Information Operations

[Schmedlap]

I was surprised that there is so much confusion on this issue, but upon searching 3-24 I only found one passing reference to Information Superiority, and it was in Appendix E. However, in the old FMI 3-07.22, I found this, which sums it up pretty well, in my opinion:

The goal of IO is to gain and maintain information superiority at decisive points. Information superiority is the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same (FM 3-0).

I think that much of the discussion on this thread is borne of misperceptions of IO rather than of some defect in the concept of conducting operations in the information environment. The real issue is how we organize our staffs and how we task various assets to accomplish it.

[Ken White]

I was surprised that there is so much confusion on this issue...

Could that be because we're trying to pin down a process that is being learned on the fly and is in considerable flux?

I think that much of the discussion on this thread is borne of misperceptions of IO rather than of some defect in the concept of conducting operations in the information environment. The real issue is how we organize our staffs and how we task various assets to accomplish it.

True and as wm said:

...Like pretty much everything else in the world of operations, each is METT-TC dependent.

Could it be that the search for clarity and coherence in an effort to simplify (possibly oversimplify???) a very complex and conditional process might obscure the flexibility needed to adapt and cope with multiple changing environments?

Sounds like a way to inadvertently design a straight jacket to me...

Or is that a strait jacket...

[Bill Moore]

http://www.army.mil/professionalwrit...05/5_05_3.html

The "IO Roadmap" provides strategic-level IO guidance for the current security environment defined in the latest QDR and NSS. The draft update of JP 3-13 incorporates the "IO Roadmap" and a new DOD IO definition: "The integrated employment of the specified core capabilities of Electronic Warfare [EW], Computer Network Operations (CNO), PSYOP [psychological operations], Military Deception, and Operations Security [OPSEC], in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decisionmaking, while protecting our own."9 The "IO Roadmap" groups IO elements in the following categories:

-Core capabilities (EW, CNO, OPSEC, military deception, PSYOP).

-Support capabilities (information assurance, physical security, counterintelligence, physical attack).

-Related capabilities (public affairs, civil-military operations).10

http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/army/t...d_doctrine.htm

This post is somewhat dated, but contains some worthwhile observations:

The strategy of using IO within military operations has a long history. The Army focuses on IO as an overarching strategy with a variety of capabilities that influence an adversary. Sun Tzu focused on the mind of the opponent in much the same way one would moving chess pieces to attain checkmate in a game of chess. The ultimate objective is gaining information superiority.

IO is not just the current trend of technology—it is the use of many aspects information targeted to achieve a specific affect or influence the adversary. Examples of IO include electronic warfare (EW), computer network attack systems, deception, and psychological operations using human factors to target as pressure points throughout an operation. The information environment is an aggregate of individuals, organizations, or systems that collect, process, or disseminate information; this environment also includes the information itself. The use of information and information technologies to influence the outcomes of conflicts has become a hot topic in the military and intelligence community. The increasing number of computer “hacking” incidents in both the private and public sectors has risen exponentially. The legal and policy issues of IO in this technology-driven environment are also under review. The use of “information as a weapon” within this ever-changing state of technology involves a tremendous amount of collection and analysis to support a specific outcome.

Given this realization, what are the expectations of and support for each echelon regarding IO?

There is more at each link, but with the exception of computer network attack, which the J3 doesn't control (in most cases), what is new? It is still unclear (despite statement to the contrary in this forum) on the purpose and intent of lumping all these activities under the IO umbrella. Having worked on a few joint operations, I have not yet seen the pratical value of IO as a stand alone doctrine. It does force people to play lip service to it, but the overall integration has been relatively lame in most cases (despite some cool looking power point slides that indicate otherwise). In my opinion, the failure to fully realize the power of IO is the failure to clarify how it should be integrated successfully in planning and operations. Clarifying isn't simplifying it, clarifying a complex concept is hard work.

For those who say there is no problem, I doubt they are current planner or operators, because I still enjoy listening to the SAMS graduates, NPS graduates, and senior officers sitting around debating IO. All of the conversations are informative, but they also indicate a level of immaturity of our current IO doctrine.

Of course it needs to be done, and it always has, I'm not underestimating the power of what IO attempts to accomplish, but rather would we and could we accomplish it anyway without IO doctrine? Since at least WWII we used EW, PSYOP, Deception and OPSEC with varying degrees of success. Did IO doctrine make us better? If so, how?

By all means we should continue to develop/improve our doctrine related to influence and the incorporation of advanced information technology to support defensive and offensive operations, but is there really a need to lump everything under one IO umbrella or is it just operations?

[joelhar]

I think the basic problem for the JP 3-13 definition is that it starts off defining the components and then tells us what they do. I do not believe the definition of IO should list the components, plain and simple. If the definition for IO is too broad and vague, then deal with it, change it into something useful.

The components should be listed, but elsewhere in JP 3-13. Chances are, if this is done, the number of components will suddenly increase. The simple premise is that everything can influence, everything should be considered for its effect on the targeted decision-maker, group of people or a general population. Dropping a kinetic bomb on a target might take out a telephone switch, a fiber-optic hub or a bad-guy, ALL of these will have meaning to selected person(s).

The scary thing to many conventional thinkers is that this threatens the old style of thinking, it would present a Revolution in Military Affairs, of sorts.

One of the major drawbacks would be a huge increase in the wargaming efforts required for planning, and there can be no handwave for this. Not only will the S/G/J-2 be required to play the part of the enemy, but might have to represent the population - it might require a whole new player. Depending on the situation someone might have to roleplay a religious group, another might play tourists, another might play affected diplomats, another might play the population in surrounding countries.

This is more an eventuality, actually, IMHO.

[Bill Moore]

The scary thing to many conventional thinkers is that this threatens the old style of thinking, it would present a Revolution in Military Affairs, of sorts.

Joelhar, I think you made a couple of good points, but I'm not so sure this is a Revolution in Military Affairs. I do agree every action can influence behavior. Once upon a time we just called this operational art, and if the various specialists (deception, intelligence, Operations Security, Electronic Warfare, etc.) understood their commander's intent and the strategic through tactical objectives, they were able to effectively apply their trade. PSYOP and influence operations have always been and will remain paramount, the advent of IO doctrine didn't change that, if anything it created unneeded confusion.

I'm not hard set against IO doctrine, but I agree that defining it with a few components is very misleading and not helpful.

The simple premise is that everything can influence, everything should be considered for its effect on the targeted decision-maker, group of people or a general population. Dropping a kinetic bomb on a target might take out a telephone switch, a fiber-optic hub or a bad-guy, ALL of these will have meaning to selected person(s).

Thus if this statement is true, do we need a separate speciality area that requires its own doctrine or is it just part of operational art?

[Rockbridge]

Well, this is a fascinating discussion about what we think the definition of IO should be versus trying to figure out how to work with the definition that we've got. The longer we continue to debate "how come," the longer it will take to get things going in the right direction. All the debates about whether the definition of IO in JP 3-13 definition fits "what we're really doing downrange" appear to be lacking in the distinction among tactical, operational, and strategic applications of IO, which clearly employ different assets and different methods.

To answer the earlier question about whether or not IO should be used as shorthand for PSYOP and message management by Irregular Warfare practicioners, the answer is simple: "Only if you have no interest in being doctrinally correct." The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept specifically states on p36 that Information Operations fits into the current concept for Irregular Warfare, thusly "Conduct information operations (operations security, information security, military deception, PSYOP, electronic warfare, computer network attack and defense; and physical destruction) in support of IW campaign objectives." Although the IW JOC itself got the definition of IO wrong (why should JOCs be constrained by doctrine??), the intent is clearly to employ a lot more than just PSYOP and message management. With regard to the use of IO as shorthand for "PSYOP and message management," it clearly sounds like a tactical (or possibly operational) application of IO by an element that doesn't have any other assets. In other words, IO for a unit that only has PSYOP and "messaging" assets will obviously only include those assets. Other units with more assets will conduct a wider variety of operations and use more assets when they conduct IO.

We seem to expend a lot of energy worrying about how "my IO doesn't look like your IO" when the real objective of IO is not to employ a specific set of capabilities, but to employ all available capabilities in order to influence the thoughts and actions of adversary and neutral parties. Fortunately, that includes killing those who need to be killed so they don't have thoughts or actions any more.

This stuff really isn't that difficult.

[Schmedlap]

Could that be because we're trying to pin down a process that is being learned on the fly and is in considerable flux?

My surprise was not that we are wrangling with process. I think that is one issue that needs to be fixed. As I wrote, "The real issue is how we organize our staffs and how we task various assets to accomplish it." Instead, I was surprised that there is a fundamental confusion/disagreement as to what information superiority is. How do we organize the staffs and C2 relationships with the assets if we can’t even agree upon what we’re using them for? But, upon reading the comments here and upon further reflection on the level of understanding that I have seen demonstrated in various units, I guess this should not surprise me.

What information superiority is, is pretty straightforward and merits very little discussion or elaboration...

The goal of IO is to gain and maintain information superiority at decisive points. Information superiority is the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same (FM 3-0).

I think if more commanders and staff know what information superiority is, then they will rather quickly figure out how to achieve it. Unfortunately, I doubt that most commanders or staff know what information superiority is. Otherwise, they would not be notorious for wanting to "sprinkle in some IO" with their operations as a last minute modification to a plan.

Maybe we need a PSYOP TPDD to print up some handbills as part of an awareness campaign. Do a leaflet drop over Leavenworth.

[Ken White]

...Maybe we need a PSYOP TPDD to print up some handbills as part of an awareness campaign. Do a leaflet drop over Leavenworth.

That and move the 'doctrine' writing out of the hands of the Snowbirds and Blackbirds. I kid, Guys, I kid...

Definitions are good but they can also be constricting. In an area of effort that really follows Moore's law with respect to development and major change speed, too much specificity might be a bad thing. Can a generic joint service definition for much of anything really be judged applicable to all services at all echelons in all environments? Perhaps -- but once you get out of hardware, I've never seen it work. Excessive centralization stifles creativity and initiative.

As Bill Moore said, this is operator stuff and it's not all that new, we just bundled some things. Every time we do that -- and we do it about every ten years or so -- it initially creates some confusion. That usually gets sorted out in a few months.

There are a lot of FlagOs getting big bucks and many hassles and they're smart guys with mostly decent staffs; they can work out what they need for their job without a lot of undue precision...

[Bill Moore]

Originally Posted by Schmedlap
...Maybe we need a PSYOP TPDD to print up some handbills as part of an awareness campaign. Do a leaflet drop over Leavenworth.

The real issue is how we organize our staffs and how we task various assets to accomplish it

I didn't see information superiority in the IO definition, but I think information superiority is a great "objective", but it will involve more than the five or so disciplines listed in the IO definition.

I like the term information superiority, simply state it as a goal/objective, and then organize the staff to accomplish it. I think that answers the mail? That allows for maxium flexability based on each unique situation. I'll still argue there is nothing "simple" about this. It is a very complex endeavor, and one that I have rarely seen done well. The "value" of IO and information superiority is its impact on accomplishing the mission, so lets say the definition is simple, that still doesn't equate to success in accomplishing it.

[davidbfpo]

I hesitate to plunge into this sphere of political warfare and my views are of an observer outside.

I see very little sign of Information Operations here in the UK and have my doubts that in Afghanistan what we do is effective. I have assumed there is an IO operation in Helmand.

Given the UK's experience in IO, notably in WW2 with black propaganda etc, once again that appears to be lost. Let alone adapting to the new technology in use; e.g. a poster campaign is used, not using texting / SMS. We know our enemy is web-friendly and appear to do next to nothing about it.

We need different IO for different audiences, leaving aside language; there are certain influential / key targets e.g. travellers to Pakistan (400k p.a. from the UK) and we need to focus on them. University students is another key group.

davidbfpo

[Bill Moore]

David your wet with the rest of us now, welcome.

The challenges remain immense, and in my opinion our doctrine doesn't provide the framework for addressing them when it comes to irregular warfare. We're not as good as we like to think we are when it comes to changing individual perceptions or changing cultures (maybe we shouldn't try). That is graduate level work, and the thesis is still being written.

What we are good at is targeting coventional enemy forces with propaganda, black psyop, deception operations, EW, etc. That was our primary focus, and we became good at. We also learned how to jam their radios, target their radars, probably attack their computer systems, and design appropriate OPSEC programs based on known enemy TTPs for collecting intelligence, not to mention our high tech intelligence capabilities that gave us an incredible information advantage over our conventional foes. In time we may have a military of killer drones that are networked to high tech sensors that can dominate any conventional foe, so in the realm of conventional warfare I think we have achieved information superiority, but I would argue we had that before the development of IO doctrine.

However, those TTPs/doctrine do not readily transfer to the realm of irregular warfare (IW). In IW we do not have information superiority. We are not very effective influencing the population or the insurgents, and our intelligence is generally very limited, but in contrast our enemy's low tech sensor system keeps pretty good tabs on us. The enemy is also pretty good at influencing the population using old school tactics, ones we can't counter unless we learn how to protect the populace from insurgent coercion. It took us a long time to relearn to stop drive by COIN, the years of raids never accomplished anything, but troops on the ground living with the populace did. Is it is IO? I would argue you can't influence or understand the populace without a presence, there is no satellite or UAV that will accomplish this task. Which one of the the five disciplines is it: OPSEC, PSYOP, EW, CNA, or deception operations? You could lump it under PSYOP, but it isn't. It is a supporting task by the new definition, but the reality is it is a decisive action in irregular warfare. In IW IO is mumbo jumbo, we just need to identify the right objectives and task organize to accomplish the objectives. It will be IO heavy, but it won't involve a lot of the five disciplines (except PSYOP) in their true form, but rather it will involve a lot of so called supporting tasks that will ultimately convince the enemy they can't win. Is this really IO or is it just operational art?

[joelhar]

I agree that we need to work within the current definition as defined by JP 3-13. However, we also need to work out the long term implications of the definition and the naming.

We have a dilemma here; the guys on the ground are making stuff up, hoping the message fits with the overall ‘guidance’ from on high. Unfortunately that guidance does not come from the government. I can’t speak for the UK, but here is how I think the US needs to solve its ‘guidance’ problem.

The mere term, Information Operations, raises all kinds of concerns and causes much confusion. There is no US Government ‘doctrine’, outside of JP 3-13 for IO.

Information Warfare implies war, which implies only the Department of Defense is playing; State and all the other government players supposedly stated this was politically incorrect back in the 90s.

DoD begins to integrate Strategic Communications at the COCOM and OSD level, and the State Department claims it as their domain. DoS has released the doctrine for this; it is quite well done.

Public Diplomacy may be synonymous with Strategic Communications, but DoD has always been the stick to State’s carrot. I’m not sure that a Public Diplomacy doctrine exists.

“War of Ideas” is a neat term, it gets at the wetware. A good book on this, which is extremely thought provoking is a book called “Fighting the War of Ideas like a Real War”, by J. Michael Waller. Dr. Waller is involved, at the USG level, with many of these discussions. But the “war of ideas” term still doesn’t encompass the depth and breadth of what we are doing.

Boiling things down to their basic components is probably a wise way to approach this. This is all about information. I choose not to say data; in my opinion data is still incomplete; information pulls things together. I’m saying this very loosely, please bear with me.

The next thing is what we intend to do with this information, and that is to influence. We want to have someone else do something of our choosing, not do something, or not stand in our way.

Someone pointed out to me the other day that the USG does not “do” operations, that is what the military does. The USG has a strategy, normally.

Putting this all together, I would say a common sense phrase for what the USG needs is an “Information and Influence Strategy”.

The problem the USG, given that ‘someone’ can put this together, is that there is no office or agency that could coordinate this message throughout the Government. Please notice, I am not saying ‘control the message’, but coordinate.

State has postulated that they are in the perfect position to do this, as they must coordinate the message our emissaries promulgate throughout the world; they also have liaisons to coordinate this message within each of the other Departments and Agencies. The problem I see with this is that one Department would, de facto, have too much authority over the other Departments, there would be an imbalance. Second, if an office were created within State, there is too much separation between the guidance generated in the White House and this office, too many layers of bureaucracy would exist.

The guidance needs to come from the Executive Branch. The office coordinating this message throughout the government should be as close to the Executive Branch as possible. I haven’t decided if this office should have any authority over subordinates, it might create too many log jams… and mere coordination may prove ineffective. But the National Security Council has the charter to coordinate the USG response, so they should have the mission to coordinate the message coming from the President as well as coordinate his/her speeches to reflect the overall message. The idea is not to create a source for propaganda, but to help put together a deep and comprehensive information and influence strategy, aimed at promoting the US agenda overseas via a unified US message. The message can be shared with the general public: “The United States of America’s position on this issue is this”. In turn this message is passed throughout the Government and posted for all to see, allowing guidance for the embassies and deployed strategic forces to be posted. When this guidance is received a subordinate and supporting strategy can be created. The general public always has the right to disagree but will generally support the position of the President – but it must be presented. This will further create a unified message from the US. Dissension will be encouraged, discussions will be expected, this is how a democracy works, and we could be the living, breathing example.

Now, with the guidance coming from Washington, we can plan an information effect on the ground and decide which ‘tools’ to use to achieve this effect. If we choose to drop leaflets, if we choose to jam a signal, if we chose to attack a network, if we choose to drop a bomb, if we choose to commit conventional forces, if we choose to keep details of our operations security, if we choose to run a deception – these would be things we choose to do to achieve a specific and desired effect.

This needs to be fixed at the top before we can hope to get IO or IW fixed on the ground…

[marct]

Hi Joel,

I agree that we need to work within the current definition as defined by JP 3-13. However, we also need to work out the long term implications of the definition and the naming.

Definitely! One of the crucial points here is that the "name" is not the "thing" (and old point from Alfred Korzybski).

The mere term, Information Operations, raises all kinds of concerns and causes much confusion. There is no US Government ‘doctrine’, outside of JP 3-13 for IO.

And, to make it even worse, JP 3-13 is really a collection of TTPs with no coherent theoretical base.

Boiling things down to their basic components is probably a wise way to approach this. This is all about information. I choose not to say data; in my opinion data is still incomplete; information pulls things together. I’m saying this very loosely, please bear with me.

The next thing is what we intend to do with this information, and that is to influence. We want to have someone else do something of our choosing, not do something, or not stand in our way.

Very nicely put! In my post yesterday I said that I would put together a blog post on this and I just finished it (here). One of the key points in it was all about intentionality. You just managed to make the same point in much plainer English .

Putting this all together, I would say a common sense phrase for what the USG needs is an “Information and Influence Strategy”.

The problem the USG, given that ‘someone’ can put this together, is that there is no office or agency that could coordinate this message throughout the Government. Please notice, I am not saying ‘control the message’, but coordinate.

Hmmm, well, I would definitely agree that you folks do need such a strategy but, I suspect, that any such strategy will only be relatively short term, especially if it is established by your executive branch since that changes every 4-8 years.

Marc

[Rockbridge]

Joel -- Good points across the board. Most of our problems with IO remain in the policy / permission / "lanes in the road" arena (what we may do) versus in the technology / TTP arena (what we can do). Because the first impacts so heavily on the second, it's policy that we really need to fix.

The concept of IO is simple: Control the other guys' view of reality, and don't let him do that to you. It's the execution where things really get tough.

[William F. Owen]

To quote from the document concerned:

My challenge for this website’s readers, then, is the following: what do we, as counter-insurgency theorists and practitioners, mean when we use the term “information operations?” Do we use IO as shorthand for psychological operations and message management?

I don't think anybody really knows. IO is another definition/content free idea, as in EBO and a few others.

It stems from the thinking that information is frightfully important, therefore we should be doing operations concerned with it. The above quote is right on the nail.

Information is mostly useless until it has been turned into intelligence by being subject to analysis and judgement. As IO seems to be nothing to do G2 functions, I have always assumed that IO meant transmitting a message to the enemy, and target populations, by a variety of means. This would seem to be merely matching actions with stated intent.

I would further submit, that unless there is an enemy whose will to fight must be broken, then it's not a military problem. Unless IO helps "break the will of the enemy," - including securing the freedom moral and political freedom of action to do so, we should have nothing to do with it.