Weight of Combat Gear Is Taking Toll

[Uboat509]

The problem with body armor now has more to do with risk adversity than anything else. The body armor we use now was not originally designed to be used the way we do now. It was intended for short duration use on an assault, especially in MOUT. In MOUT, and CQC in particular, the ranges at which combat takes place necessitate the use of some kind of body armor. Weight is less of an issue because of the shorter distances moved (versus contact in a wooded area or an open area), and the need for protection outweighs the need for speed or endurance. The problem came about when it was determined that the need for protection outweighed all other factors in all cases. As Ken often points out, when politicians become too involved in military operations bad things happen. In this case it became popular to attack the Bush administration and Rumsfeld in particular for sending our troops to combat "without adequate protection," including, among other things, body armor and increasing amounts of armor on our vehicles. It eventually reached the point where, if little Johnny is killed and he wasn't wearing body armor, there is a good chance that some elected official or other is going to want to look into why. In those cases, any viable reasons either for or against the policy tend to get lost in the political catfighting and the troops on the ground get stuck with whatever policy is most politically viable, regardless of whether or not it is tactically viable.

[jps2]

So why do we continue to patrol on roads rather than patrol by foot avoiding roads and paths. And by the way, why patrolling instead of staying and living with the good guys, ambushing the bad armed ones during night ?

please notice that I'm not an innocent about the "natives" expectations, everybody knows that the "natives" will have to stay there after we left.

[Uboat509]

So why do we continue to patrol on roads rather than patrol by foot avoiding roads and paths. And by the way, why patrolling instead of staying and living with the good guys, ambushing the bad armed ones during night ?

We do that, although not necessarily as much as or where we should. One of the issues is the distances involved. Many of the areas that we go are not really within walking distance. Travel cross-country in vehicles is problematic for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that there is a good deal of terrain that is only passable to vehicle traffic where the roads are. It would be nice if we had enough rotary wing assets to be able to severly reduce the amount of vehicle traffic that we have but we do not and will not anytime in the forseeable future. As such, our guys walk when they can and drive when they have to.

[jps2]

Thanks for clearing that point, Uboat509.
In the same idea, do you think that FOBs are the best way for us to understand the expectations/limits of Afghanis and for them to accept us ?

[JMA]

Thanks for clearing that point, Uboat509.
In the same idea, do you think that FOBs are the best way for us to understand the expectations/limits of Afghanis and for them to accept us ?

A question on FOBs. What percentage of the otherwise fighting troops are tied down in situ at any time so as to defend these FOBs?

Another question on FOBs. What percentage of the vehicle travel requirements are generated by having to resupply these FOBs?

[Infanteer]

A question on FOBs. What percentage of the otherwise fighting troops are tied down in situ at any time so as to defend these FOBs?

What do you consider a FOB? I ask because there is a difference between a piece of tactical infrastructure with a battalion on it and when where a platoon operates out of? Are we critiquing all tactical infrastructure?

I ask because a Company in a FOB or three Platoons dispersed into small compounds in villages would likely require the same amount of people to secure the position.

Another question on FOBs. What percentage of the vehicle travel requirements are generated by having to resupply these FOBs?

Probably most - remember, that vehicle traffic would be required either way if the soldiers were in a FOB or not; it would probably require more traffic if delivery of classes of supply wasn't centralized at a few key FOBs.

[JMA]

We do that, although not necessarily as much as or where we should. One of the issues is the distances involved. Many of the areas that we go are not really within walking distance. Travel cross-country in vehicles is problematic for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that there is a good deal of terrain that is only passable to vehicle traffic where the roads are. It would be nice if we had enough rotary wing assets to be able to severly reduce the amount of vehicle traffic that we have but we do not and will not anytime in the forseeable future. As such, our guys walk when they can and drive when they have to.

OK, so there is a requirement for chopper lift capacity. If adequate lift was available by what % would the vehicle movement reduce? And likewise by what % would the requirement to walk between points where there is no specific tactical reason to do so?

[JMA]

The problem with body armor now has more to do with risk adversity than anything else. The body armor we use now was not originally designed to be used the way we do now. It was intended for short duration use on an assault, especially in MOUT. In MOUT, and CQC in particular, the ranges at which combat takes place necessitate the use of some kind of body armor. Weight is less of an issue because of the shorter distances moved (versus contact in a wooded area or an open area), and the need for protection outweighs the need for speed or endurance. The problem came about when it was determined that the need for protection outweighed all other factors in all cases.

OK, so body armour is being used universally as opposed to what you believe it was intended for (which I happen to agree with you on).

While the Brits are tight lipped on to what extent body armour has reduced KIA/WIA is there any open source info on this from the US side?