The Army We Need

[Bob's World]

Confess that this my first blush with this manual myself. Agree with Gian and Wilf, and in general find it to be way too (hold onto your hat) threat-centric in its approach. Today we can no longer storm ashore on any foreign coast we chose, and simply support the side that closest matches our US interests in the area by force of arms.

Now more than ever we must prioritize the position of the populace of any country where we insert ourselves into the mix. Would love to sit down with Smedley Butler to discuss....

[Steve Blair]

Within its historical context (read Mars Learning for more on that), the SWM is an amazing piece of work. Sadly, too many on both sides of the debate ignore that context. The SWM was really the first major doctrine publication put out by the US military on that area of warfare. Is it all applicable now? Of course not, but neither is Active Defense. Is it gospel? Of course not, but there is precious little in doctrinal writing that is. It was more an attempt to codify lessons that would certainly have been lost otherwise in an area where the Corps expected to deploy again at some point in the future.

Of course, had the British Army come out with it in the 1920s or so, I'm sure it would be gospel.... (joke, for those who don't get emoticons)

[Gian P Gentile]

Steve:

Agree with your post especially that too many folks take the SWM out of its context and turn it into a "how to" manual for today's conflicts.

Problem with it, Steve, as I see things is that nobody has the 1976 version of 100-5 (active defense) on reading lists and as "must reads" before deploying to Iraq or Astan. But that Marine SWM has become the latter. And unlike other great works from the past the have an element of timelessness and ongoing relevance to them (eg., Thuycidies, Clausewitz, Callwell, Lawrence, to name a few) the Marine SWM really is a situational, historical text and should be read that way.

gian

[Ken White]

context -- in particular context of the times. Things change. I did things in Korea that were not supposed to be done in Viet Nam. I'm sure we did things in VN that no one can legally do today. I suppose we're better off for that but I do have to wonder occasionally...

The SWM is like every other piece of military gospel I've read -- and that's a bunch, I'm old and it's my only hobby -- it has its uses and its suggestions (that's all they are) must be applied with caution and an appreciation (METT-TC like) for the specifics of the situation. Same thing applies to Orde Wingate, Clausewitz, Belisaurius, Sun Tzu, Khalid ibn Walid and all the nominal experts and savants of today. Even applies to my personal pet, Subatai...

Even doctrine must be regarded skeptically. One has to know it well, apply it usually but always be prepared to interpolate and modify.

Apply anyone else's solutions of the times to your tactical, operational -- or strategic -- problems of the moment without a great deal of thought and you'll be in trouble.

[Ken White]

...as I see things is that nobody has the 1976 version of 100-5 (active defense) on reading lists and as "must reads" before deploying to Iraq or Astan...unlike other great works from the past the have an element of timelessness and ongoing relevance to them (eg., Thuycidies, Clausewitz, Callwell, Lawrence, to name a few)...

That was one of several items of 'doctrine' -- some much more current -- I had in mind just above.

I agree with all your named authors as having merit but would submit they too can lead one astray if not placed in context and modified IAW the actual situation of the moment. No one has yet come up with a golden bullet, many can provide a few silver bullets...

[Gian P Gentile]

That was one of several items of 'doctrine' -- some much more current -- I had in mind just above.

I agree with all your named authors as having merit but would submit they too can lead one astray if not placed in context and modified IAW the actual situation of the moment. No one has yet come up with a golden bullet, many can provide a few silver bullets...

Ken:

You are right; it would be hard for somebody who has no background reading and knowledge in the middle east and its history to understand lawrence, or somebody who has no background in military theory to get Clausewitz. Heck I remember when I bought my first copy of st carl at the inf officer advanced course in 1990 and read it, or at least tried to, and looked around and asked myself if I was an idiot because I just spent an entire weekend reading through this and the only thing i got out of it was something about the relationship between war and politics.

But with study and reflection many of these texts can be understood, and the ones that I mentioned have in my mind a timelessness to them that other texts simply do not. And your point about history and context and the reader of it is exactly what Clausewitz was getting at in his dicsussion on historical criticism and a theory of war.

gian

[John T. Fishel]

Gian. I wrote a piece back in 95 - published in Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement (before I became its editor and it went out of business) called "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, the GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night." Near the beginning of the piece, I discussed Callwell and the SWM and argued that the authors of the SWM were very much acquainted with Callwell, Indeed, their discussion of what Small Wars are parallels his - with one major exception. The Marines who wroted the SWM rejected wars of imperial conquest in their manual - something Colonel Callwell applauded.

The SWM is mostly TTP. In that sense it resembles the new COIN manual FM 3-24, or rather 3-24 resembles the SWM. Some TTP has changed over the decades; some remains the same. If there is a need to use mounted troops and pack animals then the SWM is a good source (Afghanistan anyone?). Gospel it is not. But it is a fascinating look at a point in the evolution of Small Wars. Certainly, one can go back to classical times to look for examples of insurgencies and other small wars that look much like those of the present. It is interesting to read Josephus' account of the Jewish revolt in light of, say the FLN's revolution in Algeria and Kilcullen's enemy centric v. population centric strategies. Obviously, Callwell is another point on the timeline - closer to the Banana Wars that are the focus of the SWM than is Josephus - but the issues we are discussing here reflect those from past records, wars, and writers from antiquity to the present.

Cheers

JohnT

[Gian P Gentile]

JohnT:

Right; I think we may have had this discussion once before on a previous thread.

Agree with what you say about SWM and Callwell. My point though was to highlight the elevated status that SWM has received especially since the start of the Iraq War and it has come to be seen in some circles as a historical "how to" conduct small wars manual with template-like relevance for the present. You are right in that it is a fascinating look into marine operations during that period. Although at least philosophically even though the marines did not consider themselves imperialist like the British, well others might see more similarities than dissimilarities. Smedley Butler certainly saw his and his marines' actions as part of american imperialism in central america.

You are right to point out the links between SWM and Callwell and of course the authors of the manual acknowledge the influence of Callwell on their writing of it. However, Callwell is of a different class in my mind. I would consider him, like Lawrence, as a minor military classic. In that sense I would elevate him above other more popular coin practioners so admired and used in today's army like Galula, Thompson, and Kitson. Reason for my saying this is simply in the breadth of knowledge of history and theory displayed in Callwell and its application in the writing of his book.

just some thoughts; liked your Sword3 Piece.

So you were editor of a journal and it went out of business? reminds me of sam adams and his attempt at beer making and tax collecting; failed at both endeavors. But what the heck, he was a superb revolutionary.

gian

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

But a death in the immediate family, and all the logistics that entails, and getting my youngest spawn off to Basra (who as a matter of fact just rung us up to let us know she was in Kuwait awaiting transport) has occupied a fair a mount of my time as of late.

On another thread here I pontificated:

“In many respects I agree with Gentile’s concerns and do not believe he is anti-COIN. The Army needs to have a robust capability to fight in both types of warfare. IMHO it is much easier for a Soldier who is highly trained in the complexities of employing the variety of weapons systems in conventional warfare to quickly adapt to a COIN/LIC/IW situation than it is for a Soldier who is trained predominantly in COIN to function at his optimum when thrust into the chaos of conventional war.

Soldiers, after all, are trained to obey orders, but to follow orders they need the skills. Conventional warfare requires solid skill sets, many of which that are also useful in COIN. COIN is more of an intellectual exercise requiring a common sense approach, an understanding of human behavior, and empathy with the local population, skills not necessarily taught or quantified in an FM.”

How we train is how we fight and at present training does seem to be slipping further towards being overly COIN centric, to the detriment of those hard skills Soldiers and Marines need. IMHO an “Advisor Corps” of the magnitude that Nagl recommends would strip away too many valuable troops from the main force. Better to develop an “Advisor Cadre,” place it within ARSOC or SOCOM, expand ARSOC to allow for sufficient personnel, make a fair amount of the strength Guard and Reserve, stop using SOF predominantly in DA, and tie them closer to State in some areas.

As to the SWM, it must be taken in the context and era for which it was written. The Marine Corps that fought in the “Banana Wars” of the 20s and 30s was not the Marine Corps that emerged from the Pacific Campaign. The genesis of that Marine Corps was Culebra and Quantico, not Haiti and Nicaragua. What I feel the “Banana Wars” contributed to the senior combat leaders in WW II was a taste of close quarters combat. At any level entering combat for the first time is a mind-boggling experience. There is great advantage to having combat vets in leadership positions when a unit enters combat for the first time, especially a green unit.

We do not need a COIN operated Army (or Marine Corps) we need a robust conventional Army and Marine Corps that is also capable of COIN and savvy in limited operations in conjunction with State in nation building/rebuilding.

To me that entails a greater fostering of professional inquisitiveness on the part of all ranks. I cracked open St Karl as a corporal, fortunately for me it was an abridged version but still, like Gian noted, it made little sense to me at the time and even made my head hurt a bit. But as I read more works by other theorists, delved into doctrine, and explored military history it made returning back to the old German dude easier and he started to make sense. To me John Boyd’s massive briefing “Patterns of Conflict” was less theoretical and more a revelation of how military history and theory all flowed together like a massive quilt writ large across the ages. That one should look at it all holistically and not try to cherry pick favorite strategies or theories. I am reminded of the introduction to the Encyclopedia Britannica’s series The Great Books. In it the editors posit that a “great conversation’ was occurring throughout the millennia between the Greek philosophers to those of the 20th Century. That each work of literature built on what came before. I see military theory and history entwined in a similar “conversation” across the ages. It’s tougher to see where you’re going if you don’t understand where you’ve been.

The Army we need is one well versed in conducting complex combat operations against a peer foe and can also decisively wage COIN.

[John T. Fishel]

You're probably right about previous threads. I'm an old guy - like Ken - and I often foget what I've written after it's posted.

I hadn't thought about Callwell in the way you suggest. Have to review him again with that in mind. I'm not entirely sure who I would put in the pantheon of Small Wars classics. Part of that depends on what aspect of Small Wars you are looking at. For Revolution, it's relatively easy - Mao clearly has a place. But for COIN - since Callwell and before my pal Max Manwaring - I'm not sure. Still, I particularly like Lansdale's memoir, In the Midst of Wars.

I guess I'm in good company with Sam Adams...

Cheers

JohnT

[Gian P Gentile]

JohnT:

agree about Mao in terms of revolutionary warfare. Although friends of mine who are chinese history scholars have pointed out some serious flaws to Mao's work; namely that it was not a reflection of reality on the ground in china.

Ref Callwell, if you can suggest you read historian Doug Porch's intro to it in a recently released reprint to it by University of Nevada Press. Porch's intro is quite good because he gets at how Callwell is still relevant today in a world of counterinsurgency theory and thought that is dominated by post world war II revolutionary war theorists.

yeah, just like the great Sam A.

UAM: ref your statement about Marine Corps roots; I think it is truly relative for them in terms of the kind of force that they are shaping for the present and future. At times it has been Quantico, but at other times certainly the SWM and Cent America.

gian

[John T. Fishel]

Gian--

Well, at least, I can drink it

JohnT

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Gian,

The point that Wilf and I and others are making is that the notion as is literally stated that soldiers are diplomats is just simply folly. They are not, they are combat soldiers and as wilf has pointed out they need to be able to do the basic functions and skills of combat soldiers. If they can do that, then they can step into different directions to do coin, stability ops, nation building etc.

There are those among us who want to limit the definition of diplomat to one who practices diplomacy to facilitate relationships and agreements between nation-states. I know this will come as a surprise to many of you, but I think the definition is lacking (I know you heard this song from me before in regards to insurgency, etc., and I'm back on that soap box again, Ken couldn't bury it deep enough to keep me from finding it again ).

This definition is fine for the State Department an organization, because as the name implies they conduct diplomacy between nation-"states". However, I think some of their young turks would agree with where I'm going with this argument. Diplomacy can't not be restricted to the protocols between nation-states (as though it ever could), because we're dealing not only with States but tribes, gangs, extended families, insurgent groups, militias and an assortment of other Stateless groups. Groups that I, and many of you, have dealt with over the years to develop relationships and work out agreements. That process is nothing less than diplomacy. I'm from one country, they're from another, and I'm working out our relationship and possibly agreements to better enable me to accomplish my mission.

Soldiers do this all over Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world far from where most State Department diplomats tread. It is not folly that soldiers practice diplomacy, it is essential. However, I'll agree with you that not "all" Soldiers practice diplomacy, nor should they, but I believe Nagl was speaking to a group of graduating officers?

In support of this argument, I refer to Bob's World's post,

In those cases where armed opposition is encountered only from irregular forces under the leadership of malcontents or unrecognized officials, the mission is one of diplomacy rather than military.”

This was written before Gulala, so a tip of my beret to the Marines of our past who actually understood insurgent warfare quite well at one time.

In the conventional war, military action, seconded by diplomacy, propa-ganda, and economic pressure, is generally the principal way to achieve the goal. Politics as an instrument of war tends to take a back seat and emerges again—as an instrument—when the fighting ends . . . The picture is differ-ent in the revolutionary war. The objective being the population itself, the operations designed to win it over (for the insurgent) or to keep it at least submissive (for the counterinsurgent) are essentially of a political nature. In this case, consequently, political action remains foremost throughout the war. It is not enough for the government to set political goals, to determine how much military force is applicable, to enter into alliances, or to break them; politics becomes an active instrument of operation.And so intricate is the interplay between the political and the military actions that they cannot be tidily separated; on the contrary, every military move has to be weighed with regard to its political effects, and vice versa.—

David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare

In the end we may disagree on the term diplomacy, but I don't know what else you would call it?

[Ken White]

I didn't bury your soap box very well, left it partly visible so you could find it, I weakened three boards in the 'platform' with saw cuts and put a bear trap inside -- be careful how often and where you use that box...

There may be some here who restrict diplomacy to nation states but I'm not one of them -- the issue is not who our side talks to; tribes, clans, gangs, militias all need to be talked to. No question and I said that above.

The issue is who talks for our side. Or, more correctly who determines what will be said by our side

If you want the Armed Forces to engage in setting foreign policy and / or law enforcement policy; that's cool -- many will agree with you. I don't and I don't think the Constitution does.

The Politicians and the foreign Policy gurus need to determine, broadly WHAT is said. -- on a local level, certainly military folks will have to talk and they hopefully will do that diplomatically and IAW the policy laid down by our silly-villian masters -- but that ain't diplomacy. Diplomacy is not a military function. Conduct of relations diplomatically, yes -- conduct diplomacy? Not IMO.

It's being done now to an extent because the GeoCom CinCs are there but that needs to be changed and if everyone in the Army comes up with their own definition for diplomacy, then Congress will get more confused than it already is and the Army will be operating in a sphere that isn't their business...

You asked:

"In the end we may disagree on the term diplomacy, but I don't know what else you would call it?"

Why do we have to disagree? I'm not at all sure we do. I'm merely saying that the civilian uberstructure sets the policy, the parameters of 'diplomacy' and the troops on the ground exercise that policy in the conduct of their relations and negotiations with locals of all kinds and they do that talking with tact and diplomatically.

[William F. Owen]

There are those among us who want to limit the definition of diplomat to one who practices diplomacy to facilitate relationships and agreements between nation-states. I know this will come as a surprise to many of you, but I think the definition is lacking (I know you heard this song from me before in regards to insurgency, etc., and I'm back on that soap box again, Ken couldn't bury it deep enough to keep me from finding it again ).

Well this one amongst you, does not think that you should limit the definition of diplomat to one who practices diplomacy to facilitate relationships and agreements between nation-states. No sir!

Soldiers should focus on soldiering. The skills needed to be a good/effective soldier will constantly change and evolve. I suggest that one of the abilities currently required is to restrict force in line with the campaign aims. That means greater discrimination, precision and proportionately.

It does not mean breaking bread and drinking tea with every owner of a mud hut who owns an AK, and asking how you can make his life better, because A, he might hold you to a promise you can't deliver, and B, it's not your job! - You may want to be break bread and drink tea to to gather intelligence, and convince him that you are the good guys. If he is starving, drop off a bag of rice and a tarp, to repair the roof of his hut which the tribe stole, but that's it.

The US Army need solid professional soldiers, not "warrior poets" in service of he post-modern COIN avant-garde.

[MikeF]

In my earlier haste, I forgot to mention that this is a wonderful thread...Even though thoughts vary from John Nagl to Col Gentile, I find a bit of truth in each post...

As I sit gazing on the beauty of the Inter-Coastal waterway back in NC, sipping on a Pabst Blue Ribbon intermixed with a bit of sweet tea, and painting memories of seashells with my daughter, I'm gonna allow y'all's thoughts to simmer a bit more....

Happy New Years and please continue the debate for the sake of the disgruntled captains and majors that struggle day in and day out...

God bless us all...

Inshallah

Mike

[Steve Blair]

I hadn't thought about Callwell in the way you suggest. Have to review him again with that in mind. I'm not entirely sure who I would put in the pantheon of Small Wars classics. Part of that depends on what aspect of Small Wars you are looking at. For Revolution, it's relatively easy - Mao clearly has a place. But for COIN - since Callwell and before my pal Max Manwaring - I'm not sure. Still, I particularly like Lansdale's memoir, In the Midst of Wars.

I guess I'm in good company with Sam Adams...

Cheers

JohnT

This is a difficult question because many of the great Army practitioners before WW 2 never wrote anything of value on their techniques. The SWM was to my mind intended to capture the tactical lessons of small wars (TTP as you suggest) and wasn't really a work of theory. Some was written during the 20s and 30s (Mars Learning goes into some of the writing in the Marine Corps Gazette and other journals that formed the background to the SWM), but prior to that it's very hard to find. Much of what successful commanders practiced during the Indian Wars, for example, was never really recorded (or became part of their own personal propaganda machines). My take on the SWM has always been that it was an attempt to prevent hard-learned lessons from fading away again. It was a tool, not a work of theory.

As for soldiers focusing on only being soldiers? Not always possible. Never has been, and most likely never will be. Why? Because each situation is fluid and ever-changing. One could even argue that the focus on just being soldiers led to the vacuum in planning that followed the fall of Baghdad. Soldiers don't plan for post-conflict, after all, because they aren't needed then.... And yes, I realize that's a bit of an exaggeration, but I'm doing it to make the point. Where we fall down is in the transition, and soldiers have to understand at least some of that to understand where their role either ends or is reduced. And by default, in some situations, soldiers do end up acting as diplomats (at least for a limited period of time). Ideal? No. Reality? Yes. Again, it doesn't mean that the Army can (or should) ever replace diplomats, but it does mean that they do need a basic grounding in some skills and ideas that might fall outside the "only soldiers" framework.

[Bob's World]

________________________________________
In debating if soldiers are also diplomats or not, it may be helpful to rephrase the question and take a fresh perspective. Certainly in war the primary diplomacy waged by soldiers is that which is inherent in their very actions, and shaped by their values and conduct. In peace soldiers have a very different role, from Port Calls (proudly touted as security assistance by our Navy brothers) to FID, to even what is often called COIN. In these missions and environments the success of the engagement is very much shaped more by the diplomatic skills of the soldier in his interactions with the populace, security forces, and foreign officials, than by any martial acts conducted. For SF soldiers, this is bread and butter, and we are very good at it; always recognizing that we are guests, and that we can only be effective in passing on any unique skills we may possess when we can set our egos aside and embrace the people, the culture and the forces we engage with for what they are, and not what they are not.

Conventional forces are not particularly good at this. When I left 8 years of Regular Army service to attend law school, I joined the Oregon National Guard and was in on the ground floor of the "Enhanced Brigade" program. My former RA brethren descended on us in hordes, forcing us to literally expand the size of our TOCs to three times their normal size to be able to accommodate the unit's staff, an equal size team of "mentors", and another equal size team of "evaluators." My job was hard enough to go to law school full time and also serve as the operations officer for a light infantry battalion an hours drive away that only got the chance to train a couple days a month. To also have to tolerate a crush of arrogant a-holes who looked down their noses at you as being sadly inferior; while (depending on which team you were on) dishing out endless advice or judgment as to how what you were doing was not they way the did it in their last assignment with the 82nd. No kidding, guess what, my soldiers don't live on post. This was not the exception, this was the norm. I see this same syndrome overseas in similar engagement with foreign armies. I give our conventional forces a D- for diplomacy. They may be getting better with recent experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, but I doubt they have risen above a C.

So, yes, I share very real cautions about taking this "soldier-diplomat" thing too far, or expecting too much. Expect it of SF with little reservation, but as you get farther from that one unique slice of our force your concerns need to rise accordingly.

But the issue I wanted to raise is that where one draws the line between war and peace also determines how one is likely to see the appropriateness of this diplomacy mission. I believe that Wilf places that line in a very different place than I do, and sees soldiers primarily being used in war for purposes of war. Gian probably drops on to the scale near to Wilf, Ken White somewhere down from there, skip a ways to Bill Moore, and then to me. I'm not sure who is right, and listen to everyone's perspective in order to improve my own.

In peacetime engagement, and I believe the majority of our engagement is certainly in support of a US that is at peace, are rooted in diplomacy. As operations become more warlike this role becomes less the focus, but must never be completely forgotten. I just would not put to much expectation on our conventional forces to be great diplomats; it just isn't in the culture.

[Steve Blair]

But the issue I wanted to raise is that where one draws the line between war and peace also determines how one is likely to see the appropriateness of this diplomacy mission. I believe that Wilf places that line in a very different place than I do, and sees soldiers primarily being used in war for purposes of war. Gian probably drops on to the scale near to Wilf, Ken White somewhere down from there, skip a ways to Bill Moore, and then to me. I'm not sure who is right, and listen to everyone's perspective in order to improve my own.

In peacetime engagement, and I believe the majority of our engagement is certainly in support of a US that is at peace, are rooted in diplomacy. As operations become more warlike this role becomes less the focus, but must never be completely forgotten. I just would not put to much expectation on our conventional forces to be great diplomats; it just isn't in the culture.

I don't think it's a question of who's right or wrong so much as it is understanding the practical role that the US military often finds itself in. Historically, officers have been called on to be de-facto diplomats with surprising regularity. Some were successful, some were not, and others muddled through until the real diplomats arrived. In most, if not all, cases these officers were not trained for those roles...it was just something they did because it went with the job. It also wasn't something that was necessarily planned by the political leadership. A great deal of it is situational.

It's fine to have a dream role for soldiers...where they sit in the corner quietly and only come out guns blazing when called for and then go back again as soon as the last bullet is fired. But reality isn't like that. I can understand the desire for it to be so, but do worry that when we get too focused on what we'd like to see we end up gutting ourselves for reality. Quite often the line between war and peace is only visible in hindsight, and even then not necessarily with stark clarity.

Should soldiers be diplomats? Not under ideal circumstances, but it's a good thing if they are at least aware that they might have to act in such a role in some situations. By the same token, we've seen what happens when diplomats try to play soldier.

[Cavguy]

It's fine to have a dream role for soldiers...where they sit in the corner quietly and only come out guns blazing when called for and then go back again as soon as the last bullet is fired. But reality isn't like that. I can understand the desire for it to be so, but do worry that when we get too focused on what we'd like to see we end up gutting ourselves for reality. Quite often the line between war and peace is only visible in hindsight, and even then not necessarily with stark clarity.

Should soldiers be diplomats? Not under ideal circumstances, but it's a good thing if they are at least aware that they might have to act in such a role in some situations. By the same token, we've seen what happens when diplomats try to play soldier.

I almost responded to Wilf last night but was tired and cranky ....

Agree with you Steve. It may not be the ideal role, but sometimes it must be done, and often the only person with the availablity and resources to meet with 'every leader with an AK' is a soldier.

I, for one, think being a soldier is about winning. Sometimes winning means kicking people in the teeth. Sometimes it requires skilled application of synchronized combined arms maneuver. And other times it requires lots of tea drinking and civil tasks. But the bottom line task is to win.

We can tilt at windmills about what soldiers should or should not ideally be doing, but reality over the last 15-20 years for the US army is that we are employed as "armed diplomats". There is little to no political will to change that anywhere in the future, so soldiers will still be required to do "diplomat" like tasks.

For all the criticism, Nagl has a very salient point - we need to prepare our soldiers to win our CURRENT conflicts. To do this, they require better training on employment of lethal and non-lethal means, and especially skills on advising host nation forces. We can continue to stick our head in the sand and say we "don't do windows", or we can address the problem to give us a better chance of acheiving victory.

As a personal story, I took tons of grief from my soldiers in Tal Afar for the amount of local meals I ate and adopting the local habits - including the dreaded man kiss (cheek - I even worked my way up to the prestigious 4-kiss greet). However, those relations proved the basis of successful pacification of my sector, just as it later did for our BCT in Ramadi. It wasn't that we preferred, liked, or even should of been doing it - it was simply what was required if we wanted to have a chance at succeeding in our AO.

We should prepare our officers for these tasks until the policy-makers decide a better framework. The military's mission remains to succeed at whatever it is assigned to by the political leadership. Whatever skillsets are needed to accomplish those tasks are what should be trained.

I still contend we can, and must, do both.