Quote Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09 View Post
AP--in many ways Russia currently as it stands acts as a criminal rouge state with two raw resources as does as the cartels in Mexico with drugs again only with nuclear weapons. To be a superpower requires three things---economic power, military power, and political power and the power to project all three.
During the Soviet years they really only had military power and political power evolving out of that military power---they never did have true economic power.
How does a "criminal rouge state" act? What behaviors or characteristics define a "criminal rouge state"?

That is one definition of superpower - but that's a definition that has a perception of power as absolute. But since it's more important to measure relative power, the status of superpower should be reserved for the state or states that occupy a preeminent position relative to the other states. According to a quantitative study I started, there are in fact four super-powers today (in order): U.S., China, Russia, and Japan. The political, military, and economic capabilities have these states are statisically significant from other states. Russia's strength relies on, as you have noted, their military power, and it still does today.

The dismantling of the USSR of course severely damaged Russia's economic power, and here is the problem: Russia's economic power has in fact improved significantly between 1991 and 2014. But that's not the metric used by Russia's elite; the reference point is in fact the perception of the height of the USSR's power (early to mid 1980s). And the insecurity created by this dissonance between the ascribed and desired status of Russia in large part defines the framework of the state's foreign policy.

Putin defines his image of the world, Putin defines his image for his own population, Putin defines the reactions to that image, Putin really does not care what the west thinks as he is as anti west as his hardliners are and he views the west as basically weak and decadent and seriously does not believe in the "values" thing. And he has voiced that a number of times since his return to power.
And that's an interesting evolution in Putin's policy: remember, he virtually inherited the presidency from the liberal faction when Yeltsin handed him the keys to power and for a time, he continued Yeltsin's approach with the West. Putin pushed for closer relationships with the West and championed Russia's inclusion into the World Trade Organization. In the opening phases of the War on Terrorism, he also offered to join the campaign since Russia has its own internal problems with Islamist terrorism. But what happened between 2001 and 2014? Bulgaria, Estonia, Lativa, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia all joined NATO. The Bush administration pushed for missile defense in Europe and abandoned its arms control agreement with Moscow. That was the start of the breach, and it was promptly widened further by other factors like the Iraq War, the war in Georgia, and so on.

Of course Putin is "anti-West". The U.S. is the preeminient power in the world tody. In the context of Russia's internal politics, with the aching for a restoration of Russia's power, defining oneself in opposition to the U.S. is sure to be political gold. The U.S. and Russia share responsibility in the collapse of bilateral relations; it's been a cycle of escalation for many years now. The question is how this development in the dyadic relationship will impact the international system and subsequently, international security. At what point was Russian intervention in Ukraine inevitable and what chain of events got us to that point?

The only example of complete Russian capitulation to the demands of a foreign power was World War I - and that was the Provisional Government after the failure of a military campaign in the midst of a domestic revolution. The U.S. may "win" Ukraine, and it may strengthen its political credibility among its European allies, but I doubt that will dissuade or deter Russia from pursuing actions contrary to U.S. interests. Sanctions and deploying U.S. troops to eastern Europe will serve as a signal that the U.S.-Russia conflict is now institutionalized, and it will facilitate further confrontation in the future when Russia responds in kind (and they will).