Ukraine (closed; covers till August 2014)

[AmericanPride]

I don't think the Poles will agree that it is isn't worth risking economic disruption if Russia moves into the Ukraine north of Crimea. They may just upset the group comity.

Unfortunately, despite Poland's ascendence since the end of the Cold War, it still has not been able to overcome its historical geographic obstacle - namely, being caught between two much stronger centers of power in Central Europe and Moscow. Warsaw has nowhere to turn if Berlin, Paris, and London strike a deal with Moscow that does not satisfy Poland's legitimate security interests. And that's the dilemma created by accepting the entrance of Poland (and the Baltic states) into the EU and NATO.

You wouldn't know it from the various spokespeople and media in Washington and Europe, but the West has no choice but to negotiate. From the New York Times:

The outlines of the sort of political settlement the United States is seeking emerged on Wednesday when President Obama and Ukraine’s interim prime minister, Arseniy P. Yatsenyuk, suggested that they would be willing to support expanded autonomy for Crimea if Russia were prepared to reverse its military intervention. Mr. Yatsenyuk also said his government would affirm an agreement that permits Russia to maintain a naval base there.

If Washington is in the stronger political position, why is it making concessions to Moscow? The sanctions exist to (1) posture for a better negotiating position, which is desperately needed and (2) signal to the various domestic audiences that action is being taken to save face. I don't think anyone seriously believes that the sanctions will compel Moscow to alter its course. As the 8th largest economy in the world, Russia is in a better position to resist sanctions but also to retailate as well than say, Serbia or Iraq.

[carl]

American Pride:

Your comment about Poland and the Baltic States is interesting. First it seems the Poles are helpless. They may not agree. Second, and even more interesting, is your apparent opinion that the disadvantage of having Poland and the Baltic States in NATO is that it makes it harder to sell them out.

I guess will see if that siloviki kleptocracy that is Russia can weather what may be coming their way.

[AmericanPride]

American Pride:

Your comment about Poland and the Baltic States is interesting. First it seems the Poles are helpless. They may not agree. Second, and even more interesting, is your apparent opinion that the disadvantage of having Poland and the Baltic States in NATO is that it makes it harder to sell them out.

I guess will see if that siloviki kleptocracy that is Russia can weather what may be coming their way.

Are the Poles "helpless"? No. But Poland is not exactly a superpower, either. Poland entered NATO to defend itself from Russia, but by doing so, it also put its security interests in the hand of Germany and France. Washington and Berlin can make an agreement with Moscow over Warsaw's objections - what recourse would Poland have if that were to occur? Could it leave the EU? Or suspend military cooperation with NATO? Absolutely not. That's the disadvantage for Poland entering into the EU and NATO. In realist IR and alliance theory, the utility of institutions and alliances like NATO are determined by their strongest members; i.e. the United States; and so the organization's interests largely reflect their interests. This is a disadvantage for Poland, which is clearly a weaker partner in the alliance, and politics is about trade-offs. The gain for Poland is the assurance of security, hence all the talk about "credibility" in Washington and elsewhere. So, the dilemma created by Polish membership is that Poland's security interests can be in direct contradiction with Berlin or Paris or Washington interest in avoiding or minimizing confrontation with Russia.

[davidbfpo]

Mirhond,

Your photo of flags is rather curious. It appears - on a quick check - to date back to July 2011, not recently. One press report refer to:

Organizers filming historical film "Match" have created a realistic and historically true situation the occupation of Kiev and Kharkov German fascist invaders.

Link:http://tol-nabat.info/main/7013-oni-...o-golubym.html

[omarali50]

I wish there was a like button on the posts
I would like to "like" David's post.

[mirhond]

Mirhond,

Your photo of flags is rather curious. It appears - on a quick check - to date back to July 2011, not recently.

*I'am busted! All is lost! Need evacuation!*
OK, its obviously staged photo, I put it here just to create more flame. Anyway, you can find real Nazi torch-light parade in Kiev on Youtube.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=skGOtMYUsfI
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2QsVVkA4Ywo

Fascinating. No subtlety at all. Fascinating.

Sorry, carl I dont get your point, please explain. May be you misunderstood what is happening on video?

[carl]

Mirhond:

The language improves but the argument is still made with a wrecking ball. Fascinating.

[davidbfpo]

That is the stark question Prof. John Schindler asks. The article has a long section by an ex-Ukrainian admiral:http://20committee.com/2014/03/14/th...r-for-ukraine/

[TheCurmudgeon]

If the Ukrainians truely believe that war is inevitable, why have they not invited in a NATO military presence? Is this because it would be seen as provacative by Russia or because NATO thinks that it is premature to become involved.

This is by no means a suggestion, it is a question of the thought process involved here.

Gallop pole on Ukranian's thoughts on NATO.

[davidbfpo]

In part:

If the Ukrainians truely believe that war is inevitable, why have they not invited in a NATO military presence? Is this because it would be seen as provacative by Russia or because NATO thinks that it is premature to become involved.

To date only the USA has deployed to Poland a F-16 squadron; which may have been a planned deployment before the crisis started.

Sadly no other NATO member has also deployed. I exclude the NATO AWACS patrolling, which is not even using bases in Poland.

I don't know why NATO has not moved, at least to the Baltic states and Poland. A military move into the Ukraine now I expect has not even been on the agenda.

Sending the EU's foreign envoy to Kiev, Baroness Ashton, is a diplomatic gesture. Why did the Ukrainian PM have to fly all the way to Washington DC? Could he not have been met half-way?

To date not much imagination on show, albeit on my limited reading.

[TheCurmudgeon]

In part:

To date only the USA has deployed to Poland a F-16 squadron; which may have been a planned deployment before the crisis started.

Sadly no other NATO member has also deployed. I exclude the NATO AWACS patrolling, which is not even using bases in Poland.

...

To date not much imagination on show, albeit on my limited reading.

At a minimum I would have expected a carrier group and a Marine MEU to be moved somewhere close, either the Baltic or the Eastern Med.

The EU, Great Britain, and the U.S. pride ourselves on the belief that our military activities are always founded in some legal principle. So unless we are directly threatened, we probably cannot militarily affect things on the ground.

Polish troops could easily cross the border. If they were attacked by the Russians it would constitute and attack on NATO. That would seem to have a chilling affect on Putin, but his psychology may read it as a threat and cause him to escalate. It just seems like, while the Ukrainians are taking the threat seriously, no one else is.

It could be that we only get the news from one side, but I am a little confused by how the NATO military side of events is playing out .

[AmericanPride]

To shed some light on Russian perspectives of Ukraine and NATO, from the Russian National Security Strategy:

A determining aspect of relations with NATO remains the fact that plans to extend the alliance's military infrastructure to Russia's borders, and attempts to endow NATO with global functions that go counter to norms of international law, are unacceptable to Russia. Russia is prepared to develop relations with NATO on the basis of equality and in the interests of strengthening the general security of the Euro-Atlantic region. The content and depth of these relations will be determined by the preparedness of the alliance to recognise Russia's legal interests when engaging in military-political planning, and to respect norms of international law; and likewise NATO's readiness to consider the further transformation of these relations...

That was written in 2009. In February of last year, Russia's 2013 Foreign Policy Concept stated:

Russia maintains a negative attitude towards NATO’s expansion and to the approaching of NATO military infrastructure to Russia’s borders in general as to actions that violate the principle of equal security and lead to the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe.

In regards to NATO, Andrew Monaghan at Chatham House had this to say about the 2013 document:

The alliance warrants a paragraph but the Russian view of the Euro-Atlantic community appears less positive even than in 2008 when Russia launched a series of proposals for the reform of the European security architecture. It argued at the time that Europe was not well served by one that aggravated old issues and was unable to address emerging problems. As a result, according to Russia, European security was divided, and a new summit and legally binding security treaty were necessary to remedy this situation. This illustrated a fundamental divergence in understandings of European security, since many in the Euro-Atlantic community instead saw Europe to be whole, free and at peace. Of late, these proposals have faded from attention in the West.

It is easy to be dismiss with skepticism many of the public remarks of the Russian government, particularly in regards to an appeal for the responsibility to protect ethnic Russians in Ukraine, but removing the pretext reveals a more rational approach to the national security problems raised by the events in Ukraine. Moscow has a particular view of the situation in Europe and of its own security and it has long opposed NATO expansion (though at one point it was suggested, but not taking seriously, that Russia petition for membership in the alliance, which would resolve its security anxieties). I think the West made a mistake in underestimating (or ignoring) Russia's stated national interests. Carl may think Russia to be a third-rate power, but it remains the 8th largest economy, retains the 2nd largest nuclear arsenal, and one of the largest standing military forces in the world.

So I don't think Moscow will budge from Crimea or from pushing its interests in Ukraine. A more inclusive policy during the 1990s might have preempted the empowerment of the nationalist-realist faction embodied in Putin, but at least Putin is predictable. That said, we should be prepared to negotiate with Russia; not because Russia's actions are lawful or moral, but because given the relative power relationships, there's no other choice. Turning to what should be on the table in negotiations, the outlines cited in several posts above (reaffirming the Russian naval presence in Crimea and extended autonomy for Crimea) seem like safe starting points as extensions of the status quo, but given the occupation and escalation, Moscow appears positioned to be more assertive in its demands. We can probably expect political uncertainity in Ukraine for some time, even with contingent IMF loans, as new power brokers jockey for position. I think the real factor here is if Washington can match Moscow's political agitation in Ukraine now that we're in the end game.

[OUTLAW 09]

Find it interesting that the leader of the Jewish community in Kiev stated recently that they have had no problems with neo right radicals and or neo Nazi's and that they the Jewish community Kiev were also fighting in the Maidan just as was the neo right.

Really thought the use of the fear of "Nazi's" had died with Stalin.

But I guess old habits of the KGB die hard.

[AmericanPride]

At a minimum I would have expected a carrier group and a Marine MEU to be moved somewhere close, either the Baltic or the Eastern Med.

The EU, Great Britain, and the U.S. pride ourselves on the belief that our military activities are always founded in some legal principle. So unless we are directly threatened, we probably cannot militarily affect things on the ground.

Polish troops could easily cross the border. If they were attacked by the Russians it would constitute and attack on NATO. That would seem to have a chilling affect on Putin, but his psychology may read it as a threat and cause him to escalate. It just seems like, while the Ukrainians are taking the threat seriously, no one else is.

It could be that we only get the news from one side, but I am a little confused by how the NATO military side of events is playing out .

I don't think the US, Germany, and UK (1) expect further military conflict in Ukraine, or (2) desire to give any justification for conflict or escalation. There's plenty of money at stake for Western Europe, but Berlin, London, and Paris enjoy the advantage of not having direct borders with Moscow. Their security is not threatened so why escalate it? Germany and France been the firmest opponents to Ukrainian (and Georgian) membership in NATO for this very reason. Sanctions provide some minimal political leverage in the negotiations while also displaying resolve in the face of aggression without actually committing to a path of armed conflict.

Despite all the bluster, I think the Obama administration recognizes the futility of military force in this scenario. Neither the Black Sea or Baltic are ideal operating areas for US naval forces and the proximity to Russia significantly increases vulnerability to counter-attack. This would not signal to Moscow the same message it would send to the capital of a smaller power. Since the Russians already know that the US will not attack, such a gesture would be politically unhelpful and be quickly condemned and dismissed by Moscow as "escalation". Russia would respond in kind with maneuvers of its own, and call Washington's bluff since the Obama administration is not prepared to fight the Russians over Crimea. What then?

[OUTLAW 09]

If one takes the Crimea as an example of the new Putin Doctrine ie one in the future can change any border based on language/ethnicity/culture using the Russian model.

There are approximately 365 hot spots (language/ethnicity/culture) where border changes can/could occur in Asia/Africa just as easily as the Crimea.

That is the significance of the Putin Doctrine for the 21st Century.

Economic sanctions will hit Russia hard as they are a two resource based economy, have a poorly developing internal economy that needs investment and new plants from the West, the Rubel has taken a massive hit and the stock market is at a 4 year low and will go lower after Monday as will the Rubel. So I am not sure who the KGB is trying to convince that it will hurt the West more---certainly not European economists who understand the Russia economy.

Gasprom has lost over 14B USD in wealth just in the last ten days and will also go lower which is one of their main cash cows.

[JMA]

If one takes the Crimea as an example of the new Putin Doctrine ie one in the future can change any border based on language/ethnicity/culture using the Russian model.

There are approximately 365 hot spots (language/ethnicity/culture) where border changes can/could occur in Asia/Africa just as easily as the Crimea.

That is the significance of the Putin Doctrine for the 21st Century.

How many of these involve current Russian Federation borders either for a territorial gain or a loss?

[OUTLAW 09]

JMA--the Baltics, four districts on the Chinese border and if Belarus ever gets rid of their current dictator the whole country---maybe give or take seven. He could expand out the current Moldavian enclaves as well as the Georgian ones.

For those that like the I/O work being done by the KGB/FSB---check this US drone story and see how any holes it has---but hey when it is all the info one gets ---even the dumb believe.


http://www.spiegel.de/politik/auslan...-a-958757.html

[OUTLAW 09]

Firn---the Russian Foreign Ministry claimed late last week they could hold up under sanctions as they had over 500B in foreign currencies---any evidence of that?

[JMA]

JMA--the Baltics, four districts on the Chinese border and if Belarus ever gets rid of their current dictator the whole country---maybe give or take seven. He could expand out the current Moldavian enclaves as well as the Georgian ones.

OK, thanks, but one needs to look at how long these ethnic Russians have been there. Here I am looking at the African example (which the Soviet Russians supported) where if you are a European it does not matter how long you have been there you are still a settler. It should be quite easy to work out the movements of ethnic Russians over the past few hundred years. They should then be invited to go 'home' to mother Russia or stay if the indigenous people allow them to but that land would never be Russian. Where there is a Russian dominant enclave one needs to look at the history to see if migration has played a role.

Are there areas of the Russian Fedration which have non-Russian majorities who could claim a need for independence? Here I talk Ingushetia, Chechnya, and Dagestan. How would the Putin doctrine apply to these three countries for example?

[OUTLAW 09]

JMA---you bring up an interesting point---the SU after 1945 and under Stalin took a move to ensure in the new eastern bloc that Russian was the primary language thus they started "forced" immigration of ethnic Russians into areas that were not previously Russian ethnic areas--remember the SU at the height of the Cold War had over 136 primary different languages and as was English/French were the official languages in Africa during the colonial period so was Russian the official language. This was also true in say Poland, Hungary, the former Czechoslovakia.

In the Ukraine virtually all Ukrainians speak Russian.

In the "stans" one will find pockets of ethnic Russians as well.

IMO the Putin Doctrine is dangerous as he can on a wim change the definition---meaning today it is language/ethnicity/culture and tomorrow what raw resources Russia needs to survive on, or a perceived "threat".

IE a demonstrator is killed in the Donetsk and the Russian FM states we will move in to defend Russians if the Ukrainians cannot control their country.

They claimed he was Russian when in fact the was a proUkrainian member of a right wing party.

Now with the latest claim of capturing of a US drone over the Crimea (one could argue they were attacked by NATO)---a Hunter ---which they claimed was launched from Bavaria by the 66th MI Group which is actually stationed in Darmstadt.

****By the way the Hunter has only a range of 125 miles which if my geography is correct it could have never reached the Crimea much less loiter over it. Unless it was launched by the Navy.

The wim can be redefined to whenever he wants it to mean--that is the dangerous aspect of the Doctrine and it stands on its head the Westphalia Treaty in the 1700s and the respecting of territorial borders since the end of WW2.

This has nothing to do with "spheres of influence" ---it is all about annexation and rebuilding of the former SU pure and simple. Remember Putin served as a KGB officer in Dresden in the GDR during his cold war days. He never did like the breakup of the SU and was vocal about that in a number of recent interviews.