Re-structuring the BCT

[reed11b]

Of course, but the timely recce effort of an infantry company in a major war has an effective radius that equals maybe ten minutes of driving (unless we talk about very, very open and featureless terrain).
I expect a degree of agility and I fear that enemies might have a degree of agility that necessitates an early warning more on the order of at least an hour for you'd otherwise be surprised when relatively unfit to fight.

except that most light infantry has access to aviation and/or vehicular assets of some sort. Not sure what you are saying about LRS, and since I am a LRS scout, please clarify.
Reed

[Hacksaw]

I've popped in and out of this discussion for a couple of weeks...
I have heard several different rules of thumb regarding force ratio vis a vis security mission... Of course it is all METT-TC dependent (especially enemy, troops, and terrain), but...
Cover Guard Screen
Corps DIV Regiment/BDE+ Squadron/BN+
Div Regiment/BDE+ Squadron/BN+ Troop/CO+
BDE Squadron/BN+ Troop/CO+ PLT+

Source FM 17-95

[Fuchs]

except that most light infantry has access to aviation and/or vehicular assets of some sort. Not sure what you are saying about LRS, and since I am a LRS scout, please clarify.
Reed

My opinion is basically that recce results should be available before a commander even thinks about moving towards some grid coordinates.

The only assets that can flood a theatre with observation & reporting capability at reasonable costs and effort and provide that kind of coverage are either aerial (SAR/GMTI radar, Sigint), orbital (electro-optical, IIR, SAR/GMTI, Sigint) or LRS.
Aerial and orbital sensors have limitations that cannot be overcome without scouts on the ground, therefore I believe that an appropriate share for LRS would be a strong battalion per corps (unless the terrain is too open or the warfare too static or force densities in the theatre too high).

[TAH]

In an era/organization of zero-sum, you are not going to be able to add something in one place without a corresponding reduction somewhere else.

From that, I propose the following organizational changes to the existing HBCT MTO&E

1. Consolidate all M3 CFVs into 6-vehicle recon/scout platoons. With 29 CFVs inside a HBCT there are enough for 4 platoons of 6 + 2 CFVs in Recon Sqdrn HQs + 1 (X2) in each of two Heavy Recon Troops. One CFV left (hold for now)

2a. Reduce number of tank companies in each CAB to one with 4 platoons of 4 tanks + 2 Co HQs tanks + 2 CAB HQs tanks for a total of 20 per CAB (down from 29). This also leaves 1 M2/M3 (S3 vehicle) from the CAB HQs left, Hold for now.

2b. Move remaining 9 tanks per CAB (total of 18) over into Heavy Recon Troops. I think you can see where this goes...

3a. Consolidate all recon HMMWVs for a total of 40. Re-org into four platoons of 6 HMWWVs (plus 4 reminder, hold for now). Assign four 6-HMWWV platoons to Light Recon Troop of Recon Sqdrn.

3b. Assign a 6-HMWWV scout platoon to each CAB.

4. "Re-organized" Recon Sqdrn now has two Heavy Troops and 1 Light Troop, all with four platoons.

5. Take reminder vehicles from above and create an "Escort and Security Company" under the STB. Create using personnel from eliminated Tank HQs and reduced need for FISTs in CABs. E&S Co gets: M2/M3 Co HQs with BFIST, HBCT MP PLT, NBC Recon PLT, the 4 remaining HMMWVs as Escort PLT, and a new/re-inforced Security PLT using the two left over M2/M3 and the 2 from the HBCT Security Section.

Some of the results:

Starting = 8 Companies manned, trained and equipped to conduct Full Spectrum Operations (FSO)
Re-org = 6 Companies and 2 Heavy Recon Troops manned, trained and equipped for FSO.

Start = 8 recon/scout platoons (3X5)
Re-org = 6 HMWWV scout platoons + 4 CFV scout platoons = 10

Increases the number of recon/scout platoons by two and moves towards standardizing Recon/scout platoons at 6 vehicles.

HBCT Recon Sqdrn should now be capable of acting as the 3rd maneuver element of the HBCT and still retain is primary role of recon. It can now guard, attack, defend, delay etc. By being able to occuplish thsse task/missions, it can also begin to address the enemy's INTENTIONS, a capability absent in the current organization.

Start = seperate/orphan platoons/sections 3 (MPs, NBC & Security)
Re-org = New Co HQs with 4 platoons (MPs, NBC, Security & Escort)

A company now resourced to enable the HBCT to begin to solve its area security concerns on its own. Also, addresses the issue of orphan platoons within the HBCT.

Down-side is a less capable recon/scout platoon in each CAB and smaller CABs (10 combat/maneuver platoons versus 12 in the original organization)

Comments?

TAH

[Tukhachevskii]

HBCT Recon Sqdrn should now be capable of acting as the 3rd maneuver element of the HBCT and still retain is primary role of recon.
TAH

So its really more of an ACAV Sqn (as per the ACAV regiments) than a recon outfit right? Can it manouvre and conduct recon or only accomplish one mission at a time; me thinks the latter. Although it could dominate a movement to contact pretty well while guiding in the other two true manouvre bns in for the kill-hunter-killer style. In non MW scenarios however, like, for instance in Iraq, you've already got rcon sqns being used in manoevre roles to make up for the short-fall but become so ensconsed in that mission that they often can't perform their primary one...i.e., recon. Still, I can see from the simple reorganisation you propose that one could get greater bang for ones buck without needing to drastically shake up the entire system. But you really need to address the above problem.

[TAH]

So its really more of an ACAV Sqn (as per the ACAV regiments) than a recon outfit right? Can it manouvre and conduct recon or only accomplish one mission at a time; me thinks the latter. recon.

Still, I can see from the simple reorganisation you propose that one could get greater bang for ones buck without needing to drastically shake up the entire system. But you really need to address the above problem.

Agree with the first half of the first statement. The intent was to re-create a more viable force using the same set of pieces. I disagree with the second part about not being able to conduct "Reconniassance"

When we say a unit is conducting reconnaissance, what do we mean? I mean the unit is out executing a tactical operation that seeks to confirm or deny assumptions made by staff/planners that will enable the commander to make effective tactical decisions.

Is that really an enemy force of dug-in infantry supported by tanks across that river or are they just high-res decoys? (composition/what they are) and dispostion/location-where they are). I also need a force that has the capability of acting as the advanced guard for the BCT to confirm/deny the enemy's INTENTIONS.

Lots of sensors of various types (SIGINT/ELINT/HUMINT/UAVs) are capable of determining the location and suspected composition of an enemy force. This can often be conducted passively from stand-off.

However, without the actions of the Adv Gd, we may never know if those bunkers are occupied, are those tanks real? is the enemy's plan to defend, delay, retire and attempt to break contact or surrender?

Discovery of the enemy's true intentions are as important (if not more important) then just figureing out who is where.

I believe that my suggested Recon/Cav Sqdrn can do both. Based on a read from the Intel guys, the BCT and recon commanders can determine/agree on a scheme of maneuver for the ARS (Armored Recon Sqdrn). Lead with Hvy Recon only, Light Recon only or combination of both.

With only two maneuver battalions, none of the BCTs can afford an entire battalion's worth of resources designed, equipped, manned and trained for two relatively simple tasks - conduct recon and conduct screen. Recon should be a tactical task or mission that any/all units are capable of executing within their own specific limitations.

Effective March of this year (2010) the doctrine changed and now "allows" ARS to be employed to conduct guard missions as well as attack & defend. However, the baseline organiozation has yet to be adapted to make that possible.

Thus my proposal.

PS. Secondary efforts were to address the tactical limitations of the two-platoons troops, the fact that the ARS brings nothing to the fight other then C2, and to begin simplify the organizations of BCT scout/recon platoons and troops.

Once the 3rd ACR transforms to and SBCT, there will be three seperate and distinct monuted recon platoons, the 3X5 CFV-HMWWV platoon found in HBCTs, a 6 HMMWV platoon found in IBCTs and a 4 Recon Carrier Variinat found in the SBCTs. There are also two seperate/distinct troop organizations, troops of two platoons in the HBCT and troops of three platoons in both the IBCT and SBCTs.

TAH

[Ken White]

I also need a force that has the capability of acting as the advanced guard for the BCT to confirm/deny the enemy's INTENTIONS...Discovery of the enemy's true intentions are as important (if not more important) then just figureing out who is where...I believe that my suggested Recon/Cav Sqdrn can do both.

Far more important -- and correspondingly far, far more difficult to ascertain. Exponentially so...

OTOH, your force can determine his capabilities which are the next best thing.

[William F. Owen]

Far more important -- and correspondingly far, far more difficult to ascertain. Exponentially so...

OTOH, your force can determine his capabilities which are the next best thing.

Ain't that the truth. In all my time in Recce I don't ever remember being tasked with discovering the enemy's intent. His location and activity yes.