New Guidance on Counter-Insurgency

[MikeF]

Saying we're doing COIN leads to that, the troops get frustrated because they can't understand why the host nation has a say in anything, the host nation gets their feelings hurt and won't cooperate and 'allies' who would help said host nation aren't all that happy to be seen helping the US. It's all politics and perceptions so the Joint pub folks better be smart in final their word selections and definitions.

And with this point, I'll be quiet.

Task: Presence Patrol
Purpose: To show the populace that you're there or something.

IMO, the most absurd contradiction/consideration that anyone has ever made. I know that I flow from tactics to operations to strategy, but my reasoining is logical (at least in my own head). You cannot tell a GPF (or any other) sergeant to simply drive around aimlessly.

If that is the aim, then just put the entire Army on temporary duty to explore the world in some notion of the early 20th century Roosevelt's "Great White Fleet."

Every mission must be tied towards the bigger picture.

v/r

Mike

[Dayuhan]

I submit that after all the time and effort, -especially in Iraq- having a Government which is not Pro-US, to the extent that it may be a de-facto enemy, and even consistently votes against the US in the UN, then you have achieved very little.

I'm not so ambitious. If we can walk away from Iraq and leave a functioning government that we don't have to enforce sanctions and no-fly zones against, and walk away from Afghanistan leaving a functioning government that doesn't blow up our buildings, ships, etc or shelter those who do... we may have achieved very little, but we've achieved enough. If they vote against us at the UN 100% of the time, I'm ok with that, not like it's anything unusual.

We didn't go to Afghanistan for truth, justice, and the American way, or to spread democracy, or for womens rights, or because they blew up Buddhas. We went there because a group that was based there and sheltered by the Afghan government was waging war against us. As long as we stop that war an assure that it is not resumed, I don't give a hot round one whether they are pro-US or not.

[Fuchs]

I'm not so ambitious. If we can walk away from Iraq and leave a functioning government that we don't have to enforce sanctions and no-fly zones against, and walk away from Afghanistan leaving a functioning government that doesn't blow up our buildings, ships, etc or shelter those who do... we may have achieved very little, but we've achieved enough.

You didn't have to enforce no-fly zones and an embargo against Iraq at all. A quick vote in the UNSC and you would have gotten rid of the embargo nonsense, which most nations despised anyway.

The only useful and near-consensus embargo was the one about arms, and that would have been enforced by neighbours (including Kuwait and Iran) if the U.S. had left the theatre.

The no-fly zones had expired their purpose within a few weeks and were a mere tool of bullying and humiliation for years - and obviously contributing to the later troubles with extremists.

The government of Afghanistan / the Taliban NEVER blew up a ship.

I'm surprised that you've got a problem with governments blowing up/demolishing buildings, for that's what the U.S. government and the Israeli government are known for.

- - - - -

A war is a success and under certain additional circumstances justifiable if it's the least evil. OIF was not the lesser evil in comparison to peace, no matter how much the spin doctors distort the story.

The Afghanistan war (well, the 2001-? involvement of the West) was quite certainly not the lesser evil in comparison to a more indirect approach, and likely not even a lesser evil in comparison to no invasion at all.


Sentiments and misinformation ruled over objective analysis and the result were self-harming military adventures of Western politicians. Sadly, they don't pay the price.
Late, too late came the conclusion of COIN celebrities: 'Don't do it again'. Guess why? Because it was a stupid idea and no success at all.

[Dayuhan]

I'm probably not the best person to defend the Iraq war, since I was not in favor of it from the start, but I think you're perhaps oversimplifying the situations that prevailed in both Iraq and Afghanistan prior to the American interventions. Inaction would have had consequences as well, and there is certainly no assurance that those consequences would have been any better than what we have now.

The mistake of not carrying the first Iraq war to its logical conclusion and removing Saddam at that time (a mistake clearer in hindsight, but no less a mistake for that) left a distinctly awkward landscape behind it.

Allowing a full rehabilitation for Saddam with no consequences at all for the attempt to forcibly annex a neighboring state would hardly have sent an ideal signal. On a more practical level, a de facto Kurdish State had emerged under American protection, including the protection of the no-fly zones. What would have been the probable consequence of removing that protection? Of course we don't know, since we didn't try, but based on prior experience one would not expect a group hug.

Lifting the sanctions, particularly the sanctions on oil exports, would have led inevitably to rearmament. The notion of an arms embargo is close to absurd, and the notion that Kuwait and Iraq could have enforced an arms embargo is downright bizarre: how do you propose that they would do that, board and search every ship entering Umm Qasr? How long do you would think it would take the Russians, French, and Chinese to trade arms deals for oil concessions, regardless of any embargo... seconds or minutes? Given Saddam's long and inglorious history of attempts to annex neighboring territory, what would be the probable consequence of rearmament?

As long as Saddam ruled Iraq, containment and punitive action was going to be necessary, unless you favor allowing moves like the attempt to annex Kuwait to go unpunished, and unless you trusted Saddam to behave in the future.

Yes, the Taliban didn't blow anything up, they merely provided shelter and support to those who openly declared and prosecuted a war against another state. These actions do tend to have consequences.

What "indirect action" would you have suggested? I guess we could have tried the Bill Clinton approach, fired off a few cruise missiles and gone back to watching the Nasdaq. That didn't work out very well the first few times, and by 2001 watching the Nasdaq was no fun anyway.

The statement that "OIF was not the lesser evil in comparison to peace" would be more compelling if there was peace to start with, or any reasonable likelihood of achieving peace.

There is certainly abundant room to criticize the steps that were taken, and a great deal more to criticize the way those steps were taken. Claiming that there were clearly superior alternatives available, though, requires some fairly loose assumptions about the probable consequences of those alternative actions. A history of bad decisions and neglect had created a situation with very few attractive alternatives.

[Fuchs]

The mistake of not carrying the first Iraq war to its logical conclusion and removing Saddam at that time (a mistake clearer in hindsight, but no less a mistake for that) left a distinctly awkward landscape behind it.

Allowing a full rehabilitation for Saddam with no consequences at all for the attempt to forcibly annex a neighboring state would hardly have sent an ideal signal. On a more practical level, a de facto Kurdish State had emerged under American protection, including the protection of the no-fly zones. What would have been the probable consequence of removing that protection?

"mistake":
The UNSC resolution legalized a violent liberation of Kuwait, not more. It was illegal and illegitimate to topple Saddam, the Bush I administration stayed smartly out of a protracted war and stayed in the bounds of the U.N.
It was no mistake - going further would have been a mistake, it would have badly influenced the immediate post-Cold War era. A march on Baghdad would have turned the U.S: itself into an aggressor (an Iraqi aggression against Kuwait didn't entitle the U.S. for anything, Article 1.1 of the Charter of the United Nations restricted the U.S..

UN Charter

CHAPTER I: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES
Article 1
The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

The U.S. committed itself to this charter. It's binding and any violation is both illegal, illegitimate and deserves a fair share of additional resentment and informal sanctions.

Conclusion: No mistake at all, Bush I was wise and right in his decision and his ability to be satisfied with limited goals.*

An invasion of Iraq right into Baghdad would have been as illegal and illegitimate as Saddam's invasion of Kuwait.
To do that would have been a terrible start into the volatile and sensitive post-Cold War world. It would have meant near-pariah status instead of huge political capital for the U.S..

- - - - -

"...no consequences at all..."

Sorry for being blunt (again), but that is utter B.S.
Losing regional power status, about 100% of sea power, 80% of land power and 90% or air power and losing a war was a huge consequence.

Again, I think it's a good opportunity to hint at "limited goals" and humility. It's not good if you want maximum solutions only.

- - - - -

"...protection of the no-fly zones. What would have been the probable consequence of removing that protection?"

1st.
Protection against what? Almost his whole air force was destroyed or out of reach. Supply of spare parts was dried out by the arms embargo.

2nd.
The factual, real ally of the U.S. was Turkey, and a crackdown on Kurdish rebels would have been in Turkish interests (actually, they did it themselves several times). What weighs heavier? The national security interest of an ally or the interest of a non-state enemy of a former state enemy of yours?
Turkey was ready to fight WW3 with the U.S., it provided bases for Desert Storm - yet the later U.S. policy ran 180° against vital Turkish national security interests despite staying allied.
It always amazes me how much this ally gets neglected and underestimated.

3rd.
Saddam didn't crack down on the Kurds on land either - the Northern no-fly zone was no complete protection anyway.

4th.
Your argument is entirely inapplicable to the Southern no-fly zone (which, IIRC, persisted for years as well?)

- - - - -

"Yes, the Taliban didn't blow anything up, they merely provided shelter and support to those who openly declared and prosecuted a war against another state. These actions do tend to have consequences."

Oh really? Bay of Pigs anyone? How many consequences were felt by Cuban terrorists in Miami for decades? Hypocrisy anyone?


"What "indirect action" would you have suggested?"

Proxy warlords with minimal liaison components after the initial phase.
No direct involvement (occupation) needed.

"The statement that "OIF was not the lesser evil in comparison to peace" would be more compelling if there was peace to start with, or any reasonable likelihood of achieving peace."

I wrote OIF, not OEF.

"Claiming that there were clearly superior alternatives available, though, requires some fairly loose assumptions about the probable consequences of those alternative actions. A history of bad decisions and neglect had created a situation with very few attractive alternatives."

You contradict yourself. "bad decisions and neglect" means "that there were clearly superior alternatives available".
It's just - as always - difficult to prove that a specific action would have necessarily had a superior outcome.
This is a limitation of life as long as we don't discover parallel sandbox universes. We have therefore learned to use rational analysis with our limited brains for ex-post and ex-ante critique of actions. That method needs to be acceptable to everyone, for the only alternative would be random actions.


*: Look at Putin. he was able to be satisfied with limited goals in Georgia and won a war in a record of five days, reversing much of NATO's policies in Eastern Europe. He could have occupied Georgia and would have stumbled into a second Chechnya. That's the blight of maximum goals.

[Dayuhan]

You might wish to read posts before responding to them. I wrote:

Allowing a full rehabilitation for Saddam with no consequences at all for the attempt to forcibly annex a neighboring state would hardly have sent an ideal signal.

You replied:

Sorry for being blunt (again), but that is utter B.S.
Losing regional power status, about 100% of sea power, 80% of land power and 90% or air power and losing a war was a huge consequence.

The consequences you cite were suffered by the Iraqi State and the Iraqi military, not by Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi people also suffered consequences. Saddam, as I said, suffered no consequences whatsoever: after invading, pillaging, and attempting to annex a neighboring state he was still kicking back in the Palace du jour, receiving oral pleasure from George Galloway. Is that the message you want to send to the dictators of the world? That they can personally decide to do any damned thing they please, and the consequences, if any, will be suffered by others? That all you have to do is wait a few years and you'll be right back in play with an open invitation to have another go?

The party that subverted international law in this case was not the US, it was the UN. By abdicating its responsibility to impose personal consequences on Saddam for his personal decision to invade, pillage, and attempt to annex a neighbour, the UN left a complete vacuum in the space it is meant to fill. Of course nature abhors a vacuum, and in this case it was the US who filled it: but do you blame the US for following the laws of international physics or the UN for leaving the vacuum in the first place?

If it is against the law to enforce the law, then there is no law, and where there is no law common sense has to prevail. Common sense says that dictators who repeatedly attempt to conquer their neighbors need to be removed from power. By the logic you cite, the second world war should have ended at the borders of Germany and Japan, and after a few years the Fuhrer and the Emperor should have been permitted to rearm and try again. Fortunately at that time we had a bit less law and a bit more common sense.

The European concept of "International Law" seems to revolve around elegant laws, erudite jurists, and dignified courts, with no police, no penal system, no capacity for enforcement. Not a concept likely to succeed in the real world.

"Yes, the Taliban didn't blow anything up, they merely provided shelter and support to those who openly declared and prosecuted a war against another state. These actions do tend to have consequences."

Oh really? Bay of Pigs anyone? How many consequences were felt by Cuban terrorists in Miami for decades? Hypocrisy anyone?

If we are going to speak of historical hypocrisies, what shall we say of Germany criticizing the US - or anyone - for aggressive behaviour?

Yes, the Bay of Pigs was a stupid move. Does that mean that the US should no longer respond when attacked? For how long? A century? Forever? Would Germany's history of aggression make it "hypocritical" for Germany to defend itself if attacked? Does England's historical involvement in narcotics peddling make it "hypocritical" for England to prohibit the importation of narcotics?

Nations will respond to the limits of their capacity when attacked. This may be argued as hypocrisy in any nation with much of a history, but it's still going to happen.

1st.
Protection against what? Almost his whole air force was destroyed or out of reach. Supply of spare parts was dried out by the arms embargo.

2nd.
The factual, real ally of the U.S. was Turkey, and a crackdown on Kurdish rebels would have been in Turkish interests (actually, they did it themselves several times). What weighs heavier? The national security interest of an ally or the interest of a non-state enemy of a former state enemy of yours?
Turkey was ready to fight WW3 with the U.S., it provided bases for Desert Storm - yet the later U.S. policy ran 180° against vital Turkish national security interests despite staying allied.
It always amazes me how much this ally gets neglected and underestimated.

3rd.
Saddam didn't crack down on the Kurds on land either - the Northern no-fly zone was no complete protection anyway.

4th.
Your argument is entirely inapplicable to the Southern no-fly zone (which, IIRC, persisted for years as well?)

1st: He had enough left to routinely violate the no-fly zone. Not enough to threaten a modern military force, but enough to do a lot of damage to a civilian population.

2nd: Do ypu propose that the US (and at that point the UN) should have allowed Saddam to resume his on-and-off campaign of genocide agoainst the Kurds because the Turks don't like the Kurds either?

3rd: The Peshmerga were a bit more capable of defending themselves on land.

4th: Saddam was also being rather harsh on the southern Shi'a, no? Remember the Marsh Arabs?

"What "indirect action" would you have suggested?"

Proxy warlords with minimal liaison components after the initial phase.
No direct involvement (occupation) needed.

Please apply the following comment to that proposal:

It's just - as always - difficult to prove that a specific action would have necessarily had a superior outcome.

Proxy warlords might have been able to prevent the Taliban from regrouping and returning... or they might not have. More than likely not, I would guess.

I wrote OIF, not OEF.

Yes, I know. The comment still applies. The alternative to OIF was maintaining a status quo of low-level conflict or a level of appeasement and surrender that would almost certainly have led to another large-scale conflict. Not attractive alternatives.

You contradict yourself. "bad decisions and neglect" means "that there were clearly superior alternatives available".

It means nothing of the sort. A bad decision can seem good at the time but be clearly bad in retrospect, neglect may seem a reasonable policy and later prove otherwise. What I said was that with hindsight, a sequence of bad decisions and neglect had left an untenable situation. Ideally that situation would have been resolved by multilateral action. Multilateral action is preferable to unilateral action, but unilateral action may at times be better than multilateral paralysis.

[slapout9]

The consequences you cite were suffered by the Iraqi State and the Iraqi military, not by Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi people also suffered consequences. Saddam, as I said, suffered no consequences whatsoever: after invading, pillaging, and attempting to annex a neighboring state he was still kicking back in the Palace du jour, receiving oral pleasure from George Galloway. Is that the message you want to send to the dictators of the world? That they can personally decide to do any damned thing they please, and the consequences, if any, will be suffered by others? That all you have to do is wait a few years and you'll be right back in play with an open invitation to have another go?

There is some Strategic Wisdom in the above statement. The person/regime that started the whole mess needs to feel the pain not the general population.

[Bob's World]

There is some Strategic Wisdom in the above statement. The person/regime that started the whole mess needs to feel the pain not the general population.

Not to bypass the government, but to recognize now, like never before in history, populaces are empowered to act out.

The measures we put in place to punish Iraq (the state) and Saddam (the dictator), did neither, but did punish the Iraqi populace horribly. The young men who formed the core of the Iraqi resistance movement to counter the US invasion grew up in an environment deprived of resources (food, meds, etc) by the U.S.; with U.S. planes dropping bombs on regular occasions; and Saddam telling them that everything would be great if it wasn't for the oppressive acts of the Americans.

The global environment was changing, and we had not caught on to the new rules. Rules that demand that you do not write off the populace as irrelevant. Or perhaps we thought that the Iraqi populace would blame the hardships we placed upon them on Saddam? Were we that naive?

Such sanctions must be carefully designed today to take into account fully the super-empowered status of today's populaces. We must assess how they will be impacted, and how they will likely react. If we want to punish a dictator we need to have the moral courage to shoot him in the face, and not in the populace.

[jmm99]

If we want to punish a dictator we need to have the moral courage to shoot him in the face, and not in the populace.

part of Bob's World. You must be feeling kinetic today - I'll loan you my dinosaur.

[Bob's World]

part of Bob's World. You must be feeling kinetic today - I'll loan you my dinosaur.

But I abhor stupid violence.

That the Iraqi populace rose up to fight us was not the strategic surprise; the surprise is that we assumed after years of such harsh treatment at our hands, colored by Saddam's propaganda, that we thought they would not.


This also weaves into the concept that I am working to flesh out on full-spectrum deterrence. This balancing of engagement to ensure that we identify these potential effects early, and either modify our initial COA of engagement to avoid the negative effects, or balance it is someway to mitigate the same.

[MikeF]

The point of Population-centric engagement is not to bypass the government, but to recognize now, like never before in history, populaces are empowered to act out.

The measures we put in place to punish Iraq (the state) and Saddam (the dictator), did neither, but did punish the Iraqi populace horribly. The young men who formed the core of the Iraqi resistance movement to counter the US invasion grew up in an environment deprived of resources (food, meds, etc) by the U.S.; with U.S. planes dropping bombs on regular occasions; and Saddam telling them that everything would be great if it wasn't for the oppressive acts of the Americans.

The global environment was changing, and we had not caught on to the new rules. Rules that demand that you do not write off the populace as irrelevant. Or perhaps we thought that the Iraqi populace would blame the hardships we placed upon them on Saddam? Were we that naive?

Such sanctions must be carefully designed today to take into account fully the super-empowered status of today's populaces. We must assess how they will be impacted, and how they will likely react. If we want to punish a dictator we need to have the moral courage to shoot him in the face, and not in the populace.

Sir, no issues with this statement. I think that perspective reigns true throughout a lot of the Special Forces community and some of the GPF; however, in my observations, the current interpretatoin of population-centric COIN by many is skewed in translation to suggest that no violence should be used.

Additionally, the method of execution is one in which we struggle. Some of my former NCO's are currently deployed with 4/82 ABN in the SFA mission in Afghan. I asked them what they would do when the Afghan Army refused to execute a mission. They replied that they would do it themselves. Mission accomplishment and unilateral action is heavily ingrained into our mindset, and that is why I caution on the current construct of Pop-centric COIN. Changing that culture and forcing GPF to advise and assist, not kick down the doors will be a long process.

v/r

Mike

[Bob's World]

The populace-centric ideas I have put forward (prioritize the needs of the populace over those of the government or threats emerging from them) are significantly different than the population-centric (control the populace while attempting to buy their support with massive governmental effectiveness programs) pushed by CNAS.

Bribing and controlling your a populace is like a leader who puts strict controls on his men, ignores their real issues, but buys them beer come Friday. I actually had a squad leader like that who asked my why his men disrespected him so much when after a week of abuse he would buy them sodas.

One tremendous handicap that we have in both Iraq and Afghanistan is that we have tremendous authority to do whatever we want. In the Philippines our hands were tied and our resources constrained. We were forced to be smart, be frugal and to take a backseat to the HN's desires and lead. Much of what is good about what we have done there was more by irritating necessity than brilliant design.

Best thing we could probably do in Afghanistan is place similar harsh constraints on ourselves, and tailor our mission set accordingly as well. Not only does this help remove the stink of US legitimacy over the Karzai government, it also forces us to shape our efforts to support and not lead the efforts there. Such actions will empower our narrative that we are not invaders. Focus our presence on force multipliers to empower HN security forces rather than on combat power to hunt insurgents

Our threat centric approach led us to using Afghanistan as a base camp for a grand hunting expedition in the mountains. This approach enabled us to allow the Afghan government to get off to a stunted start, and also to slip into a scheme of engagement that has been incredibly destabilizing to the Pakistani government as well.

Like a Law school exam question, we miss-identified the issues in our analysis of the question, and have written a brilliant answer to the wrong question. That is usually a "C" at best. Working harder based on that same analysis is still a C. Time for a new analysis of the problem and reduced effort rather than greater. After all, we must also take into account how our actions there at the operational level impact us at the strategic level around the globe. How much strategic capital have we expended on this misstated problem set?

My ops sergeant in ROTC was an E-5 in 5th SFG in Vietnam. He told me about a patrol of ARVN that he was taking into the bush after some VC. When he said he put the ARVN out front, I cut in and asked why he did not lead the patrol himself? I remember vividly the look on his face as he locked eyes with me and said: "Last time I checked, it was their war, not ours."

We need to remember whose war this is, and stop trying to define it in our terms, our lead it with our men. Last time I checked, Vietnam is doing just fine.

[Fuchs]

You might wish to read posts before responding to them. I wrote:

You replied:

The consequences you cite were suffered by the Iraqi State and the Iraqi military, not by Saddam Hussein.

Indeed, this is a world of states. Germany is allied with Italy, not Merkel with Berlusconi. Consequences for evil state actions punish states, while the punishment of actually responsible individuals is a rare cream on the cake. That's the situation.
Again I'd like to point at humility: Those who set maximum goals are destined to fail.
And the international community didn't authorize a punishment of Saddam. Waging war to punish an individual would be a crime in itself.
Oh, and finally; you're wrong again. I didn't mention it, but Saddam suffered a lot. He lost some power, the ability to travel, and he had to fear for his life for years. Why do you think he didn't get killed on day 1 of OIF by cruise missiles? He would have been an easy target and been long since dead if he had lived without serious security-related restrictions post-'91.

The Iraqi people also suffered consequences. Saddam, as I said, suffered no consequences whatsoever: after invading, pillaging, and attempting to annex a neighboring state he was still kicking back in the Palace du jour, receiving oral pleasure from George Galloway. Is that the message you want to send to the dictators of the world?

That's what the United Nations have to decide, not you, me or the POTUS. The U.S. is legally obliged to respect the Charter of the United Nations, which requires peaceful solutions unless authorized by the U.N..
Besides; much of the "pillaging" was mere propaganda anyway.

That they can personally decide to do any damned thing they please, and the consequences, if any, will be suffered by others? That all you have to do is wait a few years and you'll be right back in play with an open invitation to have another go?

Now you don't really want me to apply this to every nation and every head of government, right? I mean, be careful about what you wish.

The party that subverted international law in this case was not the US, it was the UN.

Impossible by definition.

By abdicating its responsibility to impose personal consequences on Saddam for his personal decision to invade, pillage, and attempt to annex a neighbour, the UN left a complete vacuum in the space it is meant to fill.

There's no such responsibility. And honestly, all U.S.Americans should wait till the Cold War has been over for at least one generation (or till the country has distanced itself reliably from Cold War disrespectful behaviour patterns) before seriously expecting that such arguments impress foreigners.

Of course nature abhors a vacuum, and in this case it was the US who filled it: but do you blame the US for following the laws of international physics or the UN for leaving the vacuum in the first place?

Your whole concept seems just wrong to me.
I understand that you aim at the "policeman of the world" image, but to me it's more like a "global schoolyard bully" image, so don't expect me to be impressed.

If it is against the law to enforce the law, then there is no law, and where there is no law common sense has to prevail.

There is a law. Article 1.1 of the United Nations Charter.
It clearly forbade OIF. The offender was the U.S., UK, Poland and some other mislead countries.
The U.S. got away with it officially thanks to veto right in UNSC, but I'm quite sure that the unofficial backlash will last for decades and hurt a lot.

Common sense says that dictators who repeatedly attempt to conquer their neighbors need to be removed from power.

Oh, but they deserve to be supported on the first attempt or what? I ask because that was the U.S. policy on Saddam.

By the logic you cite, the second world war should have ended at the borders of Germany and Japan, and after a few years the Fuhrer and the Emperor should have been permitted to rearm and try again.

WW2 pre-dates the United Nations. The U.N. had no opportunity to authorize more ambitious actions.
I do also fail to see any significant similarity between Iraq and German or Japan.

Would you say it's fine to immediately hang a horse thief nowadays because there were no cell phones in 19th century to call for today's police to do their job on the thief?

Fortunately at that time we had a bit less law and a bit more common sense.

Unfortunately, it led to a fiasco.
Now I guess we won't agree anytime soon if that's your idea of a good solution.

The European concept of "International Law" seems to revolve around elegant laws, erudite jurists, and dignified courts, with no police, no penal system, no capacity for enforcement. Not a concept likely to succeed in the real world.

It's not an European concept, it was very much coined by the U.S., it was agreed on by all U.N. member states and it's the obligation side of the coin of international relations for the U.S..
The other side of the coin includes such things like others feeling obliged to respect treaties with your country, to respect the U.N. and to grant your country a veto right in the UNSC.
It's childish to expect such advantages without accepting the obligations that come with them.
It's even mroe childish to try that and to expect no sh** flying into the fan.


If we are going to speak of historical hypocrisies, what shall we say of Germany criticizing the US - or anyone - for aggressive behaviour?

Easy. We're the ones who learned lessons that you didn't need to learn yet.

Besides; Germany was united in 1871 and began on its own exactly one war since (WW2), participated in three international alliance wars together with Brits and others (Boxer uprising, Kosovo, OEF-A), waged one colonial conflict worth to be called war (Herero uprising) and entered one war as ally (WWI).
1+3+1+1=6. Did I miss one? Six wars and forcible interventions in 138 years. Three in 74 years till unconditional surrender.

For comparison: The U.S. by comparison was involved in about three dozen wars/interventions in the same time frame, almost all of them voluntarily.
My country had a talent for getting almost only into really big fights, but it has never been such a serial offender as the U.S. and UK.

Yes, the Bay of Pigs was a stupid move. Does that mean that the US should no longer respond when attacked? For how long? A century? Forever? Would Germany's history of aggression make it "hypocritical" for Germany to defend itself if attacked? Does England's historical involvement in narcotics peddling make it "hypocritical" for England to prohibit the importation of narcotics?

It means that aggression does not necessarily lead to proportional consequences, and there's no moral high ground to be had for the U.S. after waging so many dirty wars for decades.

Besides; the Taliban did not attack the U.S., so it's not adequate to speak of self-defence.

Maybe you remember the Altmark incident; it's usually agreed that the British action against the Altmark in Norway's waters was illegal even by the standards of the time. That's the best historical analogy for the AQ/Taliban case that I can think of in modern history.

We would need to look back to ancient times to find examples of wars fought because a power provided hospitality to offenders. Troy and stuff.
I do therefore conclude that this is a rather recent U.S. (re-)invention. That doesn't look like a strong case to me.

Nevertheless, I did consider raids as acceptable.
I do just think that the total-war-all-enemies-must-die-or-surrender-to-the-last-man attitude is nonsense.

It's hypocritical anyway, as long as you don't invade Pakistan as well. The friendship with Saudi Arabia was barely stained. Now that looks hypocritical as well.

mine is red, obviously

[Ken White]

Mission accomplishment and unilateral action is heavily ingrained into our mindset, and that is why I caution on the current construct of Pop-centric COIN. Changing that culture and forcing GPF to advise and assist, not kick down the doors will be a long process.

He is completely correct that it will be a long process. The real question that MUST be asked is; Do we really want to do that?

That it can be done is a given, whether it should be done is the question. Changing that culture -- and it is a deeply entrenched cultural phenomenon -- may have quite adverse consequences in other forms of war. The hard fact is is that the GPF are not designed, trained or suited for such roles. Special Forces are equipped and trained to do that and can do it very well; their employment prior to a situation deteriorating to the point the GPF are committed can reduce the need to so commit.

There is no question that the GPF have to be prepared and trained for such commitments but there should also be no question that such usage will adversely impact their core skills and, far more importantly for the US, will produce only poor results unless the GPF are assisted by significant quantities of SF in their training role and civilian agency support in the development roles in which case the performance level will rise to marginal. Stellar performance is not an option given our personnel and rotation policies. These fact lead to the conclusion that GPF commitment in such roles should be only done as a last resort and due to the failure of all other options.

Mike F is advocating caution in the employment of the GPF in a role for which they are not tempermentally suited. History says that's correct. We can employ the GPF in such roles but will get only a marginal performance. There several counterpoints to that, two obvious examples are:

1. Changing the culture to gain improvement. Can obviously be done but that improvment in a supplementary and minor role will denigrate capability in primary warfighting mission sets.

2. Form dedicated 'Advisory' elements. This is woefully far from being cost effective and it will lead to forced usage of those elements even in situations where such use is contraindicated. Congress will insist on employment or deactivation.

Neither of those or several other alternatives offer much hope for improvement. Thomas P. M. Barnett's 'SysAdmin Force' is a possible alternative but it should be a new element, part of DoS and NOT DoD and should not be considered an Armed Force or military service, more a Peace Corps not totally peaceful and on steroids. I doubt Congress will pay for that.

So far better to heed Bob's World who advocates less interference in the affairs of other nations. We do that not so much because it is necessary but because we're big enough to get away with it, too selfish to invest in others and too lazy to investigate other ways to achieve the changes we desire. Those are not good reasons...

[MikeF]

The populace-centric ideas I have put forward (prioritize the needs of the populace over those of the government or threats emerging from them) are significantly different than the population-centric (control the populace while attempting to buy their support with massive governmental effectiveness programs) pushed by CNAS.

Bribing and controlling your a populace is like a leader who puts strict controls on his men, ignores their real issues, but buys them beer come Friday. I actually had a squad leader like that who asked my why his men disrespected him so much when after a week of abuse he would buy them sodas.

One tremendous handicap that we have in both Iraq and Afghanistan is that we have tremendous authority to do whatever we want. In the Philippines our hands were tied and our resources constrained. We were forced to be smart, be frugal and to take a backseat to the HN's desires and lead. Much of what is good about what we have done there was more by irritating necessity than brilliant design.

Best thing we could probably do in Afghanistan is place similar harsh constraints on ourselves, and tailor our mission set accordingly as well. Not only does this help remove the stink of US legitimacy over the Karzai government, it also forces us to shape our efforts to support and not lead the efforts there. Such actions will empower our narrative that we are not invaders. Focus our presence on force multipliers to empower HN security forces rather than on combat power to hunt insurgents

Our threat centric approach led us to using Afghanistan as a base camp for a grand hunting expedition in the mountains. This approach enabled us to allow the Afghan government to get off to a stunted start, and also to slip into a scheme of engagement that has been incredibly destabilizing to the Pakistani government as well.

Like a Law school exam question, we miss-identified the issues in our analysis of the question, and have written a brilliant answer to the wrong question. That is usually a "C" at best. Working harder based on that same analysis is still a C. Time for a new analysis of the problem and reduced effort rather than greater. After all, we must also take into account how our actions there at the operational level impact us at the strategic level around the globe. How much strategic capital have we expended on this misstated problem set?

My ops sergeant in ROTC was an E-5 in 5th SFG in Vietnam. He told me about a patrol of ARVN that he was taking into the bush after some VC. When he said he put the ARVN out front, I cut in and asked why he did not lead the patrol himself? I remember vividly the look on his face as he locked eyes with me and said: "Last time I checked, it was their war, not ours."

We need to remember whose war this is, and stop trying to define it in our terms, our lead it with our men. Last time I checked, Vietnam is doing just fine.

This may be the post of the year.

[Ken White]

and this thread is going beyond normal discussion. I think it would be wise for all of us to avoid any more posts on this thread at this time about any nations failures. All nations have many and all have their good points -- not much of that has to do with warfighting.

A reminder that this Board is for the discussion of warfighting and not for political diatribes. Some political discussion is inherent but accusations and casting aspersions and blame contribute nothing and merely invite defenses and counterclaims.

So please, let's return to the thread: New Guidance on Counterinsurgency.

[Steve Blair]

and this thread is going beyond normal discussion. I think it would be wise for all of us to avoid any more posts on this thread at this time about any nations failures. All nations have many and all have their good points -- not much of that has to do with warfighting.

A reminder that this Board is for the discussion of warfighting and not for political diatribes. Some political discussion is inherent but accusations and casting aspersions and blame contribute nothing and merely invite defenses and counterclaims.

So please, let's return to the thread: New Guidance on Counterinsurgency.

Concur. Otherwise it will be locked.

[Dayuhan]

Looking at a whole stack of unsupportable and vulnerable red-type arguments just waiting to be dissected... but the moderators object (rightly, I concede), and a day on the river awaits, so I shall reluctantly refrain. Y'all have fun.

[jmm99]

from Bob's World (JMM bold added)
The populace-centric ideas I have put forward (prioritize the needs of the populace over those of the government or threats emerging from them) are significantly different than the population-centric (control the populace while attempting to buy their support with massive governmental effectiveness programs) pushed by CNAS.

I recognize the difference in your approach from the what I would call the "reformist" (population-centric) approach - no word-coining on my part; I ripped off Eqbal Ahmad.

So, the question is: What do you do, given the needs of the populace (and including in the rights to self-determination and to good governance), where the incumbant government cannot or will not meet those needs ?[*]

This question posits that the existing insurgency against the incumbant government is also unacceptable. Historically, we could pick any number of Latin-American countries in the past century - with a number of US interventions. That is, oligarchs ruling over very poor and exploited populations, with insurgencies too radical for our taste as well.

Do you simply pack up your bags and leave; or do you engineer a "third way" movement - perhaps, not that far from the radical insurgents, but expressing the needs of the populace ?

Further posit that the NCAs have given COL Jones complete freedom of action to do what he thinks is right.

----------------------------
[*] Also posited is that the incumbant government has no ears to hear the excellent briefings of COL Jones, who is therefore in the same shoes as Paul of Acts.

PS: Upon reflection, you can answer this in two parts, using two roles: (1) COL Jones, USASF - not indigenous (so, not "his fight"); and (2) COL Jones, indigenous military, who has the appropriate group of "misfits", military and civilian, to engineer a "third way" (so, it is "his fight").

[Bob's World]

I recognize the difference in your approach from the what I would call the "reformist" (population-centric) approach - no word-coining on my part; I ripped off Eqbal Ahmad.

So, the question is: What do you do, given the needs of the populace (and including in the rights to self-determination and to good governance), where the incumbant government cannot or will not meet those needs ?[*]

This question posits that the existing insurgency against the incumbant government is also unacceptable. Historically, we could pick any number of Latin-American countries in the past century - with a number of US interventions. That is, oligarchs ruling over very poor and exploited populations, with insurgencies too radical for our taste as well.

Do you simply pack up your bags and leave; or do you engineer a "third way" movement - perhaps, not that far from the radical insurgents, but expressing the needs of the populace ?

Further posit that the NCAs have given COL Jones complete freedom of action to do what he thinks is right.

----------------------------
[*] Also posited is that the incumbant government has no ears to hear the excellent briefings of COL Jones, who is therefore in the same shoes as Paul of Acts.

PS: Upon reflection, you can answer this in two parts, using two roles: (1) COL Jones, USASF - not indigenous (so, not "his fight"); and COL Jones, indigenous military, who has the appropriate group of "misfits", military and civilian, to engineer a "third way" (so, it is "his fight").

Like my country, I must start with our Declaration of Independence. We are founded on the principle of the unalienable right and duty of every populace to rise up in insurgency at such time as its governance becomes "despotic." What exactly is despotic? Well, that is something for every populace to decide for itself as well.

So, If I am faced with a country that has a government that first was so despotic (what I call poor governance) as to incite some significant segment of its populace to insurgency; and then is so lame as to not be able to deal with the problem that it started; that to me is a government that must go. No government has a right rule when its own populace thinks it must go. To intervene and attempt to preserve the government against it populace's will creates the very conditions that I think are at the root of what we call the GWOT.

When a populace believes that its government draws its legitimacy more from some source that they do not recognize than it does from one they do, they will target that source in the conduct of their insurgency if need be to achieve good governance. I believe this conditions exists throughout the middle east due to our Cold War engagement, and AQ is conducting a savvy UW campaign to incite and support these disparate insurgencies, and also encouraging them to attack the source of inappropriate legitimacy over the same. So the Main Effort for the US should be to ID and address these perceptions of inappropriate US legitimacy over these allied governments. And then, where necessary, be a mediator between the governments and their populaces to try to keep change evolutionary rather than revolutionary.

Now, it is not up to us to decide if the incoming government is "acceptable" or not. By definition any government that prevails is "acceptable" to the populace. If it turns out that it did not have full support and itself becomes despotic, it too will suffer the same fate. Some things you just have to work out for yourself, because any external solution, no matter how good, will be bad. We can certainly let the new kids on the block that we have eyes in the sky, and that if we see them violating international law and abusing their populace that we will punish key leaders. We have the tools to do this; and we don't need to occupy the country to do so.