Selective Use of History in the Development of American COIN Doctrine

[Christian]

3. Ferghana Valley Bolsheviks vs. "Basmachi" and Eastern Bukhara highlands Bolsheviks versus Lokai, Enver Pasha and Basmachi.

Why? Because, aside from being in the neighborhood and involving the use of Islam as a rallying call by the insurgents, the bolsheviks were able to create local allies and win elites to their side despite being militantly anti-religious. The alien divide between locals and bolsheviks was even worse than between Americans and random folks up in the hills in Kunar. However, the Afghan Amir agreed to end the safe haven on his side of the river, so hard to compare with Pakistan these days.

Also, Tajikistan from 1992-1997. The opposition eventually signed a joke of a "power-sharing" agreement from a position of weakness. But that involved Sri Lanka style movement of supporting civilians and mass killing etc.. Also, they lost the safe haven in Afghanistan after Massoud allied with the Russians. So no usable lessons. Jesse Driscoll has a forthcoming book on the subject, so there will finally be something useful on the topic in English.

Unfortunately, the literature on Russian/Soviet COIN in Central Asia is terrible.

[Schmedlap]

3. Ferghana Valley Bolsheviks vs. "Basmachi" and Eastern Bukhara highlands Bolsheviks versus Lokai, Enver Pasha and Basmachi.

I admit to knowing nothing about this. Can you recommend a source (preferably a paper, rather than a book) to shed any light on it?

Also, Tajikistan from 1992-1997... Jesse Driscoll has a forthcoming book on the subject, so there will finally be something useful on the topic in English.

I googled to see if it's on pre-order at amazon, bn, etc - nothing listed. Do you know the name of it? Also, I saw that he did a paper on militias and civil wars, but I don't see it available online - perhaps there's a future tweet.

You haven't got a master's paper to write and are looking for ideas are you? (VTIC)

No. But if I did. Hopefully someone with an interest and a need stumbles upon this thread.

VTIC?

[Pete]

I haven't read Galula so I can't say whether his writings are exclusively an answer to Maoist revolutionary doctrine. However, history has lots of examples of unconventional warfare that had nothing to do with Mao. Three instances of UW in which the unconventional forces operated in support of larger conventional efforts were the Confederate John S. Mosby's battalion in Virginia during the American Civil War, the SAS and OSS Jedburgh operations in 1944 in France in support of the Normandy landings, and U.S. Army Special Forces as they were originally conceived when founded in the 1950s, stay-behinds in Germany who would promote insurgencies behind Soviet lines in the event WW III broke out. In the 1980s SF adopted the crossed arrows insignia of the old Indian Scouts, poachers turned gamekeepers who if I'm not mistaken were founded by the Army officer George Crook in the 19th century.

[Steve Blair]

I haven't read Galula so I can't say whether his writings are exclusively an answer to Maoist revolutionary doctrine. However, history has lots of examples of unconventional warfare that had nothing to do with Mao. Three instances of UW in which the unconventional forces operated in support of larger conventional efforts were the Confederate John S. Mosby's battalion in Virginia during the American Civil War, the SAS and OSS Jedburgh operations in 1944 in France in support of the Normandy landings, and U.S. Army Special Forces as they were originally conceived when founded in the 1950s, stay-behinds in Germany who would promote insurgencies behind Soviet lines in the event WW III broke out. In the 1980s SF adopted the crossed arrows insignia of the old Indian Scouts, poachers turned gamekeepers who if I'm not mistaken were founded by the Army officer George Crook in the 19th century.

Crook was not the first officer to use Indian scouts, although his PR machine would have people believe that. Scouts (both native and Frontiersmen) formed the backbone of the Frontier Army's reconnaissance efforts, and had been so since the 1830s (if not sooner).

[marct]

Crook was not the first officer to use Indian scouts, although his PR machine would have people believe that. Scouts (both native and Frontiersmen) formed the backbone of the Frontier Army's reconnaissance efforts, and had been so since the 1830s (if not sooner).

Another good example comes from the annihilation of General Hull's forces in 1812 by Brock and his allies. That campaign (less than 40 days from Hull's invasion until we captured Detroit) does have some very interesting applications top Afghanistan including how not to use propaganda and why General's should never believe their own propaganda.

[Ken White]

colonial wars. During the Revolution, Oneida and Creek Scouts were particularly effective. Wayne used Miami scouts in the move to the Battle of Fallen Timbers. Indian Scouts were always used by the Army but until 1866, they were volunteers or local employees of the units involved. That year Congress authorized '...a force not to exceed 1,000 of Indians to act as Scouts...'

A number of them got Medals of Honor. IIRC, Crooks use of Apache Scouts had some problems...

To return to the thread, I am no historian but I believe the answers to the questions are:

1. Yes, it is too narrowly focused. Maoist theory worked for the China that existed in the first half of the 20th Century, it was and is not universally applicable. It later worked to an extent in Viet Nam but only because Giap adapted. Many espouse Galula's theories because it is easier for most to wrap around a 'theory' the predicts human behavior than it is to acknowledge that such behavior is so infinitely variable that there is and can be no unifying theory. One must be infinitely adaptable and most people don't want to do that, it makes them uncomfortable...

2. No, it does not render it inapplicable though it can and does induce flaws in application. Why? Simply because Afghanistan is not China, the Afghans are not Chinese, there have been major changes in communication and other aspects of life and attempts to win over a population that will resist you simply because of who you are and which has long survived by brigandage and deception is quite different than confronting the China of 1930. Or the Viet Nam of 1950-75, much less Algeria in the 1960s -- which was not a Maoist insurgency in most aspects. Simply put, in Afghanistan the sea where the fish swim can be made toxic to fish but one is not going to win a single heart or mind. EVERY war is different, attempts to apply a template or pattern will generally be ineffective and can induce further errors and unintended consequences (however, that pattern factor does resonate with those reluctant to stray outside their comfort zones -- at a rough guess, about 80% of all populations including Colonels and Generals...).

3. The Apache campaigns come close, among other things, the inter band feuds replicate the ethnic divisions in Afghanistan. Angola might bear a look. The Philippines...

[Steve Blair]

3. The Apache campaigns come close, among other things, the inter band feuds replicate the ethnic divisions in Afghanistan. Angola might bear a look. The Philippines...

They also have a number of non-state and outside actors who had a major impact on the course of operations (to include sanctuary areas). The Philippines come close, but there was at least an inkling of nationalism in many areas that transcended tribal identities (which is something you didn't see with the Apache). Arizona between 1850ish and 1870 is actually a better fit, because you had the Pai peoples and Navajo running around as well (by the time Crook came on the scene the picture had been simplified to a degree). But now I'm wandering into my specialty and should hush...

[Dayuhan]

A few points relative to this...

First, in the midst of all this enthusiasm for insurgency study, COIN, etc, it might be worth recalling that our core antagonist in the fight of the day, AQ, is not an insurgency at all.

Second, we need to note a fundamental difference between the COIN situations we're in now and those of the Cold War. During the Cold War we intervened to assist "allies" (often rather dubious in nature) that were threatened by insurgency. Insurgencies arose against existing Governments, and we responded. In today's cases, we initiated the situations through our own decisions to occupy territory and install governments. We did not intervene to support allies, we intervened to remove governments we didn't like, and subsequently created our own "allies". In one case, Iraq, this effort was completely peripheral to the core conflict with AQ.

The point of all this is simply that today's COIN efforts were not thrust upon us, they were consequences of our own choices. I don't think it's necessarily true that COIN must dominate our immediate military future, or that dealing with AQ requires us to manage insurgencies. We have the ability to control the amount of COINage in our lives by making different decisions.

I think the French theorists missed the point when they characterized the insurgencies they faced as "Maoist", and if we accept that characterization we miss an important lesson. Our great mistake in managing the Cold War in the developing world lay in allowing our opponents to seize the moral high ground of opposition to decaying empires and oafish post-colonial dictators, while we took the role of trying to rescue sinking ships, many of which were simply unsalvageable. The Communists didn't create the insurgencies, they simply exploited and harnessed a perfectly natural desire to remove foreign conquerors and incompetent dictators, something we could and should have done ourselves, instead of swimming against an overpowering historical tide.

The lesson we need to learn from that doesn't revolve around population-centric tactics, it revolves around choosing interventions wisely and avoiding situations that will harness us to governments that cannot stand, but which we cannot allow to fall.

I could go on at length, but to sum up...

Are there lessons to be learned from Cold War COIN that are relevant today? Yes.

Are all lessons deduced from Cold War COIN relevant today? No.

[slapout9]

I haven't read Galula so I can't say whether his writings are exclusively an answer to Maoist revolutionary doctrine. However, history has lots of examples of unconventional warfare that had nothing to do with Mao. Three instances of UW in which the unconventional forces operated in support of larger conventional efforts were the Confederate John S. Mosby's battalion in Virginia during the American Civil War, the SAS and OSS Jedburgh operations in 1944 in France in support of the Normandy landings, and U.S. Army Special Forces as they were originally conceived when founded in the 1950s, stay-behinds in Germany who would promote insurgencies behind Soviet lines in the event WW III broke out. In the 1980s SF adopted the crossed arrows insignia of the old Indian Scouts, poachers turned gamekeepers who if I'm not mistaken were founded by the Army officer George Crook in the 19th century.

The Revolutionary War is almost a carbon copy of the old 7 steps from hell Special Forces model.

George Washington was the guerrilla force leader and he hired General Von Steuben to advise and train, not fight the US guerrillas. (The First Green Beret!) Because of the heroism and legitimacy of many US guerrilla members, they emerged as leaders for the demobilization step. The demobilization step is where we (US) seem to fail alot. We are good at starting and fighting, not so good at ending.

America often gets into trouble following other peoples models, we should look at our own first.

[jmm99]

one might want to explore these two rebellions after it and before 1800, Shays' Rebellion and the Whiskey Rebellion - and the Alien & Sedition Acts of the same period are also interesting.

Shays' Rebellion brought out the statement by Joneserson (oops - meant Jefferson):

.... a little rebellion now and then is a good thing. The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants.

and another from Wilfington (oops - meant Washington):

You talk, my good sir, of employing influence to appease the present tumults in Massachusetts. I know not where that influence is to be found, or, if attainable, that it would be a proper remedy for the disorders. Influence is not government. Let us have a government by which our lives, liberties, and properties will be secured, or let us know the worst at once.

And so it went - back then

Regards

Mike

[Ken White]

America often gets into trouble following other peoples models, we should look at our own first.

Abb-so-lootlee!!!

I'd even say that following the Von Steuben model instead of the Cherokee, Hodenosaunee or Anishinabe models, militarily, was the first big, bad step in following the models of others...

[Rifleman]

I love to read frontier history but I think we should remember that many of the small wars against the Native Americans were described in their day as "Punitive Expeditions." Some amounted to scorched earth campaigns.

In the southeast corn crops were destroyed, orchards were cut down, and villages were torched. For western tribes the buffalo provided a mobile commissary and even a theology (center of gravity, so to speak?) so it was hunted to the brink of extinction with the Army's encouragement. Then tribes were resettled by force. Are we going to do something like that to the Pashtun? Doubt it.

I'm sure there are valuable things to be learned from studying the Indian Wars but I guess my point is that there are also limits. Some things that "worked" then simply won't be allowed today for humanitarian and environmental reasons.

[Chris jM]

I'm sure there are valuable things to be learned from studying the Indian Wars but I guess my point is that there are also limits. Some things that "worked" then simply won't be allowed today for humanitarian and environmental reasons.

Leading of from Rifleman's mention of 'frontier history' and it's lack of relevance:

A very left-or-arc question, but does the American audience even know what I am talking about if I mention the Maori wars? They were concurrent with the American civil war, and are a great example of a series of 'small war' campaigns against a militarily capable indigenous population. It would be easy to describe it as 'counter-insurgency' if you are so inclined.

As an aside it always perplexed me in that, in New Zealand schooling, we would undertake a compulsory module on Native American Indians when we were 14 years old (approx). I never studied the era too much at the time, and since my main exposure to the colonisation of the States has been through the memoirs of Sir Harry Flashman.

Even in my limited exposure to the two wars I think a lot more of relevance can be gained from the Maori wars, if anyone is interested. To provide a simple narrative summary, the Maori's dominated the tactical engagements but were strategically impotent against the combined economic/political/military advance of the British empire. The political treaty that resulted in many ways reflected the cost involved in inflicting any decisive defeat upon the opposing tribes and made many concessions to the Maori - equal citizenship under the empire being one example.

Lots of bad history has arisen from the Maori Wars literature, including some ludicrous claims that the Maori "invented" trench warfare and the British empire could have avoided the Somme had they paid attention to the Maori and that the Maori wars saw statistically greater concentrations of artillery fire than WW1 did (both claims are absolute rubbish) however the study of the British Empire vs the Maori tribes may be of relevance and interest to today's environment, perhaps more so than the Indian Wars.