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Thread: Airpower Jumping Off In Syria

  1. #41
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by CrowBat View Post
    OK, since you like reading my posts, here something I consider a good example for 'how to do it'.

    In your answer to AP, you mentioned Rhodesians. I find it estranging that it seems everybody, literally all the serious students of 'small wars' and 'modern air power at war' got struck with the RhAF in the 1970s. Even more so because the ascendant from that air force provided a 1st class example for much more serious 'expeditionary deployment' in relatively recent times.

    Early August 1998: Zimbabwean Defence Forces were put on alert for deployment to the DR Congo. Nobody expected a 'war': task was to control the withdrawal of Rwandan forces from there.

    That is: unless certain General Kabarebe (RPA) - better known as big friend of various 1 or 2-star generals at AFRICOM, a great COIN adviser, 'innovative thinker', even 'revolutionary military mind' (cough!) within the ranks of quite US Army scholars - came to the idea to launch a de-facto 'airborne' invasion of Kinshasa: he led one of RPA's SF-units over the border into Goma (eastern DRC), commandeered at least four, perhaps five airliners are the local airfield, then stuffed these full with his troops (Rwandans), few Ugandan units etc. and then flew all of that to Kitona AB, in western DRC, on the Atlantic coast.

    Once there, Kabarebe's force swiftly overpowered the Congolese guards of about 15,000 ex-Mobutu troops held in 're-education camp' and then this mob rushed in direction of Kinshasa, 300+ kilometres away.

    With Kaberebe's force approaching Kinshasa, Zims were left without the choice: in order to save Kabila's gov, their ally, they used even civilian C-47s (yup, old transports from WWII) to rush about 800 paras, two of their SAS squads, and then four each of Hawks, FB.337s, AB.412s, and several Alouettes of their Air Force (Air Force of Zimbabwe, AFZ) to N'Djili IAP.

    That's about 1,900 kilometres as the crow flies from Harare to Kinshasa.

    Again, this is a very, very short version (full story can be read here) so let me just summarize that a combo of SAS ambushes followed by AFZ strikes has slowed down Kabarebe's advance so much that he reached south-western outskirts of Kinshasa only on 27 August, by when the Zim para battalion has already established a defence perimeter and was reinforced by a squad of Cascavel armoured cars. Early on that morning, Kabarebe then attempted to overrun the Zims at N'Djili with help of a ploy, but that attempt failed. That is: it failed partially. Rwandans, Ugandans, and 'mutineers' found themselves in possession of the southern half of the runway, the Zims in control of the northern part.

    The point was (and remains): N'Djili has a runway some 5,000+ metres long. So, the Zims used their half of the runway to fly strikes against enemy entrenched - literally - 'at the other side of the runway'. But foremost: Zim commanders didn't guess about what to do, didn't hesitate nor waste their time with philosophic recourses about strategy and tactics, about target selection or how to hit 'Ring 1, Ring 2....' etc style targets somewhere in Rwanda, 1,500 kilometres away. They hit the enemy that was clearly in front of them: well, that with 'clearly' was relative, then the mass of Kabarebe's force was concentrated on the eastern side of N'Djili slum.

    Anyway, the Zims flew so intensively for the next few days, that the engines of their aircraft and helicopters were turned on in the morning and off only late in the evening; even cooks and caterers were trained in preparing bombs and hauling them to planes...

    After losing all the heavy weaponry the Congolese mutineers brought with them (including several Type-62 and Type-59 tanks, plus plenty of ZPUs and all of Ugandan artillery), and after enjoying being at the receiving end of this onslaught for some four days, the Rwandans began falling back, and then the Zim paras - supported by Cascavel armoured cars - launched their counterattack. The battle was over about a week after it started, with remnants of Kabarebe's forces fleeing in chaos through the jungle and over the border to northern Angola - from where they were evacuated by Viktor Bout's transports at Christmas 1998 (actually, Kabarebe has left not only all the Congolese but a significant bunch of Ugandans behind; Zim and then Angolans have spent two months mopping up all of these).

    While Kabarebe's force suffered several thousands of casualties (KIA and WIA combined, though of course most of these were Congolese that fought on this side), Zims lost some 20 KIA; while most of involved AFZ's planes and helicopters were hit by ground fire not only once, none was shot down. And despite pitched and days-long fighting through kilometres-deep slums of N'Djili, 'collateral' damage was minimal - so much so, the locals were more than happy to greet Zims as liberators (highest number of reported casualties stopped at about 300 civilians - and this despite Hawks levelling several of local churches: these were used by Rwandans with predilection because of their strong construction...BTW, if you ask Rwandans, this battle 'never happened'; they were 'forced to withdraw' because of Angola's entry into the war).

    And all of this without any use of sat intel, with no ELINT and minimal SIGINT, next to no HUMINT (most of it was useless, anyway), no LGBs, no GPS-guided PGMs, no stealth planes, no APCs or MBTs developed for 20+ years and at the price of several billions - and none of all other sorts of high-tech wizardry used by the US military.

    Now, I can understand that such 'obscure' battles remain unknown in the general public, or that the US military would never come to the idea to do something like the Zims have done and rush a relatively small force into a completely isolated place encircled by 10-fold more numerous enemy, 1,900 kilometres from nearest US base. (And, to make sure: I do not 'demand' anything of that sort). I admit having my problems with understanding that such battles remain unknown within circles of specialists: after all, it would be their job to find out about them, and 'learn lessons'.

    But, what I cannot understand the least is that the US military - whether in total or CENTCOM only - can't even do its work in regards of something it should be capable of 'doing in sleep': namely, organizing and running an aerial campaign against the Daesh in Syria.

    By side all the problems related with political strategy that is mindlessly nonsensical: but the sheer fact the military can't cope with the task is, ladies and gentlemen, simply a shame.
    CrowBat,
    that was great report thanks for posting. I will probably order the book someday as soon as I catch up on the rest of my reading. Around 2016

  2. #42
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    All insurgents are civilians...

    Just one more reason that Clausewitzian (or Wardenian) war logic does not apply very well to population-based conflicts. The strategic paradigm is different, and many of the terms and concepts lead reasonably to lines of logic and actions that are, frankly, counterproductive at best.

    But if we accept that the states of Syria and Iraq no longer exist in their legally defined and recognized terms, and that a new, de facto Sunni state currently under ISIL leadership has emerged, then one can actually apply Clausewitz or Warden against that new, de facto state. Doing this, however, accepts that the former, formal states no longer exist as defined. I think we should do this, but I don't think we are ready to.

    Our strategy is much more in defense of the increasingly irrelevant Sykes-Picot agreement and our own plan for Iraq than it is a pursuit of a future, naturally stable Levant where US interests are not at risk. Doubling down on the past may produce temporary effects (like led to our initial withdrawal from Iraq), but are highly unlikely to produce an enduring result.
    Robert C. Jones
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    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  3. #43
    Council Member CrowBat's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    ...Doing this, however, accepts that the former, formal states no longer exist as defined. I think we should do this, but I don't think we are ready to.

    ...
    Doubling down on the past may produce temporary effects (like led to our initial withdrawal from Iraq), but are highly unlikely to produce an enduring result.
    Full agreement here. Though, I'm going a step further and say: Obama is doing whatever is possible to return the situation to that before 2011, at least before 2013.

    And that's never going to work: it's an entirely different game meanwhile.

  4. #44
    Council Member AmericanPride's Avatar
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    Bob,

    What does a "naturally stable Levant where US interests are not at risk" look like in your estimation?
    When I am weaker than you, I ask you for freedom because that is according to your principles; when I am stronger than you, I take away your freedom because that is according to my principles. - Louis Veuillot

  5. #45
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    We may never know in our lifetimes - particularly when the US is so heavily invested in sustaining the status quo of a handful of gov to gov relationships.

    President Washington wisely cautioned against forming designated friends or foes either one, and no place more than the Middle East and the far East do we do both.

    I think Samuel Huntington nailed the issue fairly well when he observed that the US "needs to see the world as it actually is."
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  6. #46
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Default Colonel Warden "This Is Not An Air Campaign"

    Latest CNN interview of Colonel Warden on situation in Syria and Iraq and why this is NOT an Air Campaign and what a real one would be like.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tcg4...ature=youtu.be

  7. #47
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Default The Daily Beast

    link to Daily Beast Article on "Americas WTF Airwar" some quotws from Warden are in the article.



    http://www.thedailybeast.com/article...in-syria.html#

  8. #48
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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    link to Daily Beast Article on "Americas WTF Airwar" some quotws from Warden are in the article.


    http://www.thedailybeast.com/article...in-syria.html#
    I don't think Warden's Five Rings is applicable to IS, but do agree with this comment.

    A very big difference is intensity; the current operation against the IS appears to be significantly less intense (even on a relative basis).”
    Not so sure about this one.

    Some analysts argue U.S. airpower is constrained because of the lack of target spotters on the ground. Even so, Warden says, “Many (perhaps the majority) of important strategic targets can be found through drone and satellite observation.”
    I agree with this, and as Carl has mentioned on more than one occasion, the U.S. does not fight to win anymore. Once we decide to use force, we generally need to use it decisively. We violated several principles of war/warfare to include violating surprise, initiative, mass, objective, and offense (persistent, overwhelming, and unrelenting). Frankly we defaulted to a campaign based on show that many are already seeing through. IS has already adapted, and they are gaining psychological advantage by demonstrating they can continue to gain ground despite our lame air campaign. The air campaign won't work without ground forces if our goal is to destroy IS, but it sure has heck can do better than this in degrading them.

    While Kurds – and Syrian Sunni rebels -- come up with conspiracy theories about the U.S. holding at arm’s length those who are fighting ISIS on the ground in Syria, the American approach seems more in keeping with the “hesitation and half-steps” of the Obama administration that former spy director and Pentagon chief Leon Panetta complains about in his forthcoming book, Worthy Fights.

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