Time for a FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency Update

[Steve the Planner]

Policy School 101---An accurate PROBLEM DEFINITION.

Dayuhan's observation that, in Iraq and Afghanistan, we removed an unwanted government---opposition/conflict emerged in the wake.

Ambassador Crocker was recently quoted along the lines that, at last, the Iraqis can get on with the messy process of sorting out their differences, and future without us in the middle.

A lot of echos to above comments.

[Bill Moore]

I agree that the study of history for military professionals is critical for their development, but the study of history alone without classes on critical thinking and a command climate that fosters critical thinking can actually be a detriment.

Sargent wrote,

The goal in any analysis of past events to inform current policy is to find comparable examples. It is a simple and known principle. It exists so as to provide the best possible conclusions. Where bad comparisons are knowingly used, the objective is usually to prove a conclusion arrived at ahead of time.

All too often, especially today, we have military professionals who have a read a couple of books on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, and based on this limited knowledge base they have formed biases that encourage them to bring preconceptions to the table (or as Sargent wrote, prove a conclusion arrived at ahead of time). Often, and without so much as a second thought, they'll spout out the center of gravity is the populace (or another accepted truth), and the planners will be directed to focus on methods to win their hearts, while ignoring other issues. Of course there is are no historical examples where we have won by solely focusing our efforts on winning the hearts of the populace, but that doesn't seem to matter when you have a limited understanding of history and are not required to think critically.

Steve the Planner got it right, policy 101 is correctly identifying the problem, but that so much easier said than done.