. Theoretically, this sounds great, especially when supported by articles like the following one: The U.S. Can’t Destroy ISIS, Only ISIS Can Destroy ISIS.

However, sad fact is that this article contains a number of illusions, i.e. theories that - to put it mildly - are simply not supported by facts one gets when taking a closer look at the situation there (in Algeria). Specifically:

...During the early 1990s the Algerian government fought one of the nastiest civil wars in recent history against a broad-based Islamist insurgency. The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) conducted a brutal insurgent campaign employing vicious terrorist tactics on par with today’s modern menace the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (known by the acronyms ISIS, ISIL or IS for Islamic State – you pick the one you like). GIA attacks were often indiscriminate and violent; involving large civilian massacres – quite ISIS like. While I always reserve extreme caution in endorsing any counterinsurgency or counterterrorism tactic utilized by the Algerian government, there may be one instructive lesson from Algeria’s strategy that we in the West and particularly the U.S. might examine for designing a plan to counter ISIS.

The Algerian government, having already tried extreme brutality and overwhelming force, recognized the need to employ smarter tactics. Rather than tracking every GIA member to ground and in so doing causing harm to locals and further bolstering GIA’s popular support, the Algerians selectively employed what Luis Martinez, author of The Algerian Civil War 1990-1998, describes as the “Let Them Rot” strategy. The Algerian government, Martinez explains,“sought to avoid human losses for non-strategic zones, but also to lessen the demoralizing effects of the ‘dirty job’ on the troops.” (See pg. 150.) Algerian security services isolated districts with Islamist sympathies leaving the GIA emirs to govern via Islamist law and principles. Contained by the Algerian security services, GIA emirs employed their extreme practices and quickly alienated the local populace as the district, walled off from the rest of society, crumbled economically. Over time, the districts and the GIA emirs that ruled them, slowly "rotted" creating conditions favorable for the development of local militias to combat the GIA. Local businessmen and disillusioned Islamists were re-engaged over time by the Algerian government who offered employment through security positions and opportunities through economic development plans. In the end, the Algerian government didn’t destroy the GIA in these selected districts, they instead let the GIA defeat itself.
...

Call it 'hair splitting' if you like, but:

1.) Use of 'extreme brutality and overwhelming force': this was something that in nearly 95% of cases happened spontaneously, i.e. not on order from above, and not as a part of strategy, but because units involved were seeking revenge for massacres committed by Islamists.

Even so, and although much-reported, such cases remained few in total numbers: under immense pressure from various European powers the authorities were doing whatever is possible to show that they are respecting human rights. Or how else would author like to explain a high number of Islamists that were arrested - and then released too, after a few months (all provided the author happens to know about this fact) - or the fact that Islamists found themselves 'embedded' with the population and convinced the security forces are afraid of them, in quite a few places and for quite a long time?

2.) Algerian authorities, 'sought to avoid human losses in non-strategic zones, but also to lessen the demoralizing effects of the 'dirty job' on the troops.'

It's now anything between 10 and 33 years since this war, and Algerian military and security services are in the process of retiring dozens of thousands of troops that were involved. And thousands of these are suffering immense psychological problems: this is not so because they were involved in 'dirty jobs', i.e. massacres, but because they have seen with their own eyes what the terrorists were doing to the population while in their teenage.

Perhaps author would like to check his data on this issue before jumping to conclusions?

3.) Perhaps the most important part: 'Algerian security services isolated districts with Islamist sympathies leaving the GIA emirs to govern via Islamist law and principles'.

Frankly, in nearly 15 years of research about this conflict, I have never heard about such strategy/tactics. If anything of this kind has happened, then not as a part of strategy. Surely, Algerians would isolate specific districts and sometimes do so for several months. However, this happened because they lacked troop strength to go in, mop up and secure the area.

Before anybody comes to the idea to complain that I'm making this up because it simply cannot be that the Algerians were lacking numbers: one of issues with the Algerian military is that - for obvious reasons (corruption, favourising etc.) - troops are not permitted to serve in their region of origin unless they have eight years of service in their books; i.e. all the active troops (including officers, of course) have to serve 'far away from home' for eight years, before they are permitted to re-deploy close to their area of origin. Except one does not know about this fact, it should be obvious that this practice/regulation has caused quite a number of problems with deploying specific units around the country during that war.

Because of this problem, the authorities began organizing a sort of armed militia that was responsible for protection of their homes/villages/towns, that knew the local people and terrain etc.

Thus, quite on the contrary: it can be said that the Algerian military did precisely the same mistake like the French in Algeria before, i.e. was deploying inexperienced conscript troops on a terrain unknown to them for most of the war.

Therefore, any impression about 'isolated districts and letting the GIS to rot' is based on theories of somebody who has studied this conflict from very, very far away - to put it mildly.

Now, before somebody comes to the idea to ask me, 'then how to hell did the Algerians then win, actually?' Well, they began deploying professional troops (primarily special forces) in ops supported by helicopters and advanced ELINT/SIGINT assets for actions against specific, carefully selected terrorist leaders. With these out, and with the population well informed about what the terrorists were doing to it, the rest was 'easy' (well: kind of), or at least a 'matter of time'.

Furthermore, the 'letting the Daesh rot' idea is simply bad, and this for several reasons. Firstly, Daesh is already in deep problems with large parts of local population. It's not only that various Sunni tribes in Iraq are turning against it, but there was already an armed uprising against it in Dayr az-Zawr (and this only few months after it occupied this area), as can be read here, here, here (just for example).

Reaction of the Daesh is always the same: mass slaughter.

Thus, I would say that there is simply no time to 'let them rot': if one gives these idiots enough time, there will be nobody - especially no 'local population' - left to save.