The Army We Need

[RTK]

I re-read some old posts tonight and I came to three burning questions:

Are current force modernization efforts based upon the fights in which we are currently engaged resultant of failed foreign policy strategies or are they based upon a coherent concept of future threats to the nation?

Is it possible that future wars will include both conventional and unconventional aspects where both COIN/CT focused units and heavier conventional units will be required?

Are we shooting spiders off our shoes with a 12 gauge?

Discuss....

[slapout9]

Are current force modernization efforts based upon the fights in which we are currently engaged resultant of failed foreign policy strategies.

Yes to this and it is a big one. If we had some type of rational energy policy we wouldn't even be envolved in half the countries that are on the enemy/threat list.

[Ski]

As someone who worked in the 50A field until 2006 (when I left that arena to join the 59A squad of looters), I can tell you that your first assessment is dead on.

Force development (how units are formed) and force modernization (how they are equipped) has been totally driven by our foreign policy since the 1990's. If you want to get into brushfire wars with multiple enemies fighting each other, and then you once you inject yourself into the system, then you don't need mechanized and armored forces. The USMC knew this in the 80's when they began development of the LAV force. They needed wheeled vehicle to traverse the usually terrible road networks when conducting NEO's, and just a little bit of armor to protect the joes. Throw a 25mm cannon and maybe a TOW system and you have enough firepower and protection for most third world scenarios.

The MRAP is the illogical conclusion of all of this nonsense. It is still not on any TOE or MTOE within the Army - perhaps a few specialized Engineer units are the exception.

You have to understand that there is no such thing as threat based modernization strategies any longer. That horse road out the barn in the 90's. Everything is capabilities driven - you can thank the Network Centric warfare guys for starting this road to perdition.

As to your second question, yes. All wars are a blend of both. It all depends on the senior commanders, their intelligence, mental flexibilty and willingness to innovate.

As to your final statement, of course.

I re-read some old posts tonight and I came to three burning questions:

Are current force modernization efforts based upon the fights in which we are currently engaged resultant of failed foreign policy strategies or are they based upon a coherent concept of future threats to the nation?

Is it possible that future wars will include both conventional and unconventional aspects where both COIN/CT focused units and heavier conventional units will be required?

Are we shooting spiders off our shoes with a 12 gauge?

Discuss....

[bumperplate]

Been reading this thread with particular attention to our current training methodologies.

I can't at this moment sum it all up in one or two sentences but there are excellent points in this thread about training. As an Army and as a society we are fixated on metrics. Things must be quantitative. I understand this from a scientific and statistical perspective. But, when it is used to assess the performance of organizations that constantly must execute varied, random, and unpredictable tasks, it is counter-productive. Conducting operations in southern Baghdad is not like showing proficiency in writing out the proof of the first fundamental theorem of calculus. Thus, suitability of a unit for conducting such operations cannot be assessed in a likewise manner.

In the Army, we must crack the code on this and get away from these futile exercises in training, looking to follow a recipe, check X% of boxes for the GO, just head for the PowerPoint slide showing "T" or green or whatever.

While I've met many NCOs and officers I wouldn't trust or follow in combat, overall we have some good ones out there that know their craft and can train their subordinates. To date I have not found any manual that can train a group of 19K Privates about the M2 like a seasoned 19K30 can. Nor have I encountered any manual or test that tells me that a Private is ready to man that M2 in combat as well as tough training, mentoring, and assessment from that 19K30.

I think, in the end, our central problem is trust. Our senior leaders don't trust that we can let that 19K30 loose on a bunch of junior Soldiers and train them on that M2.