Is this what he meant?
I read his position as being that fighting a counter insurgency war while holding the ability to switch to HIC (convention warfare) should the circumstances change was the plan.
There is still a war in Dhofar? Thought that wound up in 1975? (Rhodesians were actively recruited for the Oman forces after 1980)b.) What you see in Rhodesia is close what you see in Oman or Dhofar, where you have imaginative British trained officers freed from senior over sight. Point being the idea is not uniquely "Rhodesian."
The best we could put together were a number of battle groups which could operate independently or I suppose if there was a concentrated threat as a brigade. Certainly the RLI exercised as a battle group in 1979 when there was much talk of possible ZIPRA invasion from Zambia.c.) While the Rhodesians were uniquely skilled at the sub-unit level, I very doubt that they had the resources or training to fight effectively at the formation level. If you could find documented proof that they did train and resource this level of operation, and how they aimed to do it, that would be an extremely important find.
Also if you read up on Operation Quartz brigade orders were issued (I was the scribe for one of the brigades orders - as a GSO3 Ops - under direction of the Brigade Major) which were a series of attackes on insurgent Assembly Places which if looked at natonally could be seen as a divisional action.
Then if you read up on the history of the war in 1979 you will find that as the insurgent bases (in Zambia and Mozambique) became better defended (thanks to Russian and Cuban advisors) the actions against these bases became more conventional in nature. So one day the whole battalion would be gathered for these camp attacks (using conventional tactics) and a few days later sub-units were back to operating in four man "sticks". The ability to switch instantaneously between the two became second nature.
Indeed.d.) JMA may have a conflicting or additional view point.
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